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The cases contained in this volume have been selected with a
view of assisting both the student and the instructor, with illus-
trations of the practical application of the general principles and
rules of equity pleading and practice. Only so much of the state-
ment of fact and of the opinion of the court have been retained in
each case as is sufficient to make the decision upon the question
of pleading before the Court intelligible and clear. As far as
possible all padding has been excluded.
In the selection of these cases and in the preparaiion of this
volume, we are greatly indebted to the valuable assistance of
John W. Dwyer, LL. M., Insstructor of Law in the University of
Michigan.
Littleton has said: "And know, my son, that it is one of the
most honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law to have
the science of well pleading; and, therefore, I counsel thee espe-
cially to employ thy courage and care to learn this."
We hope that this collection of cases will be of some practical
assistance to the teacher in giving instruction in this very difficult
branch of the law and that it will stimulate the courage of the
student to master the "science of well pleading."
B. M. Thompson.
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EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE
CHAPTER I.
PERSONS CAPABLE OF SUING AND BEING SUED IN
EQUITY.
Suits by Aliens.
Bell V. Chapman, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 1S3. (1813.)
Action on a covenant contained in a lease. Suit commenced by
a British subject during the war of 1812. The defendant put in
the plea that the plaintiff was an alien enemy. To this plea, the
plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in the demurrer.
Per Curiam:
The plea puis darrein continuance avers that the plaintiff was, at
tlie commencement of the suit, and still is, commorant in Ireland ;
and that since the last adjournment he has become an alien enemy,
being an alien, born within the allegiance of the King of Great
Britain, with whom we axe at war, and the plea concludes in bar
of the action. There is no doubt that the plea is a valid one in the
case of the alien's residence in the enemy's countn', and the plea
may be pleaded either in abatement or in bar, for the precedents
arc both ways. (Hast. Ent. tit. Ejectment, 7. tit. Trespass per
Alien, 1. Cornw. Tab. tit. Abatement, 7. tit. Bar in Divers Actions,
87. ^YcUs V. Williams, 1 Lutw. 34, 35. West v. Sutton, 1 Salk. 2.)
This plea conforms precisely to the opinion of the K. B. in Le Bret
V. Papillon (4 East, 502), in concluding in bar of the further
maintenance of the suit. Asth o disability of the plaintiff is but
tomporary in its nature (for a state of per petual war is not to be



















































































































































EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE 
CHAPTER I. 
PERSONS CAPABLE OF UING AND BEI G UED I -
EQUITY. 
SUITS BY ALIENS. 
Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 183. {1813.) 
Action on a cov nant contained in a lea e. uit commenced by 
a Briti h subject during the war of 1812. The defendant put in 
th pl a that the plaintiff wa an alien enemy. To thi plea, the 
plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in the demurrer. 
P ER 0 URI.A. I : 
2 Suits by Aliens
be in fa vor of the ple aconcludino; i n abatement, wh e n the causej of
action i snot void or extinguished. But wh ether_the^jgl ea be in th( 3
one form or the other is, perhap s^no t material, for the jud gment
thereon would not be a bar to a new action on the return of peace .
A j udfflnent is no bar to a new suit, unless it involves th e merits
of the controversy, or be founded on matter which affords a perma-
nent avoidah'ce, or dischargeT Bu t tlie present plea only bars the
plaintiff , in his character of alien enemy commorant abroad, trom.
prosecuti ng the suit^ It does not so much as touch the meri ts of
the action. In a late case in chancery {Ex parte Boussmaker, 13
Ves. 71), Lord Erskine declared that the alien's right of action,
in such a case, was only suspended by the war, and that if the
contract was originally good, the remedy would revive on the
return of peace. This was even the ancient doctrine, according
to Lord Coke, who said (Co. Litt. 129. b.) that "true it is an
alien enemy shall maintain neither real nor personal action, donee
terrce fuerint communes^ that is, until both nations be in peace." It
is also admitted by the best modern authorities, on the law of na-
tions, that the plea of alien enemy is only a temporary bar to the re-
covery of private debts, and that the right of action returns with
the return of peace. (Bynk. Quaest. Jur. Pub. b. 1. c. 7. Vattel,
b. 3. c. 5. s. 77.)
There is, then, no well founded objection to the plea, and the
defendant is entitled to judgment.
Judgment for the defendant.*
*In the case of Clark v. Morey, lo Johns. (N. Y.) 69 (1813), which
was an action on a promissory note, the plaintiff, at the time being an
alien enemy residing in this country, the court stated the law as follows :
"And it has now become the sense and practice of nations, and may be
regarded as the picblic lazu of Europe, that the subjects of the enemy,
so long as they are permitted to remain in the country, are to be protected
in their persons and property, and to be allowed to sue as well as to be
sued. It is even held, that if they are ordered away, in consequence of
the war, they are still entitled to leave a power of attorney, and to collect

















































































































































SUITS BY ALIENS 
b in fayor of th plea concluding in abat ment, when the cau e of 
a~tion i · not 1oid or extingui hed. But whether the lea be in the 
one form or the other i , perhap , not material. for the judgment 
thereon would not be a: bar to a new action on the return of peace. 
A judgm nt i no bar to a new uit, unless it involves the merits 
of the controver ' or be founded on matter which a:ffo_!d a perma-
nent avoidanice, or i c arge. u e present plea only bars the 
plaintiff, in hi character of alie/i enemy commorant abroad, from 
pro cuting the uit. It does not o much a touch the merits o.f 
the action. In a late ca e in chancery (Ex parte Boussniaker, 13 
Ve . 1), Lo.rd Erskine declared that the alien' right of action, 
in uch a ca e, wa only suspended by the war, and that if the 
ontract was originaHy good, the remedy would revive on the 
r turn of peace. This wa even the ancient doctrine, according 
to Lord Coke, who aid ( o. Litt. 129. b.) that "true it i an 
alien enemy shall maintain neither real nor personal action, donec 
terrre fuerint communes) that is, until both nation be in peace." It 
i al o admitted by the best modern authorities, on the law of na-
tion that the plea of alien enemy i only a temporary bar to the re-
covery of private debts, and that the right of action returns with 
the r turn of peace. (Bynk. Qmest. Jur. Pub. b. 1. c. 7. Vattel, 
b. 3. c. 5. s. 77.) 
There i , then, no well founded objection to the plea, and the 
defendant is entitled to judgment. 
Judgment for the defendant.* 
*In the case of Clark v. Morey, IO Johns. (N. Y.) 69 (1813), which 
was an action on a promissory note, the plaintiff, at the time being an 
alien enemy residing in this country, the court tated the law as follows: 
"And it has now become the sense and practice of nations, and may be 
regarded as the public law of Europe, that the subjects of the enemy, 
o long as they are permitted to remain in the country are to be protected 
in th ir per on and property and to be allowed to ue as well a to be 
ued. It is even held that if they are ordered away in con quence of 
the war they ar till entitled to leave a power of attorney, and to collect 
their debts by suit." 
KlXG V. KUEPPEE
Suits by and against Sovereigns.
^^
King v. Kuepper, 22 Mo. 550. (1S5G.)
Error to St. Louis Circuit Court.
This was a suit brought by Frederick William IV, king of ^
Prussia', against Felix Coste, administrator of Frederick William
Kuepper, deceased. The petition is as follows: "The plaintiff
states that he is absolute monarch of the kingdom of Prussia, and
as king thereof is the sole government of that country; that he is*
unrestraincnl by any constitution or law, and that his will, expressed^
in due form, is the only law of that country, and is the only le<
power there known to exist as law. aV
"The plaintiff further states that by the law of Prussia any ^ ^ (
money or its equivalent sent or transmitted through the royal t^ J^ ,
post department of that country, or received to be so transmitted ^ ,1 i
or sent by any duly authorized officer of said department, if lost, q ^. \
stolen or embezzled, is to be refunded to the proper owners thereof '^
by the plaintiff, through his officers and agents, and that such
was the law on and long before the 10th April, 18-19. The plaintiiV
further states that the said Kuepper was on and for a long time
before the 10th April, 1849, the plaintiff's sen^ant and post officer
at Wermelskirchen, in the kingdom of Prussia, and that while.
said Kuepper was such post officer, he received, in liis official
capacity, large sums of money, or its equivalent, portions of which
money, or its equivalent, were transmitted through such depart-
ment, and received by said Kuepper as aforesaid, to be delivered
by him to the true owners thereof at Wermelskirchen, and por-_
tions of which were deposited with him as aforesaid by persons at
Wermelskirchen, to be transmitted by him through said post de-
partment to persons at various places ; and the plaintiff, if required,
is willing and ready to give a statement of each item, by and to
whom sent, when, &c. The whole amount of the moneys or its
equivalent, so received by said Kuepper, was seven thousand four
hundred German dollars, or thereabout, which, in the currency of
the United States, are equal to sixty-nine cents each.
"The plaintiff further says that on or about the 10th April,

















































































































































i IT BY A;:~ 
King . Kuepper, Io. 550. {1 
ERROR t 't. ui ir ·uit iourt. 
Thi wa brou ht b ' i r cl ri ·k William IV, king of ~ 
lix o te aclmini trator of r derick 
Ku Ip r de ea Th I titian i a follow The plaintiff 
tat that h i ab olut monarch of th kinO'dom of ru ia, ancl 
as kinO' th r I i h ol g v ment of that country; that h i: 
unr train b any on titution or laiw, and that hi will, expr cl~ () 
in due form, i th only law of that countr ', and i the only 1 er, 
pow r th r known to eri t a law. 1 Q -~ 
' Th plain ti further tate that by the law of Pru ia an v vJ 1 
mon y or it qui aJent ent or tran mitted th.rough th ro3 al / 
po t d partment of that country, or receiv d to be o tran mitt d ~ 
or ent b any duly authoriz d officer of aid departm nt if lo t O d . 
tolen or mbezzl d i to be refunded to th prop owner th r of 7 
by th plaintiff throuO'h hi offic r and a ent , and that uch 
wa the law on aond long befor th 10th pril, 1 -±9. The plaintiff 
furth r tat that th aid u pp r wa on and for a long time 
befor the 10th pril 1 -±9, th plaintiff ervant and p t officer 
at W rm 1 kirch n in the kingdom of Prus ia and th t w hiL 
aid Fu pper w uch po t officer he r ceived in hi official 
capa it· larO'e um of mon or it qui alent, portions of which 
mon or i quival nt w r tran mitt d through uch depart-
ment and r iv d by aiid Ku pper a afore aid to be d livered 
b ' him to th tru own rs th r of a W erm 1 kir hen and por-_ 
ti on of whi h w r d po it d with him a afor aid b pe on at. 
W rm 1 kir h n t b tran mitt d b him throuO'h aid po t 
partm nt t p r on at ariou pla · and th plaintiff if r quir d 
i willinO' and r ad to gi e a tat men f a h it m by and to 
whom nt wh n Th whol amount of th money or i 
quirn·l t .., r i d by aid u pper, wa e n thou~and f ur 
hun lr rman d lla or th r about, whi h in th curr ncy of 
th nit d tat ar qual to ixty-nin nt ach. 
· h plainti forth r a · that n r ab ut the 1 th ~ pril 
aid Ku p r did ab n 1 \Yi th a 11 :--ai 1 "um. of mo y, 
4 Suits by and against Sovereigns
and did eiiibe2?zle and convert the same to his own use, and secretly
fled and escaped from the said kingdom and came to St. Louis,
Missouri, where he died in the summer of 1849, and letters of
administration on his estate were duly granted to the defendant
(Coste) by the St. Louis probate court, on the thirty-first day of
July, 1849. The plaintiff further states that he has, according to
the law and custom of his said kingdom, duly refunded and paid
to the various and proper owners thereof the various sums of
money or its equivalent, stolen and embezzled from them respect-
ively by said Kuepper as aforesaid, and that he therefore has,
according to said law and custom, and by justice and right ought
to and has a just and legal demand against the defendant, for the
sums of money by him and his officers so refunded and paid.
"The plaintiff says, therefore, that the defendant justly owes
him said sum of money, and he estimates his damages for said
money and interest at the sum of seven thousand dollars, for which
last sum he asks judgment against the defendant."
The defendant demurred to this petition, and assigned the fol-
lowing reasons : That the petition does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action ; that it does not state any legal privity
between the plaintiff and defendant; that it does not state any
legal right in the plaintiff to recover the said sums of money
alleged to have been embezzled from certain persons living in the
kingdom of Prussia; that it does not state any legal right in the
plaintiff to recover for the money embezzled by the said Kuepper,
which, at the time of the embezzlement, belonged to other persons
than the plaintiff; that the plaintiff was not under any legal
obligation to pay to the persons from whom Kuepper embezzled
property as alleged, and the payment of such losses was merely
voluntary, and that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue in
this court; wherefore the defendant prayed judgment and for
costs.
The court below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment
for the defendant, to which plaintiff duly excepted. Plaintiff
brings the case here by writ of error.
ScoTT^ Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes up on a demurrer, and raises the question
whether a foreign sovereign can sue in our courts. It seems to
be now well settled in England that a foreign sovereign can sue

















































































































































4 SUITS BY AND AGAINST SOVEREIGNS 
and did embe2Ylle and convert the same to hi own use, and secretly 
fled and escaped from the aid kingdom and ca.me to St. Louis, 
Missouri, where he died in the summer of 1849, and letters of 
administration on his estate were duly granted to the defendant 
(Co te) by the St. Louis probate court, on the thirty-fir t day of 
July, 1849. The plaintiff further states thait he ha , acco.rding to 
the law and cu tom of his said kingdom, duly refunded and paid 
to the various and proper owners thereof the various sums of 
money or its equivalent, stolen and embezzled from them respect-
ively by said Knepper as aforesaiid, and that he therefore has, 
according to said law and custom, and by justice and right ought 
to and has a just and legal demand against the defendant, for the 
sums of money by him and his officers so refunded and paid. 
"The plaintiff says, therefore, that the defendant justly owes 
him said sum of money, and he estimaites his damages for said 
money and interest at the sum of seven thousand dollars, for which 
last sum he asks judgment against the defendant." 
The defendant demur.red to this petition, and assigned the fol-
lowing reasons: Tha,t the petition does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action; that it does not state any legal privity 
between the plaintiff and defendant; that it does not state any 
legal right in the plaintiff to recover the sa·id sums of money 
alleged to have been embezzled from certain persons living in the 
kingdom of Prussia; that it does not state any legal right in the 
plaintiff to recover for the money embezzled by the said Kuepper, 
which, at the time of the embezzlement, belonged to other persons 
than the plaintiff; that the plaiintiff was not under any legal 
obligation to pay to the persons from whom Kuepper embezzled 
property as alleged, and the payment Olf such losses was merely 
voluntary, and that the plaintiff has no legal ca.pacity to ue in 
this court; wherefore the defendant prayed judgment and for 
costs. 
The court below sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment 
for the defendaint, to which plaintiff duly x epted. Plaintiff 
brings the ca e here by writ of rror. 
SCOTT, J udg , deli er d the opinion of the court. 
This case come up on a demurrer and rai es the que tion 
whether a for ign overeign can ue in our courts. It seems to 
be now well ettl d in England that a for ign overei n can ue 
in h r court both at law and in quity. In th of Hu:ZZet 
King v. Kuepper 5
& Co. V. The King of Spain, Lord Redesdale said: "I have no
doubt but a foreign sovereign may sue in this country, otherwise
there would be a right without a remedy. He sues here on behalf
of his subjects, and if foreign sovereigns were not allowed to do
that, the refusal might be a cause of war. (1 Dow & Clark, 175;
The King of Spain v. Machado, 3 Con. Eng. Chan. 645 ; 1 Clark
& Finnelly, 333; The Columbian Government v. Rothschilds, 2
Con. Eng. Chan. 48.)
Kings have been allowed to sue in the United States. In the
case of the King of Spain v. Oliver (1 Pet. C. C. R. 276), the
suit was entertained without question as to the right of a foreign
sovereign to sue. So the case of the Republic of Mexico v.
Arrangois and others (11 How. Prac. Rep. 1) was entertained by
the courts of New York. In our courts, a writ in the name of
the state of Indiana was brought and passed through all of them,
without any question as to the right to do so. {Tagart v. State of
Indiana, 15 Mo. 209.)
If the subjects of foreign gov ern ments will contract .oblijcations
or affcxit themselves with liabilities t o their k ings or princes, and
after wards migrate to the Uni t ed States, t here is nothing in the
nature of our insti t utions whi ch shields them from their just
respons ibilities . While our government grants the rights and
privileges of citizenship to all foreigners who are naturalized under
our laws, there is neither policy nor justice in screening them from
the civil liabilities which they have contracted with the govern-
ment to which they were once subject. Our tribunals afford no
assistance in the enforcement of the penal codes of foreign nations,
nor would they aid despotic rulers, in the exercise of an arbitrary
power, in making special and retrospective laws affecting foreigners
residing here, who were once their subjects. But when laws haig
been made abroad, and debts^ have be en ^ontraxrted_jiiider_those
laws, ther e is no reason for refus in g our as sista nce in th eir eol-
lection. Though foreign laws may be enacte d by a po wer_and
in a w ay inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, th at is no
reason why they should not be enforced against tj i^e_whaJiaz£
in curred respon sibilities in respect of them . Foreign nations have
t he same ri<3i;ht to determine the form of govornme nt^^iost con^
ducive to their happine ss that we have, and to d e ny the validity
of their laws, because they have not been made in a manner

















































































































































KING v. K EPPER 
& Co. v. The King of pain, Lord edesdale said : "I have no 
doubt but a for ign overeign may ue in this country, otherwi e 
there would be a right without a remedy. e sues here on behalf 
of hi ubj ct , and if foreign o er ign were not allowed to d 
that, the r 1u al might b a au of war. (1 ow & lark, 1 5 ; 
The King of pain . Machado, 3 on. Eng. han. 645; 1 Clark 
& Finn lly, 3 · ; The olumbian Government Rothsch 'lds, 2 
Con. Eng. Chan. .) 
Kings have be n allowed to ue in th8 Unit tate . In the 
ca e of the King of pain v. Oliver (1 Pct. C. C. R. 2 6), the 
suit wa entertained without qu tion a to the right of a for ign 
sovereign to su . So the case of the Republic of Mexico v. 
Arrangois and other (11 How. Pra-c. Rep. 1) was entertained by 
the curt of N cw York. In our curt , a writ in the name of 
the tate of Indiana was brought and pa sed through all of them, 
without any que tion as to the right to do so. (Tag art v. State of 
Indiana, 15 Mo. 209.) 
If the subj ct of foreign governments will contract obligatjans 
or affect themselve wit · iliti to their kin or rinces and 
afterwards migrate to the United States, there is nothing__in th~ 
nature of our in titutions whi h hield them from their ·u t 
respon ibilities. While our government grants the rights ancl 
privileg of citizen hip to all for ign rs who are naituralized under 
our law , there i neither policy nor ju tice in creening them from 
the civil liabilitie which th y have contracted with the govern-
ment to which they were once ubj ct. Our tribunal afford no 
a i tance in th nfor ement of the p nal code of foreign nation , 
nor would th y ai d potic rul r in the exerci of an arbitrary 
pow r in makin p cial and retro p tive law affecting foreigner 
r iding h re, who w r once th ir ubject . But when law ha 
b n made abroad and debt hav b ontracted und r tho 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-=---'---~'--""'-~ 
.,...,._,"--"'-'in~hcir cfil-. 
6 Suits by and against Sovereigns
all comity amon g nations and introduce endless^wars and quar -
rels. The averments in the petition show that by the laws of
Prussia, the defendant's intestate was indebted to his sovereign,
and he should be made to answer for it.
It was maintained that this suit should have been brought in
the courts of the United States, as the constitution of the United
States expressly provides "that the judicial power shall extend to
all cases between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens or subjects."
The government of the United States being entrusted with the
power of peace and war, it was necessary to invest it with authority
to establish tribunals to which foreign states or subjects might
resort for injuries sustained by the conduct of those residing within
the limits of the United States. For the judgments of tribunals
thus established, the United States would be responsible to foreign
states. But if they, passing by the courts created by the general
government for the redress of grievances they may have sustained
at the hands of citizens of the United States, will litigate their
rights in courts for whose conduct the United States are not
responsible, if they should be dissatisfied with the measure of
justice meted to them by the courts, they have no cause of com-
plaint against the federal government. The ready answer to any
remonstrances made on that score, would be that there should have
been a resort to the tribunals established by the United States.
The foreign prince has the right to resort to the courts of the
general government; this is a privilege the constitution and laws
secure to him; but he may renounce it like any other privilege,
and litigate his rights in the state courts.
Whilst commentators on the constitution maintain that it is
competent for congress to vest all of the judicial powers of the
United States exclusively in tribunals of its own creation, it is
nevertheless admitted that this has not been done, and that the
state courts, in cases in which they had cognizance before the
adoption of the federal constitution, may, concurrently with the
/courts of the United States, still entertain jurisdiction.
The state courts, undoubtedly, before the existence of the federal
government, had cognizance of causes in which foreign states were
plaintiffs. That jurisdiction remains, unless it has been taken away
by the constitution and laws of the United States. The grant of

















































































































































6 SUITS BY AND AGAINST SOVEREIGNS 
all comity among nations and introduce endless wars and quar-
rels. The aiverments in the petition show that by the laws Of 
Pi1lssia, the defendant's intestate was indebted to his sovereign, 
and he should be made to Ml.Swer for it. 
It was maintained that this suit should have been brought in 
the court of the United States, as the constitution of the United 
States expressly provides "that the judicial power shall extend to 
all cases between a' state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, 
citizens or ubjects." 
The go ernment of the United States being entrusted with the 
power of peace and war, it was necessary to invest it with authority 
to e tablish tribunals to which foreign states or subjects might 
resort for injuries sustained by the conduct of those residing within 
the limits of the United States. For the judgments of tribunals 
thus estaiblished, the United States would be responsible to foreign 
states. But if they, passing by the courts created by the general 
government for the redress of grievances they may have sustained 
at the hands of citizens of the United States, will litigate their 
rights in courts for whose conduct the United States are not 
re ponsible, if they should be dissatisfied with the measure of 
justice meted to them by the courts, they have no cause of com-
plaint against the federal government. The ready answer to any 
remonstrances made on that score, would be that there should have 
been a: resort to the tribunals establi hed by the United States. 
The foreign prince has the right to resort to the courts of the 
general government; this is a privilege the constitution and laws 
secure to him; but he may renounce it like any other privilege, 
and litigate his rights in the state courts. 
Whilst commentators on the mnstitution maintain that it is 
competent for congre s to vest all of the judicia1l powers of the 
United States exclusively in tribunals of its own creation, it is 
nevertheles admitted that this has not been done, and that the 
state courts, in cases in which they had cognizance before the 
adoption nf the federal constitution, ma•y, concurrently with the 
courts of the United State , till entertain juri diction. 
The state cour , undoubtedly, b fore the exi tence of the federal 
government, had cognizanc of causes in which foreign state were 
plaintiff . That jurisdiction remains, unl sit ha been taken aiway 
by the con titution and laws of the United tates. The grant of 
judicial power by the constitution, in ome cases i exclusive; 
Jarvis v. Crozieb 7
in others, it is concurrent at the will of congress; that is, congress
may make it exclusive or concurrent, as it seems best. In cases
in which the state courts had cognizance before the adoption of
the constitution of the United States, that jurisdiction remains
unless it is taken away. Congress has conformed its action to this
principle, and has suffered a portion of the judicial powers of the
United States to be exercised by the state courts. (1 Kent, 398;
Story's Comm. § 1784.) The jurisdiction, in cases of the char-
a'cter of that under consideration, has not been exclusively vested
in the federal courts; hence the state courts may still exercise
jurisdiction in all such cases.
With the concurrence of the other judges, the judgment will
be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Suits by and against Infants.
t^
^^
Jarvxs V. Crozier, 98 Fed. Rep. 753. (1899.) jT^ r^ /X^
On Motion to Eemand to State Court. „ ^ -^^ ^'^
Jackson, District Judge: r\\ [J^ { f .'(/^
This cause was removed to this court, by the defendant Samljel l^j^ / v^
A. Crozier, from the circuit court of McDowell county, and the^x ^^^ */
record filed on the 14th day of November, 1895. Upon the 5tlil^'^^^(
day of January, 1898, a motion was made by the plaintiffs tojo'l i- *"
remand the cause to the circuit court of McDowell county, which. ^ ^ ^
motion (being argued by counsel) the court, upon consideration^^^V, yj^,^^
thereof, overruled. Between the time of filing the record in this^j^i^^-^ ^^^
court and the motion to remand, there seems to have been little ^-^ (i*^
preparation made for the hearing of the cause, except the filing of :\\k'' Xr
the joint answer of Samuel A. Crozier in his own right and of the ''i \h
trustees of the Crozier Land Association, and the answer of the Nor- W^ r ^
folk & Western Eailroad Company. Since the motion to remand ^Jp^ * ^
was overruled, quite a number of depositions have been taken by the^iL-r^ j,
defendants in support of their answers. The plaintiffs, failing to/^^ ^^/^
take any evidence in the case, have at the present term of the court V\ ^.r^
asked leave to renew their motion to remand, which leave was i/y^^ (u. "^
granted, and the court again heard the argument, and this cause/ z^'^'^l^
now comes on to be heard upon that motion. ^-'"'^

















































































































































JARVIS V. ROZIER 7 
in oth rs, it i con urr nt at th will f ongr that i , congre .. 
may mak it x lu iv or onG'Urr nt, a it m b t. n a e· 
in which the tat our lad ognizance b fore the adoption of 
the con titution of th Unit ,d ' tat , that juri diction r main· 
unle it i taken away. ongr ha conform d its action to thi·· 
principle, and ha uff red a portion of the judicial power of the 
United tat to be xerci d by th tate courts. (1 ent, 3 8; 
Story's Comm. § 17 4. ) The juri di tion, in cas of the char-
acter of that und r con ideration, ha not been exclu ively v ted 
in the fed ral court ; hence the tate court may till xerci e 
juri diction in all uch cases. 
With the concurrenc of the other judge , the judgment will 
be reversed, and the cause remanded. 
~ 
~ ' 11 
ITS BY AND AGALNST INF.ANTS. ~ ~ 
Jarvis v. Crozie1-, 98 Fed. Rep. 753. {1899.) / t,. k -~ 
On lliotion te> Remand te> State Court. 'lfrfl' 2 d/~k . 
JACK ON, Di trict Judge: {)jt ~).J 
Thi cau e wa removed to thi court, by the defendant Sa~~el / l y.) 
A. Crozier, from the circuit oourt of McDowell county, and the · ' ~ 
record filed on the 14th day of .r ovember, 1 95. Upon the 5tli ttlif 
day of J ainuary, 1 9 ' a motion wa made by the plaintiff to-e,o ... r . ~ 
remand the cau e to the circuit court of :McDowell county, whichd _ ~ ~ 1t 
motion (b ing argued by coun el) the court, upon consideration~/ 
thereof, overrul d. Between the time of filing the record in this~ ~ 
court and the motion to remand, there eem to have been little~ if 
preparation made for the hearing of the cau e, exc pt the filing of , ;.,,-. 
the joint an wer of amuel A. rozier in hi own right and of the U..-
tru tee of the rozier Lam.d o iation and th an w r of the or- . i.r v-J-
folk & W tern Railroad ompany. inc the motion to remand ? .fp! --tyiJ 
wa ov rrul d, quit a number of depo ition ha e been taken by thel'l'~ µ, 
defendant in upport of their an w . The plaintiff failinrr to /) u- ~-_) 
take an idenc in th a e, ha ait th pr ent term of th court Pi 1 ~ ... , 
a ked lea to ren w th ir motion to r man w bi h 1 a e wa µ-} . Q,1- ~ 
granted and the court again h ard th ar ·um nt and thi a0u e r ;VV"" ___-
now come on to be heard upon that motion. ~ 
It appear from th bill filed in thi cau b B. F. Jarvi in hi · 
8 Suits by and against Infants
own right, and as the next friend of Mary Carry Bowen and Bowen
Watts, who are infants, against the defendants, that the plaintiffs
derived title to a certain tract of land some years ago, known as
"Peery Bottoms," containing about 39 acres; that the lands were
conveyed by one Andrew Sarver, one half to William T. Moore, and
the other half to Peery and Bowen, and that William T, Moore
subsequently conveyed his one-half to J. A. Belcher, who afterwards
conveyed that one-half interest acquired from Moore to Samuel A.
Crozier, and that Crozier conveyed a portion of his one-half to
the Norfolk & Western Eailroad Company; and that the remain-
ing portion of his half was conveyed to trustees for the Crozier
Land Association. The bill discloses the fact that both Peery and
Bowen are dead, and that their one-half interest passed to their
heirs, and that all of the heirs except the infant plaintiffs, Mary
Carry Bowen and Bowen Watts, have conveyed their respective
interests in said parcel of land to the plaintiff Jarvis. The only
object and purpose of this bill is a partition of the land described
in the bill between the various owners in severalty, except a prayer
for general relief. Upon the face of the bill, there is no con-
troversy between the plaintiffs and defendants as to the extent of
their respective interests. The bill upon its face shows that the
plaintiff Jarvis is only entitled to one-fourth, and that the two
infant heirs of Bowen are entitled to one-fourth, making one-half,
and that Crozier and those under whom he claims are entitled to
the other half. Tlie question of title is not in controversy, as both
sides claim under Sarver as a common source of title. It is to be
observed that there is no allegation in this bill that Jarvis, who
sues as the next friend for the infant plaintiffs, was ever authorized
to do so by a court, or by next of kin, or by anybody interested in
them. It does not appear that he is in any wise related to them,
but that he assumed the right, without any authority whatsoever,
of making them plaintiffs in this cause of action. Ordinarily they
would properly be defendants to the cause for the purposes of par-
tition, as sought in this bill. There is no dispute between Jarvis
and the infant plaintiffs as to their title or the extent of it. He
admits upon the face of the bill that they are the owners of one
undivided one-fourth of the 29 acres. It seems to the court that the
draftsman of this bill had a special object in associating the in-
fants as plaintiffs with Jarvis, and that the object was to prevent,

















































































































































8 S ITS BY A.i:TD AGAINST !NF.A TS 
own right, and as the next friend of Mary Ca·rry Bow n and Bowen 
\ att , who are infant , again t the defendants, that the plaintiffs 
derived title to a certain tract of land ome years ago, known a::i 
' Peery Bottoms," containing about 29 acre ; that the land were 
conveyed by one Andrew Sarver, one half to illiam T. Moor , and 
th other half to Peery and Bowen, and that William T. :Moore 
sub equently conveyed hi one-half to J. A. Belcher, who afterwards 
conveyed that one-half interest acquired from Moore to Samuel A. 
Crozier, and that Crozier convey d a portion of his one-half to 
the Norfolk & We tern Railroad Company; and that the remain-
ing portion o:f his half was conveyed to tru tee for the Crozier 
Land A..,sociation. The bill disclo es the fact that both P eery and 
Bowen are dead, and that their one-half interest passed to their 
heirs, a0nd that all of the heirs except the infant plaintiffs, Mary 
Carry Bowen and Bowen Watts, have conveyed their respective 
interests in said parcel of land to the plaintiff Jarvis. The only 
object and purpose of this bill is a partition of the land described 
in the bill between the various owners in severalty, except a praiyer 
for general relief. Upon the face of the bill, there is no con-
troversy between the plaintiffs and defendants a to. the extent of 
their respective interests. The bill upon its face shows that the 
plaintiff Jarvis is only entitled to one-fourth, and that the two 
infant heirs of Bowen a.ire entitled to one-fourth, making one-half, 
and that Crozier and those under whom he claims are entitled to 
the other half. The question of title is not in controversy; as both 
ides claim under Sarver as a common source of title. It is to be 
ob erved that there is no allegation in this bill that Jarvis, who 
sue as the next friend for the infant plaintiffs, was ever authorized 
to do so by a court, or by next o.f kin or by anybody interested in 
them. It do not app ar that he i in any wi e related to them, 
but thait h a urned th right, without any authority what oev r, 
of making them plaintiff in tbi cau of a tion. Ordinarily th ·y 
wou]d properly be def ndants to the cau e for the pur1 o es o.f par-
tition, a ought in thi bill. Ther i no di put b twe n Jarvi 
and the infant plaintiff a to th ir titl or th xtent of it. He 
admit upon the fa e of the bill thart th y ar th own r of one 
undi vid d on -fourth of th 9 acr . It e m to the ourt that th 
draft man of thi bill ha 1 a p ial obj t in a o iatino- th in-
fant a plaintiff with Jarvi an th t th obj t wa to prev nt, 
if po ibl , th r moval f thi cau e by rozi r, the Crozier Land 
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Assot-iation, and the Norfolk & Western Railroad Company into
the courts of the United States, all of which defendants are non-
residents of the district of West Virginia. If this be the case, and
the court can properly do so, would it not be a case in which the
court would transpose the parties, and place them on the respective
sides of the case, so as to retain the case for hearing in this court
if it can be done? Tlie only matter in dispute or controversy, if
it can be called a controversy, between the infant plaintiffs and the
plaintiff Jarvis, would be the laying off' of their respective interests
in the said land. It is claimed that by reason of the fact of the
infant plaintiffs being citizens of Virginia, and the Norfolk &
Western Railroad Company being also a citizen of Virginia, this
case is not wholly a case between citizens of different states. This
partition can be had just as well by the infant plaintiffs being
transposed and made infant defendants in the case, and their rights
as fully and amply protected, as if they were plaintiffs to the
action. The whole theory of the case, as presented by the bill,
shows that they would more properly be defendants than plaintiffs ;
and in the absence of an allegation in the bill that Jarvis was
authorized to bring this suit, and associate these infants as infant
plaintiffs, or the exhibition of any authority sustaining an allega-
tion of that character, it would seem to be right, and properly so,
to transpose these parties, and make them defendants in this cause,
in order that the rights of all parties could be heard and adjudi-
cated in this tribunal, where the defendants Samuel A. Crozier, the
trustees of the Crozier Land Association, and the Norfolk &
Western Railroad Company could be heard, as they desired.
In the Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. Ed. 593, the court
held:
"For the purposes of a removal the matter in dispute may be
ascertained and, according to the facts, the parties to the suit
arranged on opposite sides of that dispute. If in such an arrange-
ment it appears that those on the one side, being all citizens of
different states from those on the other, desire a removal, the suit
may be removed."
In the case of Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205, 26 L. Ed. 514,
the court held (following the cases just cited) that you may disre-i
gard as inmiaterial the mere form of the pleadings, and place the
parties on the opposite side of the real matter in dispute, accord- 1

















































































































































J .ARVI v. CR ZIER 9 
Association, and th Nodolk & Wet rn aHroad ompany into 
th ourt of the nited tates, all of which ef ndan ar non-
re ident of the di trict of W t Virginia. f tbi b the as , and 
the court an propeTly do o, ould it not be a ca e in whi h the 
court w uld tran po the parties, and plac th m on the respccti c 
sid of th ca , o a to retain the e for h aring in this ourt 
if it n b don ? Th only atter i di put or ontro er y, if 
it an b all d a controv rsy, b tw n the i fant plaintiff and th 
plaintiff Jarvi would be the laying off o,f their re p ctive intere t · 
in the aid land. t i laim d that by rea on of the fact of the 
infant plaintiff being citiz n of Virginia, and th orfolk & 
t rn ailroa ompany being al o a citiz n of Virginia, thi 
cas i not wholly a as betw en citizens of different tates. T'b.i 
pa:rtition can b had ju t a w 11 by the infant plaintiff being 
tran po ed and made infant defendant in the case, and their right 
as fully and amply protected, as if they were plaintiffs to the 
action. The whol th o.ry of the case, as presented by the bill, 
shows that they would more properly be defendants than plaintiffi ; 
and in the ab ence of an allegation in the bill that Jarvi was 
authorized to bring this suit, and a sociate the e infants as infant 
plaintiff , or the exhibition of any authority ustaining an allega-
tion of that chara:oter, it would eem to b right, and properly so, 
to tran po e these parties, and make them defendants in thi cau e, 
in order that the rights of all parties could be heard and adjudi-
caited in thi tribunal, where the defendants Samuel A. Crozier, the 
trustees o the Crozier Land Association, and the Norfolk & 
Western Railroad Company could be heard, a they desired. 
In the R mo;val Ca e , 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. Ed. 593, the court 
held: 
"For the purpo es of a removal the matter in di pute may be 
ascertain d and a ording to the fact.s, th partie to the suit 
arranged on oppo ite ide of that di pute. If in uch an arrange-
m nt it appears that tho e on the one ide, being all citiz n of 
diff r nt tate :fro tho e on th oth r, d ire a r moval the sui · 
ma b remov d." 
nth a of Barney v. Latham 103 U. S. 05 26 . Ed. 147 
th court h Id (followin the a jut cited) that ou ma di r 
gard a immat rial the m r orm of th pl adings and pla the) 
arti n he oppo ite ide of th r al matter in di pute accord-
ing to the £ t . 
10 Suits by and against Infants
In the case of Hyde v. EulU, 104 U. S. 407, 26 L. Ed. 823, fol-
lowing the decisions in the Eemoval Cases, the court held that
where all the parties to the controversy on one side are citizens of
different states from those on the other side, and there is in the
suit a separable controversy, wholly between the parties who are
citizens of different states, which can be fully determined as be-
tween them, it may be removed.
It may be contended in this case that the infant plaintiffs have
made no application for a removal. They could only make it by a
party who was duly authorized to represent them as their next
friend, either by an order of court, or by a party who was either an
executor or a personal representative who had control erf their es-
tate, or who was next of kin, and so nearly related to them that
the court would recognize the right to act for them. So far as the
present case is concerned, it does not appear that Jarvis was ever
authorized to act for them, or that he was ever authorized to insti-
tute this suit for them; but he has made use of their names, and
subjected them to litigation, and the costs and expenses thereof,
without the slightest authority therefor. Is not such action upon
the part of Jarvis calculated to awaken the attention of the court
in the case, and is it not a mark of inexcusable inattention to make
infants plaintiffs in an action by a party as a next friend who is
neither next of kin nor has exhibited any authority whatever to
justify his action in arranging them as plaintiffs to an action in
which he had a personal interest ? It is a well-settled principle that
any one must have no personal interest, however remote or indirect,
who either institutes or defends an action for infants as their next
friend. In re Burgess, 25 Ch. Div. 243 ; In re Corsellis, 50 Law T.
(N. S.) 703. "When an infant claims a right or suffers an injury
on account of which it is necessary to resort to a court of chancery
to protect his rights, his nearest relation, not concerned in point of
interest in the matter in question, is supposed to be the person who
will take him under his protection and institute a suit to assert
his rights, or defend an action against him ; and it is for this rea-
son that a person who institutes a suit on behalf of an infant is
termed 'his next friend.' " 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 69. Legal proceed-
ings in favor of an infant should in every respect be strictly
guarded, for the reason that an infant on coming of age can re-
pudiate a suit brought in his name, and the court would be com-

















































































































































10 SUITS BY AND AGAINST INF ANTS 
In the case of Hyde v. RuMe, 104 U. S. 407, 26 L. Ed. 823, fol-
lowing the deci ions in the Removal Ca e , the court held that 
where all the parties to the controversy on one side are citizens of 
different states from those on the other ide, and there is in the 
suit a eparable contro eTsy, wholly between the parties who are 
citizen of different state , which can be fully determined as be-
tween them, it may be removed. 
It may be contended in this case that the infant plaintiffs have 
made no application for a removal. They could only make it by n. 
party who wa duly authorized to represent them as their next 
friend, either by an order of c~mrt, or by a party who was either an 
executor or a personal repr sentative who had control en their es-
tate, or who was n xt of kin, and so nearly related to them that 
the court would recognize the right to act for them. So far as the 
present case is concerned, it does not appear that Jarvis was ever 
authorized to act for them, or that he was ever authorized to in ti-
tute this suit for them; but he has made u e of their names, and 
ubjected them to litigation, and the costs and expenses thereof, 
without the lightest authority therefor. Is not such action upon 
the part of Jarvis calculated to awaken the attention of the court 
in the case, and is it not a mark of inexcusable inattention to make 
infants plaintiffs in an action by a party as a next friend who is 
neither next of kin nor has exhibited any authority whatever to 
ju tify his action in arranging them as plaintiffs to an action in 
which he had a personal interest? It is a well- ettled principle that 
a:ny one must have no personal interest, however remote or indirect, 
who either institutes or defends an action for infants as their next 
friend. In re Burgess, 25 Ch. Div. 2±3; In re Corsellis, 50 Law T. 
(N. S.) 703. "When an infant claim a right or suffers an injury 
on account of which it is necessary to re ort to a court of chancery 
to protect bi right , bis neare t relation not concerned in point of 
intere tin the matter in que tion, i uppo d to be the per on who 
will take him under bis proteclion and in titute a suit to a ert 
his rights, or d fend an action again t him; and it is for thi rea-
son that a per on who institute a uit on b half of an infant is 
term d 'hi next fri nd.'" 1 Dani ll, Ch. Prac. 69. L gal pr ced-
ing in favor of an infant hould in every re pect be trictly 
gua·rd d, for the reason that an infant on coming f age can re-
pudiate a suit brought in his nam and th court would be com-
pelled to trik out hi name as plaintiff and a ld it a a defendant. 
Waring v. Crane 11
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Bank v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 128,
8 L. Ed. 890, discusses at some length the rights of parties to
appear for infants; and, in a case in which there was an attempt
to secure a judgment against infants who were represented by a
guardian ad litem, he remarks that "the guardian ad litem was
appointed on motion of counsel for the plaintiffs, without bringing
the minoi"s into court, or issuing a commission for the purpose of
making the appointment. This is contrary to the most approved
usage, and is certainly a mark of inexcusable inattention," — and
refers to Coop. Eq. PI. 109, for his position. It is the duty of a
court of equity to look after the interests of infant defendants, and
to protect them, in the absence of any one to represent them ; and
it would seem proper in this case that a court of equity should make
the infants defendants, and appoint a guardian ad litem to protect
their interests as infant defendants, instead of allowing them to
remain as plaintiffs to that action, and possibly have their estate
more or less absorbed by the costs and expenses of litigation. An
order will be entered transposing the position of Mary Carr}- Bowen
and Bowen Watts from plaintiffs to defendants, and making them
defendants in this action : also, directing that a guardian ad litem
be appointed for the infant defendants, to protect their interests.
For the reasons assigned, the motion to remand is overruled.
Waring v. Crane, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 79. (1830.)
The bill in this cause was filed in July, 1824, in the name of
the complainants, who were infants, by A. Brunson, as the next
friend of W. Waring, and by W. Baker, as the next friend of the
other three complainants; charging the defendants, who were
(>xecutors, with mismanagement of the estate of the father of the
complainants; and also alleging that one of the defendants was
irresponsible. An injunction was granted restraining the executors
from selling or disposing of the estate. In October, 1825, upon
the application of the defendants, and with the consent of the
counsel for the complainants, a receiver of the estate was appointed.
On the fourth of ]\rarch, 1827, W. Waring became of age; but
without adverting to that fact the cause was brought to a hearing
without giving any notice to him or calling upon him to appoint
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Chief Ju tice Ma hall, in th ·a e of ank v. Ritchie, 8 P t. 128, 
8 L. d. 0, di. cu t ome length the rights of partie to 
app ar for infant ; -an , in a ca e in which there was an att mpt 
to e ure a judgm nt again t infants who w re repr ented by a 
guardian ad litem, he r ark that 'th guardian ad litem wa 
appoint d on motion of un 1 for th plaintiff, without bringing 
th mino into court, or i 'uing a ommi ion for the purpo e of 
making the appointment. hi i contrar; i.o the mo t approved 
u ag , and i c rtainly a mark of inexcu able inattention,' -aind 
ref r to Coop. Eq. 1. 109, for hi po ition. It i the duty of a 
ourt of equity to look after the inter t of infant defendant , and 
to protect them, in the ab ence of any one to repre ent them; and 
it woulcl e proper in thi ca e that a court of equity hould make 
th infant defendant and appoint a guardian ad litem to protect 
their int re t a infant defendants, in t ad of allowing them to 
remain a plaintiff to that action, and poo ibly hav their e tate 
more or le s ab orbed by the co ts and expen e of litigation. An 
order will be entered tran p ing the po ition of M:ary Carry Bowen 
and Bowen Watts from plaintiff to d fendant , and making them 
defendant in thi, action; al o, directing that a guardian ad litem 
be appointed for the infant defendant , to protect their interest . 
For the rea on a igned th motion to r mand i overruled. 
Waring v. rane, ,., aige (-C:. . Y.) 79. (1830.) 
Th bill in thi cau e wa :filed in Jul3 1 9-J: in the name of 
the complainanL ho w re infant , b3 A. Brun on a the next 
fri nd of W. Waring and by W. Baker a the next friend of the 
ther three complai ant ; charging the defendant who were 
xecutor with l i manag m nt of the e tate of the father of the 
omplainant ; and al o an ging that one of the defendant wa 
irre .. pon ible. An injunction wa granted re training th ecutor::; 
from lling or di po ino- of the tat . In ctober 1 25 upon 
th appli ation of h d f ndant and with th con ent of the 
oun 1 for th complainant a r ceiver f th e tate wa appoint . 
n th fourth of l\Iar h 1 W. Warin · b came of aa · but 
with ut adv rting to that fa t the au wa brouaht to a h aring 
ithout ITT.i; ing an noti to him or a.Uina upon him to ap int 
a oli itor. n th 1 th of pril 1 a d er e f r an ac ount 
12 Suits by and against Infants
was made b}' the consent of the counsel for the defendants and
of the guardians of the complainants. The cause was afterwards
brought to a hearing on the master's report, but it being ascer-
tained that one of the complainants was of age and had no notice
of the hearing, the chancellor ordered the cause to stand over, that
such complainant might have notice to appear and defend his
rights. An order was subsequently made referring it to a master
to enquire and report whether there were any just grounds for the
commencement and prosecution of tliis suit ; and whether the same
had been prosecuted by the advice of counsel in good faith, and
with the sole object of subserving the interest of the infant com-
plainants; and to enquire and report whether the complainant
W. Waring, since he became of age, had adopted the proceedings
in the suit and assumed the agency and management thereof. The
master reported that although there were apparently, yet in fact
there were no just grounds for the commencement of the suit;
that the suit was commenced for the infants by the advice of coun-
sel, and with the sole object of subserving their interests ; that after
W. Waring became of age, he took possession of the papers in the
suit, and procured a master to proceed on the order of reference;
and that since May or June, 1827, he had had the direction and
management of the suit. After this report was made, the cause
was brought to a final hearing, upon the pleadings, proofs, reports
and the objections of the complainants' counsel to the last report.
I The Chancellor:
K 5 ^ A ^^ ^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ behalf of an infant by his next friend, and
fcr ^ \ ii/the bill is dismissed or a decree is made in the cause before the
f jicA infant is of age, he cannot be personally charged with the costs.
y Thcj are to be charged against the next friend, unless there is
y -vvi^ Ir^ fund under the control of the court belonging to the infant, in
'^" 'i^^ ' .which case the court may direct the costs to be paid out of that
(L; fund. {Taner v. Ivie, 2 Yes. sen. 466.) But the costs will not b e
t (L ""V" charged on the infant's estate, unless the co urt_is_satisfied th£_suit
A Q/^ . was brought in good faith, and with a bona fi de intent t ojbenefit
<^^ the infant. (Pearce v. Pearce, 9 A^es. 547. Whitaher v. Marlar,
^^^foyl Cox's Cas. 285.) In Turner v. Turner (2 Peere Wms. 297),
0"^' j> the next friend died before a decree in the cause. After the infant
y^ became of age, he refused to proceed in the suit; and the bill was



















































































































































12 SUITS BY AND AGAINST INFANTS 
was made by the con ent of the counsel for the defendants and 
of the guardians of the complainants. The cause was afterwairds 
brought to a hearing on the master's report, but it being ascer-
tained that one of the complainants was of aige and had no notice 
of the hearing, the chancellor ordered the cause to stand over, that 
such complainant might have notice to appear and defend his 
right . An order wa sub equently made referring it to a master 
to enquire and report whether there were any ju t grounds for the 
commencement and prosecution of thi suit; and whether the same 
had been pro ecuted by the advice of counsel in good faith, and 
with the sole object of subserving the interest of the infant com-
plainant ; and to enquire and report whether the complainant 
W. Waring, ince he became of age, had adopted the proceedings 
in the suit and assumed the agency and management thereof. The 
master reported that although there were apparently, yet in fact 
there were no just grounds for the commencement of the suit; 
that the suit was commenced for the infants by the advice of coun-
sel, and with the sole object of subserving their intere ts; that after 
W. Waring became of age, he took po e sion of the papers in the 
suit, and procured a master to proceed on the order of reference; 
and that since May or June, 1827, he had had the direction and 
management of the suit. After this report was made, the cause 
wa brought to a final hearing, upon the pleadings, proofs, reports 
and the objections of the complainants' counsel to the last report. 
THE CHANCELLOR: 
1~ If a bill i filed on behalf of an infant by his next friend, and 
U' the bill is dismis ed or a decree i made in the cause before the 
infant is of ag , he cannot be per onally charged with the cost . 
krbey are to be charged against the n xt friend, unless there is 
? ai fund und r the control of the court belonging to the infant, in 
"v- . which ca e the court may direct the co t to be paid out of that 
J fund. ( Taner v. I vie, 2 Ve . en. 66.) But the co ts will not be 
~ ;\p harged on the infant' tat , unle th court i sati fiedJhe_suit 
CV ~ , wa brou ht in ood faith, and with a bona de intenJ to benefit 
~ the infant. (Pearce v. Pear e, 9 V . 5 7. Whitaker v. Marlar, 
~vA ~ 1 Cox' Ca. 2 5.) n Tu.rner v. Turner (2 P re Wm. 9 ), 
i ~ th next fri nd di d b fore a d er in the au e. After the infant V 1 came of age he r fu d to pro in th uit; and the bill wa 
~ i mi ed again t him with co ts. But on a re-hearing in that 
ui 
r Jo ;.,,-• 
"\, 'If/ 
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case, Lord King reversed his former decree as to the costs, and
decreed that the infant was not liable therefor. (1 Strange, 708.
2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 238, S. C.) If the suit was improperly brought,
and the infant elects to abandon it when he becomes of age, he
may apply to the court for a reference to ascertain the fact, and the
bill will then be dismissed, with costs to be paid by the next friend.
j3ut although the complainant elects to abandon the suit when he
is of age, he ca nnot, as a mat t er of course, compel the next friend
to ])ay the costs. If the suit was properly brought for^the infant's
benefit, he mu st pay the c osts^ of the next fri end, a nd also th ose
of the adverse party, wh en he app lies to dismiss the bill, (Anon.
4 Madd. Iv. 4G1.) If he elects tojproceedjn jthe cause after he i s of
ago, the ncxtfri end is discharged from hisj i ability, and the infan t_
will be l iable in t lic_s amc manner as if the suit had been comm enced
by an adult. (1 Harrison, -tT-i. Mitford, 26.) The only excep-
tion to this rule must be, the case that sometimes occurs, where a
decree has been made during liis infancy, by which the infant's
rights are bound. There the suit cannot be abandoned, although
it was not brought in good faith, and was against the interest
of the infant. In such a case, if the infant applied in time, the
court might compel the next friend to remunerate him for the
costs and expenses to which his estate had been improperly sub-
jected, although he was compelled to proceed under the decree.
In this case, W. Waring became of age before the decree was made
against the executors for an account. He afterwards elected to
proceed under the decree, and took the management of the refer-
ence into his own hands. He has therefore affirmed the act of his
next friend in bringing the suit, and it is too late for him now to
insist that it was improperly brought. His proportion of the
defendants' costs must be charged on him personally, or be paid
out of his share of the estate.
The situation of the next friend of the two complainants who
have not arrived of age is different. If the suit was now in a
situation to have the bill dismissed without prejudice to the rights
of the infants when they come of age, I should be disposed to
charge the costs upon their next friend, on the ground that the
suit was improperly instituted by him, and without taking ordi-
nary care to inform himself as to the facts. But some embarrass-
ment now arises from the decree of April, 1827, under which the
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ca e, Lord ing r versed hi form r d ere a to the co ancl 
de ·r d that he infant wa not liabl ther for. 
2 q. 1a. br. , 1• 1.) 
and th jnfont 
may appl t th 




n xt fri nd in bringing the uit and it i too late for him now to 
in i t that it wa improper! brought. Hi proportion of th 
def ndant co t mu t be harg d on 1im per onall3 or be paid 
out of hi har of the tate. 
h ..:ituation of th n xt fri nd of th two complainant who 
haY n t arrived of aO' i diff r nt. If th uit a now in a 
. ituati n t haY th bill di mi ed without pr ju lice to the riO'ht 
of th infant wh n th ' com of ag I hould b cli p -- e to 
hnra th o t upon h ir next fri nd n th QTOun l that the 
. nit wa __ imr rap rl r institut 1 by him. and with ut takinO' or li-
nary ar t inform him ... lf a t th fa t . ut om mbarra -
m nt no"· a 'i fr m th l r f \.1 ril, 1 · , , un l r whi 11 th 
a count f th d f ndant ha\ e n tak n. y h will £ th 
14 Suits by and against Infants
testator the defendants were trustees, both of the real and personal
estate, until the youngest child became of age; and it was their
duty to take care of it until that time, and then sell or divide it
among the complainants. Instead of consenting to a decree for an
account, and asking for the appointment of a receiver, they should
have asked for a dismissal of the bill; to enable them to go on
and execute the trust, and account to the heirs when they became
of age. The report of the master upon that reference having been
confirmed, that accounting, so far as it goes, must be considered
final between the parties. But the defendants cannot take the
legacies, which were evidently intended as a remuneration in part
to them for the execution of their trust under the will, and aban-
don the trust. As they have been guilty of no misconduct or
breach of trust they are entitled to the costs of defending this suit
and of taking the account, to be paid out of the fund. The injunc-
tion must be dissolved and the receiver discharged; and he must
account with and pay over to the defendants the balance, if any
in his hands, and deliver to them all property which has come to
his possession. In case of disagreement, his accounts must be
passed before a master residing in the county of Jefferson. The
decree must direct the defendants to proceed and execute the trust
according to the directions of the will, and to distribute the prop-
erty among the complainants when they become of age, respec-
tively, retaining out of the share of each one-third of the costs of
this suit. It must reserve to the complainants the right to apply
to the court for further directions as they shall be advised, if they
cannot settle the estate amicably with the executors; but the
account, as far as it has been taken is to be conclusive upon both
parties. The defendants are also to be at liberty to apply to the
court from time to time as they shall be advised, for directions
in relation to the execution of their trust; giving the usual notice
of such application to the complainant who is of age or to his
solicitor, and to the guardian of the infants. The right is also-
to be reserved to each of the complainants who arc infants, at any
time within six months after they come of age, and notwithstand-
ing any acts done by them under the decree in this cause, to apply-
to the court for such order and dirnction in relation to the costs,

















































































































































14 SUITS BY AND AG.AI ST INF ANTS 
t tator the defendant weTe tru t e , both of the real and per onal 
e ~ tate, until the youn0 e t child b came of age; and it was their 
duty to take care of it until that tim , and then ell or divicle it 
among the complainant . In t ad of con enting to a lecre for an 
a· ount, and a king for the appointment of a receiver, they shoulJ 
ha v a keel for a di missal of the bill; to enable them to go on 
and execute the trust, and account to the heirs when they became 
of age. The report of the ma ter upon that reference having been 
onfirmed, that accounting, o far a it goes, must be considered 
final between the partie . But the defendants cannot take the 
1 gacies, which were evidently inten led as a remuneration in part 
to them for the execution of their tru t under the will, and aban-
don the tru t. As th y have been guilty of no mi oonduct or 
breach of tru t they are entitled to the co t of defending thi uit 
and of taking the account, to be paid out of the fund. The injunc-
tion must be dis olved and the receiver di charged ; aind he must 
account with and pay over to the defendants the balance, if any 
in his hands, and deliver to them all property which has come to 
his po se ion. In case of di agreement, his accounts must be 
pa ed before a master residing in the county of J e:fferson. The 
decree must direct th defendants to proceed and execute the trust 
according to the directions of the will, and to distribute the prop-
erty among the complainants when they become of age, re pec-
tively, retaining out of the hare of each one-third of the costs of 
thi uit. It mu t reserve to the complainants the right to apply 
to the court for further directions a they shall be advised, if they 
cannot ettle the estate amicably with the executors; but the 
account, a far as it ha been taken i to be conclusive upon both 
parlie . The clef ndant are al o to be at liberty to appl to the 
court from time to time a they hall b ad vi ed, for directions 
in r lation to the execution of th ir tru t; giving the u ual notice 
of u h application to the complainant who i o·f age or to his 
olicitor and to th guardian of the infant . The right i also. 
to be r ervcd t a h of the complainants who arc infant at any 
tim within ix month aft r th y om of age, and notwith tand-
in any a t done by them und r the cl re in thi cau , to apply· 
to th court for u h od r an 1 dir ction in r lation to the costs, 
as between them and their next friend, as may be just. 
KNICKEEBACKEII v. FliEEST 15
KnicTcerhacher v. De Freest, 2 Paige (N. Y.) SOh. (1830.)
Tins was an application on the part of the complainant to ap-
point a guardian for an infant defendant. The infant had
neglected to appear, for twenty days after the time for appearing
as prescribed in the 22d rule had expired; and a petition was
thereupon presented to the court agreeably to the last section of
the 144th rule, requesting that a particular person named in such
petition should be appointed guardian.
The Cpiancellor:
The court never selects a guardian ad litem for an infant de-
fendant on the nomination of the adverse party. It is frequently
necessary for the guardian seriously to contest the complainant's
claim. It is his duty in every case to ascertain from the infant
and his friends, or from other proper sources of information, what
are the legal and equitable rights of his ward. And if a special
answer is necessary, or advisable, for the purpose of bringing the
rights of the infant properly before the court, it is his duty to put
in such an answer. If the infant is a mere nominal party, or has
no defence against the complainant, and no equitable rights as
against his co-defendants which render a special answer necessar}',
the general answer will be sufficient. If the infant has any sub-
stantial rights which may be injuriously affected by the proceed-
ings in the cause, or if the claim against him is of ar doubtful
character, it is also the duty of his guardian ad litem to attend,
before the court on the hearing, on the taking of testimony in the
cause, on references to the master, and on all other proper occa-
sions to bring forward and protect the rights of his ward. And if
the guardian neglects his duty, in consequence of which the rights
of the infant are not properly attended to, or are sacrificed, he
may be punished for his neglect. H e will also in such case be
liabl e to_the inf ant for all da mages he may sustain. Although it
is the duty of the court to protect the rights of infants, when they
are properly before it, so that they may be seen and fairly under-
stood, yet it is the special duty of the guardian ad litem to bring
those riglits directly under the consideration of the chancellor

















































































































































K ICKERB KER . FREE T 15 
J{nickerba ker . e Fre e l 2 Paige (N. Y.) 304. (18 0.) 
Tur wa an appli ation on th part of the complainant to ap-
point a guardian for aID infant d i ndant. The infant had 
n gl cted to apr ear, for twen day alt r th time for app aring 
a· pr rib d in th 2 d rule had xpired; and a petition wa 
th reup n pre nt d to the court agr eably to the la t ection of 
the 1 -±th rul , r qu ting that a particular per on name l in u ·h 
p titian h uld b a·pp int d guardian. 
TnE Cn CELLOR: 
Th court nev r 1 cts a guardiam ad litem for an infant d -
f n lant on the nomination of the ad ei:rse party. It i fr qu ntly 
ne ary for the guardian eriou ly to cont t the complainant' 
claim. It i hi duty in ev ry ca e to a certain from th infant 
and hi friend , or from other prop r ource of information what 
are the legal and equitable right of hi ward. And if pecial 
an w r i n e ary, or advi able, for the purpo e of bringin the 
right of th infant prop rly before the rourt, it i hi duty to put 
in uch an an w r. If the infant i a mere nominal party, or ha~ 
no d £ n again t th complainant, and no quitable right a-
ao-ain t hi co-d ·f ndaints which r nder a pecial an wer nece ary 
th neral an wer will be ufficient. If the infant ha any ub-
tantial right whi h may be injuriou 1 aff cted by the proc el-
ing in th cau , or if the claim again t him i of ai doubtful 
chara t r it i al o th duty of hi guardian ad litem to att nd, 
b for th ourt on th hearino- on th takino- of t timon in th 
tho._ 
f the ,..., uardian it 
16 Suits by and against Infants
would be improper in any case to permit the complaina^nt to name
the person who is to resist his claim against the infant.
The revised statutes have made provision for the appointment
of a o-uardian for an infant defendant in courts of common law,
where he neglects to have one appointed for himself. (3 E. S.
447, § 10, 11.) It is therefore advisable that the proceedings in
this court should conform to the spirit of those provisions. There
a guardian is not to be appointed for an infant, on the application
of the adverse party, until the infant defendant has been duly
notified and required to procure one to be appointed for himself.
When the complainant applies for the appointment of a guardian
for an infant defendant, under the last clause of the 144th rule,
he will be entitled to an order appointing such person as shall
then be designated by the court guardian ad litem, unless the
infant, within ten days after service of a copy of such order, shall
procure a guardian to be appointed for himself; and shall give
notice thereof to the complainant. Such service may be made on
the infant, or at his place of residence, in the usual manner, if he
is of the age of 14 years or upwards. If he is under that age it
should be served on his general guardian, or on his relative, friend
or other person, with whom he resides. At the expiration of the
ten days, on filing an affidavit of the service of the order, and that
no notice of the appointment of a guardian ad litem has been
received, the complainant may have an order of course that the
former order for the appointment of the guardian named by the
court, be made absolute.
In partition causes, where security is required from the guardian,
the order must require the infant to procure a guardian to be
appointed and to file the requisite security within the ten days,
or the order for the appointment of the person named by the court
will be made absolute, on his filing such security. \YheTe the in-
fant is a non-resident, special directions must be given by the
court as to the manner of serving the order, if any notice thereof
shall be deemed requisite.
In this case James Porter is appointed guardian ad litem, if
the infant defendant sliall not procure one to be appointed for

















































































































































16 SUITS BY JD GA.I ST INF.ANTS 
would be improp r in any a e to p rmit the complainant to name 
the person who i to re i t hi laim again t the infant. 
The revi ed statutes ha e made provi ion for the appointment 
of a guardian for an infant defendaint in court of common law, 
where he neglect to have one appointed for himself. (2 R. S. 
44 , 10, 11.) It i therefore ad vi able that the proceeding in 
thi court hould conform to the piri t of tho e provi ion . 'l1here 
a guardian i not to be appointed for an infant, on the a:pplication 
of th ad1er e party, until the infant defendant ha been duly 
notified and required to procure one to be appointed for him elf. 
When the complainant applie for the appointment of a guardian 
for an infant defendant, under the last lau e of the 1-1-±th rule, 
he will be entitled to an order appointing uch person a hall 
then be de ignated b the court guarlian ad liteni, unle the 
infant, within ten day aft r ervice of a opy of uch order, hall 
procure a guardian to be appointed for him elf; and hall give 
notice thereof to the complainant. uch rvice may be made on 
the infant, or at hi place of re idence, in the u ual manner, if he 
i of the age of 1-1 year or up" ard . If he i under i.hat age it 
should be rved on hi general guardian, or on hi relafrvc, friend 
or other per on, with whom he re ide . t the expiration of the 
ten day on filing an affidavit of the ervice of the order, and that 
no notice of the appointm nt of a guardian ad liteni ha been 
rec ived, the complainant may have an order of cour e that the 
form r order for the appointment of the guardian named by the 
court, be made ab olute. 
In partition cau where ecurity i required from the guardian, 
the ord r mu t require th infant to procure a guardian to be 
appointed and to file the requi ite ecurity within the ten days, 
or i.he order for the appointm nt of the per on named by the ourt 
will be made ab olut , on hi filing uch ecurit '. \Vh re the in-
fant i a non-r ident p ial dir ction mu t be gi.v n by the 
court a to the mann r of erving th ord r if an ' notic thereof 
hall be deemed r qui ite. 
In thi ca Jam orter i appoint c1 gunr linn ad l item iC 
th infant d f nclant . h 11 not pro ure one to b ar pointccl for 
him elf within ten day . 
.J^
Enos v. Capps
Ems V. Cam)s, 12 III. 25
This was a- bill in chancery filed by Capps against the plaintill'V*'^ ^ A ^
in error and others. The bill charges that Capps had an equitablctrl J^v*/
interest in certain lands, which Pascal P. Enos held as trustee for(>^w
one Moore, and of which he died seized. That Moore and the
heirs of Enos, are combining, etc., to deprive Capps of the land.
P. P. Enos, deceased, and left a widow and several children, who
were all made parties.
This writ of error is prosecuted by Susan P. Enos and Julia R.
Enos, who are respectively under the age of twenty-one years, act-
ing by Pascal P. Enos, the younger, as their next friend.
The decree sought to be reversed was rendered by Ford, Judge,
at September, 1836.
Treat, C. J.:
This was a suit in chancery brought in 1834, by Jabez Capps
against John Moore, William S. Hamilton, Salome Enos widow
of Pascal P. Enos, deceased, and P. P. Enos, Z. A. Enos, M. M.
Enos, S. P. Enos, and J. R Enos, his heirs at law. The heirs were
then all minors. The bill set up an equitable title in the com-
plainant to a tract of land, of which Pascal P. Enos died seized;
and it contained a prayer that the heirs might be required to con-
vey the legal estate to the complainant. Process was served on all
the defendants except Z. A. Enos, S. P. Enos and J. R. Enos. At
the October term, 1835, Salome Enos was appointed guardian ad
litem for the infant defendants; and at the September term, 1836,
the bill was taken for confessed against all of the defendants, and
a decree entered, requiring Salome Enos to convey to the com-
plainant all of the interest of the heirs in the land. In 18-47, a
writ of error for the reversal of the decree was sued out in the
name of all of the defendants. Tlie complainant pleaded, that
more than five years had elapsed between the entering of the
decree and the suing out of the writ of error; to which the de-
fendants replied, that two of the heirs were still infants, and within
the saving clause of the statute. This court sustained a demurrer
to the replication, and dismissed the writ of error. The decision
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';t7~r- / if ~ 
Eno . app 1 Ill . ;,5 . (fs~or ~~.:: .,/' jyl: 
ai bill in ·hancery fil 'U 1 y 1app again t the plaintiff iV 
th . r h bill ·hara- that 1app had an quitabl ~ 
•r ain lancl hi h a cal I . 1 no h ld a tru te for · 
iz 1 cl . That :\ oore and the 
1app of th land. 
Ycral hildren, who 
wer all ma partic . 
Thi writ of rror i pro ecut d by u an . 1 n and Julia R. 
Eno who ar r p tively und r th a e of twenty-one yea act-
ing b , a ca-1 . Eno the younger a th ir next friend. 
Th d r e ought to be re ersed wa rendered b; Ford, Judge, 
at eptember, 1 36. 
TRE T • J.: 
Thi wa a uit in chancer brouaht in 1 3-± by Jabez Capp" 
again t John Moor William amilton alom Eno widow 
of a cal . Eno cea ed and . Eno , Z. . Eno I. :JI. 
Eno . P. Eno and J. R Eno hi heir at law. Th h ir were 
then all minors. The bill et up an quitable titl in the m-
plainant to a tract of land, of which Pa cal P. Eno died eized ; 
ancl i conta1ned a pra er that th heir might b required to con-
\e) the 1 aal e tat o th complainant. Proce wa erved on all 
th defendant x pt Z. . Eno . P. Eno and J. . Eno . t 
th ctob r term 1 alo e Eno wa appoint d 21lardian ad 
litem for th infant d f ndant · and at the ptemb r term, 1 36 
the bill wa tak n f r onf d a aain t all of the d f ndant and 
nam 
mor tha 
till infant", and within 
ann ·lau tatut . hi tut U"tain d a cl murr r 
to th r pli ati n and di 1i " d i.h writ f rr r . Th d i i n 
wa I ut n th 0 r un l that, a an~~ on f th d f ndant 
2 
18 Suits by axd against Infants
might under our statute ha^ve removed tlie case into the Supreme
Court, by appeal or writ of error, and as some of them had lost
their right to do so by lapse of time, they should not be permitted
to avail themselves of the nonage of their co-defendants, to accom-
plish indirectly what the law would not allow them to do directly :
See -i Gilman, 315. This writ of error is prosecuted by S. P. Enos
and J. K. Enos, who are still minors, and within the protection
of the statute.
The decree was unquestionably erroneous. No answer was ever
filed bjjhe_£u ardian ad litem nor was any proof introduced to _siis-
tain the averments of the bill. I^either a defau lt, no r a decree pr o
confesso can bejak en against an inf ant defendant;_Therejnust_be
a^guardian ad Ui £m ap pointedjor him, and the guardia nLJBB§t fije
an_answer ; and^t he complainan t must th en make fu ll proof_of ^is
rightj o the relief c laimed. Even where the answer of_Jh£_^guard-
ian admits the bill to be Jrue^ the^complainant^ must prove the
Fruthofjiis^allegat ions with the same str ictness^asjf the answer
had interposed a direct and positive denial : McCIay v. Norris, 4
Gilman, 370; Hough v. Doyle, 8 Blackford, 300. The decree,
then, as to the present plaintiffs in error cannot l)e sustained.
Bartlctt V. Batts, IJf Ga. 539. (ISoJ,.)
Trespass, &c., in Lee Superior Court. Decision by Judge Love,
November Term, 1853,
William N. Batts brought his action for trespass &c. vs. William
IST. Bartlett. The infancy of the plaintiff being suggested, counsel
for plaintiff moved the appointment of a guardian ad litem, for
the purpose of prosecuting said suit; which motion was granted,
and the Hon. Lott Warren was so appointed. [The father and
natural guardian of the plaintiff not residing in this State.]
This decision is assigned as error by the defendants below, and
plaintiff in this Court.
By the Court. — Benning, J., delivering the opinion.
As to suits by infants, this seem;? to have been the state of the
Law of England, at the time when that Law was introduced into
Georgia.

















































































































































1 SUITS BY A D .A.GA.INST INFANTS 
might under our statute haive removed the case into the Supreme 
ourt, by appeal or writ of error, and a ome of them had lost 
their right to do o by lap e of time, they hould not be permitted 
to avail them elve of th nonage of their co-defendant , to accom-
pli h indir tly "hat th law would not allow them to do directly: 
ee -:!: Gilman 15. Thi writ of error i prosecuted by S. P. Enos 
and J. R. Eno who are till minors, and within the protection 
of the tatu . 
The decre wa unque tionably erroneous. No answer was ever 
:filed by the guardian ad litem nor was any proof introduced to sus-
tain the averment of the bill. Neither ai default, nor a decree P!Y 
confe so can be taken again t an infant defendant. There must be 
~guardian ad litem appointed for him, and the guardia1n must file 
an an wer; and the complainant mu t then make full proof of his 
right to the relief claimed. Even where the an wer of the guard-
iain admit the bill to be true, the complainant must prove the 
truth of hi allegation with the ame trictnes as if the an wer 
had interpo ed a direct and positive denial: McClay v. Norris, 4 
Gilman, · 370; Hough v. Doyle, 8 Blackford, 300. The decree, 
then, as to the present plaintiffs in error cannot be ustained. 
Bartlett v. Batts, 14 Ga. 539. ( 18 4.) 
Trc pa , & ., in Lee Superior Court. Deci ion by Judge LovE, 
November Term, 1853. 
William N. Batt brought his action for trespa &c. vs. William 
N. Bartlett. The infancy of the plaintiff being ugg ted, coun el 
for plaintiff mo ed the appointment of a guardian ad litem, for 
the purpo e of pro ecuting aid uit · which motion wa granted, 
and the Hon. Lott Warr n wa o appointed. [Th father ancl 
natural guardian of the plaintiff not re iding in thi State.] 
Thi d ci ion i a igned a error by the def ndant below, and 
plaintiff in thi ourt. 
By the ourt.-BEN :rING J., deliv rin the op1mon. 
to uit by infant thi m:) to hav been th tate of the 
Law of 1 DO'"land, at the tim when that Law wa introduc d into 
oro-rn. 
Pr ·() . miaht l u d out by the infant alon , l nt the a rlara-
Bartlett v. Bates 19
tion could not regularly be filed before a next friend to the infant
had been appointed by the Court, for prasecuting the infant's
suit. If the declaration was filed before such a next friend had
been appointed, the defendant might, at his option, refuse to
plead, or he might go on with his defense. If he chose to go on,i
A and did go on until a verdict had passed against him, he lost alll
right to object to the non-existence of a next friend in the suit.
That after, verdict had become a matter which was cured by the I
Statutes of jeofails.
If not clioosing to go on, the defendant refused to plead to the
declaration, or after pleading, refused to take any other of the
steps to be taken by defendants before verdict, the Court would
not comi)el him to advance ; but neither would it dismis s _the in-
fant's suit. It would j ucrely, at that stage of the case, appoint a^
next friend to__the_ inf ant ; and ha ving appointed one, it would
consider th e case as standing in th e condition_ in whichit would
have stood, h ad a next friend been regularly appointed at the fi igt
momen t, at wh ich one might prope £ly_ha ve been a ppointed.
Tlie suit, although attended by a next friend, was the suit of
the infant's. The next friend was merely an officer of the Court,
apix>inted by the Court to look after the interests of the infant.
He was not a) party to the suit. (Macpherson on Inf. 353. 1
Tidd Pr. 99. 2 Saund. Eep. 117, f note (i.)— Flight v. Bodand,
4 Russ. R. 298. Sinclair v. Sinclmr, 13 Mees & W. 640.
[1.] Upon the whol e, it seems very s afe to say, that a suit
c^menced_aiid 4)rosecuted- hyL_aii_inianL^alQn£»_is_ji ot absolutely !
void; an d although_de££ati££_nLJganting^ a next friend, the d efe_ct
is one which, before verdict is amendable, and after verdict is
cured.
[2.] The father of the infant is not the only person that is
eligible to the place of next friend. Any other may be appointed
by the Court, in its discretion. And when the father can be a
witness for the infant, or when he neglects the interests of the
infant, if another is appointed, it is done in the exercise of a wise
discretion. (1 Tidd. Pr. 99, 100. 1 Danl. Ch. Pr. 94, 95.)
There does not appear to be any material difference between
a next friend and a guardian, ad litem. (1 Tidd., 99, 100. —
Macpherson on Inf. 352, 353.)
No error is apparent in the record in this case; and there-

















































































































































Ban.TLETT v. B 'IES 1 
tion oould not r gularly be fil 1cl b f r a xt fri ncl o the infant 
had been app intecl by th 1 urt, f r Ir cuting the infant's 
uit. If the cl larati n wa filed bdor u ·h next friend hacl 
been app in cl, th dcf ndant might, at hi ption, refu e to 
pl ad, or h might g on with hi cl f n . f he ·ho e to go on,~ 
r
and did 0 n until a erdict had pa d again t him, he lo t all 
right to bject t th non- xi ten of a xt fri nd in the uit. 
That aft r, rdi t had b come a matt r which wa cured by th 
Statut of jeofaiil . 
H not choo in t go on, the defendant ref eel to plead to th 
declarati n, or aft r pleading, r f d to take any other of the 
st p t b taken by d fendant b for v rdi t, th ourt wou 
not c mpel him to advance; but neither would it di mi t_he in-
fant ·t. It would mer lx,_ at that tage of the ca e, appoint a 
n xt friend to the infant; and ha ing appointed one, i would 
~n id r he ca e a tanding in the condition in which it would_ 
ha e toad, had a n xt friend be n regularly appointed a the :first 
mom nt, ait whi h on might properly have been appointed. 
The suit, although att nded by a next friend, -;a the uit of 
the infant . The next friend wa m rely an officer of the ourt, 
appoint d by the ourt to look after the int re of the infant. 
wa" not ai party to the uit. (Macpher on on Inf. 35 . 1 
Tidd r. 99. 2 aund. Rep. 11 , f note ( i. )- Flight v. Bodand, 
4 R . R. 29 . inclair v. inclairJ 13 Mee & W. 640. 
[l.] ::!J?On the whole, it eem very af to ay. that a uit 
comm nc and pr ut infan i not ab olutel 
oid; and al thou ·h de antin a next friend the d f t 
whi h, b fore am ndable, and after verdict is 
The father of the infant i not th onl per on that i 
to th pla of next fri nd. ny other ma b appoint d 
bv th ourt in · di cretion. nd wh th father an b a 
witn for the infant or when h n glee th int r t of the 
infant i anoth r i appoint d it i don in the 
di er tion. ( 1 Tidd. r. 99, 100. 1 anl. h. r. ± 9 . ) 
Ther do not ppear to b an material di:ff r n e b hr n 
ardian ad litem. 1 Tidd. 9 100.-
3.) 
rror i appar n i th r r m tbi and her -
f the ourt b low ouo-ht to b a ·med. 
,K^./^
2^ }J^ «. §^'I'J-'S BY AND AGAINST INFANTS
'^ n c^ Johnson v. ^Yaterllouse, 152 Mass. 5S5. flSOl.)
. . /^ ctWrit of error to reverse a judgment of the Superior Court,
rendered in an action of tort to recover for personal injuries occa-
sioned to the defendant in error by a dog owned by the plaintiff
in error. The record showed that the answer in the original action
contained a general denial, and alleged that the defendant at the
time of the issuing out of the plaintiff's writ "was and is under
twenty-one years of age." The second paragraph of the plea was
as follows: "And further says that the plaintiff was a minor,
as alleged, at the time of said judgment, and that he had no
probate guardian or legally appointed guardian ad litem; but
that he was in fact represented and defended in said action, in
which judgment was recovered, by his father and mother, and that
said action was twice tried by a jury, and at both trials the father
and mother were present in said Superior Court, and were repre-
sented by counsel, and defended said action on behalf of said
p^itioner."
irkJL f^ At the hearing, before Field, J., the facts contained in the
' '^'\ second paragraph of the plea were admitted to be true, and the
^ judge reserved the case for the consideration of the full court.
y.
a/^, C. Allen, J.:
~s riy Tl^^ general rule is well established, that a judgment cannot
)t/^ -ilT properlybe rendered against an int anF defe ndan t in a civil s uit,
A p unless he has a guardian who may defend the suit in h isJ jeFalf ;
^ \ tP and if a judgm en t" is so rendered, the infant is entitled t o maintain
i/^ a writ of error to avoid the same. Crockett v. Drew, 5 Gray, 399.
>/< Swan V. Horton, 14 Gray, 179. Farris v. Richardson, 6 Allen,
> ^'^ — 118. Mansur v. Pratt, 101 Mass. 60. Cassier's case, 139 Mass.
^ ^ In the present case, the plea avers that the plaintiff in error
^\( ^^^ ^^ infant at the time of the rendering of the judgment, and
\k/ ^^^ °° probate guardian or legally appointed guardian ad litem,,
j^ but was in fact represented and defended in the action by his
^^ father and mother, who were present in court at the trial, and
■/ir ( » were represented by counsel, and defended the action on his be-
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::0 /11 ·~ ~ . 
.AGAINST INF.ANTS 
if of <( _ J\ .vr; /' J 
e . v r-Y 
1 
)/ l l c John on v. Tfaterhouse, 15 Mass. 585. {1891.) 
~""' ~RIT OF ERROR to rever e a judgment of the Superior Court, 
. / i rendered in an action of tort to recover for personal injuries occa-
ioned to the defendant in error by a dog owned by the plaintiff 
fl' in rror. The record howed that the an wer in the original action 
~ \ contained a g neral d nial, and alleg d that the defendant at the 
Jr9 time of the i uing out of the plaintiff writ "was and i under 
~ twent -one 3 ear of ag . ' The cond paragraph of the plea was 
/ / a follow : ' And further a that the plaintiff wa a minor, 
e a alleged, at the time of ruid judgment, and that he had no 
y /' probate guardian or legally appointed guardian ad litem; but 
V <r that he wa in fact rep re ented and def nded in aid action, in 
,.Y which judgment was recovered, by his father and mother, and that 
I / V aid action was twice tried by a jury, and at both trial the father 
U and mother were pre ent in aid Superior Court, and were rnpre-
V' ,. ~ ented by counsel, and defended said action on behalf of said 
JJP pptitioner." 
) ~~ / At the hearing, before Field, J ., the facts contained in the 
J "~q second paragraph of the plea were admitted to be true, and the 
\l' judge re erved the ca e for the consideration of the full court. 
~~ ~ 
v/'\ b v 
,F ., vJt 
P\ j) v/ 
\r 
p 
c. ALLEN, J. : 
9J The general rule i well established, that a judgment cannot 
properly be rendered agarnst Ml mfant defendant in a civil suit, 
unle he ha a guardian who may defend the suit in his behalf; 
and if a judgment i o rendered, the infant i entitled to maintain 
a writ of rror to avoid the ame. Crockett v. Drew, 5 Gray, 399. 
S wan v. Horton, 14 ra;, 179. Farris v. Richardson, 6 Allen, 
11 -! Mansur v. Pratt, 101 M . 60. Oassier's ca e, 139 :Ma . / 
~?s. 
( / n the pr nt ca e the pl a a e that th plaintiff in error 
wa an infant at the tim of th r nd rirw of th judgm~pt, and 
fY ~ bad no Ir bat uardian o 1 o-ally app int d uardian ad litem, 
ut wru in fa t repr ent d and d f nd d in the a tion by bi· 
!' ./ r" fath r and mo her who w re pr ent in ourt at th trial, and 
~ [ ' were r pr nt by un el, and d f nd d th action on hi be-
./ ~ft 1 half~ he d f ndant in rror ontend that th e fact will upply 
r / 
// 1 .. 
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the want of a guardian regularly and formally appointed, and that
under these circumstances the infant is not entitled to maintain
his writ of error.
Such appears to be the rule adopted in Vermont. Priest v.
Hamilton, 2 Tyler, 50. Wrisley v. Kenyan, 28 Vt. 5. Fuller v.
Smith, 49 Vt. 253. The case cited from Mississippi does not
appear to us to go so far, as there a husband was authorized by
statute to appear for his infant wife, so that no guardian ad litem
for her was deemed necessary. Frishy v. Harrisson, 30 Miss. 452.
Xo other decision has been cited by counsel which goes so far as
the Vermont cases, and after some examination we have found
none. The practice of having a regularly appointed guardian rests
on good reasons. It has been said that the duty of watching over
the interests of infants in a litigation devolves in a considerable
degree upon the court. Bank of United States v. Ritchie, 8 Pet.
128, 144. This duty is performed in the first instance by seeing
that an infant is represented by a guardian who is suitable to
protect his interests in the particular case. The father is usually
a proper person to act as such guardian, but not always. There is
an obvious advantage in having the fitness of the person who is
to act as guardian determined in, the first instance, rather than
after the trial is over. It was held in Brown v. Severson, 12 Heisk.
381, that where an infant's mother, who was named as his guar-
dian, in his father's will, had appeared in a suit as his guardian,
and answered as such, and had been recognizeil by the court as
guardian, the judgment should not be set aside, though no formal
appointment as guardian appeared of record. In the case now
before us, the infant's parents did not file an answer as his guar-
dians, nor assume to act formally as such, and there is nothing
to show that the court recognized them as his actual guardians,
or acted upon the assumption that they were such. They were
simply his parents. It is la jd down in Ma _cpherson on Infant^
353, that no legal right of p arentage or of gulirdianship Avill
enable any one to act for the infant without an appointment a_s
guardiaiL. If there is no guardian of an infant defendant, the
plaintiff must bring the matter to the attention of the court, and
see to it that one is appointed. Sican v. Ilorton, 14 Gray, 179.
Shipman v. Stevens, 2 Wils. 50. Clarke v. Gilmanton, 12 X. H.
515. Mason v. Denison, 15 Wend. 64, 67. In Letcher v. Letcher,
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the want of ai guardian r ularly and f rmall appointed, and that 
und r th ircum tancc he infant i not ntitlecl to maintain 
hi writ of rror. 
u h a pp •a to be the rul adopt d in errnont. Priest 
II amilton, · Tyl r, 50. 1Vr · ley . Ken yon, t . Fuller v. 
'mith, 4 t. · 3. h a ·it d from 'Mi i ippi do not 
appear to u o o far, a there a hu band was au horiz cl by 
tatut to app ar for hi infant wif , o, that n guardian ad litem 
for her wa cl em d ne, airy. Frisby . II arris on, 30 :Jii . 45 9 • 
o oth r cl i ion ha been ited b:y c un el which go o far a 
th r ont a e , and after ome xamination we have found 
none. Th pra tice of having a regularly appointed guairdian re ts 
on good r a on . It ha be aid that he duty of watching over 
the inter t of infant in a litigation devol in a con id rable 
degree upon th court. Bank of United tates . Ritchie, Pet. 
128, 144. Thi duty i performed in the :first in tance by eeing 
that an infant i repr ent d by a guardian who i uitable fo 
protect hi int r in the particular case. The father i u ually 
a proper per on to act a uch guardian, but not alway . There i · 
an ob · ou advantage in having the :fi.tne of the person who i 
to act a guardian determined in the :first in tance, rather than 
after th trial i over. It wa held in Brown v. everson, 12 Hei k. 
3 1, that wher an infant' mother, who wa named a hi guar-
dian, in hi father' will, had appear d in a uit a hi guardian, 
and an wer d a uch, and had been recognized by the court a 
guardian, th jud ment hould not be et aside, though no formal 
appointment a guardian appeared of record. In the ca e now 
b fore u , th infant' par nt did not file an an wer a hi guar-
dian , nor a ume to act formally a uch, and ther i nothing 
to how that the court recoo-niz d th m a hi actual guardians 
or act cl upon the a umption that the w re uch. The ' ere 
imply hi parent . It i laid down in :Mac h ron on Infant. 
..£32 hat no 1 gal right of par nfag or of guar ian hip will 
<nabl any on to act for the infant without an appointment a_ 
guard· an..._ lf th r i no guardian of an i fant defendant the 
plainti mu t bring th matt r to the att ntion of the court and 
to it that on i appoin d. wan v. Horton, 1± raJ· 1, 9. 
hipman . tevens, il . 0. larke v. Gilmanton 19 _ .... 
-. M on v. Denison, 1 \ nd. 6± n L etcher\. Letcher 
Ia hall the mother f infant d fen lant h a al~o 
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herself a defendant, answered for them as their guardian ; but she
did not appear to have been appointed to defend for them, and the
judgment against them was reversed. See also Irons v. Crist, 3
Mai-shall, 143 ; Searccy v. Morgan, 4 Bibb, 96 ; Pond v. Doneghy,
18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 558. In Swain v. Fidelity Ins. Co. 54 Penn.
St. 455, an attorney appeared for an infant at the instance of his
mother; but this was held to be insufficient. In Colman v. North-
cote, 2 Hare 147, Vice Chancellor Wigram refused to receive the
answer in equity of a married woman, who was an infant, either
separately or jointly with her husband, until a guardian should
have been assigned to her. The fact that there are adult de-
fendants joined with an infant defendant, and that all appear
by the same attorney, will not avail to prevent the infant from
obtaining a reversal of the judgment. Goodridge v. Ross, 6 Met.
487. Castledine v. Mundy, 4 B. & Ad. 90. 2 Saund. 212a, note 4.
The father of an infant soldier is not entitled to his bounty money,
nor to money paid for his enlisting as a substitute in the army.
Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen, 497. Kelly v. Sprout, 97 Mass. 169.
Taylor v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 97 Mass. 345. Nor has a
father as such a right to demand and receive a legacy to his
infant child. Miles v. Boy den, 3 Pick. 213, 218. Oenet v. Tall-
madge, 1 Johns. Ch. 3. When an infant sues by prochein ami, in
theory of law the prochein ami is appointed by the court, and his
authority to act may be revoked by the court. Guild v. Cranston,
8 Cush. 506.
It seems to us that it is more in accordance with the general
current of decisions, and with sound principles, to hold that the
facts stated are insufficient to show that the plaintiff in error is
bound by the judgment rendered against him. Certainly he ought
not to be bound by the appearance of his father and mother for
him, unless in point of fact they were suitable persons to repre-
sent him in the particular case, and to defend his interests; and
the proper time for making the inquiry whether they were so is
past. The original answer disclosed the fact of infancy, and the
original plaintiff, the present defendant in error, might have had
a guardian ad litem appointed by making an application to the
court.
According to the practice under the statutes of this Common-

















































































































































22 SUITS BY AND AGAINST INF ANTS 
her elf a defendant, an wered for them as their guardian; but she 
did not appea·r to have been appointed to defend for them, and the 
judgment again t them was reversed. See also Irons v. Crist, 3 
far hall, 1±3; earcey v. Morgan, 4 Bibb, 96; Pond v. Doneghy, 
18 B. 1on. (Ky.) 558. In Swain v. Fidelity Ins. Co . 54 Penn. 
St. -±55, an attorney appeared for an infant a1t the instance of his 
mother; but this was held to be insufficient. In Colman v. North-
cote, 2 Hare 1-±7, Vice Chancellor Wigram refused to receive the 
an wer in equity of a married woman, who was an infant, either 
separately or jointly with her husband, until a guardian should 
have been assigned to her. The fact that there are adult de-
fendants joined with an infant defendant, and that all appear 
by the same attorney, will not a·vail to prevent the infant from 
obtaining a reversal of the judgment. Goodridge v. Ross, 6 Met. 
487. Castledine v. Mundy, 4 B. & Ad. 90. 2 Saund. 212a, note -t 
The father of an infant soldier is not entitled to his bounty money, 
nor to money paid for his enlisting as a substitute in the army. 
Banks v. Conant, 14 Allen, 497. Kelly v. Sprout, 97 Mass. 169. 
T aylor v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 97 Mass. 345. Nor has a 
father as such a right to demand and receive a legacy to his 
infant child. Miles v. Boyden, 3 Pick. 213, 218. Genet v. Tall-
madge, 1 Johns. Ch. 3. When an infant sues by prochein ami, in 
theory of law the prochein ami is appointed by the court, and his 
authority to act may be revoked by the court. Guild v. Cranston, 
8 Cush. 506. 
It seems to us that it is more in accordance with the general 
current of decisions, and with sound principles, to hold that the 
facts stated are insufficient to show that the plaintiff in error is 
bound by the judgment rendered against him. Certainly he ought 
not to be bound by the appearance of his father and mother for 
him, unless in point of fact they were suitable per ans to repre-
sent him in the particufar case, and to def end his interests; and 
the proper time for making the inquiry whether they were so is 
past. The original answer disclos d the fact nf infancy, and the 
original plaintiff, the pr ent d fendant in rror, might have had 
a guardian ad litem appointed by making an application to the 
court. 
c ording to the practice under the statute of thi Common-
wealth, e en wh re a judgment i found to hav be n erroneou by 
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reason of an error in fact, the entry must be judgment reversed.
Pub. Sts. c. 187, § 2. Packard v. Matthews, 9 Gray, 311.
Judgment reversed.
McDermott v. Thompson, 29 Fla. 299. (1892.)
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe county.
The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
(Judge Malone, of the Second Circuit, sat in the place of Mr.
Chief Justice Eaney, who was disqualified.)
Taylor, J. :
On the 20th day of Januar}^, 1883, John L. McDermott filed
his bill in equity in the Circuit Court of Monroe county, Sixth
Judicial Circuit, against John E. Thompson, as executor of the
will of Olivia Gibbons, deceased, and against George Edward and
Tliomas Eugene Gibbons, minor children of Olivia Gibbons, de-
ceased, praying that the last will of Oliviai McDermott, who was
formerly, before her marriage with McDermott, called Olivia
Gibbons, made before her marriage with McDermott, be set aside
as illegal and void, and for an accounting by John E. Thompson
as the executor of such will, &c.
John E. Thompson, as executor, answered. Testimony was
taken and the cause submitted to the chancellor, and a final decree
therein was rendered in the court below on the 24th of April,
1882, setting aside the will and declaring it to have been revoked
because of the fact that it was made by the testatrix prior to her
second marriage, devising all of her property to children by
former marriage, and having had issue of a son by her second
marriage with McDermott who was not provided for by said will.
From this decree the cause was appealed to this court, and this
court at the January Term, 1883, rendered a decision therein (19
Fla., 852) reversing the decree of the court below because of the
failure to make the minor children of Olivia Gibbons by her first
marriage parties to the suit by proper service upon them of process
in the cause, and because of the want of proper answer for such
minoi-s through a guardian ad litem. In the former decision of
this court in the cause it was distinctly decided that the subpoena
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rea on of an error in fact, th ntry mu t l e judgment re r ·ed. 
Pub. t . c. 187, 2. Packard . Matthews, 9 ray, 311. 
Judgment reversed. 
McD ermott v. Thompson, 9 Fla. 99. {1892.) 
Appea1 from th ircuit ourt for n·fonro unty. 
The fact in the tated in th opinion of h court. 
( J udg Ialon , of th ·ond ircuit, at in th place of Mr. 
Chi f Ju tic Raney, who wa di qualified.) 
T LOR J.: 
On the Oth day of January, 18 2, John L. McDermott :filed 
quity in the ircuit ourt of Monroe county ixth 
Judicial ir uit, again t John E . Thomp on a xecutor of the 
will of livia ibbon dee a ed, and again t George Edward and 
Thoma Eu ene Gibbon , minor children of Olivia Gibbon , de-
ea ed prayin that th la t will of Olivia• fc ermott, who wa"' 
form rly, befor her marriag with fcDermott called livia 
ibbon , mad b fore h r marriage with 1cDermott, be et asid 
a ill gal and void, and for an accounting by John E. Thomp on 
a th xecu tor of u h will, &c. 
John E. Thomp on, a executor, answered. Te timony wa 
taken and the cau e ubmitted to the chancellor, and a final decree 
therein wa rend r d in the court below on the 24th of April, 
18 2, etting a ide the will and declaring it to have been revoked 
because of the fact that it wa made by the te tatrix prior to her 
econd marriage, devi .. ing all of her property to children by 
former marriage, and ha ing had i ue of a on by her econ<l 
marriage with McDermott who was not provided for by aid will. 
From thi decree th cau e wa appealed to thi court and thin 
court at the J anuar Term 1 3, r ndered a deci ion therein ( 19 
Fla., 52) rev r ing the d cree of the court below b cau e of the 
failur to mak the minor children of livia Gibbon b ' h r fir t 
marria·a parti to th uit b · proper ervi upon th m of proce "' 
in th and b au of th want of prop r an w r for u h 
mmo iardian ad l item. In the former ci ion of 
thi our in th au it wa di tin tl d id d that th ubpcena 
in th au h uld b r1 d up n th minor in p r on and 
y
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u])on a guardian ad litem for them appointed by the court, and
that the service on the minors should be in the presence of their
legal guardian, if they have one, or in the presence of such person
as had for the time being the actual care or custody of such minors.
After the decision of this court subpoena seems to have been issued
to such minors, but the return of service thereof is defective be-
cause it does not show the names of the minors upon whom it was
(served, neither does it show that it was ever served upon any
guardian ad litem for such minors appointed by the court. On
the 2d day of June, 1883, after the service of subpcena on the
minors, of which the imperfect return was made as aforesaid,
G. Bowne Patterson, as guardian ad litem for the minors, George
E. and Thomas E. Gibbons, interposed a demurrer to the bill.
This demurrer was subsequently on September 11th, 1884, sus-
tained by the court below, and the bill dismissed; and from this
order the cause is appealed a second time to this court. How, or
by what authority, G. Bowne Patterson got into the cause as guar-
dian ad litem for these minors, we have been unable to discover
from anything in the record. Therejsno order of cou rt ap point-
ing and authorizi ng ^ him to act in that capacity, an d_ there_is_no
subpoen a directed too r served upon him, citing him in th at or any
other capac ity_to appear and answer _forL ^nfl nn bphg VP^ of said
minors. We are constrained to conclude from this status of the
record that the requirements of the former decision and mandate
of this court have not been complied with, and that the said minors
are not yet properly before the court. With that decision we are
fully in accord. It pointed out with sufficient particularity what
was necessary to be done in order to get the minors properly before
the court; 1st, that a guardian ad litem should be appointed by
■ ,. . |the court for such minors; 2d, that such minors should be per-
\^J^ sonally served with subpoena in the presence of their legal guar-
,^ (dian, or in the presence of such person who had the care and cus-
tody of them; and 3d, that such guardian ad litem should be
served with subpcena in the cause. None of these requisites have
been complied with. It follows that all the proceedings and orders
had and made in the cause since the former decision of this court
in the premises must be set aside and reversed, with directions to
supjjly tlie omissions in the proceedings therein, and herein jwinted

















































































































































24 SUITS BY AND AGAINST INFANTS 
upon a guardian ad litem for them appointed by the court, and 
that the ervice on the minors should be in the presence of their 
legal guardian, if they have one, or in the presence of uch person 
a had for the tim being the actual care or custo ly of such minors. 
Aft r the decitSion of this court ubpama seems to have been issued 
to such minor , but th return of service thereof i defective be-
cau e it does not show the names of the minors upon whom it vrns 
'
served, neither does it show that it wa ever erved upon any 
guardian ad litem for such minors appointed by the court. On 
the 2d day of June, 1883, after the service of subpama on the 
minors, of which the imperfect return was made as aforesaid, 
G. Bowne Patterson, as guardian ad litem for the minor , George 
E. and Thomas E. Gibbons, interposed a demurrer to the bill. 
This d murr r was ub quently on September 11th, 1884, sus-
tained by the court below, and the bill dismi sed ; and from this 
order the cause is appealed a second time to this court. How, or 
by what authority, G. Bowne Paitterson got into the cause as guar-
dian ad litem fo.r these minors, we have been unable to discover 
from anything in the record. There is no order of court appoint-
ing and authorizing him to act in that capacit:y, and there is no 
sub cena directed to or served u on him citin him in that or any 
other capacity to appear and answer for and on behalf of sai 
minors. We are constrained to conclude from this status of the 
record that the requirements of the former decision and mandate 
of this court have not been complied with, and that the said minors 
are not yet properly before the court. With that decision we are 
fully in accord. It pointed out with sufficient particularity what 
wa necessary to be done in order to get the minors properly before 
the court; 1 t, that a guardian ad litem hould be appointed by 
the court for such minors; 2d, that such minors should be per-
, onally erved with ubpama in the pres nee of their legal guar-
dian, or in the pre ence of uch person who had the care and cus-
tody of them; and 3d, that uch guardian ad litem hould be 
ervcd with ubpcena in the cau e. Non of th e r quisites have 
be n complied with. It follow that all th proceeding and order 
had and mad in th cau e in e the former d ci ion of this court 
in the premi mu t b t a ide and rever ed, with directions to 
upply the omi ion in the proceeding therein, and h r in pointed 
out, and it i ord red. 
DoRSiiEiMER V. Roorback 33
Suits by and against Persons ]\Ientally Incompetent.
Dorsheimer v. Roorback, 18 N. J. Eq. 438. (18G7.)
This was a motion on jjart of the defendant to order the bill to
be taken from the llles, on the ground that the complainant was
an idiot, and the bill was filed in her name by one Couse, as her
next friend, he not having been appointed her guardian upon
inquisition found, or been authorized by this court in this case
to file the bill as her next friend.
The Chancellor:
The motion is made by the defendant, and not on part of the
idiot, or any one in her behalf. But in this case, where it is alleged
in the bill that complainant is an idiot a nativitate, and unable
to manage her affairs, and sues by a person calling himself her
next friend, without any appointment, if the proceeding is not
according to law, and not binding on the idiot, the defendant
must make this motion to protect himself from being obliged to
defend a suit brought without authority.
Idiots and lunatics may sue at law ])y next friend, to be ap-
pointed by the court; but in equity, must sue by the committee
or guardian of their estates duly appointed. When the idiocy or
lunacy is not partial, and, in all cases, when it has been found on
an inquisition, a court of equity will not allow a suit to be brought
by an idiot or lunatic in his owm name, or that of a next friend,
nominated by himself, or appointed by the court; his guardian
or committee must join in the suit. When a person is only par-
tially incapable, as one merely deaf and dumb, the court will
appoint a next friend to be joined with him in the suit, and to
conduct it for him.
The authorities all agree that idiots and lunatics must sue in
equity, by their committees or guardians. In this state, the per-
sons to whom the estates of idiots and lunatics are committed
upon inquisition found, are styled their guardians; in many of
the other states, and in England, they are called their committees.
Shclford on Lunatics, 415, says: "Idiots and lunatics must sue
in courts of equity by their committees." In Story's Eq. PI., § 64;
1 Daniell's Chan. Pr. (3d ed.) 79; Stock on Non Compotes MenWs,
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S UITS BY AND AGAINST PERSONS 1ENTALLY INCOMPETENT. 
Dorsheimer v. Roorbaclc, 18 N. J . Eq. 438. (1867.) 
This wa a otion on part of the d f ndant to ord r the bill to 
be tak n from th file , on th ground that the complainant wab 
an idiot, and the bill wa filed in her nam by one ou , a her 
n xt fri nd, h not having b en appoint d her guardian upon 
inqui ition found, or b en authorized by this court in thi a e 
to :file th bill as her next friend. 
THE CHANCELLOR : 
The motion i made by the defendant, and not on part of the 
idiot, or any one in her behalf. But in thi ca e, where it i alleged 
in the bill that complainant i an idiot a nativitate, and unable 
to manage h r affairs, and u by a person calling him elf h r 
next friend, without any appointment, if the proceeding i not 
according to law, and not binding on the idiot, the defendant 
mu t make thi motion to protect himself from being obliged to 
defend a suit brought without authority. 
Idiots and lunatics may su at law by next friend, to be ap-
point d by the court; but in equity, must sue by the committee 
or guardian of their estates duly appointed. When the idiocy or 
lunacy i not partia1, and, in all ca es, when it ha been found on 
an inqui ition, a court of equity will not allow a uit to be brought 
by an idiot or lunatic in hi own name, or that of a next friend, 
nominated by him elf, or appointed by the court; his guardian 
or committee mu t join in the uit. When a person is only paor-
tially incapable, a one merely deaf and dumb, the court will 
appoint a next friend to be joined with him in the suit, and to 
conduct it for him. 
The authoritie all agree that idiots and lunatic must ue in 
quity, by th ir committee or guardians. In thi tate the per-
son to whom th e tat of idiots and lunati are committed 
upon inqui ition found, ar t led th ir guardian · in man of 
th other tat and in Eno-land they are all d their ommittee . 
h lford n Lunati a Idiot and lunatic mz t ue 
ourt I quit ' b th ir ommittee . ' n tor 6 ; 
1 ani 11 han. r. ( 3d d.) 9 · tock on on om pot ... en ti , 
3 · Iitford 1 q. 1. 29, and 2 Barb. Chan. Pr. 9 -±, th am rule 
26 Suits — Persons Mentally Incompetent
is laid dowu; and it is further stated by some of these authorities,
that a suit ought not to be brought, even by the committee, with-
out the direction of the court, ujjon an inquiry made, whether it
is for the benefit of the idiot or lunatic. I find no case or authority
in which it is held that they may sue by a next friend, either a
volunteer or appointed for the purpose.
The only semblance of authority found, is the passage in Shel-
ford 416, and copied in 1 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 81: "If a person
exhibiting a bill, appear upon the face of it to be either an idiot
or a lunatic, and no next friend or committee is named in the bill,
the defendant may demur." Daniell cites Fuller v. Lance, 1 Ch.
Cas. 19, which has nothing in it on this point. Shelf ord cites
Mitford on PI. 153, which says: "If an infant or a married
woman, an idiot or a lunatic, appear to be such on the face of the
bill, and no next friend or committee is named, the defendant may
demur."
Lord Redesdale evidently intends to refer singula singulis, and
does not mean to imply that a next friend is proper for an idiot
or lunatic, any more than that a committee is necessary for an
infant or feme covert. This passage has been adopted by the other
two writers, without noticing that the words next friend were
not applicable to the subject of which they were then treating —
idiots and lunatics.
The rule is a wise one. It should not be permitted that any
volunteer should, by styling himself the next friend of an idiot,
bring a suit for him, and lose or jeopard his rights by an action
brought inopportunely, and it may be, prosecuted without skill
or honesty. The idiot would have no security for the amount
recovered by such next friend, and the defendant could not pay
him, or settle with him, safely.
The motion to take the bill from the files must be granted.
Boughan v. Morris, 87 III. App. 642. (1899.)
Statement. — This is an appeal from an interlocutory order
appointing a receiver.
Tlie bill of complaint was exhibited by James L. Morris, by
Arthur Morris, his brother and next friend. Tlie bill alleges that

















































































































































26 SUITS-PERSONS MENTALLY INCOMPETENT 
i laid down; and it is further tated by ome of the e authorities, 
that a uit ought not to be brought, even by the committee, with-
out the direction of the court, upon an inquiry ma·de, whether it 
i for the b nefit of the idiot or lunatic. I find no case or authority 
in which it i held that they may sue by a next friend, either a 
volunteer or appointed for the purpose. 
The only emblance of authority found, is the pas age in Shel-
ford ·±16, and copied in 1 Daniell Ch. Pr. 81: 'If a person 
exhibiting a bill, appear upon the face of it to be either an idiot 
or a lunatic, and no next friend or committee is named in the bill, 
the defendant may demur." Daniell cites Furler v. Lance, 1 Ch. 
Oas. 19, which has nothing in it on this point. Shelford cites 
Mitford on Pl. 153, which ay : "If an infant or a married 
woman, an idiot or a lunatic, appear to be such on the face of the 
bill, and no next friend or committee is named, the defendant may 
demur." 
Lord Redesdale evidently intend to refer singula singulis, and 
does not mean to imply that a next friend i proper for an idiot 
or lunatic, any more than that a committee is necessary for an 
infant or f eme covert. This passage has been adopted by the other 
two writers, without noticing that the words next friend were 
not applicable to the subject of which they were then treating-
idiots and lunatics. 
The rule i a wise one. It should not be permitted that any 
volunteer hould, by styling himself the next friend of an idiot, 
bring a suit for him, and lose or jeopard his rights by an action 
brought inopportunely, a·nd it may be, prosecuted without skill 
or honesty. Th idiot would have no ecurity for the amount 
recovered by such next friend and the defendant could not pay 
him, or ettle with him, afely. 
The motion to take the bill from the file mu t be granted. 
Roughan v. Morris, 87 Ill. App. 64 . {1899.) 
ST TEME rT.-Thi i an appeal from an interlocutory order 
appointing a receiver. 
The bill of complaint was exhibited by Jame L. M:orri , by 
rthur orri hi broth r and ne. t fri nd. Th bill all ge that 
J a.me L. Morri i an in ane per on; that he is a widower and 
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had no children, and that Arthur Morris, who appears as his next
friend in the suit, and George Morris, his two brothers, are his
next of kin. The bill also alleges that the defendant, Michael
J. Roughan, procured the signature of James L. Morris to a certain
pretended power of attorney, giving the defendant full control and
dominion over all the property of said Morris, consisting of a
large l)usiness and real estate, improved and rented; that for a
considerable space of time said Iloughan had been in complete
and undisturbed possession of said property; that said Roughan
had made no report of any of his doings in the premises; that
by reason of his management the business was becoming deeply
involved, was likely to be ruined, and the income of Morris de-
stroyed, unless the same was cared for; that the creditors of the
complainant were refusing to grant any more credit to the busi-
ness so long as it was under the control of the defendant; that
the landlord was about to levy a distress warrant for non-payment
of rent, and that if the assets of the complainant were properly
applied this would be wholly unnecessary; that defendant had
collected and disposed of, to his own use, large sums of money
belonging to complainant; that the defendant fails and neglects
to pay the debts of the estate, and willfully and maliciously per-
mits the estate to become more and more indebted ; that the de-
fendant is insolvent, irresponsible, and not a proper person to
conduct said business ; that about five weeks must necessarily elapse
before the matter of the insanity of Morris can be heard in the
Probate Court of Cook County, where a petition has been filed
by Arthur Morris and George Morris, brothers and next of kin
of complainant, asking for the appointment of a conservator.
The prayer of the bill is inter alia for the appointment of a
receiver to collect the rents of real estate owned by James L.
Morris, and to manage the business of said Morris until a con-
servator can be appointed by the Probate Court of Cook County.
Upon the application for appointment of a receiver, a hearing
was had upon bill of complaint and affidavits, and oral testimony.
An interlocutory order was entered appointing one Frank D.
Kitchner as receiver. This appeal is from that order.
^Ir. Presiding Justice Sears delivered the opinion of the
court.
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h ad no hildren, and that rthur :Jiorri , who appear a hi next 
fri nd in the uit a·nd or :\Iorri hi two brothers, are hi· 
next of kin. Th bill al o alleg th t th 1 f nd nt, :Mi ·ha 1 
J. oughan, pro ure th ignatur of Jam L . Iorri to a c rtain 
pret nd d pow r oi attorn , gi ing th def ndant full control and 
dominion er all th property of aid orri , con i -ting of a 
larg bu in an r al tate impro d and rented; that for a 
on itl r ble pa of time aid oughan had been in omplete 
and undi turbed po e ion of aid property; that aid oughan 
bad ma no r port of any of hi doin0 in th premi e ; that 
by r a on of hi mana em nt the bu ine w becoming deeply 
in olved, wa likely to be ruined and the income of :Morri de-
tro 1 d unl th ame wa cared for; that the er ditors of the 
complainant er r fu ing to grant any more credit to the bu i-
ne~ o 1 ng a it wa und r the control of the defendant; that 
th landlord wa about to 1 vy a di tre warrant for non-payment 
of r nt and that if the a et of th complainant were properly 
appli d thi would be wholly unnece ary; that defendant had 
·ollect d and di po d of, to bi own u e, large um of money 
belongino- to complainant · that the defendant fail and neglect-
to pa the d bts of the e tat , and willfully and maliciou ly per-
mit th state to become more and more indebted · that the de-
fendant i in ol ent irre pon ible and not a proper per~on to 
conduct aid bu in · that about five weeks mu t nee arily elap e 
before th matt r of he in anity of forri can be heard in the 
P roba e ourt of Cook ount3 where a petition ha be n filed 
by rthur Morri and G orge Morri , brother and next of kin 
of complainant, a king for th appointment of a con ervator. 
The prayer of th bill i inter alia for the appointment of a 
receiver to colle t th rents of real e tate owned by Jame I,. 
:Morri , and to mana e th bu in of aid Morri until a on-
ervator can b appointed by th Probate ourt of Cook ount '· 
pon th application for appointment of a receiver a hearing 
wa ha upon bill of omplaint and affida it a·nd oral te timony. 
An int rlo utory ord r was ntered appointino- one Frank D. 
itcbner a rec i r. Thi app al i from that order. 
fR. RE IN J TI E EAR eli ered the opinion of th 
court. 
But on qu tion of ontrolling importance 1 r ~~nte upon 
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this appeal, viz.: whether the suit may be entertained for the
purpose indicated when commenced by an insane person by his
next friend.
The grounds for the intervention of a court of chancery are
here ample, if the suit were brought by a complainant of sound
mind and in his own name. The relation of the parties, the
insolvency of defendant, the refusal or failure to account, and
the waste alleged, constitute sufficient ground for intervention
of a court of equity, if the suit were brought by John L. Morris
of sound mind. Tlie question then is, he being a lunatic, could
the suit be brought by his brother as his next friend?
The statute, Sec. 13, Chap. 86, R. S., provides as follows in rela-
tion to conservators:
"He shall appear for and represent his ward in all suits and
proceedings unless another person is appointed for that purpose,
as conservator or next friend; but nothing contained in this act
shall impair or affect the power of any court to appoint a con-
servator or next friend to defend the interests of said ward im-
pleaded in such court, or interested in a suit or matter therein
pending, nor its power to appoint or allow any person as next
friend for such ward to commence, prosecute or defend any suit
in his behalf, subject to the direction of such court."
Could the court then allow Arthur Morris, as next friend, to
maintain this suit for the purpose disclosed by the bill?
It is contended by appellant that the question is determined
adversely to the maintenance of the suit by the decision of our
Supreme Court in Covington v. Neftzger, 140 111. 608. If the
purpose of this suit were merely the termination of the agency
created by the power of attorney to appellant and for an account-
ing, we think it clear that the case would be governed by the
Covington case, and that the bill would not lie for such purpose
when brought by one volunteering as next friend. But here the
purpose of the bill is merely to conserve the estate until a con-
servator might be appointed by the Probate Court.
It would seem upon principle that a court of chancery should
have the power to protect the estate of an insane person until
a conservator could be appointed by the Probate Court, to which
jurisdiction the appointment of conservators of insane persons is
committed l)y the law of this State. The jurisdiction of the
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thi appeal, viz.: whether the suit may be entertained for the 
purpose indicated when commenced by an insane person by his 
next friend. 
The grounds for the intervention of a court of chancery are 
here ample, if the uit were brought by a complainant of sound 
mind and in hi own name. The relation of the partie , the 
in olvency of defendant, the refu al or failure to account, and 
the waste alleged, constitute sufficient ground for intervention 
of a court of equity, if the suit were brought by John L. Morris 
of sound mind. The question then is, he being a lunatic, could 
the suit be brought by his brother as his next friend? 
The statute, Sec. 13, Chap. 86, R. S., provides as follows in rela-
tion to conservators: 
"He shaU app ar for and represent his ward in all suits and 
proceedings unle another person is appointed for that purpose, 
as conservator or next friend; but nothing contained in this act 
shall impair or affect the power of any court to appoint a con-
servator or next friend to defend the interests of said ward im-
pleaded in such court, or interested in a suit or matter therein 
pending, nor its power to appoint or allow any person as next 
friend for such ward to commence, prosecute or defend any suit 
in his behalf, subject to the direction of such court." 
Could the court then allow Arthur Morris, as next friend, to 
maintain this suit for the purpose disclosed by the bill? 
It is contended by appellant that the question is determined 
adversely to the maintenance of the suit by the decision of our 
Supreme Court in Covington v. N eftzger, 140 Ill. 608. If the 
purpose of thi uit were merely the termination of the agency 
created by the power of attorney to appellant and for an account-
ing, we think it clear that the ca e would be governed by the 
Covington ca e, and that the bill would not lie for uch purpose 
when brought by one volunteering a next friend. But here the 
purpose of th bill i merely to con rv the e tate until a con-
servator might b appointed by the Probate Court. 
It would em upon principle that a ourt of hancery hould 
have th pow r to prot t th tate of an in an p r on until 
a con ervator ould b appoint d l th robat ourt to which 
juri diction th appointm nt of on ervator of in an p r on i_ 
committed by the law of thi tate. T'h juri di tion of thv 
han 1lor h r t thu appoint thi recciv r, can not be maintained 
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upon the ground alone that the sul)ject-mattor of the suit is a
matter proper for equitable cognizance, that is, the agency, the
waste, and the right to an accounting, for in respect to such relief
as the complainant might be entitled to in these matters, the suit
could not be maintained by one volunteering as next friend, un-
der the decision in the Covington case. But it would seem that
the suit may be maintained under the general chancery power to
protect the estates of lunatics, and for the limited purpose of such
protection oiily as could be shown to be necessary until a con-
servator might be appointed by the Probate Court.
In England the care of lunatics and their estates was vested
in the sovereign, and although the exercise of this care and control
was delegated by the sovereign to the chancellor, yet it was always
treated as a special prerogative of the crown, and not as a matter
within the general chancery powers.
The question of the inherent powers of our courts of chancery
in relation to this subject has been treated differently in different
States. In some States it has been held that the subject had so
far become a matter of chancery jurisdiction in England, that
when by constitution or statute the powers and jurisdiction of
the Court of Chancery of England were given to our courts of
chancery, this element of jurisdiction was thereby conferred. In
others it has been held that the power which the English chan-
cellor exercised in this behalf was not a judicial power, but a
delegated prerogative right, derived from the crown, and by special
delegation in each instance. But the courts so holding have, at
least in some cases, also held that when there was no special pro-
vision by the commonwealth giving courts of chancery this juris-
diction and power, yet it was to be considered as arising ex
necessitate for the protection of the persons and property of the
commonwealth.
Whether the conclusion that our courts of chancery have this
jurisdictional power is reached by the one process of reasoning
or the other, is of little importance. It may be regarded as well
settled in our State that the power exists in a court of chancery
to conserve the estate of a lunatic, when such action is necessary.
Dod(]c V. Cole, 97 111. 338.
The question then is, whether such protection may be extended
by a court of chancery for the period only which must intervene
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upon the ground alone that the ul ject-matter of the uit i a 
matter pr per for e uitaible ognizanc that i , the agency, the 
wa te, and th right to an a countin()" for in r pect to uch reli E 
a the omplainant might be entithl to in th e atter , th uit 
could not b maintai d by one volunt ·rinb a next fri nd, un-
d r th d i ion in th ovington ca c. ut i w uld em that 
th uit may be maintained und r th g n ral hancery po r 
prot t th tat of lunatic and for th limit d purpo f uch 
prot tion onl a ould be hown to b n c ar until a on-
rvator migh b appointed by the Probate ourt. 
n En land th car of lunatic and their tate wa e ted 
in h oYer i ·n an although the exerci e of thi care and control 
wa tlelegatecl by th o reign to the chanc llor y t it wa alway 
t r ated a a pecial preroo-ative of the crown, and not a a matter 
within the · neral hanc ry powers. 
Th que ti n of the inherent power of our courts of chancery 
in relation to thi ubj ct ha been treat d differently in different 
tate . In ome tat it ha been h ld that the ubject had o 
far become a matter of chancery juri diction in England, that 
when by con titution or tatute the power and juri diction ')f 
th Court of hancery of England were given to our court of 
chancery, thi element of juri diction wa thereby conferred. In 
other it ha been held that the power which the Engli h chan-
cellor exerci d in thi behalf wa not a judicial power, but a 
delegat d prerogati e right, deri ed from the crown, and by pecial 
d leo-ation in each in tance. But the court o holding have, at 
1 a t in ome ca , al o held that w h n there wa no pecial pro-
\i ion b, the commonw alth giving cour of chancery thi juri -
diction and pow r, ·et it wa to b con id red a ari ing ex 
neces itate for the protection of the p r on and propert3 of the 
commonw alth. 
\Yhether the conclu ion that our court of hancery ha1 thi 
juri dictional pow r i r ach d b th one proc of rea oning 
or the other i of littl importance. It may be r o-arded a ell 
cttl d in our tat tba t th power exi t in a cour of chancery 
t on r tl tat of a lunatic wh n uch action i ~ nece ary. 
Dodge '· 11. 
h qu tion th n i , whether u h I rot cti n may be :xten e 
l y a court of hanc r ' for th period nl ' '\\'"hi h mu ~t int r1 n 
before a con r tor an b appoint d b a ourt of pr at . Th 
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only contention to the contrary is based upon the decision in the
case of Covington v. Neftzger, supra. The gist of the decision
in that case is expressed in the following language of the court:
"A person suing as next friend has no authority to bind the
lunatic or his estate. * * * It would be a dangerous rule to'
hold that such a person might, at his own will or discretion, come
into court for the purpose of impeaching a transaction in which
he has no interest, as trustee or otherwise, and over which he has
no control. * * * ^Ye think it is a well settled principle that
the person who brings a bill to avoid the deed of an insane person,
must have power to act for such person and bind him and his
estate."
The court also considered whether the rule of the trial court
upon Covington, the next friend, to file a bond for costs, amounted
to an order authorizing him to sue. It seems clear that the court
did not intend to hold that the trial court might not in any case
"'allow'- a suit to be maintained by a next friend, and did not
construe the section of the statute above set forth to that effect.
AVhat the decision does hold is that a volunteer can not thus elect
to set aside the deed of the lunatic. And there is a distinction
indicated between an attempt to procure equitable relief in chan-
cery by setting aside a deed for a lunatic who appears only by
next friend, and an effort merely to protect the estate of the lunatic
through a suit brought by next friend until a committee or con-
servator can be appointed to represent him.
The case of Jones v. Lloyd, 18 Law Eep. Eq. Cas. 265, which
is cited in the Covington case and quoted from for the express
purpose of illustrating this distinction, would seem to precisely
apply to the conditions here presented. In that case the court
said:
"Can a suit be instituted by a lunatic, not found so by inquisi-
tion, by his next friend ? I have no doubt it can. There is author-
ity upon the subject, and it seems to me so distinct that I have no
occasion, really, to refer to the reason, for I think the cases of
Ligld V. Light (25 Beav. 248), and Bcall v. Smith (Law Rep. 8
Ch. 85), are such authorities; but independently of the unre-
ported case of Fislier v. NelJcs, where I know the point was dis-
cussed, and independently of authority, let us look at the reason
of the thing. If this were not the law, anybody might, at his will
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onl ' contention to th con rary i ba ed upon the d ci ion in the 
ca of ovington . N ef tzger, supra. The gist of the decision 
in that a e i _pre ed in th followin lan uage of the court: 
A p r on uing a next fri nd ha no authority to bind the 
lunatic or hi e tate. * * * It would be a dangerou rule to· 
hold that u h a person might, at hi own will or di retion, come 
into court for the purpo of imp aching a tran action in which 
he ha no intere t, a tru t e or otherwise, and over which he ha -
no ontrol. * * * We think it i a well ettlecl principle that 
the per on who brings a bill to avoid the deed of an in ane person, 
mu t have power to act for uch per on and bind him and his 
e tate." 
The court al o con ider d whether the rule of the trial court 
upon Covington, the next friend, to file a bond for co t , amounted 
to an ord r authorizing him fo ue. It eem clear that the court 
did not intend to hold that the trial court might not in any case 
'allow" a uit to be mainta:ined by a next friend, and did not 
con true the ection of the statute above set forth fo that effect. 
\\That the d i ion doe hold i that a volunteer can not thus elect 
to et a ide the deed of the lunatic. And there i a di tinction 
indicated between an attempt to procure equifable relief in chan-
cery by etting a ide a deed for a lunatic who appears only by 
next friend, and an effort merely to protect the e tate of the lunatic 
through a uit brought by next friend until a committee or con-
ervator can be appointed to represent him. 
The ca e of Jones v. Lloyd, 18 Law Rep. Eq. Oas. 265, which 
i cited in the Covington case and quoted from for the expre s 
purpo e of illustrating thi di tinction, would eem to precis ly 
apply to th condition here pre ented. In that ca e the court. 
said: 
" an a uit b in tituted by a lunatic, not found o by inqui i-
tion, by hi next fri nd? I hav no doubt it can. Th r i author-
ity upon th ubj ct and it cem to me o di tinct that I hav no 
occa ion, r ally to r fer to the r a on, for think the ca of 
Light v. Light (25 Beav. 24 ), an B eall . mith (Law R p. 8 
h. ) are u h authoriti · but ind p nd ntly of th unre-
port d a of Fi her v. 0i elle wh r l now the p int wa di -
·u ed and ind p ndent] y of authority let u look at the reason 
f the thiner. If thi w r not th law anybo y might at hi will 
and pl a. ur , commit wa tc on a lunatic prop rt~ r fo damacre 
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or serious injur}' and ann()\aiic(- to him or his property, without
there being an}' remedy whatever. In the first place, the Lord
Justices or the Lord Ciianeelior are not always sitting for applica-
tions in lunacy. In the next place, if they were, everybody knows
it takes a considerable time to make a man a lunatic by inquisi-
tion, * * * Is it to be tolerated that any person can injure
him or his property without there being any power in any court
of justice to restrain such injury? Is it to l^e said that a man
may cut down trees on the property of a person in this unfortunate
state, and that because no effort of his can be made, no member
of his family can file a bill in his name as next friend, to prevent
that injury? Is it to be allowed that a man may make away with
the share of a lunatic in a partnership business, or take away the
trust property in which he is interested, without this court being
able to extend its protection to him by granting an injunction at
the suit of the lunatic by a next friend, because he is not found
so by inquisition ? I take it those propositions, when stated, really
furnish a complete answ'er to the suggestion that he can not main-
tain such a suit. Of course they do not answer the question as to
how far he may carry it; but that he can maintain such a suit
^for the purpose of protection, for the purpose of ol)taining, as in
this case, a receiver, I should think there can be no doubt what-
ever."
Other decisions holding to like doctrine are: Beese v. Reese,
89 Ga. 645; Whetstone v. Whetstone, 75 Ala. 495.
We are of opinion, therefore, that while under the decision in
the Covington case this suit brought by next friend might not be
maintained for the ultimate purpose alone of annulling the deed
by which the agency of the defendant was created, nor for the
obtaining of an accounting alone, yet it may be maintained for the
sole purpose of protecting the estate of the lunatic, through a re-
ceivership, until a conservator can be appointed to act for him.
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r erious injury and ann yan . ' to him r hi prop rty, wrn1out 
th r b ing any r m , l \ hat,,. r . ln tl fir t pla · , th" Lord 
u tic s r th rel 1ha1 · llor ar n alway itting for applica-
tion in luna y. In th n . :t pla e, if lh 'Y wer , ev ryl ody know ' 
it tak s a on id rabl im' t make a man a lunatic by inq ui ·i-
ti n. * ··· * i to b tol rat d tha any per on can injure 
him or hi pr p rty with ut th r b i g any pow r in any ourt 
.r ju tic to r train u h injur ? I it t b aid that a man 
may cut d wn tr on th pr p rty of a per on in thi unfortunate 
. tat , an 1 that be au no ffort of hi · n b mad no member 
f hi :family an fil a bill in hi nam a n yt fri nd to pr vent 
that injury? I it to b allow d that a man may mak away with 
th har f a lunati in a partner hip bu in or tak awa the 
tru t pr p rty in whi h h i intere t d, without thi ourt l eing 
abl to xt nd it protection to him by granting an injun ti n at 
th uit of th lunati by a n xt fri nd, b au e he i not founJ 
o b inqui ition? I take it tho e pr po ition , when tat d r ally 
furni h a ompl t an w r to th ugg tion that he can not main-
tain uch a ui t. £ cour th y do not an w r the que tion a to 
how far h may arry it; but that he can maintain uch a uit 
for the purpo of prot cti n for th purpo e of obtain.in a in 
thi ca , a rec iver, hould think th r can be no doubt what-
e er. ' 
ther deci ion holdinO' to like do trine are : Ree e v. ReeseJ 
9 a. 6-±5; 1 het tone v. hetstoneJ 5 la. 495 . 
w· ar of opinion, th refore that whil under the deci ion in 
th o in ton ca e thi uit brought by n xt friend might not be 
maintain 1 £.or th ultima t purpo e alone of annullin th d eel 
b' whi h th agency of the def ndant wa reated nor for the 
obt, ining of an a countin · alone, yet it ma b maintained for the 
1 purpo of prot tin th tate of th lunatic through a re-
c i rship until a. con r ator an b appointed to act for him. 




^r^y' ^^ PARTIES TO A SUIT IN EQUITY.
'^ ^ Parties Classified.
^* * Chadbourne v. Coe, 10 U. S. App. 78. (1892.)
Eeuben W. Chadbourne, a citizen of the State of Wisconsin,
filed his bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Minnesota against Orlen P. Whitcomb, a citi-
zen of the State of Colorado, and James N. Coe, a citizen of the
State of Minnesota, alleging that Whitcomb was indebted to the
complainant in a sum exceeding five thousand dollars upon certain
promissory notes set out in the bill ; that Whitcomb was insolvent,
and that to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors he had by
deeds conveyed certain real estate, and by bills of sale transferred
certain personal property, to Coe upon certain secret trusts in
writing, which instruments creating the alleged trusts are made
exhibits to the bill. The last in date of these alleged trust agree-
ments included all the property, real and personal, conveyed and
transferred by Whitcomb to Coe, and the powers conferred and
trusts imposed on Coe thereby are as follows:
"Now, in consideration of the premises I, the said Orlen P.
Whitcomb, hereby authorize and fully empower the said James
N. Coe to sell, exchange or dispose of any and all of the said
property mentioned in the agreements hereinbefore referred to,
whicli has not been already disposed of, together with all of the
personal property hereby conveyed to said Coe, to such person
or persons, and for such prices and on such terms as said Coe shall
sec fit, hereby granting unto said Coe full and exclusive authority
to manage, dispose of and control said property or any thereof as
he shall see fit, and hereby fully investing him with all the rents,
profits and increase of said property, both real and personal, and
giving him full authority to execute and deliver any and all con-
veyances or instruments necessary or proper to convey or dispose
of, or in the management of, the same without obtaining my_ con-
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~~ PARTIES TO A SUIT IN EQUITY. 
CHAPTER II. 
A~ PARTIE OLA IFIED. . . 
~ Chadbourne v. Coe, 10 U. . App. 78. {1892.) 
Reuben W. hadbourne a citizen of the State of Wi consin, 
filed hi bill in eq ui t in the ircui t ourt of the United State 
for the Di trict of 1inne ota again t Orl n P. Whit omb, a citi-
zen of the tat of Colorado, and Jame :N. Coe a citizen of th·3 
State of Iinn ota, allegina that "hitcomb wa ind bted to the 
complainant in a um exc ecling :fi e thou and dollar upon certaiu 
promi ory note t out in the bill; that Whitcomb wa in olvent, 
and that to hind r, delay and defraud hi creditor he had by 
deed conveyed certain real e tate, and by bill of sal tran ferr cl 
certain per onal property to Coe upon certain er t tru t }n 
writing which in trument creating the alleged tru t are mad 
exhibit to the bill. The la t in date of the e alleged tru t agr e-
m nt included all the property, real and personal, convey d and 
tran ferred by Whitcomb to Coe, and th power conferred arnl 
tru t impo ed on oe thereby are a follow : 
Tow, in con ideration of the premi e I, the aid Orlen 
Whit omb, h r by authorize and fully empow r the aid Jame· 
e to ll, xchange or di pose of any and all of the aid 
pro1 rty m ntioned in the agr em nt h reinbefore r f rr cl t 
whi ·h ha not b n alr ady di po eel of tog ther with all of the 
p r onal prop rt her b3 on y d to aid oe to uch l r. n 
or p r on , and for u h pri e and on u h t rm a aid o ha U 
fit her by ranting unt aid o full and ex lu iv authorit 
t rnana e di po of and ontrol ai 1 pr p rty or an.' th r of a~ 
h . hall fit and h r b fully inv tin him with ·111 the r nt'i 
pr fit and in r a. f aid pr p rty both r al an 1 p r onal, anu 
giving him full auth rity t ex ut ncl d liv r n and all on-
yanc . or in trum nt n c ar · or pr p r t 
f, r in th manao- rn nt f th ._ rn with ut 
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property derived from the sale of any of said property, or the
rents, profits or increase thereof, said Coe is hereby authorized and
directed to liold and apply, when reduced to money, on any sura
or sums of money now due or hereafter owing to said Coe from
said Whitcomb, and on any indebtedness incurred in the manage-
ment of said property or taxes paid, and on any and all liabilities
now or at any time hereafter incurred by said Coe for said Whit-
comb, as surety or otherwise, and after the satisfaction and pay-
ment of all such claims and indebtedness whatsoever, the balance
thereafter to be paid to said Whitcomb."
It is alleged that Whitcomb has no other property out of which
the complainant can make his debt. The prayer of the bill is
that the conveyances of Coe be set aside, that the trust agreements
be declared void, and that Coe be required to account; that the
real estate be sold and the complainant's debt paid out of the pro-
ceeds and the moneys received from Coe on the accounting. The
complainant died, and the suit was revived in the name of Cath-
erine E. Chadbourne and Smith W. Chadbourne, his executors.
Whitcomb appeared specially and filed a plea to the jurisdiction
of the court upon the ground that he was a citizen of Colorado,
which plea was sustained, and the bill was dismissed as to him.
No complaint is made of this ruling, touching which the counsel
for the appellants in their brief say: "\Miitcomb was originally
made a defendant, but he was dismissed upon filing a plea to the
jurisdiction, and, as we think, properly, under the act of August
13, 1888, defining the jurisdiction of Federal courts, and no excep-
tion is taken to the dismissal." After the suit was dismissed as to
Whitcomb, Coe filed a demurrer to the bill for want of proper
parties, which the court sustained and entered a decree dismissing
the bill without prejudice, and the complainants appealed. In
the brief of the counsel for the appellants it is said: "The only
question for the consideration of this court is whether or not the
Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer upon the ground
that Whitcomb is not a party to the action." The opinion of the
Circuit Court dismissing the bill is reported in 45 Fed. Rep. 822.
Caldwell, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, de-
livered the opinion of the court.
The Supreme Court of the United States divide parties to suits

















































































































































HADBO R E . OE 33 
property deriv d fro the ale of any of . aid property, or be 
r nt · profit r in ·r a e thereof, aid 1 i h r by authorized anu 
dir t d t hold nd pply wh n rc<lu · d t money, on any , um 
or um of mon y n w due or her aft r ing to aid 1oe from 
aid \ hiteomb, and on any indebtedn in ·urr d in the managc-
m ·nt of aid pr p rty r ta e paid, and on any and. all liabili ic 
now or at any ti h r aft r in urr -d by aid o for aid Whit-
·omb, a ur ty or therwi e, an l aft r th ati faction and pay-
m •nt of all u h laim and ind 1 t dn wh oe r, the balan ·e 
ther af r t b paid to aid hit ornb. 
It i all d that \1 hitcornb ha no oth r pr p rty out of which 
h complainant an make hi debt. The prayer of the bill i-
tbat th on yan of oe be et a ide, that the tru t agreement 
b d clared void, and that oe b r quired to account; hat the 
r al tat be old and the complainant' d bt paid out of the pro-
e: d and th money received from oe on the accounting. The 
complainant died, and the suit wa revived in the name of Cath-
erine 1 • hadbourne and Smith W. Chadbourn , hi executor . . 
Whit omb app ar d pecially and fil d a pl a to the juri diction 
of the ourt upon the ground that he wa a itizen of olorado 
which pl a wa u tained, and the bill wa di mi ed a to him. 
o complaint i made of thi ruling, touching which the coun el 
for the app llant in their brief ay : 'Whitcomb wa originally 
mad a defendant, but he wa di mi ed upon filing a plea to the 
juri diction and a w think, prop rly, und r th act of ugu t 
1 , 1 , d fining th juri diction of F deral courts, and no excep-
tion i taken to th di mi al." fter the uit wa di mi ed a to 
Whitcomb o fil d a demurrer to the bill for want of proper 
parti whi ·h the court u tained and entered a d cree di~mi in<T 
the bill without pr judice, and the complainant appeal d. In 
the bri f of th un 1 for th app lla t it i aid : Th only 
qu tion f r th on id ration of thi ourl i whether or not h' 
ir uit ourt rr d in u tainin<T the demurr r upon the ground 
that \ hit omb i not a party to the a tion. The opinion of th 
tut li"mi ing the bill i r ported in 4 Fed. ep. 2' . 
ir uit Jud ·e· aft r tat.in , th ca e a abov d -
li pini. n f th tut. 
Th > u1 r m ourt £ th di id parti , m 
in qui y int thr la formal p·:irti ~ · cond n ce ' -
3 
34 Parties Classified
sary parties; Third, indispensable parties. Formal parties are
those who have no interest in the controversy between the imme-
diate litigants, but have an interest in the subject-matter which
may be conveniently settled in the suit and thereby prevent further
litigation. They may be parties or not at the option of the com-
plainant. Necessary parties are those who have an interest in the
controversy, but whose interests are separable from those of the
parties before the court, and will not be directly affected by a
decree which does complete and full justice between them. Such
persons must be made parties, if practicable, in obedience to the
general rule which requires all persons to be made parties who are
interested in the controversy, in order that there may be an end
of litigation; but the rule in the Federal courts is, that if they
are beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or if making them parties
would oust the jurisdiction of the court, the case may proceed to
a final decree between the parties before the court, leaving the
rights of the absent parties untouched, and to be determined in
any competent forum. The reason for this liberal rule in dis-
pensing with necessary parties in the Federal courts will be pres-
ently stated. Indispensable parties are those who not only have
an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy, but an interest
of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either
affecting their interests or leaving the controversy in such a con-
dition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. Shields v. Barrow, IT How.
130, 139; Ribon v. Railroad Companies, 16 Wall. 446, 450; Coiron,
V. Millaudon, 19 How. 113; Williams v. Bankliead, 19 Wall. 563;
Eendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; Alexander v. Horner, 1 McCrary,
634. .
I The general rule as to parties in chancery is that persons falling
within the definition of necessary parties must be brought in for
the purpose of putting an end to the whole controversy, or the
bill will be dismissed; and this is still the rule in most of the
state courts. But in the Federal courts this rule has been relaxed.
The relaxation resulted from two causes: First, the limitation
imposed upon the jurisdiction of these courts by the citizenship
of the parties; and Second, by their inability to bring in parties
out of their jurisdiction by publication. The extent of the re-
laxation of the general rule in the Federal courts is expressed in

















































































































































34 p ARTIES CLA.SSIFIED 
sary partie ; Third, indi pen able parties. Formal parties are 
those who have no intere t in the controversy between the imme-
diate litigaints, but have an interest in the subject-matter which 
may be conveniently ettled in the suit and thereb3 prevent further 
litigation. The may be parties or not at the option of the com-
plainant. ec ary partie are those who have an intere t in the 
controversy, but whose interests are separable from those of the 
partie before the court, and will not be directly affected by a 
decree which does complete and full justice between them. Such 
per ons must be made parties, if practicable, in obedience to the 
general rule which requires all persons to be made partie who are 
intere ted in the controversy, in order that there may be an end 
of litigation; but the rule in the Federal courts is, that if they 
are beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or if making them partiea 
would ou t the juri diction of the court, the case may proceed to 
a :final decree between the parties before the court, leaving the 
rights of the absent parties untouched, and to be determined in 
any competent forum. The reason for this liberal rule in dis-
pensing with necessary parties in the Federal courts will be pres-
ently stated. Indispensable parties are those who not only have 
an interest in the subject-matter of the controversy, but an interest 
of such a nature tha·t a :final decree cannot be made without either 
affecting their interests or leaving the controversy in such a con-
dition that it final determination may be wholly incon i tent 
with equity and good conscience. Shields v. Barrow, 1' How. 
130, 139; Ribon v. Railroad Companies, 16 Wall. 446, 450; Co iron 
v. Millaudon, 19 How. 113; Williams v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563; 
Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; Alexander v. Horner, 1 McCrary, 
634 .. 
The general rule a to parties in chancery is that per ons falling 
within the definition of n ce ary parties mu t be brouO"ht in for 
the purpo e of putting a nd to the whole contro r , or the 
bill will be di mis d; an this is till the rule in most of the 
state ourt . But in the F deral court thi rule ha b n relaxed. 
The relaxation r ulted from two cau Fir t, the limitation 
impos d upon the juri diction of the ourt by the citizen hip 
of th parti ; and cond, by their inability to bring in partie, 
uut of their juri di tion by publication. Th extent of th re-
laxation of th g neral rule in the Federal court i , pre ed in 
the forty- eventh quity rule. That rule is imply d cla·ratory of 
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the previous decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject of the
rule. The Supreme Court has said repeatedly, that, notwithstand-
ing this rule, a Circuit Court can make no decree affecting the
rights of an absent person, and that all persons whose interests
will be directly affected by the decree are indispensable parties.
Shields v. Barrow, supra; Rihon v. Railroad Companies, supra;
Coiron v. Millaudon, supra; Alexander v. Horner, supra; The
Cole Silver Mining Company v. The Virginia and Gold Hifl
Water Company, 1 Sawyer, 685.
Can a decree be made in this case without affecting the rights
of Whitcomb? Before the complainants can have the specific
relief sought by the bill, the court must find and decree: First,
that Whitcomb is indebted to the complainants in the sum of
$5,000 more or less as alleged in the bill ; Second, that Whitcomb
is insolvent; Third, that the deeds from Whitcomb to Coe are
fraudulent and void as to Whitcomb's creditors; Fourth, that the
agreement between Whitcomb and Coe relating to the sale of the
property and an accounting for the same, and for the rents and
profits thereof, is fraudulent and void; Fifth, that the lands be
sold and that the proceeds of the sale be applied to the payment
of Whitcomb's alleged indebtedness to the complainants; and
Sixth, that Coe account for the property and its rents and profits,
and that he pay the amount found due to the complainants on
Whitcomb's alleged indebtedness to them. If the complainants
are not creditors of Whitcomb, as they allege; or if Whitcomb is
not insolvent; or if the deeds Wliitcomb made to Coe are not
fraudulent; or if the contracts set out between Whitcomb and Coe
are valid, the bill cannot be maintained. In the judicial deter-
mination of every one of these issue s Whitcomb is an indis pensable
^rty. As to some of them he is necessarily the only party in
interest; the only party who would be affected by the decree, and
the only party capable of making an intelligent defence.
The contracts or trust agreements between ^^^litcomb and Coe
made part of the bill are not fraudulent on their face. Upon
their face they are valid agreements, under which Whitcomb can
compel Coe to account for the property, and its rents, issues and
profits. If the court in a suit to which Whitcomb was not a party
should compel Coe to account for, and turn over, the property and
money to the complainants, such a decree would be no bar to a suit
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of the iupr m 1 urt on th ubject of the 
rule. The upr m ,ourt ha aicl r p at dly, that, notwith tand-
in thi rul , a ir :ui t 1ourt an make no d cree affecting tl e 
right of an ab nt p r on, and that all p r ons ' ho int r' t 
will be d.ir ctly air 1. d by th d er ar indi p n able parti . 
hield . Barrow, upra,· Rivon . ailroad ompanies, supra; 
Coiron . 1 illaudon, supra; Alexander . II orner, supra; The 
Cole ilver lining ompany v. The irginia and Gold Ilill 
lVater ompany, 1 a·wyer, 6 5. 
an a decree be made in thi ca e without affecting the ri h 
of Whi omb? fore the o plainant an haYe the pe ·ific 
relief ought by th bill, the court mu t find and d cree : Fir t 
that \\ hitcomb i indebt d to the complainant in the um of 
$5,000 mor or 1 a alleged in the bill; econd, that Whitcomb 
i in ol nt; Thir , that th de d from Whit omb to oe are 
fraudul nt and void a to Whitcomb creditor ; Fourth that the 
agre ment between hitcomb and oe relating to the ale of the 
prop rt and an accounting for the ame, and for the rent and 
profit thereof i fraudul nt and void; Fifth, that the land he 
old an that th pro eed of the ale be applied to the payment 
of itcomb all g d indebtedne to the complainant · and 
ixth, that Coe account for th property and it rent and profits, 
and that he pa the amount found due to the complainant on 
Whit omb all ged indebtedne to tb m. If the complainant 
are not er di tor of Whitcomb a the all ge; or i£ Whitcomb i · 
not in ol ent; or if the deed Whitcomb made to Coe are not 
fraudulent; or if th contract et out between Whitcomb and oe 
are alid the bill annot be maintained. In the judicial deter-
mination of ev r one of ~he e i ue Whitcomb i an ind.i p n able 
~ to ome of them he i nece aril the onl part in 
intere t · the onl party who would b affected b th decree and 
the onl party capable of making an intelligent defence. 
Th contracts or tru t agreement b tween Whitcomb and o 
mad part of the bill are not fraudul nt on their face. pon 
th ir fac h are alid a r ment und r whi h Whitcomb an 
comp 1 ac ount for the propert and it r nt i u and 
profit . ourt in a uit to whi h hit omb wa not a par 
h nl 1 mp 1 t a ount for a·nd turn r, th prop rty an 
monry to tlt omr luin, nt , uch a d r oul har to a ::::nit 
y Whit m a ain. t o to com 1 th latt r t a · unt t - him 
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according to the terms of the agreement between them, and for
this reason Coe has a right to insist that Whitcomb shall be made
a party for his protec-tion. Alexander v. Horner, supra.
Formerly the general rule was that a judgment must be obtained
and execution returned 7iulla hona, or its equivalent, before a bill
could be filed to vacate a fraudulent conveyance, and it was held
that the debtor was a necessary party to such a bill. In modern
times this rule has by legislation in some of the States, and by
judicial decisions in others, undergone important modifications not
necessary to be noticed in the decision of this case. The cases on the
subject are collected in 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 1-115, note 4;
Story's Eq. PL (10th ed.), § 233, note (h) ; Pomeroy on Remedies
and Remedial Rights, § 347. But the modern cases which go to
the greatest length in modifying the old rule fall far short of sup-
porting the complainants' contention in this case. In this case
there is not only no judgment, but it is contended that the alleged
debtor has no right to be heard on the question as to whether he
owes the complainants anything for which a judgment should be
rendered.
We do not rest our decision upon the ground that a creditor
cannot file a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of his debtor
and subject the property to the payment of his debt until he has
obtained a judgment at law for his debt and had a return of nulla
hona (as to which see Case v. Beauregard, 101 TJ. S. 688) ; but
upon the ground that a creditor cannot maintain a bill to establish
a debt against his alleged debtor, to annul the debtor's conveyances
and contracts, and appropriate his property and money to the pay-
ment of the creditor's alleged debt, without making the debtor a
party of the bill seeking such relief. It is fundamental in the
jurisprudence of this country that no court, and, least of all, a
Federal court, can adjudicate upon the rights of one not before
it and not subject to its jurisdiction.


















































































































































36 PARTIES CLASSIFIED 
according to the terms of the agreement between them, and for 
thi rea on oe has a right to insi t thait Whitcomb shall be made 
a part for hi protection. Alexander v. H 01·ner, supra. 
Formerly he general rule was that a judgment must be obtained 
and ex cution returned nuUa bona, or its equivalent, before a; bill 
could be filed to vacate a fraudulent conveyance, and it was held 
that the debtoir was a nece ary party to such ai bill. In modern 
times this rule has by legislation in some of the States, a·nd by 
judicial deci ion in other , undergone important modifications not 
nece ary to be noticed in the decision nf this case. The cases on the 
ubject are collected in 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 1415, note 4; 
Story's Eq. Pl. (10th ed.), § 233, note (b); Pomeroy on Remedies 
and Remedial Rights, § 347. But the modern cases which go to 
the greatest length in modifying the old rule fall far hart of sup-
porting the complainants' contention in this case. In this case 
there is not only no judgment, but it is contended that the alleged 
debtor has no right to be heard on the question as to whether he 
owes the complainants anything for which a judgment should be 
rendered. 
We do not rest our decision upon the ground that a creditor 
cannot file a bill to set aside a; fraudulent conveyance of his debtor 
and subject the property to the payment of his debt until he has 
obtained a judgment at law for his debt and had a return of nulla 
bona (as to which see Case v. Beauregard, 101 U. S. 688) ; but 
upon the ground that a creditor cannot maintain a bill to establish 
a debt against his alleged debtor, to annul the debtor's conveyances 
and contrads, and appropriate his property and money to the pay-
ment of the creditor's alleged debt, without making the debtor a 
party o·f the bill seeking such relief. It is fundamental in the 
juri prudence of this country that no court, and, lea t of all, a ., 
Federal court, can adjudicate upon the rights of one not before 
it a-nd not subject to its jurisdiction. 
The decree of the Circuit Court is 
Affirmed. 
Brunner v. Bay City
Brunner v. Bay City, J^O Mich. 2SG. (1^.)[ ^ -^ jj^ _ P
Joint Plaintiffs.
^A
Appeal from Bay. Submitted June 8. Decided June 1/
Bill to set aside tax sales and vacate sewer assessment
ants appeal. Eeversed; bill dismissed.
Campbell, J.: '^ v /* c i ~
This is a bill filed by a large number of persons whose lots have , jtT » .
been bid in by Bay City under a sewer assessment to have the sales \y ///
set aside as illegal. The ground of illegality is that the sewer itself i ^ ^ (^
was not authorized to be built, nor the assessments authorized ioW Ok
be made in the manner adopted. /, lO- '^
Without going at length into the question presented, we areijj^-,/ ^.
met at the outset by a difficulty which we cannot overlook. We do a ^ (^
not find any warrant for any such joinder of grievances. The citytr ^ ^
now occupies the same position which would be occupied by anylJr
other tax purchaser who might choose to bid off all of these parcels.i
Each complainant would have against him a single separate^' o
grievance, but it would not in law be a common grievance, merely^p
because it was similar in its nature to the grievances of others
The assertion of his title against one would be by a separate action
and his action of ejectment could not implead any persons
interested in the parcel it involved. Matters in which there is no
common interest on the one side or the other are not allowed to*^ vir^
be litigated jointly; and while there are some classes of cases j^' ^
where the community of interest is not as plain as in others, we
do not think they go far enough to warrant this suit.
The joinder of several parties similarly interested in resisting-|b»
a common aggressor was ordinarily allowed, to save multiplying U
litigation, to settle once and finally the matter in contention. It ^
was at first strictly confined to cases where the act complained of,
if done, or continued, would affect every one in the same way, and
would affect all, if any. It was applied in questions of commons
in pasturage, fisheries, and similar interests, and in questions of
tithes, which were asserted over certain districts. It was extended
on the same grounds to frauds or wrongs by corporate aixents
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finally applied to restrain taxes and assessments, in which the
inhabitants of localities taxed, or the owners of land in assess-
ment districts, were sought to be charged for a common burden.
There is no doubt that in some of these cases the rule may have
been extended somewhat beyond the line first laid down. But in
all of the cases which have been well considered, there has been
one cause of grievance which at the time of filing the bill involved
some aggressive action in which all of the parties complaining
were involved in precisely the same way. And we have held dis-
tinctly that in such actions, if any person set up grievances not
of the same common nature with those of the rest, the bill could
not be maintained. Kerr v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 34. See also
Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540 and Scofield v. Lansing, IT Mich.
437; YoungUood v. Sexton, 33 Mich. 406.
In the present case it may be doubted whether the complainants
could have joined in a suit to enjoin the assessment, however
illegal. The chief objection underlying the whole theory of the
bill is that the assessment was not and could not lawfully be made
upon any general and uniform system of apportionment; but that
each lot should be assessed, not an aliquot part of a general charge,
but so much as it was separately benefited by the work. It is very
evident that each complainant is interested in enlarging the re-
sponsibilities of the rest and in diminishing his own. Instead of
a communty of interest their interests are hostile.
But when the assessment has been enforced by sale, we can see
no reason why one purchaser should differ from another, or why
the purchase of several lots should be regarded as a common wrong
to the several lot-owners. He is not after his purchase capable
of doing any act which can operate as a common grievance. Each
act in the enforcement of his title is an independent and several
injury, if it is a wrong at all, and no lot-owner is hurt by the
wrong done to his neighbor. It would be like the exclusion of a
person from a common or fishery, on personal grounds, and not on
a denial of the general right. No joinder of complaints could be
allowed in such cases.
We think Bay City cannot be sued in this way, and that if any
lot-owner has an equitable grievance against the sale of his lot
actually made, he must sue for it separately.
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finally applied to re train taxes and a e sments, in which the 
inhabitants of localiti taxed, or the owner of land in a ess-
ment di trict , w re ought to be charged for a common burden. 
Th re i no doubt that in ome of these ca es the rule may ha·rn 
been extend d somewhat beyond the line first laid down. But in 
all of th ca es which have been well considered, there has been 
on cau e of grievance which a·t the time of filing the bill involveLl 
ome aggre ive action in which all of the partie complaining 
were involved in precisely the same way. And we have held di .... -
tinctly that in such action , if any per on set up grievance not 
f the ame common nature with those of the rest, the bill could 
not be maintained. Kerr v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 3-±. See al o 
Miller v. Grandy 13 Mich. 5-10 and Scofield v. Lansing, 17 Mich. 
-±3'; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406. 
In the pre ent case it may be doubted whether the complainants 
could have joined in a suit to enjoin the assessment, however 
illegal. The chief objection underlying the whole theory of tho 
bill is that the assessment wa not and could not lawfully be made 
upon any general and uniform system of apportionment; but that 
each lot should be assessed, not an aliquot part of a general charge, 
but so much as it was separate!) benefited by the work. It is very 
evident that each complainant is interested in enlarging the re-
ponsibilities of the rest and in dimini bing hi own. Instead of 
a communty of interest their intere ts are hostile. 
But when the assessment has been enforced by sale, we can see 
no reason why one purchaser hould differ from another, or why 
the purcha e of everal lots should be regarded as a common wrong 
to the several lot-owner . He is not a:fter his purchase capable 
of doing any act which an operate as a common grievance. Each 
act in the enforcement of his title i an independent and several 
injury, if it is a wrong at all, and no lot-owner i hurt by the 
wrong done to hi neighbor. It would be like the xclu ion of a 
per on from a common or fi hery, on per on.al around , and not on 
a enial of th eneral right. No joinder of complaint could be 
allowed in uch ca e . 
We think Bay City cannot b ued in thi way, and that if any 
lot-owner ha an quitabl grievance again t the ale of hi lot 
actually made, he mu t ue for it eparately. 
The decree mu t be reversed with costs and bill dismissed. 
Murray v. Hay 39
CooLEY and Graves, JJ., concurred.
Marston, C. J., being a resident tax-payer of Bay City, did not i^P^
sit in this case. r^ij^ " '-^
Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Cli. (N. Y.) 59. {ISJto.J'T^'^ ^\J.>^/ ^
This was an application, on the part of the complainants, to . ^^ Ji
open an order entered by the defendant to close the proofs, ancF*"^^ '^\^
to allow farther time for the complainants to take testimony in^^^'''*^
this cause. And a second application was made, for leave to amen
the complainant's bill, by striking out the name of Murray as one
of the complainants therein. V^
The defendant's solicitor, on the 10th of June, 1835, entere|^
an order that the complainants produce witnesses in this cause/,
within forty days after notice of the order, and served a notice jjl/^ ' \^
of such order upon the solicitor for the complainants the samo^*-^^^ *^
day. On the 18th of July, the solicitor for the complainants }^^y^ ^
mailed an affidavit, directed to the chancellor, and obtained his, Jt^ ii)^^-
fiat for an order, founded thereon, extending the time to produce U/J^ '^
proofs until the 1st of October. The fiat was received on Mon-'' jj-^^ ,^
day the 21st of July, the second day after the great fire in Xewf^^Lji'^ ^
York; and the order was entered the same day, but was not served,' t^ ^
until the afternoon of the 22d, owing to the derangement oi
business produced by the fire. Previous to the receipt of notice oil
the order, the defendant's solicitor had entered an order to closj
the proofs; which, under the instructions of his client, he refused, ^'^ ^t^
to open. The application for leave to amend was made upon th(!- Jp^^ ^ ^
supposition that an objection for a misjoinder of complainants . t^ /j/
could be sustained ; the bill having been filed by two persons, vfh^i'^^'^ltr^ f,
were owners of different dwelling houses in severalty, having no/'^^ v. '*'[
joint interest in either of them, to restrain an alleged nuisanco^A^^l^*^''
which was a common but not a joint injury to both of the com-, ^ ^iJ^
plainants. / ^ ^j^
The Chancellor: J^ ^'-'
The objection that the order to produce witnesses was not
entered in the proper form is not well taken. By the practice
of the English court of chancery, and as it formerly existed here,
eitlier party who wished to close the proofs was obliged to enter


















































































































































fifAH T ... r 
sit in thi 
RRAY V. y 3 
R \ • , J ., on ·urr cl. 
b 1ing a r ident tax-pay r f Bay ity, did not rjf,0 
_, ",./' 
- ~~t.- :AA 
Murray . Jlay 1 a;·b. 'h. ( . Y.) 9. (1 4 .) c;.}r~ ~ 
Thi wa an a1 pli ati n on th part f the ·omplainant, to rl.~ / 
op nan ord r nt rd by th d f ndant to clo e th proof, an0.F , 
1. llow farther tim for the complainant to tak te timony i 
thi ·au e. nd a on application wa mad for lea ' to amen ~ 
th' omplainant l ill ' triking out the name of Murra: a o:e111 ~ 
f th omplainaint th r in. ~.., _) ~ 
Th d f ndanf oli ·itor on the 1 th of June, 1 35 ntere~ ~ 
an rd r that h complainan produce witn e in thi cau e . 
ithin forty a ·~ after noti e of th ord r and ened a noti ·ev , ~ · ~ 
of uch order upon th olicitor for the omplainan the am P - UV' 
da ·. On th 1 th of Jul', the olicitor for the complainant. J'~~f'.~  
maile l an affidavit dir ct d to the hanc llor and obtain cl hi· p ,.tA 
fiat for an ord r found d thereon extending the time to produce ~ ~ 
proof until th 1 t of October. The fiat wa received on ~Ion-V v 
da · the 1 t of Jul ' th cond da · after he gr at fir in ~ """e~~~ !A 
York; and the ord r wa entered the ame da but \fa not erved; / 
until th afternoon of the 2 d, owing to th derangement o - t--1 
bu ine produ d by th fir . Previou to the re eip of notice of 
th ord r the d f ndant olicitor had enter d an ord r to clo 
th proof · whi h und r th in truction of hi client he r fu e 
to open. Th application for leav-e to am nd wa made upon th' - ,.;- u-
uppo ition that an objection for a mi joinder of complainant~ . d-"' , ~ 
ould b u tained · th bill having be n filed by two per on wh~ V ' 
wer own r of iff rent d w lling hou in everalt having not r f c)., 
joint int re t in either of th m to r train an alleged nui anc 
whi h wa a common but not a joint injury to both of the com-
plainant . 
TIIE IH. ELL R : 
Th j tion that th or r to pro uce witne 
n t r 1 in th pr p r f rm i not 11 taken. y 
f th ~ no-li h urt of hanc ry, an n it form rly 
ith r part: who wi h d t 1 th pro f \Ya o lig cl t ut r 
a rul hat the ad r ar .' produ hi witn ' s ; an 1 at h 
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expiration of the time allowed by that order, he entered the order
nisi to pass publication. By this last order both parties were
precluded from examining farther witnesses, after the expiration
of the eight days, unless an order to enlarge publication had been
obtained in the meantime. (2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 563. 1 Smith's Ch.
Pr. 252.) The rules of this court, however, have altered the prac-
tice so far as to allow either party to enter a forty day order to
produce witnesses, upon which the party entering such order, or
the adverse party, may proceed and obtain an absolute order to close
the proofs after the expiration of the time allowed by the first
order, unless the time shall be enlarged by a special order of the
court. (Eule 68.) But the mere authority to one party to enter
an order to close the proofs, upon an affidavit of the receipt of a
notice from the adverse party of an order to produce witnesses,
did not necessarily require a variance in the form of the first
order. The order to produce witnesses may therefore be in the
form originally used, requiring the adverse party to produce wit-
nesses within forty days. Or it may be in the form contained
in the precedents of Barbour and of Hoffman, requiring the parties
to produce witnesses, &c. ; which is according to its legal effect,
under the new rule of this court upon the subject. The order to
close the proofs was therefore strictly regular; although the form
of the preliminary order entered by the defendant did not in terms
require the defendant himself, as well as the complainant, to pro-
duce witnesses within forty days. For, upon filing an affidavit of
the receipt of notice of such an order as was entered in this case,
the complainant could himself have entered an order to close the
proofs, at the expiration of the specified time.
But as the complainants had actually obtained the fiat of the
court, and had entered an order thereon, enlarging the time to pro-
duce witnesses, within the time allowed for that purpose by the
practice of the court, the service of which order was delayed by
mere accident, the order to close the proofs should be opened
upon payment of costs. The excitement and confusion neces-
sarily produced among business men in N'ew-York by the great
fire on the previous Saturday, is sufficient of itself to excuse, or
account for, the delay in serving the order immediately after it
was entered. The order to close the proofs must therefore be
vacated, and the time to produce witnesses is extended to the

















































































































































40 JOINT PLAINTIFFS 
expiration of the time allowed by that order, he entered the order 
ni i to pa publication. By thi la t order both parties were 
precluded from examining farther witne es, after the expiration 
of the ight day , unl an order to enlarg publication had been 
obtained in th meantime. (2 an. Ch. Pr. 5G2. 1 Smith's Ch. 
Pr. · 5· . ) The rule of thi court, however, have altered the prac-
tice o far a to allow either party to enter a forty day order to 
produce witnes e , upon which the party entering uch order, or 
the adver e party, may proceed and obtain an ab olute order to close 
the proofs after the expiration of the time allowed by the first 
order, unle the time shall be enlarg d by a special order of the 
court. (Rule 68.) But the mere authority to one party to enter 
an order to close the proof , upon an affidavit of the receipt of a 
notice from the adverse party of an order to produce witnes e ·, 
did not necessarily require ai variance in the form of the first 
order. The order to produce witne se may therefore be in the 
form originally used, requiring the adver e party to produce wit-
nesses within forty days. Or it may be in the form contained 
in the precedents of Barbour and of Hoffman, requiring the parties 
to produce witnesses, &c. ; which is according to its legal effect, 
under the new rule of this court upon the subject. The order to 
close the proofs was therefore strictly regular; although the form 
of the preliminary order entered by the defendant did not in terms 
require the defendant himself, as well as the complainant, to pro-
duce witnesses within forty days. For, upon :filing an affidavit of 
the receipt of notice of such an order as was entered in this caGe, 
the complainant could himself have enter d an order to close the 
proof , at the expiration of the peci:fied time. 
But a the complainant had actually obtained the :fiat of the 
court, and had nt r d an order ther on, enlarging the time to pro-
duce witne e , within the time allowed for that purpose by the 
practice of the court, th ervic of whi h order wa delay d by 
mere a·ccid nt, th order to clo e the pr f hould be op ned 
upon payment of t. Th xcitement and confu ion n ces-
sarily produced among bu iness men in w-Y ork by th ITTeat 
:fire on th pr viou aturday, i uffici nt of it lf to e:xcu , or 
account for, th d lay in r ing th ord r imm diately after jt 
wa nt r d. T11c ord r to lo. th proof mu t th r fore be 
a at 1 an 1 th time to produce witn e i ext n 1 1 to the 
fir t of ov mher n xt inclusive. An1 th complainant are to 
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pay to the defendant's solicitor $15 for his costs of entering the
order to close the proofs, and noticing the cause for hearing, and
opposing this application to open such order.
The application to amend, by leaving out the name of one of
the complainants, should also be granted, upon such terms as
will eirectually protect the defendant as to costs, &c.; if there
is in fact a misjoinder of the complainants, which may be fatal
to their suit at the hearing. Upon an examination of the ques-
tion, however, I am satisfied there is no misjoinder of complain-
ants, so far as the bill seeks to restrain the continuance of a nui-
sance which was a common though not a joint injury to both
of the parties who have filed this bill. There is no inflexible
rule on the subject of joinder of parties in this court. But, as a
general principle, several complainants, having distinct and inde-
pendent claims to relief against a defendant, cannot join in a suit
for the separate relief of each; nor can a single complainant,
having distinct and independent claims to relief against two or
more defendants severally, join both or all of them in the same
bill. Tliere are, however, many exceptions to this general
principle; and the court exercises a sound discretion in deter-
mining whether there is a misjoinder of parties, under the par-
ticular circumstances of the case. Thus in the case of Ken-
sington V. White (3 Price's Rep. 164), the court of exchequer
in England overruled a demurrer for multifariousness, which
was put in to a bill, filed by seventy-two different underwriters
upon policies for the defendants, upon which policies the com-
plainants had been sued at law for their respective subscriptions ;
the object of the bill being to enable each complainant to estab-
lish a defence, which was common to all. And this decision
was followed by Lord Abinger in the more recent case of MUh
and others v. Camphell (2 Young & Coll. Exc. Eep. 389),
where the suits against some of the complainants were upon
ordinary policies by simple contract, and against others upon a
policy under seal. Tliis court also sustained a bill filed by dif-
ferent judgment creditors, having a common but not a joint in-
terest in the relief sought by their suit, in the case of Brincl-er-
hoff and others v. Brown and others (6 John. Ch. Rep. 130).
And it is a common practice in this court for two or more judg-
ment creditors, having separate judgments, to join in a suit to

















































































































































M RRA.Y • HAY 41 
pay to th cl f ,ndant olicitor ·15 for hi co t of entering th 
ord r to ·lo e th proof , and n ti ing th cau for hearing, and 
oppo ing thi appli ation to op n u ·h rd r. 
The ar pli ·ati n t am nd, 1 y 1 a'rin ut th name of one of 
the omplainant . h uld al o L grant up n u h t rm a~ 
will £r tually pr l -t th d f nclan a · l . ; if there 
i in fa a mi j ind r f h mplainant. whi ·h may b fa al 
to th ir uit at th h aring. pon an ·arnination f th qu -
tion how v r am ati .fi d th r i no mi j ind r o.f omplain-
ant , o far a th bill k to r train th ontinuan e o.f a nui-
an whi h wa a mmon though n t ~ joint injury to both 
of th parti w h ha v .fil d thi bill. Th er i no in xible 
rul on th ubj t o.f joincl r of partie in thi ourt. But, a n. 
gen ral prin 'pl , e ral complainant having di tinct and ind -
pend nt laim to r li f a a·in t a d f ndant, cannot join in a uit 
for th parat r li f of a h; nor an a ingle omplainant,. 
having di tinct and ind pendent laim to reli f again t tw or 
mor def ndant rall , join both or an of th m in the ame 
bill. Th re ar however, many xception to thi general 
prin ipl · and th ourt exer i e a ound di er tion in deter-
mining wh ther th re i a mi joinder of partie und r the par-
ticular ir um tan e of the ca e. Thu in th a e of Ken-
sington v. White ( 3 Price' Rep. 16 ) , the court of exch uer 
in England overrul d a demurr r for multifariou ne , which 
wa put in to a bill, .fil d b r v nt)-two differ nt underwriter 
upon poli i for the d fendant upon whi h policie th om-
plainant had be n u d at law for their re pe tiv ub cription ,; 
the obj t of th bill b ing to nabl a ·h complainant to e tab-
li h a d f nee whi h a common to all. nd thi deci ion 
wa follow l b ' r bing r in th mor rec nt ca of Ji ill· 
and oth er ampbell ( ounO' ~ oll. i:xc. Rep. 3 ), 
wh r th uit a ain t om of th omplainant were upon 
ordinar ' poli i b impl ontra and a ain t oth r upon a 
policy un l r eal. Thi court al o u tained a bill .fil d by dif-
f r nt ju }O'ment r ditor ha in a common but not a joint in-
ter t in th r li f ouO'ht b th ir uit in th 
lzoff and oth r . Brown ancl other 
n 1 it 1. in thi ourt r more ju cr-
i. j in in a ui t to 




mon debtor, after they have exhausted their remedies at law, by
executions upon their respective judgments.
The particular question which arises in this suit, whether two
or more persons having separate and distinct tenements which
are injured or rendered uninhabitable by a common nuisance, or
which are rendered less valuable by a private nuisance which is
a common injury to the respective tenements of each of the
complainants, may join in a suit to restrain such nuisance, does
not appear to have been raised in England until recently; and
then in a single case only, wliich was not very fully considered.
In the case of Spencer & V^'ard v. The London and Birming-
ham Railway Company (1 Xicoll, Hare & Car. Railway Cases,
159), which came before the vice chancellor of England in 1836,
the bill was filed by the landlord and his tenant, for a nuisance
which was supposed to be an injury to the interests of each in the
property; and an injunction was granted without raising the
question of misjoinder of parties.
The same thing occurred in the case of Sutton and others v.
Montfort (4 Sim. Eep. 559), which came before the same equity
judge five years previous; where two tenants of different build-
ings, having no joint interest, joined with the landlord of both
in filing the bill to restrain the nuisance. But in the more re-
cent case of Hudson and others v. Maddison (5 Lond. Jur.
1104), which came before him in December, 1841, where five
different owners of separate houses had joined in a bill to re-
strain a nuisance which was a common injury to all their houses,
he seems to have taken it for granted that the objection of mis-
joinder of complainants would be fatal at the hearing; and he
discharged the injunction upon that ground alone. (See 13 Sim.
Eep. 416, S. C). Even if that case may be considered as finally
settling the question in England, which I presume it does not,
as it does not appear to have received the sanction of the lord
chancellor, upon appeal or otherwise, I do not consider myself at
liberty to follow that decision here; as the question was settled
by this court directly the other way, more than twenty years since.
In the case of Reed and others v. Gifford (Hopk, Rep. 416),
which came before Chancellor Sanford in February, 1825, the
complainants, as the chancellor states in his opinion, were several
proprietors of different lands and mills, and of separate parts of

















































































































































42 JOINT PLAINTIFFS 
mon debtor, after they have exhausted their remedies at law, by 
execution upon their respective judgments. 
The parti ular question which arises in this suit, whether two 
or more per on having separate and distinct tenements which 
are injured or rendered uninhabitable by a common nuisance, or 
which are rendered less valuable by a, private nuisance which is 
a common injury to the respective tenements of each of the 
complainants, may join in a suit to restrain such nuisance, does 
not appear to have been raised in England until recently; and 
then in a single case only, which was not very fully considered. 
In the case of SpencM· & Ward v. The London and Birming-
ham Railway Company (1 Nicoll, Hare & Ca·r. Railway Cases, 
159), which came before the vice chancellor of England in 1836, 
the bill was filed by the landlord and his tenant, for a nuisance 
which was supposed to be an injury to the interests of each in the 
property; and an injunction was granted without raising the 
question of misjoinder of parties. 
The same thing occurred in the case of Sutton and others v. 
Montfort (4 Sim. Rep. 559), which came before the same equity 
judge five years previous; where two tenants of different build-
ings, ha·ving no joint interest, joined with the landlord of both 
in filing the bill to restrain the nuisance. But in the more re-
cent case of Hudson and· others v. Maddison (5 Lond. Jur. 
1104), which came before him in December, 1841, where five 
different owners of separate houses had joined in a bill to re-
strain a nui ance which was a common injury to all their houses, 
he seems to ha,ve taken it for granted that the objection of mis-
joinder of complainants would be fatal at the hearing; and he 
discharged the injunction upon that ground alone. (See 12 Sim. 
Rep. 416, S. C.) . Even if that case may be con idered as finally 
settling the question in England, which I presume it does not, 
a it doe not appear to have received the anction 0£ the lord 
chancellor, upon appeal or otherwise, I do not consider myself at 
lib rty to follow that deci ion here; as the question was settled 
by thi court directly the oth r way, more than twenty years since. 
In the ca e of Re ed and others v. Gifford (Hopk. Rep. 416), 
which came before Cha llor Sanford in February, 1825, the 
complainants, a the chanc llor tate in hi opinion were several 
proprietors of different land and mills, and of separat parts of 
the natural w ter-cour e at the outlet of a lake. The nuisance 
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■which they sought to restrain was an artificial channel, cut by
the defendant ujjon his own land, the effect of which would be
to draw off the water of the lake, and thereby to prevent it from
flowing in its natural channel to the several mills of the com-
plainants, respectively. And he decided that as the acts of the
defendant, complained of, were a common injury to all the com-
plainants, there was such a common interest in the subject of the
suit as to authorize them to join in one bill; although the injury
which each sustained, by the diversion of the water from his
individual mill, was separate and distinct.
It is true each of the complainants, in that case, would have
had the right to file a bill to restrain the nuisance, which was a
special injury to his individual property. But as the relief sought
was the same as to all the complainants, there certainly was no
good reason for compelling them to file several bills to protect
their common right against acts of the defendant, which were
injurious to all of them. A similar opinion was expressed by me
in the case of The Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen (4 Paige's
Eep. 510) ; although from the manner in which the formal ob-
jection of the misjoinder of complainants was raised in that case,
it was not necessary definitely to decide the question of misjoinder
of parties. For it is well settled that a mere formal objection of
that kind, which is neither raised by demurrer nor by the answer
of the defendant, cannot be set up at the hearing as a bar to
relief which is common to all the complainants.
In the case of MarseUs and others v. The Morris Canal Com--
pany (Saxton's Eep. 31), where the objection was raised, that the vl,^
bill was multifarious, because several persons having distinct am\U<^>^\ ^^^^
independent interests had joined therein as complainants, the acts , JU v^
of the defendants, complained of, were neither a joint nor even a ' ^^-^ -^
common injury to all the complainants. There the entry upon iw-^^ w^/^"^^
the land of each complainant and excavating the same, for th^J^'*\ \p^
purpose of making the canal, without compensating the owner for^^^ji-^
his property, was a distinct and independent cause of complaint.
And it was in nowise injurious to his co-complainants; nor did
it in any way interfere with, or affect, their several rights of
property. That case therefore was rightly decided upon that
ground. In the case under consideration, however, the bill shows
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whi ·h th :ought t r ''train wa a1 arLifi ·ial ·hann 1, ut by 
th d f nclant up n hi wn land, th if ·t f which would he 
t draw ff i.h wal r f th lak t prev nt it from 
flowing in it natural hann 1 to th cv r 1 mill of th om-
plainant. r ·p ·tiv 1 . nd h d i ·d th t a th act of the 
d I ndant . m1lain 1 l f w r a 'Ollllll n injur r to all th ·om-
plainant th r · wa u h a ommon int 'r t in the ubj ·t of the 
. uit a to auth riz th m t join in on bill; although th injury 
which a h u tain d by the liv r i n f the water from hi::, 
indi idual mill wa parat and di 1.in t. 
It i tru a ·h of th omplainant in that ca e would ha e 
had th right t :fil a bill to r train the nui ancc, which wa a 
p ial injur to hi indiviclual prop rty. But a th r lief ought 
wn th am a to all the oomplainant , ther rtainly wa no 
good rea on for comp llino- them to fil Y ral bill to protect 
their common right again t act of the def ndant which were 
injuriou to all of them. A imilar opinion wa xpre ed by me 
in the ca e of The Tru tees of 1V atertou:n ow en ( 4 Paige .: 
p. 510); althoucrh from the mann r in which the formal ob-
j tion of th mi joinder of complainant wa rai ed in that a e, 
it wa not n c ary d finitely to decide the qu ti n of mi joind r 
of partie . For it i w 11 ttlcd that a mer formc 1 ohj ·tion of 
that kind whi h i neitb r rai ed by demurrer nor y the an w r 
of the def ndant annot be et up at the hearing a a bar to 
r lief whi h i ommon to all th mplainant . 
In th of Illar el is and others . Th e 111 orri Canal Com- , 
pany (. a:xton R p. 31) where th objection wa rai ed, that tbe 
bill wa multifa.riou b au e1 ral per on havino- di tinct and 1 "'~ 
ind pend nt int r t bad joined th r in a omplainant the act r* / 
f th d f ndani. omplained of w r n ith r a j int nor e en n. V - ~ 
comm.on injury to all th omplainant . Th r the entr r upon 
th land of a h omplainant and :x a atincr th ame for th 
purpo of makinO' th anal without omp n a tin th own r f r ~ 
hi prop rt wa a di tin t and ind p nd nt au of omplaint. 
n 1 it wa in n "i.. injuriou to bi o- mplainant · nor lid 
it in an wa: int rf r with or a t th ir ral riahti'i of 
Ir p rt . That a th r for wa ri htl. ' 1 id 1 up n that 
crroun . und r on id rai.i n how y r. i.h 1 ill how. 
that the ontinuan f th all a 1 nui ance an of 
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every part of it, is a common injury to the separate property and
rights of each of the complainants.
It is said the complainants in this case in addition to their
prayer for a perpetual injunction to restrain the continuance of
the nuisance, have also prayed for an account, and compensation
for the damage which they have respectively sustained by the
alleged nuisance. The insertion of such a prayer might perhaps
render the bill multifarious, if the court, at the hearing, would,
upon the case made by the bill, be required to grant such multi-
farious relief, in addition to the restraining the continuance of
the nuisance, which is a common injury to both complainants.
But where multifarious relief is not prayed for in the bill, it is
not a matter of course to give multifarious relief at the hearing,
under the general prayer, in addition to the relief in which the
complainants have a common interest. That objection to this
bill may therefore be obviated by striking out that part of the
prayer which calls for an account of the damages which the com-
plainants respectively have sustained by reason of the alleged
nuisance.
The motion to amend by striking out the name of Murray, as
one of the complainants, must be denied with $15 costs. But the
complainants are to be at liberty to amend their bill within twenty
days, by striking out the prayer for an account and payment of the
damages.
Lloyd V. Loaring, G Yes. 773. (1802.)
This bill, filed by Evan Lloyd and two other persons on behalf
of themselves and all other members of the Caledonian Lodge of
Free Masons, except the Defendant Loaring, against Loaring and
another person, stated, that Plaintiifs are members or companions
of a certain ancient fraternity, society, or lodge of Free Masons,
called or known by the name of the Caledonian Chapter, No. 2, and
being No. 2 on the list of the societies of Eoyal Arch Free Masons,
consisting of Plaintiffs and a number of other persons; and Plain-
tiff Lloyd being the chief or principal officer, and the other two
Plaintiffs secretaries or other officers of the said companion, chap-
ter or society: Plaintiffs as such three officers, as aforesaid, hav-

















































































































































Jor.r T PL INTIFFS 
e\ ry part of it i a common injury to the eparate property and 
right of each of the complainants. 
It i aid the complainants in thi ca e in addition to their 
prayer for a perpetual injunction to re train the continuance of 
the nui ance, have al o prayed for an account, and compen ation 
for the damage which th y have re pecti ely su tained by the 
alleged nui ance. The in ertion of such a prayer might perhaps 
render the bill multifariou , if the court, at the hearing, would, 
upon the ca e made by the bill, be required to grant such multi-
fariou relief, in addition to the re training the continuance of 
the nuisance, which is a common injury to both complainants. 
But where multifariou relief i not prayed for in the bill, it i · 
not a matter of course to give multifarious relief at the hearing, 
under the general prayer, in addition to the relief in which the 
romplainant have a common intere t. That objection to thi 
l ill may therefore be obviated by triking out that part of the 
prayer which call for an account of the damages which the com-
1 lainants respectively have u tained by rea on of the alleged 
nw l:!nce. 
The motion to amend by striking out the name of Murray as 
ne of the complainant , mu t be denied with $15 co t . But the 
complainants are to be at liberty to amend their bill within twenty 
clay , b} triking out the prayer for an account and payment of the 
lamages. 
Lloyd . Loaring, 6 Ves. 773. (1802.) 
THr bill filed by Evan Llo} d and two oth r per on on behalf 
of them 1 e and all other member of the Caledonian Lodge of 
Fr 1a on x pt the fendant Loarin again t Loaring and 
anoth r p r on tat d that Plaintiff ar member or companion. 
f a ertain ancient frat rnit}, o iet or lod of Fre fa on , 
call or known by th nam of th al d nian ha pt r No. , and 
1 ing o. on th li t of th . o i ti of o al r h Fr 1a on' 
on i tin of lainti:ff and a numb r of th r er n · and Plain-
tiff lo d being th hief or rin ipal ffi r an th oth r tw•) 
lainii.IT ecr tari r oth r offi r f th ai 1 ompanion cha -
t r or o i ty: Plaintiff. a u h thr ffi r a afore aid, ha -
in<Y th . o1 mana em nt ancl dir cti n f the affair of the aid 
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Caledonian Chapter; which said chapter has been duly certified,
and the names of the members registered according to law.
The bill farther stated, that the said chapter or society held tlieir
meetings at the Horn Tavern; and the dresses and decorations,
and the books and papers, tools and implements, and other goods
and effects, of the said chapter or society were there kept in a chest;
the key of which was kept by Lloyd, as principal officer. A union
with another chapter, called the Prudence Lodge, having been pro-
posed and assented to by the members then present, and that the
future meetings should be held at the Free Masons Tavern, the De-
fendant Loaring and four other members then present authorised
the janitor or servant of the said chapter to remove the said prop-
erty to the Free Masons Tavern ; the master of which was directed
to deliver it to him on producing the written order and in the pres-
ence of Lloyd, and to no other person. The Defendants afterwards
went there ; pretending authority from Lloyd ; and that by mistake
he had sent the wrong key; and they broke open the chest; and
took away all the said dresses, &c.
The bill further stated, that by the rules and condition of the
said society it is necessary, whenever any of the business or cere-
monies are to be transacted or performed, that the Plaintiffs or one
of them should be present; especially Lloyd as the president or
principal officer; to whose care the key to the chest, and the effects,
and the books, containing the laws and constitution and the ac-
counts of the said society or chapter and the original warrant or
charter arc entrusted ; and it is indispensable, that he should have
possession of them; without which the society cannot properly be
convened, or the business transacted; and the Defendant Loaring
is interested in, or has a share in, the property vested in him as a
joint tenant with the other members ; and having got the exclusive
possession of the said effects, is a trustee for the other members,
and bound to restore them uninjured for the use of the society.
The bill charged, that the Plaintiffs took a Bow-street officer
to the house of the other Defendant Hannam ; who acknowledged,
that they had taken the property; and restored part of it, that
was in his possession ; but that Loaring has the greatest part, and
in particular the books of the constitution, laws, and rules, of the
said chapter or society, the books of account, names of the mem-
bers, minutes of the proceedings, and the original warrant or

















































































































































LLOYD Y. Lo RING 45 
Caledonian hapi r; whi 11 ai ·hapt r ha b en duly certified, 
and th na f th m mb r r gi ter d ac ording to law. 
Th bill farth r tat d, that th aid hapt r r ociet h ld their 
m ting a th rn a rn; and h dre and d corations, 
th book and pa1 er ool an impl m nt and other good 
f th aid ha pt r or oei ty w re th r k pt in a che t; 
th k y f whi h w k pt l y loyd, a prin ipal offic r. union 
with anoth r ha t r, all d h rud nee od e ha ing be n pro-
po d an a nt d to by h memb r then pr . ent, and that the 
future m tin h uld l e held at th Free a on avern, the e-
f ndant oaring and four o her m mb then pr ent authori cl 
the janitor or r ant of th aid chapter to r more the aid prop-
rty to th Fr e Ia on T'a ern; th ma ter of which wa directed 
to d liv r it to him on producing th written ord rand in the pre~ -
nc of Lloyd and to no other pe on. The f ndant afterward 
went ther ; pr t nding authority from Lloyd; and that by mi take 
he had nt the wrong key; and th y broke open the che t; and 
took away all th aid dr e , &c. 
Th bill further tated, that by the rul and condition of the 
aid ociety it i ne · ar , whenever an.J of the bu ine or cere-
moni are to be tran acted or performed, that the Plaintiff or one 
of th m hould be pre nt; e pecially Llo 'd a the pre ident or 
principal officer; to who e care the key to the che t, and the effect 
and the book containing the la and con titution and the ac-
count of th aid ociet ' or chapter and th orio-inal warrant or 
charter ar entru t d · and i i indi pen able that he hould ham 
po ... , e ion of them· without which the ociet cannot properly be 
c nz ned or th bu ine tra-n act d · and the fendant Loarin0 
i , inter t d in or ha a har in, the propert r ve ted in him a a 
joint tenant with th oth r memb r · and ha Ying got the excl i rn 
I osse ion of th aid t i a tru tee for th other memb r., 
and bound to re or them uninjur d for th u £ the ociet ·. 
h bill char d that th laintiff took a Bow-... treet officer 
t th hou of h o h r Def nda1nt Hannam· who acknowledge , 
l 1,. the had tak n th property · and re" tor d part of it that 
'' '<1. in hi po ion· but that oarinrr ha th gr ate t part an 
in particular th book of th n titution la11 and rule~ of th 
'ai 1 r1 apt r r 0 i tr the bo k of a u t nam ~ of th m m-
l r , minut of th proc edin R and th inal warrant r 
hart r, rrrant to them by th hapter of Royal 
46 Joint Plaintiffs
Arch Masons; by which the Caledonian Chapter is constituted or
authorised and continued, and without which original warrant or
charter no meetings of the said chapter or society can be properly
and regularly convened or held, or the business or ceremonies, or
functions, of the said chapter or society performed; that the per-
sons, by or from whom such constitution and warrant or charter
were granted, are all long since dead ; and no constitution or char-
ter can now be had ; and if the said constitution or charter or war-
rant should be lost or destroyed, the said chapter or society would
either be wholly dissolved, and lose its rank and privileges among
the several different lodges or chapters, or be prejudiced or de-
graded; that the Defendant Loaring has threatened and intends
to burn or otherwise destroy the property, and in particular the
books and the original warrant or charter; and that Plaintiffs are
ignorant of the particulars, of which the property consists ; and the
Defendants refuse to discover, &c.; whereby the Plaintiffs cannot
take any effectual steps at law.
The bill prayed a discovery; and that the Defendants may be
decreed to deliver up the said articles uninjured or undefaced;
and in the meantime be restrained from disposing of, burning, or
otherwise destroying, defacing, or injuring, them.
The Defendants demurred generally to this bill for want of
Equity, and also for want of parties.
Lord Chancellor [Eldon] :
If this is not a corporation, how could these five persons remove
these articles? Loaring himself had a right to object to the pro-
posed junction. If I consider them as individuals, the majority
had no right to bind the minority. One individual has as good a
right to possess the property as any other: unless he can be
affected by some agreement. But how is this Court to take notice
of these persons as a society ? A bill might be filed for a chattel ;
the Plaintiffs stating themselves to be jointly interested in it with
several other persons : but it would be very dangerous to take notice
of them as a society, having any thing of constitution in it. As
to the Statute referred to, the meaning was only to take them,
provided they gave notice of their meetings, out of the operation
of the Sedition Laws, not to acknowledge them. In this lull there
is a great affectation of a corporate character. They speak of their

















































































































































46 JOI T PLAINTIFFS 
Arch Ma on ; by which the Caledonian Chapter is constituted or 
authori ed and continued, and without which original warrant or 
charter no me ting of the aid chapter or ociety can be properly 
and regularly con ened or h ld, or the bu ine or ceremonie , or 
function , of the said chapter or so iety performed; that the per-
on, by or from whom such constitution and warrant or charter 
w re granted, are all long ince dead; and no con titution or char-
ter can now be had; and if the said con titution or charter or war-
rant hould be lo t or de troyed, the aid chapt r or ociety woul<l 
either be wholly di olved, and lo e it rank and privileges among 
the several different lodges or chapt rs, or be prejudiced or d<~­
graded; that the Defendant Loaring ha threatened and intends 
to burn or otherwi e de troy the property, and in particular the 
book and the original warrant or charter; and that Plaintiffs are 
ignorant of the particulars, of which the property consists; and the 
Def ndant refu e to di cover, &c.; whereby the Plaintiffs cannot 
take any effectual steps at law. 
The bill prayed a di covery; and that the Defendant may be 
decreed to deliver up the said article uninjur d or undefaced; 
and in the meantime be restrainecl from di posing of, burning, or 
otherwise destroying, defacing, or injuring, them. 
The Defendants demurred generally to this bill for want of 
Equity, and also for want of parties. 
Lord CHANCELLOR [ELDON] : 
If thi i not a corporation, how could these five persons remove 
the e article ? Loaring himself had a right to object to the pro-
po d junction. If I con ider them as individual , the majority 
had no right to bind the minority. One individua1 has as good a 
right to po e the property a any other: unle he can be 
aff ted by om agreement. But how i this Court to take notice 
of i.he per on a a oci t ? A bill might b fil d for a chattel; 
the laintiff tating them clv to be jointly int r ted in it with 
ev ral oth r p r on : 1 ut it would b v ry dang rou to tak noti r:e 
of them a a o iety, having any thing of on titution in it. A 
to th tatute ref rred to, the meaning was only to take th m 
provided th y gave notic of i.h ir m tin out of the operation 
of the edition Law, not to acknowledg them. In thi bill there 
i a gr at aff ·tation of a corporate chara ter. They peak of th ir 
law. and · n. tj tut ion. uncl th 01·iginal hart r, by which th y 
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were constituted. In Cul'len v. The Duke of Queensberry, Lord
Thurlow said, ho would convince the parties, that they had no law;,
and constitutions. But tliere was an allegation, that he was indi-
vidually liable. It is the absolute duty of Courts of Justice not to
permit persons, not incorporated, to affect to treat themselves as a
corporation upon the Itecord. If the Plaintiffs had stated simply,
that they and several persons were jointly interested, or even they
on behalf of themselves and others, provided it was manifestly in-
convenient to justice to make them all parties, and stating this case
as individuals, upon the principle of Fells v. Read it might be very
proper. That this Court will hold jurisdiction to have a chatte"l
delivered up, I have no doubt: but I am alarmed at the notion,
that these voluntary societies are to be permitted to state all their
laws, forms, and constitutions, upon the Record, and then to tell
the Court, they are individuals. Then what sort of a partnership
is this; for it is now admitted to be a partnership? The bill
states, that they subsist under a charter, granted l)y persons, who
are now dead; and therefore, if this charter cannot be produced,
tlie society is gone. Upon principles of policy the Courts of this
country do not sit to determine upon charters granted by persons,
who have not the prerogative to grant charters. I desire my ground
to be understood distinctly. I do not think, the Court ought to
permit persons, who can only sue as partners, to sue in a corporate
character; and that is the effect of this bill.
The Demurrer was allowed.
May 13th. The Lord Chancellor, when the demurrer was
allowed, having thrown out an intimation, that the Plaintiffs might
amend, ]\Ir. Eomilly and Mr. Roupell moved for leave to amend
tlie bill.
ilr. Piggott and Mr. Wooddeson, for the Defendants, opposed
Ihe motion; insisting, that it would not be permitted in the case
of any partnership trade ; that the decision in Lord Coningshy v.
Sir Joseph Jel-yll was not considered regular: at least it is not of
course, where the demurrer is not merely for want of parties-
and that there is not a passage in this bill, in which the objection
taken l)y the Court does not occur.
Lord Chancellor [Eldox] :
If the Plaintiffs strike out their present style as Plaintiffs, and

















































































































































LL YD . LOA.RI 
w re con titut d. In 'ut'len . The Duke of Queensuerry, iu 
'.I.1hurlow aid, h w ulcl · nvinc th parti , that th y had no 1 w. 
ancl on titutio ut th 'r · wa.· an all 'Jab n, that h wa: incli-
viclually liabl . i th ab olut •duty oi 1 urt J: Ju~ ti · ot io 
permit p r on n L in rp rat cl t aife ·t t tr at th m.·elv ' a :i 
·orporation up n th I · rel. Ii th lainti.O:. had tat cl . imply, 
that th y and s ral p I on w r jointly inter t ·d, or e' they 
on b hall of th m lv and oth r , provicl d it wa maniJ> ·tly in-
on ni nt to ju ti to mak th m all parti , and tatina thi a e 
a indiviclual upon th prin ipl of 1 ells . Read it mi ht 1 Yery 
prop r. That thi ourt will hold juri di ti n to hav a ·hattel 
c.1 'liv r cl up have no doubt: but I am alarmecl at the notion, 
that th oluntar o i ti ar to b p rmitt cl to tat all their 
and con titution , upon the ord, and then to tell 
urt th y ar in li idual . Then what ort of a partn r hip 
i thi · · for it i now admitted to be a partner hip? Th bill 
tat ' that th y ub i t und r a harter, grant d by p rson wh:) 
ar now d ad; and therefor , if thi harter cannot l produce<l, 
th o i ty i on . Upon principl of p lie th ourt of thi~ 
ountr do not it to d termine upon harter granted by per on:, 
who hav not the prerogative to grant hart r . I d ir my O'rouncl 
to b und r tood di tin tly. I do not think the ourt ought to 
permit p on who can onl u a partn r to ue in a corporate 
hara ter; and that i th ffcct of thi bill. 
Th D murr r wa allow 1. 
:Jla ' 1 th. Th Lord hancellor when the demurrer wa 
allow d ha ing thrown out an intimation, that the Plaintiff might 
am nd fr. Romilly and Ir. oup 11 mov d for leave to amend 
th bill. 
Mr. iggott and Ur. \\ oodde on for th f n lant oppo ed 
th moti n · in i ting, that it would not b p rmitted in th ca e 
f an ' partn r hip trad · that th d ci ion in Lord oning by \. 
'ir Jo eplz J kyll wa not con id red r gular : at lea t it i" not of 
ur wh r th d murr r i not m r 1 for want £ I arti ; 
;md th, t th r bill in whi h the obj tion 
tak n b · th 
orcl JI .l.T ELL R [ELD x]: 
If th lainti:ff trik out th ir pr nt hl a laintiff and 
ue a in lividual th will appear a li r nt p I"SOns. I 1ri\ 
48 Joint Plaintiffs
them leave to amend, because I am not sure, I should not contra-
dict some rule ; having had great doubt, whether I should allow the
demurrer. That doubt is founded upon this; that it has been
decided, that individuals forming a voluntary society may as indi-
viduals, not as a voluntary society, have such a joint interest in a
chattel, that this Court would take notice of that interest, and of
agreements upon it, not with reference to them as a voluntary-
society, but as individuals. I allude to the case I argued without
success upon the tobacco-box. With respect to that decision I had
considerable doubt, whether this very case would not arise out of it.
I had great doubt, whether a voluntary association for the best
purpose is to meet without the authority of a corporation, and
make laws and statutes, which have no authority, and then call
upon this Court to administer all the moral justice, that may arise
upon the disputes among these, in a sense unauthorized, bodies.
It is singular, that this Court should sit upon the concerns of an
association, which in law has no existence; and in that case, that
this Court should be ancillary to their agreements as to their toasts,
&c. I was much disappointed with that case upon that part of it;
though I never had a doubt as to the jurisdiction upon chattels be-
tween man and man. But it is too late to consider that now.
In this case, though I cannot disguise from myself, that the
whole record attributed more of a corporate character than I ought
to permit a voluntary society to put upon the record, yet I could
not devest myself of this notion altogether ; that, though they had
assumed that character, yet upon the whole bill there was a case
represented fairly of individuals with a joint interest, absurdly
representing themselves corporate; and I had doubt enough there-
fore, whether over-ruling the demurrer was absolutely right. By
giving leave to amend I thought I might enable them to reduce
the record to that, which, it is admitted, might be made by a new
bill. Suppose, Mr. Worseley's silver cup was taken away from the
Middle Temple: the society must some way or other be permitted
to sue ; and this is really the same ; for it is not material, what it
is. Upon the whole therefore I thought it fair to let them amend
by striking out all that.
In the manuscript notes I have seen strong passages, as falling
from Lord Ilardwicke, that, where a great many individuals are
jointly interested, there are more cases than those, which are fa-

















































































































































48 JOINT PLAINTIFFS 
them leave to amend, because I am not ure, I should not contra-
dict some rule; having had great doubt, whether I should allow the 
demurrer. That doubt i founded upon thi ; tha·t it has been 
decided, that individual forming a voluntary ociety may a indi-
vidual , not a a voluntary society, have such a joint interest in a 
chaittel, that i.hi Court would take noti of that interest, and of 
agreement upon it, not with reference to them a a voluntary 
ociety, but a individual . I allude to the ca e I argued without 
succe upon the tobacco-box. With re pect to that decision I had 
con iderable doubt, whether this very case would not airise out of it. 
I had great doubt, wheth r a voluntary as ociation for the best 
purpo e i to meet without the authority of a corporation, and 
make law and statutes, which have no authority, and then call 
upon thi Court to administer all the moral justice, that may arise 
upon the disputes among these, in a sense unauthorized, bodies. 
It i singular, that thi Court should it upon the oncerns of an 
a sociation, which in law has no existence ; and in that case, that 
this Court should be ancillary to their agreements as to their toast~, 
&c. I was much disappointed with that case upon that part of it; 
though I never had a doubt as to the jurisdiction upon chattels be-
tween man and man. But it is too late to consider that now. 
In this case, though I cannot disguise from myself, that the 
whole record attributed more of a corporate cha·racter than I ought 
to permit a voluntary society to put upon the record, yet I could 
not deve t myself of this notion altogether; that, though they had 
as urned that character, yet upon the whole bill there was a case 
repre ented fairly of individuals with a joint int rest, absurdly 
repre enting themselves corporate ; and I had doubt enough there-
fore, whether over-ruling the demurrer wa ab olut ly right. By 
giving leave to amend I thought I might nable th m to reduce 
the record to that, which, it i admitt d might be made by a new 
bill. uppo e, Mr. Wor ley' silver cup was taken away from the 
fiddle Temple: the oci ty mu t ome way or other be permitt d 
to u ; and thi i reall} the ame; for it i not mat rial, what it 
i . Upon th whol th r fore I thought it fair to 1 t them amend 
by triking out all that. 
In the manu cript not I have een trong pa ag , a falling 
from Lord Hardwick that, wh r a r at many individuals are 
joi11tly int r t d th r ar mar ca e than tho which ar fa-
mili r f r J ii r and l gat , wh r th urt will 1 t a few 
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represent the whole. There is one case very familiar, in which the
Court has allowed a very few to represent the whole world.
Leave was given to amend.
1. Where a number of persons have an interest in the same
subject, if a Court cannot recognize them as a legally associated
body, but is bound to consider them as individuals. Lord Eldon
declared, not only in the principal case, but in Ex parte Lacey,
6 Ves. G28, that the majority have no right to bind the minority.
2. As to the jurisdiction which Courts of Equity exercise, for
the delivery of specific chattels, and the permission granted to
certain individuals to sue, as representing a joint interest, although
they may not be a regularly incorporated society, provided they do
not profess, by their bill, to sue as corporators; see, ante, the note
to Fells V. Eeacl 3 V. 70.
3. A plaintiff, it has been said, is now frequently permitted,
as in the principal case, to amend his bill, in order to avoid the
effect of a demurrer, at any stage of the argument, before judgment
is given thereon (Baker v. Mellisli, 11 Ves. 72) ; and, before the
demurrer is argued, it was long ago agreed, that the plaintiff may
obtain leave to amend his bill, as of course. Lord Coningsby v.
Sir Joseph Jekyll, 2 P. Wms. 300. Convenience, and the saving
of both expense and time, have dictated a farther relaxation of
practice in modem days; strictly speaking, after a demurrer is
allowed, the bill is out of Court; and Lord Hardwicke said there
was no instance of permission given to amend it {Smith v. Barnes,
1 Dick. 67) ; but Lord Eldon has declared, that he knew many
cases in which, after a demurrer allowed, and the bill dismissed
by order, it had been considered in the discretion of the Court to
set the cause on foot again. And, as this indulgence is granted
to a plaintiff, so, on the other hand, when, during the pendency
of the argument of the demurrer, and before judgment, the Court
sees the demurrer is too general; but that, if more confined, it
would be good ; permission will, for the sake of justice, be given to
the defendant to amend the demurrer, at that stage of the proceed-
ings. Baler v. MclUsh, ubi supra.
4. As to the cases in which the general rule, requiring all par-
ties interested in a suit to be before the Court, may be dispensed


















































































































































LLO D . L ARI G 49 
repre ent the whole. Th r i one a e v ry familiar) in which th 
Court ha allow d a ry few to repr nt th whole world. 
a,·' wa ··v n to amend. 
1. WHERE a numb r of per o s hav an interc t in the ame 
ul j ct, if a Court a not recognize them a a legally a ciated 
bod , but i bound to on id r them a individual , ord Eldon 
c1 clarec1, not only in the principal a e but jn Ex parte Lacey, 
6 V . 6 , that th majority have no right to bind the minori y. 
to th juri diction which ourts of quity ex rci e, for 
th deli ry of pe ific chattel , and the p rmi ion granted to 
c rtain individual to u , a representing a joint intere t, although 
th y ma not be a r gularly incorporat d oci ty pro ided they do 
not prof , by their bill, to ue a corpora tor ; ee ante,, the note 
to Fells v. Read, 3 V. 70. 
3. A plaintiff, it ha been said, i now frequently permitted, 
a in the principal ca e, to amend hi bill, in order to avoid the 
effect of a demurrer, at any tage of the argument, before judgment 
i given thereon (Balcer v. Mellish, 11 Ve. ·); and, before the 
demurrer i argued, it wa long ago agreed, that the plaintiff may 
obtain 1 a e to amend hi bill, as of cour e. Lord oning by v. 
Sir Joseph Jekyll 2 P. Wm . 300. Convenience, and the aving 
of both expen and time, have dictated a farther r elaxation of 
practice in modern da} ; trictly peaking, after a demurrer is 
allowed, the bill i out of Court; and Lord Hardwicke ai d there 
wa no in tance of permi ion given to amend it ( mith v. Barnes, 
1 Dick. 6 ) ; but Lord Eldon ha declared, that h knew man 
ca e in which after a demurrer allowed and the bill di mi ed 
b order, it had b en con idered in the di cretion of th ourt to 
et the cau e on foot again. And a thi indulgen i granted 
to a plaintiff, o on the other hand when during th pend ncy 
of the arrrument of the d murrer aind befor judgment, the ourt 
e th d murrer i too g neral · ut that if mor confined it 
woul 1 b ood; p rmi ion will for the ak of ju ti e b gi n 
tl f ndant t am nd th d murrer at that tag of the proc d-
ing . Baker v. M ll' h ubi supra.. 
to the ca in whicl th rr n ral rule, r quirinrr all ar-
ti t d in a uit to f r th ur . 11r:1y b di:- n e 1 
po t th no to Th e Attorney eneral . Ja k on 11 
4 
50 x Q?' Parties Defexdaxt
Parties Defendant.
'HoyU V. Moore, Jf. Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 175. (lSJf5.)
Cause removed from the Court of Equity of Lincoln County,
at the Spring Term, 1845.
The Bill is filed for the purpose of obtaining from the Court
directions to the plaintiff, how to distribute property in his hands,
which he holds as representing Alexander Moore, deceased. Alex-
ander Moore, by his will, gave to his wife, Elizabeth Moore, con-
siderable property, both real and personal, during her life, and, at
her death, to be disposed of as she might think proper, among her
children. Elizabeth Moore, by her will, gave a certain portion of
the property, so devised to her, to the children of her deceased
son, James Moore, naming them. The plaintiff is the adminis-
trator with the will annexed of Alexander Moore, and he may be
the executor of Elizabeth Moore, though it is not stated in the
Bill, nor is her will exhibited. The Bill then states, that, after
selling a large portion of the personal property, preparatory to
dividing it among those who were entitled, he was '^y some of the
legatees ordered to pay over none of the legacies or bequests, &c.";
"that some of the negroes are claimed by Margaret Moore, relict
and widow of James Moore, dec'd., who is the guardian of the
children of A. Moore, dec'd. The) other children claim that
the negroes shall be sold and divided among the other children of
Alexander Moore;" "that James Moore and William Moore, sons
of A. Moore, died after the making of the will and before the
testator. William left five children; and John Moore died many
years before, leaving" — with a space, to insert, as we presume,
the names of his children, but setting out none. The Bill then
proceeds: "Eobinson ]\[oore is still living, Alexander is still liv-
ing, John Rhinehardt married Ann, Michael married Polly, since
dead; William Scott married Posanna, both dead; they left issue
William Scott, who died without issue, Alexander Pankin mar-
ried Elizabeth, still living" — not stating the period when any of
the foregoing died. The Bill then prays, that "tlie proper parties
may be made defendants, and if there arc others than those set
forth, they may be made parties, &c." — "that the clerk may be





















































































































































Cau e removed from the Court of Equity of Lincoln County, 
at the Spring Term, 1845. 
The Bill i :filed for the purpose of obtaining from the Court 
directions to the plaintiff, ho.w to distribute pr9perty in his hands, 
which he holds as representing Alexander Moore, deceased. Alex-
ander Moore, by his will, gave to his wife, Elizabeth Moore, con-
iderable property, both real and per anal, during her life, and, at 
her death, to be disposed of as she might think proper, among her 
children. Elizabeth Moor , by her will, gave a certain portion of 
the property, so devised to her, to the children of her deceased 
on, James Moore, naming them. The plaintiff is the adminis-
trator with the will annexed of Alexander Moore, and he may be 
the executor of Elizabeth Moore, though it is not stated in the 
Bill, nor is her will exhibited. The Bill then states, that, after 
elling a large portion of the personal property, preparatory to 
dividing it among those who were entitled, he was ''by some of the 
legatees ordered to pay over none of the legacies or bequest , &c." ; 
"that some of the negroes are claimed by Margaret Moore, relict 
and widow of James Moore, dec'd., who is the guardian of the 
children of A. Moore, dec'd. Thel other children claim that 
the negroes shall be sold and divided among the other children of 
Alexander Moore;" "that James Moore and William Moore, sons 
of A. Moore, died after the making of the will and before the 
te tator. William left :five children; and John Moore died many 
year before, 1 aving" - with a space, to in ert, a we pre ume, 
the names of hi hildren, but setting out none. The Bill then 
proceeds: "Robin on Moore i still living, Al xand r i till liv-
ing John Rhinehardt marri d Ann, Mi hael marri d Polly inc 
cl ad; William cott married Ro anna, both dead; they 1 ft i ue 
William Scott, who died without i ue, Alexander ankin mar-
ri d Elizab th, . till living"-not tating the p riod when any of 
th foregoing di d. The ill then pray that "the proper partie. 
may l e mad cl f ndant and if th r ar other than tho t 
forth they ma b mad partie , &c."-"that th 1°rk may 1 e 
ord r 1 o i u hi tat writ of . ubp na to tl1 I rop r def nd-
HOYLE V. MooKi: • ol
ants, &c." Answers were filed by several persons, Sii^ji replication
taken, and the cause set for hearing. ' ^
Nash, J. :
We much regret it is not in our power to grant to the plaintiff
the relief he seeks. The Bill, no doubt from haste, is so inarti-
ficially drawn, that we cannot give him the instructions required.
It is a general rule in Equity, that all the persons, however nu-
merous they may be, who are interested in the subject of a suit,
must be made parties, either plaintiffri or defendants, if known;
and like a declaration at common law, the circumstances consti-
tuting the case must be set forth in the Bill at large. Mr. Cooper,
in his Equity Pleading, page 9, states, that the second part of the
Bill sets forth the names of the parties. In order to obtain the
answer upon oath, the Bill must pray, that the writ of subpoena
issue to the defendant; and, although persons may be named in
the Bill, none are parties to it, against whom process is not prayed.
Coop. Eq. Plead. 16. 1 P. Wil. 593. 2 Dick. 707. A defendant
is as necessary to the just and proper construction of a Bill in
Equity as a plaintiff. In the case we are now considering, there is
no defendant whatever — process is prayed against no one. The
prayer is, "that the clerk be ordered to issue subpoenas to the
proper defendants, &c." But who are they? Xo name or names
are given. How is he to find them out? Is it to be left to his
discretion to say, who ought to be made defendants? This, in fact,
is what the plaintiff does ask. It is not, as before remarked,
sufficient that the names of individuals are contained in the Bill.
Process is not asked against them, nor against any one in par-
ticular. There is, then, no party defendant to the Bill. But the
Bill is liable to other objections, equally fatal. It is, among other
things, stated, that John ]\Ioore died before the testator, leaving
children, and a blank is left in the Bill, after the word "leaving,"
apparently for inserting the names of his children, and perhaps of
his representatives, if he had any. It is not stated whether there
is a representative or not. The Bill does not state who are tlie
children of Alexander Moore. The names of certain persons are
mentioned, but whether they are such children, we are left to
conjecture. Some of those, so mentioned, are said to be dead,

















































































































































II YLE ~I HE ~ 1 
ant , &c.' n w w r fil d by 
tak n, and the au e et f r hearing. 
eral per on , a·~ replication 
' / 
ASH, J .: 
\\ mu h rcgr t it j n t in our pow r t grant to the plaintiff 
th r lief h e k . Th ill, no doubt from ha te, i o inarti-
fi ially drawn, that we ann t gi e him i.h in ruction required. 
t i a g n ral rul in Equity, hat all the p on howev r nu-
m rou he ma b , who are int r t d in the ubjec of a uit, 
mu t b made parti' , ith r plaintiff or d f ndant , if known · 
and lik a de laration at common law, the ircum tance on ti-
tuting the a u t b t forth in the Bill at large. :Jfr. 1oopcr, 
in hi quity 1 ading, page 9, tate that the econd part of the 
Bill et forth h name of the parti . In order to obtain Lh13 
an r upon oatl he Bill mu t pray, that the writ of ubpama 
I u to th d f ndant; and, although pe on may be named in 
the ill none ar partie to it, again t whom proce i not prayed. 
Coop. Eq. Plead. 16. 1 P . il. 593. 2 Dick. 0 . A defendant 
i a ne e ary to the ju t and proper con tru tion of a Bill in 
Equit a a plaintiff. I n the case w are now con idering, there i 
no d f ndant whatever- proce i pra ed a ain t no one. 'lhe 
pra · r i , 'that the clerk be order d to i ue ubpama to th 
prop r defendant & . ' But who are they? .... o name or name· 
ar iY n. ow i he to find them out? I it to be left o hi· 
di er tion to ay, who ought to be mad defendant ? Thi , in fact, 
i what the plaintiff do a k. It i not, a before remarked, 
uffi i nt that th name of individual a·r contained in the Bill. 
roe i no a ked again t them nor again t any one in par-
ticular. There i th n, no party defendant to the Bill. ut the 
ill i liabl to other obje tion equally fatail. It i , among other 
thin tat d, that John "Moore died before th te tator 1 ann. 
childr n and a blank i 1 ft in the Bill after the word leaYing.' 
appar ntl3 for in rting the nam of hi chilc1r n, and perha1p of 
hi r pr ntativ if he had any. It i not tated wh ther th r-' 
i a r pr entati or not. Th Bill do not tate who ar the 
c:hildr n of \1 and r l\Ioor . The nam of certain pe on ar 
111 ntion 1 bu h h r th y ar u h hildren, w are 1 ft to 
·onj tur . om of th o ention d ar aid t a , 
hut wh n th · li d w ar not inform d. I would b impo .. ii l 
.•' 
52 Multifariousness
for the Court, upon this executor's bill, to know to whoiD to
decree the money.
The Court has gone very far, in sustaining Bills defectr, sly
drawn — but we think this so essentially wanting in one of the
points, necessary to the institution of a suit in any Court, that we
cannot sustain it.
Pee Cubiam. Bill dismissed.
Multifariousness.
Warren v. Warren, 56 Me. 360. (1868.)
Bill in Equity^ heard on demurrer, brought in the name of
George Warren and Lewis P. Warren, of Westbrook, who were
the sole heirs at law of the late John Warren, against John G.
Warren and Charles W. Scott, executors and trustees of the last
will and testament of the late Nathaniel Warren.
The bill alleges substantially that, in 1815, John and Nathaniel
Warren entered into a co-partnership in the business of lumbering,
farming, trade and navigation, under the firm name of J. & N.
Warren, each uniting his property, real and personal, and they
were in all things to share equally in their partnership affairs;
that their partnership business continued till Sept. 10, 1845, when
John Warren died intestate, leaving the complainants his sole
heirs and representatives, and that, upon his decease, all his prop-
erty, together with his interests in said partnership business, vested
in them ; that, during John Warren's lifetime, he advanced to the
partnership more than his proportionate part of the funds and
performed more than his share of the services therein; that, at
John Warren's decease, Nathaniel Warren had received the larger
share of the partnership profits, and was indebted to John Warren
therefor and for the surplus advances aforesaid; that the partner-
ship thus continued without any adjustment, until Feb. 11, 183-1,
when Nathaniel Warren was found indebted to the co-partnership
in a certain sum named; that, from Feb. 11, 1824, to the time
of John Warren's death, there was no settlement or exhibit of the
condition of the partnership affairs, although Nathaniel Warren
kept the partnership 1)ooks and papers and was thereto often re-

















































































































































52 MULTIFARIOUS ESS 
for the Court, upon this executor's bill, to know to whom to 
decree the money. 
The Court ha gone very far, in sustaining Bills defecfr, .ely 
hawn-but we think this so es entially wanting in one of the 
point , nece ary to the institution of a suit in any Court, that we 
cannot sustain it. 
PER CuRIAM. Bill dismissed. 
MULTIFARIOUSNESS. 
Warren v. Warren, 56 Me. 360. (1868.) 
BILL IN EQUITY, heard on demurrer, brought in the name Jf 
George Warren and Lewis P. Warren, of Westbrook, who were 
the sole heirs at law of the late John Warren, against John G. 
Warren and Charles W. Scott, executors and trustees of the last 
will and testament of the late Nathaniel Warren. 
The bill alleges substantially that, in 1815, John and Nathaniel 
Warren entered into a co-partnership in the business of lumbering, 
farming, trade and navigation, under the firm name of J. & N. 
Warren, each uniting his property, real and personal, and they 
were in all things to share equally in their pa·rtnership affairs; 
that their partnership business continued till Sept. 10, 1845, when 
John Warren died intestate, leaving the complainants his sole 
heirs and representatives, and that, upon his decease, all his prop-
erty, together with his interests in sari.d partnership business, vested 
in them; that, during John Warren's lifetime, he advanced to the 
partnership more than his proportionate part of the funds and 
performed more than his share of the services therein; that, at 
John Warren's decease, Nathaniel Warren had received the larger 
share of the partnership profits, and was indebted to John Warren 
th refor and for the surplus advance aforesaid; that the partner-
ship thus continued without any adju tment, until Feb. 11, 182-.1:, 
when Na thani 1 Warren was found ind b d to the co-partnership 
in a c rtain um named; that from F b. 11, 1824, to the time 
of John Warr n' d ath ther wa no ttl ment or exhibit of the 
condition of th partn r hip affair although athaniel Warr n 
kept the partner fop 1 o k and pap r and was th reto oft n r .. 
qu ted by John Wan n and that no· a ount th reof ha lwcn 
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rendered by Nathaniel Warren or his representatives, to the date
of this bill; that, prior to the death of John Warren, the co-
partnership acquired certain real estate, a part of which was there-
after divided, but a certain part thereof remained undivided at the
decease of John Warren, which, together with a large amount of
personal property, rights and credits, was continued in the part-
nership business; that no administration of John Warren's estate
has ever been granted to any person ; that the complainants became
entitled to all the rights and remedies in equity to which their
father in his lifetime was entitled.
The bill further alleges that, on August 11, 1844, one Walker
united his business of lumbering to that of J. & M". Warren, and
that the lumbering business was carried on by J. Warren, N. War-
ren and Walker, the said J. & N. Warren having one-fourth part
interest each, and Walker one-half part interest therein; that, in
all other respects, the partnership business of J. & X. Warren was
conducted same as before Walker's connection therewith ; that said
lumbering business was carried on by the firm name of Warren &
Walker, separate and distinct from the other partnership business ;
that, after the death of their father, the complainants succeeded
to his partnership interests, all of which remained in the hands
of Nathaniel Warren, and it vested in them; that, thus repre-
senting their father's interests, the complainants were admitted by
Nathaniel Warren into the partnership before stated; that the
co-partnership business, so far as the lumbering was concerned,
was carried on by Nathaniel Warren, owning one-fourth. Walker
one-half, and the complainants, owning and representing in the
right of their deceased father, the remaining fourth part interest
in the same; that the several parties in the lumbering business
were each to contribute their respective proportion of services and
property and receive a proportionate share of the profits ; that the
former partnership business of J. & N. Warren was continued
after John Warren's death by Nathaniel Warren and the com-
plainants, owning and representing the moiety of their father
deceased, and they so continued in said business till Nov. 1862 ;
that, after the decease of John Warren, Nathaniel Warren received
more than his share of its proceeds and the complainants con-
tributed more than their share to the business.
The bill further alleges that the lumbering business was con-

















































































































































WARnE . \ Ilil•N 53 
rend r d by a thani 1 \ arr n or hi r pr ntati v , to the elate 
of tbi bill; that, prior to the d ath of ohn arren, the co-
partn r hip a quir cl rtain r al c tat a part of whi h wa there-
aft"r di i l tl but ai ertain part th r of r main d unclivid d at the 
d c a of ohn \\arr n which, i. o»th r with a large amount of 
p r onal pr I rty, ri 0 ht an 1 r lit , wa conti ued in the part-
n r hip bu. in . ; tha no aclmini 'trati n of John Warren tate 
ha v r b n oTant d to any p I on· that the complainant became 
ntitl d to all the rights and r medi in equity to which their 
father in hi lif tim wa ntitled. 
Th bill furth r all g that, on ugu t 11, 1 -±-!, one Walker 
unite 1 hi bu in of lumbering to that of J. & .... . Warren, and 
that the lumb ring bu in was carri d on by J. Warren, N. War-
ren aind Walker, the aid J. & . Warren having one-fourth part 
inter t ea h an alker on -half part intere t ther in; that, in 
all o her r p c , th partn r hip bu ine of J. & N. Warren wa 
mnduct d ame a b fore Walker's connection therewith; that aid 
lumbering bu ine wa arri d on by th firm nam of Warren & 
W alkcr, parate and di tinct from the other partner hip bu ines ; 
that, after the death of their father, the complainants succeed d 
to hi partn hip inter t , all of which remained in the hand 
of .r athaniel Warren, and it ve t d in them; that thu r epre-
entino- th ir father' inter t , th comr lainant were admitted by 
.,.athani 1 Warren into the partner hip befor tated; that the 
co-partner hip bu in , o far a the lumbering wa concern d, 
wa carried on by athani 1 Warren owning on -fourth Walker 
one-half and the omplainants, owning and r pr enting in the 
right of th ir dee a d father the r mainin fourth part intere t 
in th am ; that the Yeral parti in th lumb rinO' bu ine 
"
7 r ach to contribute th ir re pectiv proportion of ervice an 
propert and r c i a pr portionat har of th profit ; that the 
form r partn r hi bu in of J. & . Warr n wa continued 
aft r ohn Warr n d ath b ' athani 1 Warr n and th com-
plainant ownino- and r pre enting th moi t of their fath r 
decca 1 and th o continued in aid bu in till .i. ov. 1 2 ; 
that aft r th d c a of John Warr n 
mor than hi har of it proc ed an 1 t1; on-
tribut 1 mor than th ir har to the u in . . 
Th ill furth r all o· " that th lum rin bn inc wa n-
tinu 1 by athani l Wan n alk r an 1 the r 1111 lainant until 
54 Multifariousness
July, 1854, when Walker sold Ms interest to one Brigham, and
received his share of the profits, and fully accounted for his share
of the property; that, in July aforesaid, the complainants pur-
chased Nathaniel ^Yarren's interest in tlie lumbering interest; that
Nathaniel Warren then held a large amount of property, rights
and credits received from Jolin Warren and never accounted for,
and a large amount of interest and profits which arose from the
funds of the co-partnership of J. & N. Warren, in the hands of
X. Warren, before and after Jolin Warren's death ; that Nathaniel
Warren, so holding the funds of J. Wan-en, in his lifetime, and,
since his death, of the complainants, which he ought to have ac-
counted for to the complainants, the complainants, at Nathaniel
Warren's request, made their promissory note, dated July 1, 1854,
and payable to Nathaniel Warren, for the sum of $8930; that said
note was given for convenience, with the full understanding with
Nathaniel Warren that whatever sum of money or other property
Nathaniel Warren held as due John Warren in his lifetime, or,
since his death, to the complainants, should be applied to the pay-
ment of said note, and that the amount so held was more than the
value of the note.
The bill further alleges that the partnership business, other than
the lumbering business, was continued by Nathaniel Warren and
the complainants, till November, 1862, when Nathaniel Warren
died testate, and the defendants were appointed executors of his
will, duly probated, and trustees of certain trusts therein named,
which they accepted; that, in Nov., 1866, the defendants, as
executors, disregarding the understanding before named and con-
triving to oppress the complainants, sued said note and entered
their action at the January term, 1867, of this Court, where the
same is now pending.
The bill further alleges that, during the partnership of J. & N.
Warren, both before and since the death of John Warren,
Nathaniel Warren applied to his own use, from the profits of
said co-partnership, large sums of money exceeding his propor-
tion, and, up to the time of his death, Nathaniel Warren has
had charge of the partnership books of account between himself
and John Warren and l)etween himself and the complainants; that
the complainants have had no means to ascertain the true state of
their accounts; that the complainants repeatedly applied to

















































































































































54 MuLTIFARIO sNEss 
July, 1854, when Walker sold his interest to one Brigham, arn1 
received his share of the profits, and fully accounted for his share 
of the property; that, in July afore aid, the complainant pur-
cha ed Nathaniel \\ arren' interest in the lumbering intere t; that 
athaniel Warren then held a large amount of prop rty, rights 
and credits received from John Warren and never accounted for, 
and a large amount of interest and profits which arose from the 
funds of the co-partnership of J. & N. Warren, in the hand of 
N. Warren, before and after John Warren's death; that Nathaniel 
Warren, so holding the funds of J. Warr en, in his lifetime, and, 
since his death, of the complaiinants, which he ought to have ac-
counted for to the complainants, the complainants, at Nathaniel 
Warren's request, made their promissory note, dated July 1, 185-J., 
and payable to N athailliel Warren, for the sum of $8920; that said 
note was given for convenience, with the full under tanding with 
Nathaniel Warren that whatever sum of money or other property 
Nathaniel Warren held as due John Wail'ren in his lifetime, or, 
since his death, to the complainants, should be applied to the pay-
ment of said note, and that the amount so held was more than the 
value of the note. 
The bill further alleges that the partnership business, other than 
the lumbering business, was continued by Nathaniel ·warren and 
the complainants, till November, 1862, when Nathaniel Wairren 
died testate, and the defendants were appointed executors of his 
will, duly probated, and trustees of certain trusts th rein named, 
which they accepted; that, in Nov., 1866, the defendants, as 
ex cutors, disrega-rding the understanding before named and con-
triving to oppress the complainants, sued said note and entered 
their action at the January term, 1867, of this Court, where the 
same is now pending. 
The bill further alleges that, during the partnership of J. & N. 
Warren, both before and since the death of John Warren, 
Nathaniel Warren appli d to hi own use, from the profits of 
said co-partner hip, large um of mon y exceeding hi propor-
tion, and, up to the tim of hi d ath athani 1 W arrcn ha .. 
had charge of the partn r hip book of account between himself 
and John Warren and b ween hims lf and the omplainants; that 
th complajnan hav ha 1 no m an to a certain th true tate of 
th ir ac ount · that the complainants repeatedly applied to 
Nathani 1 Warr n in hi lif time and sine hi a ath, to the 
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defendants, for au account of all the alfairs of the co-iDartnerbhip
between Nathaniel & John Warren, in his lifetime, and, since his
death, between Nathaniel V^arren and the complainants; that
Nathaniel Warren, in his lifetime, refused and neglected to
answer said account to John Warren or the complainants, as have
the defendants since the death of Nathaniel Warren; that the
defendants pretend that nothing is due the complainants; that
Nathaniel Warren received $5000 more than his proportion of the
partnership profits; that the defendants ought to apply said
moneys to the payment of said note and be enjoined from prosecut-
ing their suit thereon, and render a true account of the partner-
ship transactions.
The prayer of the bill was for an answer and for an account
of all the partnership dealings, and the defendants be decreed to
apply whatever is found due the complainants to the payment of
said note, and the balance to the complainants, offering to pay
whatever may be found due from John Warren or the com-
plainants; that, in the meantime, the defendants be restrained
from prosecuting their suit on the note, and for further relief.
The defendants demurred, assigning the following causes:
1. That the claims and transactions set out in the bill occurred
more than six years before the filing of the bill ;
2. That the plaintiffs, as heirs of John Warren, have no right
to maintain the bill or to any relief touching the same;
3. That, as to so much of the bill as seeks an answer touchinsr
real estate acquired by the co-partnership prior to the death of
John Warren, the plaintiffs have not made such a case in refer-
ence thereto as entitles them to any discovery or relief;
•1. That as to so much of the bill as seeks an answer touchinsr
the alleged admission of the plaintiffs into the co-partnership after
the death of John Warren, the continuance of the co-partnership
thereafterwards, &c., the plaintiffs have not made such a case as
entitles them to any discovery or relief; and,
5. That the bill is exhibited for several separate and distinct
claims and causes which have no relation to or dependance on
each other, and concern different and distinct persons who have
no common relation to or interest in the same; because the bill
is multifarious, and because it discloses no equity on the part- of

















































































































































WARREN V. WARREN 55 
defendants) for n a ount f all th afl'.ai of th co-parln r hip 
b tween athani 1 J hn Warr n) in hi lif im ) and, ince hi·· 
death) betw n thani 1 ·w arr n and th o plainants; that 
athani 1 V arren) in hi lifotim ) r fus d and neglected to 
an w r aid ount t hn \ arr n or the omplainant ) as ha 
the d f ndant inc the death f athani 1 Warren; that the 
d f ndant pr t nd that nothing i due tl omplainant ; that 
athaniel \\arr n r c ived $5000 mor than hi proportion of the 
partn r hip profit ; that the defenda·nt ought to apply aid 
mon y to th paym nt of aid note and be njoined from pro ecut-
ing th ir uit thereon, and render a true account of the partner-
ship tran action . 
The pra 'er of the bill was for an an wer and for an account 
of all th partnership dealing ) and the defendant be decreed to 
apply whatever i found due th complainant to the payment of 
said note) aind th balance to the omplainant , offering to pay 
whate r may be found due from John Warr n or the com-
plainant · that) in the meantime) the defendant be re trained 
from pro uting th ir uit on the not and for further reli f. 
Tbe def ndant demurred, a ignin the following cau e : 
1. That the claim a·nd tran a tion et out in th bill occurred 
more than ix year b fore the filing of the bill; 
2. That the plaintiff ) a h ir of John Warren ha e no right 
to maintain the bill or to any relief touching the ame; 
3. That) a to o much of the bill a eek atll an wer touching 
real e tate acquired by the co-partner hip prior to the death of 
John ~arr n) th plaintiff have not made uch a a e in refer-
ence ther to a entitle them to any di covery or r lief; 
-!. Tha a to o much of the bill a eek an an wer touching 
the alleged admi ion of the plaintiff into the co-partner hip after 
the death of John Warren, the ontinuance of the co-partn r hip 
thereafterward , &c. the plaintiff have not made uch a ca e a, 
enti 1 th m to any di covery or r lief; and) 
5. That the bill i xhibited for everal eparate and di tinct 
laim and cau e whi h hav no r lation to or dependance on 
ach oth r and n rn diff r nt and di tinct per on who ha1e 
no common r la ion t r int r t in th am ; b cau th bill 
i multifari u n b au e it di lo no quit· on the part o 
th plaintiff nor an right to th a i tanc of a ourt of equity. 
5G MULTIFAEIOUSNESS
Kent, J. :
The principal ground, set fortli in the demurrer to this bill, is
that it is multifarious. Before examining the allegations in the
bill, it is important to ascertain what is the true definition of
multifariousness as applied to a bill in equity, and its extent and
limitations. Equity, whilst it is broad and liberal in the applica-
tion of remedies, and avoids the strict technicalities of the common
law, yet forbids the mixing together in one bill of entirely distinct
and independent matters of complaint, or the introduction of par-
ties wdio are not interested in the subject matter or decree sought,
and have but an incidental interest in some question raised by the
statements in the bill. The objection, therefore, is of a two fold
character, one relating to the subject matter and prayer of the bill,
and the other relating to the parties thereto. But "a bill is not
multifarious because it joins two good causes of complaint, growing
out of the same transaction, when all the defendants are interested
in the same claim of right, and when the relief asked for in rela-
tion to each is of the same general character." Foss v. Eayiies,
31 Maine, 81 ; Story's Eq. PI., § 284.
Where the object of the bill is single, to establish and obtain
relief for one claim, in which all the defendants may be inter-
ested, it is not multifarious. Bughee v. Sargent, 23 Maine, 260.
"A bill is not to be regarded as multifarious when it states a right
to account from A & B against whom it has one remedy which it
seeks to enforce, and also claims a lien against A for what is due.''
Story's Eq. PI., § 284.
A bill is not multifarious when it sets up one substantial ground
of relief and also another on which no relief can be had. VarricJc
V. Smith, 5 Paige, 137.
In the case of Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. C. E., 432, Chan-
cellor Walworth, after stating that there did not appear to be
any necessary connection between the different subject matters
stated in the bill, says that, "the counsel is wrong in supposing
that two distinct and independent matters or claims, by the same
complainant against the same defendant, cannot properly be united
in the same bill. Multifariousness in a bill is only where different
matters, having no connection with each other, are joined in the
bill against several defendants, having no interest in or connection
with one or more of the distinct causes of action or claims for

















































































































































56 MULTIF .ARIOUSNESS 
KENT, J.: 
The principal ground, set forth in the demurrer to this bill, is 
that it i multifariou . B fore examining the allegations in the 
bill, it i important to a certain what i the true definition of 
multifariou ne s a applied to ai bill in equity, and its extent and 
limitations. Equity, whil t it is broad and liberal in the applica-
tion of remedies, and avoid the strict technicalitie of the common 
law, yet forbid the mixing together in one bill of entirely distinct 
and independent matters of complaint, nr the introduction of par-
ties who are not intere ted in the subject matter or decree sought, 
and have but an incidental intere t in ome que tion raised by the 
tatements in the bill. The objection, therefore, i of a two foltl 
character, one relating to the ubject matter and prayer of the bill, 
and the other relating to the parties thereto. But "a bill is not 
multifarious because it joins two good causes of complaint, growing 
out of the ame tran action, when all the defendants are interested 
in the same claim of right, and when the relief asked for in rela-
tion to each i of the same general character." Foss v. Haynes, 
31 Maine, 81; Story's Eq. Pl., § 284. 
Where the object of the bill is single, to esta-blish and obtain 
relief for one claim, in which all the defendants may be inter-
ested, it is not multifarious. Bugbee v. Sargent, 23 Maine, 26~). 
"A bill is not to be regarded as multifarious when it states a right 
to account from A & B against whom it has one remedy which it 
seeks to enforce, and also claims a lien against A for what is due." 
Story's Eq. PL, § 284. 
A bill is not multifarious when it sets up one substantial ground 
of relief and al o another on which no relief can be had. Varrick 
v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137. 
In the ca e of Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. C. R., 432, Chan-
cellor Wal worth, after ta·ting that there did not appear to be 
any necessary connection between the different ubject matters 
tat d in the bill, ay that, "the coun el is wrong in uppo ing 
that two di tinct and ind pendent matt r or claim by the ame 
complainant again t the ame defendant cannot prop rly b unitc<l 
in the sam bill. Multifariou ne in a bill i only where di:ff rent 
matter , having no connection with ach other ar join d in the 
bill again t evera1 def ndant having no inter t in or conn ction 
with one or more of th di tin t cau of a· tion or claim for 
whi ·h th bm j hr uaht 0 that u h d f ndant are put to the 
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unnecessary trouble and expense of answering and litigating mat-
ters stated in the bill in which they are not interested, and with
which they have no connection. But a simple misjoinder of dif-
ferent causes of complaint, between the same parties, which cannot
conveniently and properly be litigated together, is sometimes called
multifariousness, although the ground of objection, in such cases,
depends upon an entirely different principle, and is a mere matter
of convenience in the administration of justice."
Story also says, — that "the objection of multifariousness and
the circumstances under which it will be allowed to prevail, or not,
is, in many cases, a matter of discretion and no general rule can
be laid down on the subject." Eq. Plead., § 284.
The Supreme Court of the United States takes the same view
in Gaines v. Cheiv, 2 How., 619, and in Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How.,
411. In the latter case, the Court say, — "We are of opinion that
the bill is in no just sense multifarious. It is true that it em-
braces the claims of both companies, but these interests are so
mixed up in all these transactions that entire justice could scarcely
be done, at least, not conveniently be done, without a union of
the proprietors of both companies. It was well observed, by Lord
Coltenham, in Catnphell v. McKay, 1 Mylne & Craig, 603, and
the same doctrine was affirmed in this Court, in Gaines v. Chew,
2 Howard, 642, that it is impracticable to lay down any rule as to
what constitutes multifariousness as an abstract proposition; that
each case must depend upon its own circumstances, and much
must necessarily be left, where the authorities leave it, to the sound
discretion of the Court."
If we apply the doctrines and principles of these authorities to
the facts in this case, we fail to find sufficient foundation to the
objections made, to require us to dismiss the bill on the ground of
multifariousness.
The case presented in the bill is substantially one between part-
ners, seeking for an adjustment of partnership business. It sets
forth a co-partnership as existing between the complainants and
the deceased, represented by the defendants, from 1845 to 1862.
That such a partnership existed during that time, is distinctly
averred. The bill in fact seeks for an adjustment of that partner-
ship, and the ascertainment of the rights of the different parties
during the existence of that firm. It is true that it sets forth the

















































































































































ARREN V. ARilEN 5 
unneces ary trouble and xp n e of an wering and litigating mat-
ter stated in the bill in whi h th y ar not intere ted, and with 
which th y hav no onnection. ut a impl misjoinder f dif-
ferent au of ompla,int, between th ame partic , which annot 
conv ni ntly and pr p rly be litigat cl tog •th r, i om time call J 
multifari u n although th ground. .r ol j ·tion, in uch ·as , 
<l p ncl upon an entir ly di:ff r n principl , and i a mer matter 
of on ni nee in th admini tration of ju ti· . ' 
tory al o ay ,-that the obj ction of multifariou n and 
the cir um tanc und r which it will be allow d to prevail, or not, 
i , in many ca e , a matt.er of di r tion and no general rul can 
b laid down on th ubject.' Eq. 1 ad., 2 4. 
Th upr m ourt of the Unit d tate tak the ame iew 
in Gaine v. hew, 2 ow., 619 and in Oliver v. Platt, 3 ow., 
411. In th latter a , the Court ay,-'~ e are of opinion that 
th bill i in no ju t en e multifariou . It i true that it ern-
brac the claim of both companie but the e intere t are . o 
mix d up in all the e tran action that entire ju tice could carcel 
be don at lea t, not conveniently be done, without a union of 
the propri tor of both companie . It wa well ob erved, by Lord 
Coltenham, in ampbell v. McKay, 1 1\1ylne & Craig, 603, and 
the am doctrin wa affirmed in thi Court, in Gaines . Chew, 
2 Howard, 642, that it i impracticable to lay down any rule as to 
what con titute multifa.riou ne as an ab tract proposition; that 
each ca mu t depend upon it own circum tance , and much 
mu t n ce arily be 1 ft where the authoritie leave it, to the sound 
di cretion of the Court." 
H we apply the doctrine and principle of the e authoritie to 
the fact in thi ca e, we fail to find ufficient foundation to the 
objection made, to require u to di mi the bill on the ground of 
multifariou ne . 
The a e pre ented in the bill is ub tantially one between par -
ner , e king for an adju tment of partner hip bu ine . It et 
forth a co-partner hip a xi ting between the complainant~ and 
th ec a d r pr nt d b) th defendant from 1 -!"' to 1 '... 
That u h a parln r hip xi t d J.urino- that tim i~ di tinctl 1 
aven d. Th bill in fa t e k for an adju tm nt of that partn r-
hip and th a rtainm nt of the rio-ht of th iffcr nt I arti ~ 
durinCT th ·i t n f that :firm. It i true that it " t f rth h 
of a - artn r hip b tw n John an athaniel Warr n 
58 Multifariousness
for many years before 1845, and that the complainants are the
heirs of John. If the bill had been framed as claiming a right as
heirs alone to have an adjustment of the partnership, without
showing any other connection with the co-partnership, than as
heirs of their father, it might well be questioned whether such a
bill should not be instituted by an administrator and not by the
heirs. But the bill sets forth that the complainants, being heirs,
"were admitted by Nathaniel into the partnership before stated.''
They then became co-partners, and not simply heirs, and came in
as members of the firm, as individuals, and not in their representa-
tive capacity. They now ask that the old co-partnership matters
may be examined, not on the ground that they were members of
the firm before their father's death, but because they were so inti-
mately connected with the business after his death, that it is neces-
sary to investigate and settle these prior matters, in order to deter-
mine the rights of the parties under the firm as it existed after the
complainants came in.
If they came in, assuming simply their father's place by consent
or understanding with the surviving partner, and entitled to all
his interest in the firm property, and liable for all its debts, then
it may be that they should be held entitled or liable, as the case
might be, from the settlement in 1824. In such a case, if it became
necessary to institute a bill in equity to adjust the affairs of the
firm, thus continued, it clearly would not be multifarious to con-
nect the prior with the subsequent transactions and seek for an
adjustment of both, where the parties are the same.
If another view is taken and these complainants are to be re-
garded as having been admitted as members of a new firm, and
independent of the old one, but as contributing the capital be-
longing to their father at his death, in the firm, it would not be
objectionable to ask for an examination and adjustment of the
condition of that firm, in order to ascertain, among other things,
wliat capital was in fact put in by the new partners. At all
events, the transactions referred to in the bill arc not so entirely
disconnected with the main purpose of the suit, as to justify us in
saying that they cannot have any bearing on the case after all the
facts are developed.
The allegations in the bill in reference to the branch partner-
ship, in which one Walker was originally a party, do not appear

















































































































































58 M ULTIF .ARIOUSNESS 
for many y ar before 1 -±5, and that the complainants a·re the 
h irs of John. If the bill had been framed a claiming a right a. 
heir alone to have an adju tment of the partnership, without 
showing any other connection with the co-partnership, than as 
heirs of their father, it might well be questioned whether such a 
bill hould not be in tituted by an admini trator and not by the 
heirs. But the bill sets forth that the complainants, being heirs 
"were admitted by Nathaniel into the partnership before stated;'' 
They then became co-partners, and not simply heirs, and came in 
as members of the firm, as individuals, and not in their representa-
tive capacity. They now ask that the old co-partnership matter' 
may be examined, not on the ground that they were members of 
the firm before their father's death, but oocau e they were so inti-
mately connected with the business after his death, that it is neces-
sary to investigate and settle these prior matters, in order to deter-
mine the right of the parties under the firm as it existed after the 
complainant came in. 
If they came in, assuming simply their father's place by consent 
or understanding with the surviving partner, and entitled to all 
his interest in the firm property, and liable for all its debts, then 
it may be that they should be held entitled or liable, as the ca. c 
might be, from the settlement in 18 4:. In such a case, if it became 
necessary to institute a bill in equity to adjust the a·ffairs of the 
firm, thus continued, it clearly would not be multifarious to con-
nect the prior with the ubsequent transactions and seek for an 
adjustment of both, where the partie are the same. 
If another view is taken and these complainants are to be re-
garded as having been admitted as members of a new firm, ancl 
independent of the old one, but as contributing the capital be-
longing to their father at hi death in the firm, it would not be 
objectionable to a k for an examination and adju tment of the 
condition o.r that firm, in order to a c rtain, among other thing , 
what capital wa in fact put in by the n w partners. At all 
e ent , th transaction r £erred to in th bill are not o entirely 
di connected with th main purpo e of th uit, a to ju tify us in 
aying that they annot have any bearing on th ca e after all the 
fact are developed. 
The all gations in the bill in ref rence to the branch partner-
ship, in whi h one Walker wa ori!rinally a party, do not appear 
to us a improp r, or a uch di tinct and ind pendent and un-
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connected matters as bring them within the objection of multi-
fariousness. That partnership was in relation to one branch only
of the business of the general firm, and was confined to that par-
ticular business. It was well likened by the counsel for the com-
plainants to the branches of a co-partnership, so common in
mercantile transactions, existing in different cities or countries.
It is not properly a distinct and independent firm, but a wheel
within a wheel, or a branch from a common trunk.
If Walker had remained as a partner, he, undoubtedly, should
have been made a party. But the bill shows that, in 18o-l, Walker
sold out his interest, and received from the partnership his share
of the profits, and fully accounted for his share of the property.
On the same day, the complainants purchased of Xathaniel War-
ren, the testator, his interest in the lumbering business, which
was the sole business of the branch firm. Thus that particular
union was dissolved, and Walker had no further interest, and no
claim is made upon him, nor any that could affect his interests.
How far the purchase by the complainants of Xathaniel War-
ren's interest was a full and final settlement, so far as that branch
of the business is concerned, we cannot determine until the whole
case is developed by the proof. All we now say is, that the bill is
not objectionable for this cause on demurrer. The same remark
may apply to the statute of limitations, invoked as one cause of
demurrer. The bill was commenced within six years after the final
dissolution of the partnership, by the death of Xathaniel Warren,
in 1862.
We arc now called upon to consider, on this demurrer, whether
or not the statute of limitations should be applied to any part
of the transactions between the parties, or whether they were in
the nature of merchants' accounts, or open transactions, the in-
vestigation of which would not be precluded by the statute. These
questions may well await the answers and proof. There is nothing
in the bill which on its face shows that the cause of complaint
io necessarily and absolutely barred by the statute of limitations.
Demurrer overruled.

















































































































































W .ARRE V. W .ARREN 59 
connected matt r a bring h m within the obj ction of multi-
fariou ne . That partn r hip wa in r la i n to one branch only 
of the busin f the g n ral firm and w onfined to that ar-
ticular bu in t wa well lik n d by h ounsel for he com-
plainants to th bran hes of a co-partn r hip, o common in 
mer antil tran ac ions, exi ting in different itie or countrie ~ . 
t i not pr p rly a di tinct and ind n lent firm, but a wheel 
within a wh 1, or a branch from a common trunk. 
If v alk r had r mained a a partner, he, undoubtedly, hould 
ha e been mad a party. But the bill how that, in 1 54, alker 
old out hi in er t, and receiv d from the artnership hi hare 
of the profit , and fully accounted for hi hare of the property. 
On the sam day, the complainants purcha ed of Nathaniel War-
ren, the te tator hi intere t in the lumbering busine , which 
wa th ole bu in of the branch firm. Thu that particular 
union wa di sol ed, and Walker had no further intere t, and no 
claim i made upon him, nor any that could affect his intere ts. 
How far the purchase by the complainant of Nathaniel War-
r n intere t wa a full and final ettlement o far as that branch 
of the busine i concerned, we cannot determine until the whole 
ca e i dev loped by the proof. All we now ·ay i , that the bill i 
not objectionable for this cau e on demurrer. The ame remark 
may apply to the tatute of limitation , invoked a one cau e of 
demurrer. Tb bill wa commenced within ix year after the final 
di olution of th partner hip, by the death of Nathaniel Warren, 
in 1 6 . 
W are now called upon to consider, on thi demurrer, whether 
or not the statute of limitation hould be applied to any part 
of the tran action between the partie , or whether they were in 
the nature of mercha·nts' account , or op n tran actions, the in-
' tigation of whi h would not be pr clu led b ' the tatute. Th e 
que tion ma well await the an wers and proof. Th re i nothing 
b th bill which on its face how that the cau e of complaint 
i · nece arily and ab olutely barred by the tatut of limitation .. . 
Demurrer 01:erruled. 
BARROWS DICKERSON, DA FORTH and TAPLEY, JJ., concurred. 
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Winslow V. Jenness, 64 Mich. S^. (1887.)
Appeal from. Lapeer. (Stickney, J.) Argued October 28, 1886.
Decided January 6, 1887.
Bill to restrain the prosecution of 21 ejectment suits. De-
murrer, for multifariousness in the misjoinder of unconnected
causes of action, sustained, and bill dismissed. Affirmed. The
facts are stated in the opinion.
Campbell, C. J.:
This bill, which was filed in February, 1886, seeks to restrain
defendant Gertrude Smith from prosecuting 21 ejectment suits,
and to compel her to convey to the several complainants an undi-
vided third interest each to the property involved in the suit in
which he or she is interested. There are no joint interests in
complainants. Each claims title to separate land, in which Mrs.
Smith sets up her own title to an undivided third. Defendant
Gertrude Smith demurred for multifariousness in the misjoinder
of unconnected causes of action, and the demurrer was sustained,
and the bill dismissed. Complainants appeal.
The case contains a recital of several matters, giving the history
of various partnership matters, which are detailed in a bill for-
merly filed by defendant Isaac N. Jenness against his co-defend-
ant, Gertrude Smith, to obtain the same relief which is sought
here. Jenness v. Smith, 58 Mich. 280. The present record does
not entirely conform to that. But in order to try the sufficiency
of the present bill on the one question of multifariousness, it will
only be necessary to give an outline of the controversy, giving
complainants the advantage of all the ambiguities.
The case, thus abridged, is this: Henry Fish, father of Gert-
rude Smith, died intestate in May, 1876, leaving her his heir at
law, 17 years of age. Before his death, he, and defendant Isaac
N. Jenness, and Allen Fish (since deceased) were ownei*s of con-
siderable tracts of land in Michigan, including the lands here in
controversy, which are in Lapeer county. They were all in part-
nership, under the name of I. N. Jenness & Co., and these lands,
although held by tenancy in common, are claimed to have been
partnership property. After Henry Fish's death, it is claimed it
became necessary to continue the business and manufacture the


















































































































































Winslow v. Jenness, 64 Mich. 84. (1887.) 
Appeal from Lapeer. (Stickney, J.) Argued October 28, 1886. 
Decided January 6, 1887. 
Bill to r train the pro ecution of 21 ejectment suits. De-
murrer, for multifariousn s in the mi joinder of unconnected 
causes of action, sustained, and bill dismissed. Affirmed. The 
facts are stated in the opinion. 
CAMPBELL, 0. J.: 
This bill, which was filed in February, 1886, seeks to restrain 
defendant Gertrude Smith from prosecuting 21 ejectment suits, 
and to compel her to convey to the several complainants an undi-
vided third interest each to the property involved in the suit in 
which he or she is interested. There are no joint interests in 
complainants. Each claims title to eparate laJld, in which Mrs. 
Smith sets up her own title to an undivided third. Defendant 
Gertrude Smith demurred for multifariousness in the misjoinder 
of unconnected causes of action, and the demurrer was sustained, 
and the bill dismissed. Complainants appeal. 
The case contains a recital of several matters, giving the history 
of various pa1rtnership matters, which are detailed in a bill for-
merly filed by defendant Isaac N. Jenness against his co-defend-
ant, Gertrude Smith, to obtain the same relief which is sought 
here. Jenness v. Smith, 58 Mich. 280. T'he present record does 
not entirely conform to that. But in order to try the sufficiency 
of the present bill on the one question of multifariousness, it will 
only be necessary to give an outline of the controversy, giving 
complainants the advantage of all the ambiguities. 
The ca , thus abridged, is this: Henry Fi h, father of Gert-
rude Smith, died inte tate in May, 1 76, leaving her hi heir at 
law, 17 years of age. Before hi death, he, and defendant Isaac 
. J nn , and Allen Fish ( ince d cea ed) were own r of con-
id ral 1 tracts of land in Mi higan, including th lands here in 
contro er y whi h ar in Lapeer county. They wer all in pa·rt-
ner hip under the name of I. N. J nne & o. and the e land.:, 
although held by tenancy in ommon, ar claim d to have beeu 
partnership property. After Henry Fi h' d ath, it i claimed it 
became nee ary to continue the bu ine amd manufacture the 
pine left, so a to clo e matters out, and, after using such personal 
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assets as could be spared without stopping the business, the debts
could not be paid off without selling lands.
Allen Fish became defendant Gertrude's guardian, and, suppos-
ing salc-s could not be made complete without autliority to act for
her, applied to the circuit court for the county of St. Clair, and
obtained a decree, the sul)stance of which is not set out, but which,
it was assumed, gave him power to act for her. Had the case been
otherwise sufficient, it would have been necessary to show just what
those proceedings were. After that decree, Allen Fish, for himself
and also as guardian, joined in warranty deeds with Isaac N".
Jenness and the widow of Henry Fish, to several parties, of the
various parcels of land involved in this suit, including the com-
plainants or their respective grantors, for prices set forth in the
bill; and the consideration so received was used for partnership
purposes. Tliese conveyances were not made at auction or at
the same time, but at private sale, and from time to time, during
the year 1877. It does not appear when the contracts were made,
and it is not averred that the deeds referred to the lands as part-
nership property, or that they were so considered by the purchasers.
All that is shown as to the partnership is that the money was used
for its benefit. One of the conveyances is shown to have been
made in carrying out an individual land contract executed by the
three partners during Henry Fish's life-time. This piece of land
is averred to have been conveyed for a valuable consideration, the
amount of which docs not appear, l)y Allen Fish, for himself and
as guardian, with Mrs. Fish, to Jenness, who conveyed the land to
Charles Bashaw, a complainant, and holder of the original con-
tract.
It is assumed, and is no doubt true, that Fish's deeds as guardian
were void, the sales never having been reported or confirmed.
Whether any lands remained unsold does not appear, but is not
important now.
Gertrude Smith has brought ejectment for her interest as heir
at law, each complainant being sued separately for his or her sev-
eral parcels.
The case, then, is that of a person claiming an undivided interest,
wliich, so far as she is concerned, has never been parted with, who
is sued in equity to compel her to surrender and release it to the
several grantees of her co-tenants, on the assumption that they

















































































































































WINSLOW V. JE NESS 61 
assets as could be pa1 without topping the busine , the d l> , 
could not be paid off with ut elling land . 
Allen i h became def ndant rtrud guardian, nd, uppo -
ing sal ould not be made ompl te without authority to act for 
her, applied to the ircuit court for th ounty of t. Clair, and 
obtain d a 1 ere , the ub tance of whi ·h is not t out, but whi ·h, 
it wa a um d, gav him pow r to act for her. Had the ca e 1 c n 
oth rwi e uili i nt, it ould have been ncce sary to how ju what 
tho e proc dings were. ft r that decre , llcn i h, for him lf 
and al o a uardian, joined in warranty deed with Isaac 
Jenne and the widow of H nry Fi h, to e eral parties, of the 
variou par 1 of land involv d in this uit, including the com-
plainant or th ir re p ctive grantors, for price et forth in the 
bill; and the on id ration so r ceived wa u ·ed for partnership 
purpo e . The e conveyance were not made at auction or at 
the ame time, but at private sale, and from time to time, during 
the year 18 . It doe not appear when the contract were made, 
and it is not averred that the deed referr d to the land a part-
nership property, or that they were o considered by the purcha er . 
All that i hown as to the partner hip i that the money w used 
for its benefit. One of the conveyances is shown to have been 
made in carrying out an individual land contract executed by the 
thre partn r during Henry Fish' life-tim . Thi piece of land 
i av rred to have been conveyed for a valuable onsideration, the 
amount of which do not app ar, by Allen Fi h for him elf and 
as guardian, with Mrs. Fi h, to J ennes , who conveyed the land to 
Charle Ba haw, a complainant, and holder of the original con-
tract. · 
It is a sumed, and i no doubt true, that Fi h' deeds as guardian 
were oid, the ale never having been reported or confirmed. 
\'\ h th r any land remained un old does not appear, but i not 
important now. 
G rtrud mith ha brought ej ctm nt for h r int re t a heir 
at law, ea h omplainant b ing ued parately for hi or her ev-
ral parcels. 
Th a then, i that of a p r on laiming an undivided inter t, 
whi h, o far a h i on rn d ha n v r been part d with who 
i u d in quity to om 1 h r t urr n · an r 1 a e it t the 
. cveral grante of h r o-t nant on th umption that they 
wn d it all and onv d jt all quitably. 
62 Multifariousness
Tlie guardian's transfers are not relied upon, and could not
be relied upon, as having any part in the controversy. ISTo equity
could arise out of them. They were nullities, or else the bill had
no basis.
The legal issue is, therefore, a simple one. Each of these com-
plainants claims under a purchase which was not made under any
legal proceedings, which was separate in time and in consideration
from every other sale. The only alleged common equity is that the
conveyances from Jenness and Allen Fish, which in law conveyed
two-thirds, should be held in equity as conveying the entirety.
The bill does not even show a simultaneous origin, or a common
fraud or contrivance by which these complainants were deceived.
All that can be made out is that they bought of the same parties
independently, and their title has failed in the same way; and no
fraud or conduct of defendant in any way contributed to their
difhculty.
This attempt to obtain relief by joint bill goes beyond the
broadest doctrine which has been formulated anywhere. There is
no common wrong and no privity among them. Their grievances
are similar, and that is all that can be said in their favor.
The general rule of equity is that every several grievance must
be redressed by a several proceeding. The only recognized excep-
tions to it (and these are considerably qualified) are instances
where there is a single right asserted on one side which affects all
the parties on tlie other side in the same way, or a single wrong
which falls on them all simultaneously and together. The in-
stances which are most familiar are rights in common which are
resisted by the owner of the estate on which it is charged, tax-
rolls assessing all parties on an equal ratio, frauds by trustees
affecting all the cestuis que trustent, and the like. Here the griev-
ances are not separate and similar, but single and uniformly in-
jurious. And it has been held in this Court, as well as elsewhere,
that, if there is any distinction in the proportion or chairacter of
the several grievances, there can be no joinder. Kerr v. Lansing,
17 Mich. 34.
Where the cause of grievance does not arise out of the same
wrong, affecting all at once as well as similarly, there is no founda-
tion for any such joinder. Our own precedents have settled the
doctrine sufficiently.


















































































































































The guardian's tran fers are not relied upon, and could not 
be relied upon, as having any part in the controversy. No equity 
could arise out of them. T'h y were nullities, or else the bill haJ 
no ba is. 
The legal issue is, therefore, a simple one. Each of these com-
plainants claims under a purchase which was not made under any 
legal proceedings, which wa eparate in time and in consideration 
from every other sale. The only aHeged common equity is that the 
onveyances from J ennes and Allen Fi h, which in law conveyed 
two-thirds, should be held in equity as conveying the entirety. 
The bill does not even how a simultaneous origin, or a common 
fraud or contrivance by which these complainants were deceived. 
All that can be made out is that they bought of the same parties 
independently, and their title has failed in the same way; and no 
fraud or conduct of defendant in any way contributed to their 
difficulty. 
Thi attempt to obtain relief by joint bill goes beyond the 
broadest doctrine which has been formula.ted anywhere. There i8 
no common wrong and no privity among them. Their grievances 
are similar, and thait is all that can be said in their favor. 
The general rule of equity is that every several grievance must 
be redressed by a several proceeding. The only recognized excep-
tions to it (and these are considerably qualified) are instances 
where there is a single right asserted on one side which affects all 
the parties on the other side in the same wa,y, or a single wrong 
which fall on them all simultaneously and together. The in-
• tances which are most familiar are right in common which are 
resisted by the owner of the estate on which it is charged, tax-
rolls asses ing all partie on an equal ratio, fraud by trustees 
affecting all the cestuis qu.e t1~stent and the like. H re the griev-
ance are not eparate and imilar, but single and uniformly in-
juriou . And it ha be n h lcl in thi Court, as well a elsewhere, 
that, if th re i any di tinction in the proportion or chairacter of 
the everal grievance , ther can be no joinder. K err v. Lansing, 
17 fich. 34. 
·wher the cau of grievance do not ari e out of the ame 
wrong affecting all at once as w ll a imilarly, th r i no founda-
tion for any uch joinder. Our own precedent have settled the 
doctrine suffici ntly. 
In the ca e of Wal h v. Varney, 38 l\fi h. 73 each of ev ral 
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complainants had purchased separate parcels under partition pro-
ceedings, which were valid as against all who were before the court,
but which left out some of the tenants in common. These com-
plainants joined in a h\\\ to restrain ejectment suits brought by the
heirs not concluded by the partition, and sought further to have
the partition decree opened and extended so as to bind them. But
it was held complainants had no common grievance entitling them
to join, and also that they had no rights beyond their purchase.
This last point bears on another difficulty in this case which is
distinct from the question of multifariousness. As the bill states
their case, they bought a title in which defendant purported to
have an interest in her own right, and which failed apparently
from a defect in the guardian's power, of which, as that decision
holds, they had notice.^ The bill does not indicate that they bought
in reliance on the right of Fish and Jenness to convey the whole.
In Bigelow v. Booili, 39 Mich. 623, a bill was filed by com-
plainants to redeem, basing their right on a joint interest ac-
quired under execution. It was held that, as this joint title failed,
the bill could not stand to help separate interests derived other-
wise. That case, however, is not one where the particular point
raised here is veiy clearly presented, although a bill to redeem
usually includes all parties to be affected.
In Woodruff v. Young, 43 Mich. 548, a bill filed against three
defendants for fraud in hindering complainant from getting the
settlement of an estate in which they were all concerned, and also
for frauds committed by them separately in various dealings aris-
ing out of the same family relationship, but not connected with the
estate, was held multifarious, because the frauds were distinct.
In Brunner v. Bay City, 46 Mich. 236, it was held that parties
whose lots had been sold under the same illegal assessment, and
bid in by the city, had no longer any grievance for which they
could join in a bill, and that each lot-owner had merely the several
riglit to pursue the city as he would any other person having a deed
whieh would be a cloud on his title to the separate lot. That case
cannot ho distinguished in principle from this. And this was on
the ground that thenceforward any claim or assertion by the city
against one lot could in no way affect any other lot, but must be
prosecuted and defended separately. It cannot help or hinder any
'"It is a well-settled doctrine that parties purchasincr titles under judi-
cial sales purchase just what can be lawfully sold, neither more nor less,
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complainan had pur ha d parat pare 1 und r partition pro-
ce ding , whi h w r valid a again tall wl o were before the court, 
but whi h 1 ft ut ome of t1 t nant in ommon. The e com-
plainan j in d in a bill tor train j tm nt ui brought by the 
h ir not on lud d by the partition, ancl ought further to have 
the pa:rtition clc r op ned and ext nd d o a to bind them. But 
it wa h 11 complainant had no ommon gri anc entitling them 
to join, and al o that they had no right yond their purcha e. 
Thi la t point b ars on another diffi ulty in thi case whi ·h i 
di tinct from the que tion of multifariou n . A the bill tate 
their ca e, they bought a title in which d fendant purported to 
have an interest in her own right, and which failed apparentl; 
from a d f ct in the guardian' pow r, of which, a that deci ion 
holcl , they had notic .1 The bill does not indi ate that they bought 
in r lian eon th right of Fi hand J nnes to convey the whole. 
In Bigelow . Booth, 39 Mich. 622, 3J bill was filed by com-
plainants to red em, basing their right on a joint intere t ac-
quir d under execution. It wa held that, as thi joint title failed, 
the bill could not stand to help separate interests derived other-
wi c. That case, however, is not one where the particular point 
rni ed here i very clearly pre ented although a bill to redeem 
usually include all parties to be affected. 
In Woodruff v. Young, 43 Mich. 548, a bill filed again t three 
def ndant for fraud in hindering complainant from getting the 
ttl m nt of an e tate in which they were all concerned, and al o 
for fra:uds committed by them separately in variou dealings ari -
in0 out of the ame family relation hip, but not connected with the 
estate, wa held multifariou , becau e the frauds were distinct. 
In Brunner v. Bay ity, 46 Mich. 236, it wa held that partie 
who e lo had be n sold under the ame illegal a es m nt and 
bi 1 in by the city had no longer any grievance for which they 
couB jo'n in a bill, and that each lot-owner had erely the everal 
ri ht to pur ue the it r a he would any other person ha ing ad ed 
whi h would b a loud on hi titl to the eparate lot. That ca c 
cannot b di tingui h d in prin ipl from thi . nd thi wa on 
th ground that thenc forward any claim or a ertion b the cit: 
n o-ain t on lot could in no way affect any oth r lot, but mu t l e 
pro cut 1 and f nd d parat 1 . It cannot help or hind r any 
lt'It i a well- ttl d do trine that par ti pur ha ing title un er j udi-
cial al pur ha ju t ' hat can 1 lawfully old. neither more nor les 
and ha e no forth r ri ht . n a/sh v. [ ar11 j . ri h. 76. 
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one of these complainants to have defendant's title made out or
defeated against any of the rest. Judgment in one of the eject-
ment suits could not be shown in any of the others, and could not
affect them.
It is hardly necessary to increase citations, but they are not dif-
ficfult to find. In Jones v. Garcia del Rio, 1 Turn. & R. 297, where
several persons had been induced to buy scrip in the same loan by
a fraud affecting them all in the same way, but by separate pur-
chases. Lord Eldon dismissed their bill on this sole ground. He
said that the plaintiffs, if they had any demand at all, had each a
demand at law, and each a several demand in equity; that they
could not file a bill on behalf of themselves and the other holders
of scrip ; and, as they were unable to do that, they could not, hav-
ing three distinct demands, file one bill; and, upon that ground
alone, his lordship, without again adverting to the question of
public policy (which had been raised and discussed), dissolved the
injunction. This decision was in 1823.
In 1834 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Pet. 123, on the same principle. There a
considerable number of underwriters, taking risks on the same
property and voyage, but severally, and not jointly, had paid their
insurances to the same bank as holder, on the understanding that
the money should be refunded if it turned out they were not
liable. Tliis having been ascertained, they joined in a l)ill against
the trustees of the bank, which was in liquidation, its charter hav-
ing expired, to recover back their funds. Chief Justice Marshall
disposed of their claim Yery briefly, refusing to pass on the equities,
which were controverted. He said:
"The plaintiffs who unite in this suit claim the return of money
paid by them severally on distinct promissory notes. They are
several contracts, having no connection with each other. Tliese
parties cannot, we think, join their claims in the same bill."
The principle is also recognized in Story, Eq. PL § 279, and
Daniell, Ch. Pr. 395.
It is by no means clear from the allegations in the Ijill that the
grievances or claims of these complainants are entirely similar in
their equities. But this we do not think it necessary to discuss.
Their claims, good or bad, are entirely separate, and there is no
common grievance.
The decree should be aiTirmed, with costs.

















































































































































64 M ULTIF ARIO US NESS 
one of the e complainant to have defendant's title made out or 
defeated again t any of the rest. Judgment in one of the eject-
ment suits could not be shown in any of the others, a.ind could not 
affect them. 
It i hardly necessary to increase citations, but they are not dif-
ficult to find. In Jones v. Garcia del Rio, 1 T'urn. & R. 297, where 
e eral persons had been induced to buy scrip in the same loan by 
a fraud affecting them a.U in the same way, but by separate pur-
cha es, Lord Eldon dismi sed their bill on this sole ground. He 
said that the plaintiffs, if the3 had any demand at all, had each a 
demand at law, and each a several demand in equity; that they 
could not file a bill on behalf of themselves and the other holder~ 
of scrip; and, a they were unable to do that, they could not, hav-
ing three di tinct demands, file one bill; and, upon that ground 
alone, his lord hip, without again adverting to the question of 
public policy (which hoo been raised and discussed), dissolved the 
injunction. This decision was in 1823. 
In 1834 the United States Supreme Court decided the case of 
Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Pet. 123, on the same principle. There a. 
considerable number of underwriters, taking risks on the same 
propert3 and voyage, but everally, and not jointly, had paid their 
in urances to the same bank as holder, on the understanding that 
the money should be refunded if it turned out they were not 
liable. This having been ascertained, they joined in a bill against 
the trru;tees of the bank, which was in liquidation, its charter hav-
ing expired, to recover back their fund . Chief J ru;tice Marshall 
di posed of their r:la:im very briefly, refusing to pass on the equities, 
which were controverted. He said: 
"The plaintiff who unite in this suit claim the return of money 
paid by them everaUy on distinct promissory note . They are 
several contract having no connection with each other. These 
parties cannot, we think, join their claims in the same bill." 
The prin ipl i al o r cognized in Story, Eq. Pl. § 279, and 
Daniell, Ch. Pr. 3 9 5. 
It i by no m a•n lear from the allegation in the bill that the 
grievan e or laim of the e complaina t are ntir l imilar in 
their equities. But thi we do not think it n c ary to discuss. 
Their claims, good or bad, are entirely parate, and there is no 
common grievance. 
The deer f'l ul b affirmed, with . L. 
The other J l , ti . ·oncun d. 
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Pointon V. Pohiton, L. B. 12 Eq. Cos. 5^7. (1871.)
Demurueu for multifariousness and for want of parties.
George Pointon, who died on the Gth of January, 18G3, leaving
a widow, the Defendant Eliza Pointon, and four children, three of
whom were Plaintiffs, the fourth being out of the jurisdiction, and
not a part}' to the suit, him surviving, and who at the time of his
decease was carrying on, in partncrsliip with his brother, the
Defendant William Pointon, the businesses of lime burner and
corn merchant and miller, by will, dated the 2nd of January, 1863,
after bequeathing all his furniture to his wife, subject to the pay-
ment of certain debts, gave, devised, and bequeathed all his prop-
erty, real and personal, unto his wife and to his brother William
Pointon, whom he appointed executors, upon trust to convert
into money by sale, or by William Pointon taking all or any part
thereof by valuation, which he thereby empowered him to do, and
to invest (as in the will mentioned) for the benefit of his wife for
life, and after her decease or second marriage to divide the same
equally amongst all his children. The bill, filed on the Ifith of
May, 1871, against William Pointon and the testator's widow,
alleged that the testator's estate included his share and interest in
the assets of the partnership; that the affairs of the partnership
had not been wound up; that William Pointon, on the death of
the testator, possessed himself of such assets; that he had carried
and was carrying on the businesses under the old style; that it
was expedient that the testator's estate should be administered by
the Court; also that the accounts of the partnership should be
taken; that this could not be conveniently done, except in this
suit or in one similarly constituted, William Pointon being both
executor and suriving partner; that William Pointon ought to
account for what he had received, and for what, but for his wilful
default and neglect, he might have received on account of the
testator's estate ; that he had employed the testator's estate in the
businesses, and had thereby occasioned great loss to it; that he
had mismanaged and neglected the businesses, and that thereby
large sums had been lost to the testator's est<ite. There were also
allegations that he was getting in the outstanding partnership debts,


















































































































































POINTON V. POINTON 65 
Pointon . Pofriton~ L. R. 1 Eq. as. 547. (1871.) 
EM RRER for multifairiou n ancl for want of parti . 
G org ointon who di d on the Gth of January, 1863, leaving 
n widow, th £ nclan 1 liza oint n, ancl four hildren, thr e of 
whom wer lain iff th fourth being out of the juri diction, and 
not a part} to th uit, him urvi ing and who at the time of hi. 
lccec wa · rrying on in partnership with hi brother the 
Def ndant William ointon, th bu ines e ol'. lime burn r and 
corn mer hant and miller, by will, dat d the nd of January, 1 63, 
al'.tcr b queathing all his furnitur to hi wif , ubject to the pay-
ment of ertain debt gave, d vi eel, aIDd b qu athed all hi prop-
ert real and personal, unto hi wife and to hi brother William 
Pointon whom h appointed x cutor , upon tru t to convert 
into money by ale, or by William Pointon taking all or any part 
th r of by valuation, which he thereby empow r d him to do, a:nd 
to in t (as in th will mention d) for the ben fit of hi wife for 
lif , and after h r decea e or econd marriage to divide the ame 
quall3 among t all his children. The bill, filed on the 16th of 
May, 18 1, again t William Pointon amd th te ta.tor' widow 
all ged that the te tator' e ta.te included hi share and intere t in 
th a et of the partnership; that the affairs of the partnership 
had not been wound up · that William Pointon on the death of 
th t ta.tor, po d him elf of uch a et ; that he had carried 
and wa carrying on the bu in e under the old t3 le; that it 
wa xp client that th te tator' tate hould b admini tered by 
the ourt; al o that the accoun of the partner hip hould be 
taken · hat thi ould not be conv ni ntl done except in thi 
uit or in one imilarl con titut d William ointon being both 
e cutor and uri ing partn r · that William Pointon ought to 
account for what h had r c i ed and for what but for hi wilful 
d fa.ult and n 1 c h might hav recei d on acCQunt of the 
t ta or tat · hat h had mploy cl th te tator' tate in the 
bu ine an had th r b o ca ioned r at lo to it; that h 
had mi mana d aud n gl t d th bu in and that th r by 
lar um ha b n lo t t th t tat r 
all crati n tha h wa er ttincr in th ou ~ta ing partner:~hip 
an 1 that h int nd d to appl ' th m to hi ~·n u e · hat h 
5 
66 Multifariousness
agreed to purchase Forge Mill and the stock-in-trade, part of the
partnership assets, at a valuation, and had obtained a conveyance
of the mill, but had not paid the purchase-money either in respect
of the mill or in respect of the stock-in-trade, and that he had
advertised the mill for sale by auction.
The Plaintiffs, three children of the testator, prayed that his
estate might be administered; for accounts of what William
Pointon had received, or, but for his wilful default and neglect,
might have received; and that he might be charged with what
was due from him in respect of the partnership, both before and
since the death of the testator, and with all losses occasioned by
his mismanagement and neglect in reference to the businesses; for
a receiver of the testatoi^'s estate and of the assets of the partner-
ship and of the businesses carried on by William Pointon since
the death of the testator; and for injunctions to restrain William
Pointon from interfering with the testator's estate and the assets
of the partnership before and since his death, and from selling
the mill; and for the appointment of new trustees; and for all
proper accounts.
Sir Jonx Wickens, V. C. :
I think that the demurrer to tliis bill is not well founded. It is
a demuiTcr for want of parties, and for what is called multifarious-
ness, but which is really misjoinder of subjects in a suit. As to
the objection for want of parties, the case appears to me to be
clearly within the 9th rule of s. 42 of the 15 & 16 Vict. e. 86, and
I think it is impossible to hold that three out of four cestuis que
trust — residuary legatees — cannot sue an executor, because tlie
fourth has not been brought before the Court, without doing away
with the operation of this clause of the section. The only authority
which has been relied upon on this point is the case of Payne v.
Parker. That is a case of this sort: A trustee under a settle-
ment was brought before the Court to represent the interests of
the cestuis que trust, and the Plaintiff, having elected to have those
interests represented, was bound to have them represented by
proper persons. The only question was, whether he had done so;
and the Court decided that the trustee, Mr. Heningham, did not
siilFieiently represent the interests of the cestuis que trust, and
required that they should be made parties; and I think that the

















































































































































66 1'f LTIF ARIO S ESS 
agr ed to purcha e Forge Mill and the stock-in-trade, part of the. 
partner hip a t , at a valuation, and had obtained a con e) ance 
of the mill, but had not paid the purcha e-money either in respect 
of the mill or in re pect of the tock-in-trade, and that he had 
ad verti ed the mill for sale by auction. 
The Plaintiff , three children of the te tator, prayed th&-t his 
e tate might b admini tered; for accounts of what William 
Pointon had received, or, but for his wilful default and neglect, 
might have r ceived ; and that he might be charged with what 
wa due from him i_n re pect of the partnership, both before and 
ince the death of the te tator, arnd with all los es occa ioned by 
his mi. management and neglect in reference to the businesses; for 
a receiver of the te tator' e tate and of the as ets of the partner-
hip and of the bu ine es carried on by William Pointon since 
the death of the te tator; a.ind for injunctions to restrain William 
Pointon from interfering with the testator's estate and the as ets 
of the partnership before and since hi ~ death and from elling 
the mill; and for the appointment of new tru tee ; and for all 
proper accounts. 
SIR JOH WICKENS, v. c.: 
I think that the demurrer to this bill is not well founded. It is 
a demurrer for want of parties, and for what is called multifarious-
nes , but which i really mi joinder of ubject in a suit. As to 
the objection for want of parties, the case appears to me to be 
clearly within the 9th rule of s. 42 of the 15 & 16 Viet. c. 86, and 
I think it is impo ible to hold that three out of four cestuis que 
trusfr-r idua1ry 1 gat e - cannot ue an executor, becau e th 
fourth ha not been brought before the Court, without doing away 
with the operation of thi lau e of th ction. The only authority 
which ha been reli d upon on thi point i the ca e of Payne i;. 
Parker. That i a a of thi art: A tru tee under a ettle-
ment wa brought b f r the ourt to repr nt the intere t of 
the cestui.s que tru t, and th Plaintiff having 1 cted to have tho e 
int re t repr ent d was bound to hav th m repr ent d by 
proper person . The onl} qu tion wa , wheth r h had done o · 
an 1 the ourt d id d that the tru te Mr. eningham, did not 
uffi i ntly repre nt th intere t of the cestui.s que frust, ancl 
r quir d that they hould be made partie ; and I think that the 
Court could nat ha e d cided otherwi e. But that cai:; wh n 
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attentively looked at, has, in my opinion, no application to the
present.
Next, as to the question of multifariousness: I think that there
is no more in the objection on that ground than there is in that
for want of parties. There are three analogous vices to which
bills in equity are subject — misjoinder of Plaintiffs, misjoinder of
Defendants, and multifariousness or misjoinder of subjects of suit.
It is the last which is imputed to this bill. Multifariousness, prop-
erly so called, exists when one of the Defendants is not interested
in the whole of the relief sought, as the old fonn of the demurrer
for multifariousness shows. Misjoinder of subjects of suit is where
two subjects distinct in their nature are united in one bill, and
for convenience sake the Court requires them to be put in two
separate records. The case of Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Madd. 138;
Jac. 151, in which the bill was for the administration of a testa-
tor's estate, and to set aside a sale made of part of it by the execu-
tor, was an instance of this. There the Court refused to allow the
two subjects to be united, although the Plaintiff was interested in
each, and the Defendants were liable in respect of each. In the
present case the misjoinder is of this nature: the suit is first an
ordinar}' suit against the devisees in trust and executoi"s for the
administration of the real and personal estates of the testator ; and,
secondly, the Plaintiff's claim to have the partnership accounts
taken as between the testator's estate and the Defendant William
Pointon, the testator's partner and one of the executors and trus-
tees; and then the suit is further complicated in this way: it is
alleged that William Pointon has sold to himself or taken posses-
sion of the partnership assets at a valuation under a power in the
will, and that he has not paid for them. It is suggested that not
only is the price of such assets in his hands, but that he having
sold to himself without payment, what was purported to be sold
remains assets of the testator till the price is paid. If a trustee
who is entitled to take property at a valuation has a valuation
made, but does not pay the money, nothing passes; until the
money has been paid he has no interest in the property.
It is not necessarj' to consider whether the Plaintiffs are or are
not entitled to all the relief which they ask; but the question is,
whether the various subjects as to which relief is sought are such
as if fit for discussion can be properly dealt with in one suit.
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att ntiv ly look d at, h , in my o inion no application to the 
pr nt. 
Next, a to th quc tion f mul ifariou ne : I think that th re 
i no mor in th obj ion on that ground than there i in that 
for want of p rtie . T11er are thr anal gou vice to hich 
bill in quit , re ubject-mi joinder f laintiff mi joinder of 
Defendant am.1 multifariou n or mi j ind r of ubjects of uit. 
It i th la t whi h i imputed to thi l ill. ultifariou ne , prop-
erly o call d i t h n one of the efendan i not inter tecl 
in the wh le f he reli f ought, a the ol form of th demurr r 
for multifariou 11 how . :Hi joinder of ubj ct of uit i here 
two ubj t di tinct in th ir natur are united in one bill, and 
for com· ni nc ake the ourt 1 quir them to be put in tw-o 
eparat r cord . The ca e of alvidge . Hyde, 5 Iadd. 13 · 
J ac. 151, in whi h the bill wa for the admini tration of a te ta-
tor' e tat , and to et a ide a ale made of part of it by the execu-
tor, wa an in tanc of thi . Th re th Court refu ed to allow the 
two ubject to b united, although the Plaintiff was interested in 
each, and the efendants were liable in re pect of each. In the 
pre ent ca e the mi joinder i of thi nature: the uit i first an 
ordina1; uit again t he de isee in tru t and executors for the 
admini traition of the real and personal e tate of the testator; and 
second.13, the Plaintiff claim to have the partner hip accounts 
taken a between the te tator' e tate and the D f ndant William 
Pointon, the te tator' partner and one of the executors aind tru"-
tee ; and then the uit i further complicated in thi way: it i , 
alleged that William Pointon has sold to him elf or taken pos 
ion of the partner hip as et at a valuation und r a power in the 
will, and that he ha not paid for them. It i ugg ted that not 
onlj i th price of uch a ets in hi hand but that he having 
old to him elf without paym nt, what wa purported to be old 
remain a et of the te ta or till th price i paid. If a tru tee 
who i entitled to take property at a valuation ha a aluation 
made, but doe not pay the mone nothino- pa e ; until the 
mone ha been paid he ha no int r t in the propert . 
It i not nee ar to consider wh ther the Plaintiff are or ar 
not entitled to all the relief which th a k; but th que tion i" 
whether the variou ubj t a to which r lief · ought ar u h 
a if :fi for di cu ion can be pr p rh dealt with in on uit. 
Thi i of coure a mat r of di er ti n. Th ourt will 11 allow 
68 MULTIFAEIOUSNESS
distinct subjects to be mixed up in one suit when it would be
inconvenient to the Court, or unfair to some one or more of the
parties to it; but not one of these considerations, or of those
mentioned in the case of Camphell v. Mackaij, 1 My. & Cr. 603,
applies to the ])resent case. The estate of the testator cannot be
wound up until the partnership accounts have been taken, nor
until it has been ascertained whether William Pointon will pay
the purchase-money or not. It is quite clear that, if there are to
be separate suits, they must be closely intermixed, and the winding-
up of the principal suit must await that of the other or others, and
before it can be found out what the estate of the testator consists
of, or what William Pointon owes to it, the partnership accounts
must be taken. I am wholly unable to discover why they should
not be taken in this suit. If it would result in inconvenience or
unfairness, it would be another matter; but it appears to me to
be impossible to say that any inconvenience can be apprehended,
or that any injustice will be done. My opinion being that the
objection as to misjoinder of subjects has failed as completely as

















































































































































68 1\1.ULTIF ARIOUSNESS 
di tinct ubjects to be mixed up in one suit when it would be 
inconvenient to the Court, or unfair to some one or more of the 
partie to it; but not one of these con iderations, or of those 
mentioned in the ca e of Campb ell v. Mackay, 1 My. & Cr. 603, 
applie to th pre ent ca e. The e tate of the testator cannot be 
wound up until the partner hip accounts have been taken, nor 
until it has been ascertained whether William Pointon will pay 
the purchase-money or not. It i quite clear that, if there are to 
be eparate suit , they mu t be closely intermixed, and the winding-
up of the principal suit mu t await that of the other or other , and 
before it can be found out what the estate of the testator consists 
of, or what William Pointon ow to it, the partnership account:; 
mu t be taken. I am wholly unable to discover why they should 
not be taken in this suit. If it would result in inconvenience or 
unfairness, it would be another matter; but it a;ppears to me to 
be impossible to say that any inconvenience can be apprehended, 
or that any injustice will be done. My opinion being that thH 
objection as to misjoinder of subjects has failed as completely as 
thait as to misjoinder of parties, flie demurrer must be overruled. 
CHAPTER III. .
FORM AND REQUISITES OE A BILL IX EQUITY. > ,«
Paets of a Bill ix Equity. n^ ^ y
ComstocTc V. Herron, Ji5 Fed. Rep. GGO. (lS91.)rjy }t^ »^ h^
This cause is before the court upon exceptions to the answer/^ -^^
of the respondents Herron and Fisher. The bill charges that as^
in productive real estate and mortgages or interest-bearing stocksj^j^ /^
and bonds, and to pay the income therefrom to the complainant. |;|;-^ ^ jy
The respondents answer, denying the averments, and stating thai i/^ ^^/J'^
they have never been requested until the present year, by the com- Lp rjlr-
plainant or any other persons, to make said investments, and that,"^ ^
on the contrar}^ it was well known to the complainant that they \\ ^1
were proceeding as rapidly as possible to convert the estate into .^ ^ [
money or productive property, so as to make said investments^ , li^
also that their entire conduct in this matter was fully known toL^ ^
the complainant, and approved by her, and that she has nevero-x^^^^
expressed the least dissatisfaction in reference thereto. To these ^TvA^ o/'f'
averments the complainant excepts. They are directly and prop- ^/^ "^
erly responsive to the charge of the bill. I do not think that the f^ ^'
respondents, w'hen charged with dereliction of duty and violation
of their trust, ought to be limited to a simple denial, and to be
precluded from setting up that not only was no objection made by
the complainant, but that she approved their entire conduct in
this matter. \Yhile it may be true that that may not affect the
final decree in this case, I think the trustees are entitled to relieve
themselves from the imputations which are at least implied by
the averments of the bill. Moreover, these averments of the answer
are directly responsive to the charge that the respondents refused
to make investments. Tlie same line of remark applies to the






















































































































































om tock . IIerron, 45 Fed. Rep. 660. {1891.) v.J. Y ~ 
FORM E I LI E UITY. 
ART ILL L ~ Q IT . 
AGE, • : rJ v~ ,)" 
Thi au e i b for th court upon exception to the an we~ J 
of the r pond nt H rron and · h r. The bill charge that ~/ _ 
x cutor and tru t und r the will of Margaret Poor, deceased~ 
th y have d lay d, negl c d, and refu ed, and till delay, neglect, / 
and r f e, to in t the um of $56,6 , a directed by the will,, · ~-> 
in productiv real tate and mortgag or intere t-bearing tock rt _) 
and bond , and to pay th in ome therefrom to the complainant: J"-_ 
Th responden an w r, denying the averm nt, and tating that.:~/. 
th y have never been r que ted until the pre nt year, by the com-~~;}­
plainant or any other per on , to make aid inv tments, and that, 
on the contrary, it wa well known to the complainant that they 
were proceeding as rapidl a po ibl to conv rt the tate into 
money or produ ti e property, o a to make aid inve tment , 
al o that th ir ntire condu t in thi matter wa fully known to 
the omplainant and approv d b h r, and that h ha ne er 
xpre ed th 1 ast di ati fa tion in r f rence thereto. To the e 
a rm nt the complainant exc pt . Th y ar directly and prop-
rl re pan ive to the harg of th bill. I do not think that the 
r ~pondent wh n harg 1 with d r li tion of dut and violation 
f th ir tru t ought to b limit d to a impl d nial an to be 
pr lud d from ttin up that not onl ' wa n obj tion made by 
th omplainant but that h appro d th ir n ir conduct in 
thi matt r. \\fill it a b true tha that ma3 not affect the 
final d r in thi a e, thin] th tru t are nti 1 d to r li Y 
th m 1 from th imputation whi h ar at lea t impli d by 
th a rm nt of th bill. Ior 01 r the e av rment~ of th an w r 
ar dir tl re p n~iv t th har tha th r pon nt~ 1 fu ~ 
t mak inv tm nt . Th am lin of r mark appli t th 
portion of h an w r in whi h the r ~ pon nh• tat hat th y 
69 
70 Parts of a Bill in Equity
were assisted by the complainant in their efforts to sell the Newport
cottage; she being familiar with it, and owning the furniture in
it. Without entering into detail, it is enough to say generally that
the bill charges the trustees with neglecting their duties and re-
fusing to carry out the provisions of the will, and that by their
failure to execute the trusts reposed in them the estate is con-
stantly being depleted, and that there is danger of the destruction
of the distributive share of the complainant, and, further, that
they have mingled the trust moneys of the estate coming into their
hands as trustees and executors with their own money and property,
instead of keeping the same separate and apart, by reason whereof
the money and property of the estate is likely to be confused, so
that it cannot be separated from other funds. The averments of
the answer to which exceptions are taken are in response to these
wholesale charges, with reference to which the respondents have
a right to vindicate themselves. It was said, in substance, upon
the argument that there was no intention to reflect upon the
respondents, and that the bill was drawn in accordance with ap-
proved forms, and it was insisted that the averments of the answer
excepted to did not touch the merits of the cause, which was not
intended to be adversary, but merely for the construction of the
will and the ascertainment of the rights of the complainant.
Nevertheless the averments are in the bill, and, being there, the
respondents have a right to answer them fully. Originally a bill
in equity consisted of nine parts, of which there were five principal
parts, to-wit, the statement, the charges, the interrogatories, the
prayer of relief, and the prayer of process. But all these, according
to more recent authorities, may be dispensed with excepting the
stating part and the prayer for relief; for, as Langdell in his
hand-book on Equity Pleadings states:
"All that was ever essential to a bill was a proper statement
of the facts which the plaintiff intended to prove, a specification
of the relief which he claimed, and an indication of the legal
grounds of such relief." Section 55.
Had the bill been confined to these limits, as it might have been,
there would have been no occasion for the answers to which the
exceptions are directed; but, as it was not so limited, and as the
answers do not go beyond what is responsive to the bill, the excep-
tions will be overruled, without taking into consideration whether

















































































































































70 p ARTS OF A BILL IN EQUITY 
were as isted by the complainant in their efforts to sell the Newport 
cottage; he being familiar with it, and owning the furniture in 
it. Without nt ring into detail, it i enough to say generally that 
the bill charges the tru tee with neglecting their duties and re-
fu ing to carry out the provisions of the will, and that by their 
failure to execute the trusts reposed in them the estate is con-
tantly being depleted, and that there i danger of the destruction 
of the distributive share of the complainant, and, further, that 
they have mingled the trust moneys of the estate coming into their 
hands as trustees and executors with their own money and property, 
in tead of keeping the arne separate and apart, by reason whereof 
th money and property of the estate i likely to be confused, so 
that it cannot be separated from other funds. The averments of 
the answer to which exceptions are taken are in response to the e 
wholesale charges, with reference to which the re pondents have 
a right to vindica1te themselves. It was said, in substance, upon 
the argument that there was no intention to reflect upon the 
respondents, and that the bill was drawn in accordance with ap-
proved forms, and it was insisted that the averments of the answer 
excepted to did not touch the merits of the cause, which was not 
intended to be adversary, but merely for the construction of the 
will and the a certainment of the rights of the complainant. 
Nevertheless the averments are in the bill, and, being there, the 
respondents have a right to answer them fully. Originally a bill 
in equity consisted of nine parts, of which there were five principal 
parts, to-wit, the statement, the charges, the interrogatories, the 
prayer of relief, and the prayer of proces . But all these, according 
to more recent authorities, may be dispensed with excepting the 
stating part and the prayer for relief; for, as Langdell in hi8 
hand-book on Equity Pleadings states: 
"All that wa ever e ential to a bill was a proper statement 
f the facts which the pla·inti:ff intended to prove, a specification 
of the relief which he claim d, and an indication of the 1 gal 
ground of such relief." ection 55. 
Had the bill been confin d to the e limit as it might have been, 
ther would hav been no occasion for the an wer to which the 
x ption are dir cted ; but, as it wa not o limited and a the 
an wer do not go be and what i re l~on ive to th bill the excep-
tion will b oYerruled, without takino- into con id ration whether 
the matt r t f rth in th porti n of th an . w r to which the 
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exceptions are taken are material to the final disposition of the
cause.
Address of the Bill,
Sterrick v. Pugsley, Fed. Cases, No. 13379. (1S7J,.)
On motion of complainant [Charles V. Sterrick] for a pre-
liminary injunction to restrain defendants [James W. Pugsley
and others] from using a deed of assignment of a patent by com-
plainant to defendant Pugsley, and from claiming or exercising
any rights thereunder.
LoNGYEAR, District Judge:
Some preliminar}' objections will be first noticed. The defend-
ants' counsel objected to the bill of complaint being read on the
grounds: 1st — That the entitling of the court is not "in equity,"
but of the "circuit court," etc., merely. 2d — That it is entitled
in the cause.
The address of the bill is to the "circuit court," etc., "in chan-
cery sitting." This is sufficient, and if the entitling of the court
were of any consequence the court would direct it to be amended
by adding the words "in equity." The bill is entitled in the cause.
This is irregular, because until the bill is filed there is no cause
pending. The bill, however, is complete without it, and the en-
titling as to the parties is rejected as surplusage. The objections
to the bill arc, therefore, overruled.
Counsel for defendants also objected to the reception and read-
ing of the affidavits annexed to the bill of complaint in support
of the motion for injunction on the grounds: 1st — That they
have no proper venue. 2d — That they are not entitled in any cause
"in equity."
The affidavits are sworn to before United States circuit court
commissioners, some of them before a commissioner for the Eastern
district, and some before a commissioner for the Western district
of Michigan. The^venue of each is: "State of Michigan, County
of Calhoun," or, "County of Kalamazoo," according, I suppose,
to the county in which the oath happened to be administered. This
was irregular. The proper venue of an affidavit taken before a


















































































































































l:TIRICK V. .r UG LE ' 71 
exceptions are taken ar mat rial to the final di position of he 
cause. 
A.DDRE OF THE BILL. 
terrick . Pug ley, F ed. ase , L\ o. 13379. {187 4.) 
On motion of omplainant [ harle t rrick J for a pre-
liminan injunction to re train d fendants [Jame . Pug ley 
and oth r ] from u ing a de d of a ignment of a patent by com-
plainan to def ndant Pug le ' and from claiming or exerci ing 
a·ny right th reunder. 
Lo TG E.lR, Di trict Judge : 
Som pr liminary objections will be first notic2d. The defend-
ant ' coun el objected to the bill of complaint being read on the 
groun 1 : 1 t-That the entitling of the court i not "in equity" 
but of the circuit court," etc., m rely. d-That it i entitled. 
in the cau e. 
The addre of the bill i to the "circuit court," etc., "in chan-
cery itting." Thi i ufficient, and if the entitling of the court 
were of an con quence the court would direct it to be amended 
by adding the word 'in equit} ." The bill i entitled in the cau e. 
Thi i irregular, becau e until the bill i filed there i no ca1u e 
pending. The bill, however, i complete without it, and the en-
titling a to the partie i rejected a urplu age. The objection .. 
to the bill are, therefore, overruled. 
Coun el for def ndant al o objected to the reception and read-
ing of the affida,it annexed to the bill of complaint in upport 
of th motion for injunction on the ground : 1 t-Tha·t the 
haw no proper venue. 2d-That the; are not entitled in any cau~e 
in equit3. 
Th affidavit are worn to before United tate circuit court 
commi ione ome of them b for a commi ioner for the Ea tern 
li trict and om b for a commi ioner for the tern di trict 
The ' nu of ea h i : tate of UichiO'an ount · .. 
or ount · of alamazoo a ordinO' I "uppo e 
ounty in whi h th ath happ n d to b a lmini,.ter d. Thi 
wo irr aular. h pr p r nu of an affida,it tak n befor a 
tate commi ion r is : nit d ate of menca i. -
73 Address of the Bill
trict of /' naming the district and state for wliich the com-
missioner is such. In this case it should have been "Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan," or "Western District of Michigan," as the case
was. In the view taken by the court, however, upon the merits
of the motion, admitting all the affidavits, it is unnecessary for the
purposes of this case to decide what is the effect of the irregularity
in the venue.
The objection to the entitling of the court is not tenable upon
the ground stated. The affidavits were all made before the suit was
commenced. Such affidavits should in no case be entitled in any
court or cause. When they are so entitled it is a good cause for
their rejection. Beg. v. Jones, 1 Strange, 70-i; Bex v. Pierson,
Andrews, 313; Bex v. Harrison, 6 Term E. 60; King v. Cole, Id.
640; 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 891; Humphrey v. Cande, 2 Cow. 509;
Haight v. Turner, 2 Johns. 371; In re Bronson, 12 Johns. 460;
MiUihen v. Sehje, 3 Denio, 54; Haivley v. Donnelly, 8 Paige, 415;
1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 600. See, also, the decision of this court made
in the present term in BlaTce Crusher Co. v. Ward (Case No. 1505).
But it was said at the argument, if there is no entitling how can
it be known for what purpose the affidavit was made ? This ob-
jection, if it be one, can be very easily obviated by stating the pur-
pose for wliich it is intended in the affidavit itself.
The bill and affidavits having been read, defendants' counsel
offered to read a sworn answer and accompanying affidavits in
opposition to the motion. To this the complainant's counsel ob-
jected, on the ground that he had not been served with copies.
Affidavits to be used in support of, or in opposition to, special
motions, ought always to be served on the opposite counsel a rea-
sonable time before the motion is brought on. Where this is not
done the court may reject the affidavits, or, in its discretion, allow
the same to be read, giving the opposite party the option to pro-
ceed with the hearing or to take time for the perusal and examina-
tion of the affidavits, and production of affidavits in reply, where


















































































































































72 ADDRESS OF THE BILL 
trict of---," naming the district and state for which the com-
uch. In this case it should have been "Eastern Dis-
. . . 
m1 10ner I 
trict of 1ichigan," or "Western District of Michigan," as the case 
wa . In the iew taken by the court, however, upon the merits 
of the motion, admitting all the affidavit , it i unnecessary for the 
purpo e of thi case to decide what i the effect of the irregularity 
in the venue. 
The objection to the entitling of the court i not tenable upon 
the ground stated. The affidavits were all made before the suit was 
commenced. Such affidavit should in no case be entitled in any 
court or cau e. When they are so entitled it is a good cause for 
their rejection. Reg. v. Jones, 1 Strange, 704; Rex v. Pierso11,, 
Andrews, 313; Rex v. Harrison, 6 Term R. 60; King v. Cole, Id. 
640; 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 891; Humphrey v. Cande, 2 Cow. 509; 
Haight v. T urner, 2 Johns. 371; In re Bronson, 12 Johns. 460; 
~Milliken v. Selye, 3 Denio, 54; Hawley v. Donnelly, 8 Paige, 415; 
1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 600. See, al o, the decision of this court made 
in the present term in Blake Crusher Co. v. Ward (Case No. 1505). 
But it was said at the argument, if there is no entitling how can 
it be known for what purpose the affidavit was made? This ob-
jection, if it be one, can be very easily obviated by stating the pur-
pose for which it is intended in the affida-vit itself. 
The bill and affidavits having been read, defendants' counsel 
offered to read a sworn answer and accompanying affidavits in 
opposition to the motion. To this the complainant's counsel ob-
jected, on the ground that he had not been served with copies. 
Affidavits to be used in support of, or in opposition to, special 
motions, ought always to be served on the opposite counsel a rea-
sonable time before the motion is brought on. Where this is not 
done the court may reject the affidavits, or in its di cretion, allow 
the same to be read, giving the opposite party the option to pro-
ce d with the hearing or to take time for the perusal and examina-
tion of the affi la vi ts, and production of affidavit in reply, where 




Gove V. Pettis, Jf Sandf. (N. Y.) JfOJf. (18J,6.) < ^ ^^
Demurrer by the defendant, Pettis, to a bill filed against him/-
together with W. Austin and B. Dyckman. Several causes of de
murrer were expressed, and at the hcarin<,f, other objections to the-W/*' \J
bill were taken, ore tenus; all of which will be found stated in the*^ A'^ r^
opinion of the court. t^ . „ . ^
The Vice-Ciiaxcellor: ,^^ n ^' r'
It is no longer a ground of demurrer that the complainant onuts, V^ '^ e.
to state in the bill, his occupation or addition. V - J^ ^J^^*'^
The omission of the signature of solicitor or counsel is a caui^"" \/^
for moving to take the bill from the files of the court. It is a mat-C/
ter of practice, not of pleading; and is not a proper subject for
a demurrer.
I think otherwise of the omission to verify the bill, or to waive
an answer on oath. The bill as served, is one not verified by the
oath of the complainant, and yet it requires an answer on the oath
of the defendant. By the 17th rule, if the bill do not waive the
defendant's oath to the answer, it must he verified by the complain-
ant or his agent, attorney or solicitor.
This is a substantial part of the pleading, having a vital influ-
ence on the cause; and the omission to comply with the positive
requirement of the standing rule, is a defect in the bill for which
a demurrer may be interposed. The chancellor has so decided in
respect of the averments in creditor's bills, prescribed by the 189th
rule. (McEIwain v. Willis, 3 Paige, 505.)
As this defect is obviously a slip or clerical er/or, which might
be amended, I have looked into the demurrer for want of equity,
which was raised ore tenus, at the hearing. No relief is praj^ed
against Pettis, nor is it stated that the discovery from him is
essential or material. It does not appear by the bill, that Abbott
has not a perfect remedy at law. The facts stated are available
at the trial in his defence, and there is no apparent reason for his
coming into this court.
On these grounds the bill must be dismissed as to Pettis, but

















































































































































GOVE . ETTIS 
.~zrl 
ove . ett 4 ,.:::. ;
1
.' . .) 404 . {1 46) ;~~ 
E r nn n b ' th ti , to a l i 11 fil d again t hi m/-0 
tog th r with W. \.u tin an ) ·kma·n. f Y ral cau of cl - / 
murr r w r pr cl ancl at th h arin 1.h r ol j tion t the~ 






IE I E- II ELLOR : W. v 
It i no long r a ground of demurrer that the complainant o ty· 
to tat in th bill hi upation or addition. . 
Th omi ion of th ignatur of olicitor or oun 'el i a ca:u ~ v 
for mo ing to tak the bill from th :fil of the court. It i a mat 
ter of practice not of pl ading; and i not a prop r ubj ct for 
ad murr r. 
I think otherwi e of th omi ion to verify th bill or to waive 
an an wer on oath. Th bill a erv d, i one not verified b the 
oath of the complainant, and ;et it r quire an a wer on the oath 
of the 1 fendant. By th 1 th rule, if th bill do not waive th 
defendant oath to th an wer, it must be ri:fi d by the complain-
ant or hi agent, attorney or olicitor. 
Thi i a ub tantial part of th pl ading having a vital influ-
nc on th au e; and th omi ion to omply with the positive 
requir m nt of the tandin rule, i a d fe t in the bill for which 
a d murrer may b int rpo d. Th hancellor ha o d ided in 
r pect of th av rm nt in redito1 bill pre cribed by th 1 9th 
rule. (JI cElwain v. 1 illi 3 aige . ) 
thi cl fe t i bviou ly a lip or leri al rJ.·or which might 
be amend d I have look into th demurrer for want of equit , 
which w, rai ed ore tenu , at the h aring. ro reli f i pra ·ed 
again t tti n r i it tat d that th di cover .fr m him i 
ntial or ma1t rial. It do not app ar b th bill that bbott 
ha not a p rf t r m d at law. h fa t tat d ar arnila le 
at th trial in hi 1 f n nd th r no appar nt r a on for hi· 
omin into thi ourt. 
th gr und th ill ml t 
with ut . I i di mis ' d :finally 
i m1 a t P tti.:- but 
n th d murr r ore ten u , 
74 Introduction
v.liich, if it were the only valid one, would be allowed upon the
payment of costs. On the other hand the demurrer for form, being
well taken, would, standing alone, entitle the defendant to a bill
of costs on the complainant's amending. It will be equitable, there-
fore, to give no costs to either party.
arvey v. Richmond, 6 J/. Fed. Rep. 19. (189Jf.)
wo Demurrers to the Bill of Complaint.
Hughes, District Judge:
This case is before me at present solely on the pleadings filed.
The bill was first presented to one of the judges of the court on
otion for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.
After a hearing on this motion and two other hearings of motions
jy the court, the bill went back to rules. Under the practice ob-
aining in the circuit courts of the United States, it became incum-
bent upon the defendants in the cause to plead at the September
rule^jia^past ; that is to say, on Monday, the 3d of September,
happened that that day was a national holiday, and dies non,
the clerk's office being closed. TliSs circumstance constituted
Tuesday, the 4tli of September, which was the next succeeding
^P> " ^^y>i ^^^® September rule day for the purposes of this case. Ac-
^/jj}^ cp^mngly one of the defendants, viz., the Eichmond Eailway &
"^^ xcX'^l^ctric Company, appeared and filed a demurrer to the bill on
'pr^^Q 4th. Afterwards, to wit, on the 6th of September, the Eich-
ond & Manchester Eailway Company entered its appearance by
8unsel, and tendered a demurrer, on its part, to the bill of com-
plaint.
The two demurrers are substantially the same. The disposal of
one of them by the court will virtually dispose of the other. As the
demurrer of the Eichmond defendant is regularly in, and permis-
sion to file that of the Manchester defendant cannot materially
affect the proceedings in the case, and as, moreover, it is within
the discretion of the court to permit the filing of the demurrer of
the Manchester defendant, the court permits that demurrer to bo
filed.
The principal ground of demurrer insisted upon l)y defendants


















































































































































which, if it wer the only valid one, would be allowed upon the 
payment of co . On the other hand the demurrer for form, being 
well taken, would, standing alone, entitle the defendant to a bill 
of co ts on the compla·inant' amending. It will be equitable, there-
~ to give no 07 to either party. 
~*::Richmond, 64 Fed. Rep. 19. (1894.) 
~ V ya6'~wo Demurrers to the Bill of Complaint. 
~ eAi'uGHES, Di trict Judge : 
) ~ / O This case is before me at present solely on the pleadings filed. 
~ The bill was first presented to one of the judges of the court on 
' otion for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. 
er a hearing on this motion and two other hearings of motions 
y the court, the bill went back to rules. Under the practice ob-
;v _ytaining jn the circuit courts of the United States, it became incum-
(1"' bent upon the defendants in the cau e to plead at the September 
,J...I rule past; that is to say, on Monday, the 3d of September. 
~_:Al o happened that that day was a national holiday, and dies non, 
Y._ ~ the clerk's office being closed. Thiis ciricu1mstance constituteu 
.. _ .> Tuesday, the 4th of September, which wa the next succeeding 
~ (""' day, the September rule day for the purposes of this case. Ac-
~;_;} 
1 
~ngly one of the defendants, viz., the Richmond Railway & 
~~c;ric Company, appeared and filed a demurrer to the bill on 
~ ~he 4th. Afterwards, to wit, on the 6th of September, the Rich-
ond & Manchester Railway Company entered its appearance b.r 
~ el, and tendered a demurrer, on its part, to the bill of com-
laint. 
The two demurrer are substantially the ame. The dispo al of 
/ one of them by the court will virtually di po e of the other. A the 
d murrer of the Richmond defendant is r gularly in, and permi -
ion to file that of the Manch ter defendant cannot mat rially 
affect the pro dings in th ca e, and a , moreover it i within 
the di er tion of the court to permit th filin · of th d murrer oi 
the Manch ter defendant, the court permit that d murrer to be 
filed. 
The principal ground of d murr r insi t d upon by d f ndants 
i the failure of th bill to et out th pla of re id nee of the 
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plaintiffs in the cause, and also the places of residence of defend-
ants. The hill alleges the plaintiffs to he citizens of Maryland, and
the defendants to be citizens of Virginia, but disregards rule 20 in
equity which requires the residence of all parties to be set out in
the bill. As rule 20 does not define the method by which the dis-
regard of this requirement by the pleader shall be taken advantage
of, I infer that its intention is to leave that matter in each instance
to the discretion of the court. My own opinion, in the absence
of conclusive authorities on the subject, is that the failure of the
bill to give merely the places of residence of the plaintiffs and
defendants is not of sufficient gravity to require resort to a de-
murrer. I think it would be competent for the court to require
the residences to be stated in the bill by amendment on the spot,
without delay, on motion.
But the defect of the bill in this case is graver than the mere
failure to give residences. There is a jurisdictional omission, more
serious than the mere failure to conform to rule 20 in equity.
It would not be sufficient for a bill to set out that John Doe, a
citizen and resident of Maryland, complains of Richard Roe, a cit-
izen and resident of Virginia. If there were but one judicial dis-
trict in Virginia, the omission to state Richard Roe's place of
residence might not be demurraljle, and might be amended on mere
motion. But there arc two districts in Virginia, and the bill must
give jurisdiction in the district in which the suit is brought. It
is of jurisdictional essence that the bill shall allege that Richard
Roe is a citizen of Virginia, resident at some place, alleged to
be in the eastern district of Virginia. The bill at bar uses no other
language in describing the defendants than to say that the suit
is against "the Richmond & Manchester Railway Compan}', and the
Richmond Railway & Electric Company, corporations duly incor-
porated under the laws of the state of Virginia, and as such citi-
zens of A^irginia." Tliat is all. There is no allegation that the
defendant companies are residents, respectively, of Richmond and
of Manchester, in the eastern district of Virginia; having their
offices for the transaction of all their business (Code Va. § 11 04)
in Richmond and Manchester, respectively, in the eastern district
of Virginia. The omission is jurisdictional, and is demurrable.
The fact that a corporation is resident in Richmond, and has its
ofiBce for the transaction of all its business in Richmond, cannot be

















































































































































p1ainti:O: jn th ·au 
a•n . Th l ill , 11 er 
the d f nd· nt t l 
HARVEY v. RI IIMOND 
and al: th i la · . f r id nee 0£ d f n 1-
th plaintiff: t h itiz n f :Jiarylancl and 
itiz n. of \ irginia ut di r gard rul in 
th r .'i] ·n f all parii t he et out in 
1 . n t d •fin • th m »lho l y which h di -
r gar 1 f thi ,' r ' JUir •rn nt by 1.h 1 l ·ad r hall l tak n ad vantage 
of I inf r tha it int 1ntion i t 1 a,· that matt r in ai ·h in tan 
to th di ·r ti n C th ourt. My own pinion) in th ah n · 
of on ·] u i \' auLh riti on th ul j t) i that th failure of th 
bill t giv m r 1 ' h pla f r id n of th plain iff an 
d .. f ndan ' i n t of uffi ient gra ity to r quir r · rt to a d -
murr r. I think it w uld be mp t nt for th ourt to requir 
b tat cl in th bill by am ndment on th p t 
withou d la,' on motion. 
ut th def t of the bill in thi a c i gra r than th mer., 
£ailur t giv r id n . Th r i a juri dictional omi ion) more 
eriou than th m r failure to onform to rul 0 in equi '· 
It w uld not b uffi i nt for a bill to t out that J obn oe) a 
itiz n a d r id nt f far rland) complain 0£ ichard Roe a· it-
1z n an r id nt of Vircinia. If th re w r but one judi ial di ' -
trict in \ irginia th omi ion to tate Ri bard o pla e of 
re id n might not be demurral 1 and might be amen 1 d on m r 
motion. ut th r ar two 1i trict in \ irginia and th bill mu 
gi j uri li ti on in th di tri t in w hi h th ui t i brou ht. It 
i 0£ juri di tional '~ nc that th bill hall all that i hard 
Roe i a citizen f \ irginia) r id nt at om plac all g d to 
b in the a tern di ri t 0£ Vir inia. The bill at bar u e no other 
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used in its corporate name. It is a fundamental rule of pleading
that implications cannot supply allegations. Certainty and pre-
cision are of the essence of pleading, and all material averments
must be positive and express. Implications, even necessary impli-
cations, can never dispense with material allegations. The bill
here is demurrable and defective in not containing all averments
giving jurisdiction of the cause to the circuit court of the United
States for the eastern district.
I have not time at present to consider the remaining grounds of
demurrer set out by the two defendants in the cause. I will say,
however, that, whether these grounds be valid or not, the bill is
amendable in the respects enumerated, on motion of complainants.
I do not think that the paper called the "answer of defendants"
is yet in the cause, except as an affidavit. The defendants are not
bound to file an answer in the present stage of the cause.
V (fA r. ^ Stating Part.
^\A^*^ y-* Seals v. Robinson, 75 Ala. 363. (1883.)
Appeal from Pike Chancery Court.
Heard before Hon. John A. Foster.
This was a bill in equity by J. M. Eobinson & Co., a mercantile
partnership, carrying on business in Louisville, Kentucky, simple
contract creditors of S. J. Seals, against the said Seals, R. C.
Seals, his wife, and W. A. Wei don, seeking to have vacated and
set aside, as fraudulent and void, a deed executed by S. J. Seals to
]iis wife, bearing date 17th June, 1881, and conveying to her sev-
( ral lots of land, situated in the city of Troy, in this State ; and
to have the property conveyed by the deed sold for the payment of
complainants' demand; and it was filed on 20th February, 1882.
.\s appears from the averments of the l)ill, and from the proof, the
complainants sold S. J. Seals, on 29th and 30th days of September,
1881, goods, wares and merchandise, amounting in price to nearly
one thousand dollars, on credit, and without security, the debt
maturing at two and four months; on which was paid, on 24th
November, 1881, the sum of two hundred dollars. The bill alleges:
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u ed in its corporate name. It is a fundamental rule of pleading 
that implication cannot upply allegations. Certainty and pre-
ci ion are of the e ence of pleading, and all material averments 
mu t be po itive and xpre s. Implication , even necessary impli-
c tion , can never di pense with mat rial allegations. The bill 
here is demurrabl and defective in not containing all averments 
giving jurisdiction of the cau e to the circuit court of the United 
State for th ea tern district. 
I have not time at present to consider the remaining ground of 
demurrer set out by the two def ndants in the cause. I will say, 
however, that, whether the ground be valid or not, the bill is 
amendable in the re p cts enumerated, on motion of complainants. 
I do not think that the paper called the "answer of defendants" 
i yet in the cause, except as an affidavit. The defendants are not 
bound to file an an wer in the pre ent stage of the cause. 
STATING PART. 0'b ~~o, 
-(". ?-- Seals v. Robinson, 75 Ala. 363. 
~PPEAL from Pike Chancery Court. 
Heard before Hon. JOHN A. FOSTER. 
(1883.) 
Thi was a bill in equity by J. M. Robinson & Co., a mercantile 
11artnership, carrying on bu iness in Louisville, Kentucky, simple 
c ntract creditors of S. J. Seal , against the said Seals, R. C. 
, i als, his wife, and W. A. Weldon, eeking to ha·ve vacated and 
et a id , a fraudulent and void, a deed executed by S. J. Seals to 
hi wif , bearing dat 17th June, 1881, and conveying to her sev-
ral lo of land, ituated in the city of Troy, in thi State; aml 
t ha·v th property onveyed by the deed old for the payment of 
· mplainant ' d mand; and it wa filed on 20th F bruary 1882 . 
. \ app ars from th averment of the bill and from the proof the 
r· mplainants old . J. al , on 29th and 0th day of ptember, 
"1 1, good , war a d m rchandi amounting in pri e to nearly 
on thou and dollar on credit, and without curity th debt 
maturing at two and four month ; on whi h wa paid, n 24th 
vember, 1881, th um of two hundr d d llar . Th bill allege : 
' hat at tb tim id pur ha w 1 mad th ai 1 . J. al:-; 
Seals v. Robinson ""
held and owned in his own name and right a large amount of real
citate and personal property, of great value, to-wit, eight or ttn
thousand dollars, consisting of valuable brick storehouses in the
city of Troy, and dwellings and lots in said city, and stock in
trade and choscs in action, as represented by him, of the value
of four thousand dollars; and that upon the faith of said real
and personal property, so owned by him and held and standing
in the name of said S. J. Seals, in his own right as aforesaid, your
orators were induced to sell and credit and trust said S. J. Seals,
and sell and deliver to him goods, wares and merchandise upon
the credit aforesaid. Orators further aver that, at the time the
said S. J. Seals made the purchases aforesaid, he had himself
reported in commercial circles as being worth, over and above all
liabilities, in his own right, twelve thousand dollars; and through
these representations, and his property aforesaid, he was enabled
to obtain credit and to be trusted." It is then averred that on
9th January, 1882, the said S. J. Seals filed in the office of the
judge of probate of said county, for record, thejieed in question,
which is made an exhibit to the bill. Tlie consideration 'expressed
in the deed is the natural love and affection which^'the grantor
had and bore towards his ^dfe, the grantee, and the property is
conveyed to her in fee simple, to have and to hold "as her separslte
property under the statutes of the State governing the estates of
married women." After averring the execution by S. J. Seals, on
17th Februar}', 1882, of an assignment of all his property, then
owned by him, to W. A. Weldon, his father-in-law, as assignee or
trustee for the benefit of his creditors, the bill proceeds: 'TTour
orators further represent to your Honor, and aver the fact so to be,
that tlie said deed made by said Seals to his said wife, R. C. Seals,
was not executed on the 17th day of June, 1881, but was executed
some time after that date, to-wit, about the 9th day of January,
1882. But orators aver that if they are mistaken in this, then
they aver that said deed was not delivered on said day, and was
never in fact delivered until the 9th day of Januar}-, 1882, when
the same became, for the first time, a matter of record."
It is also averred that said deed was without valuable considera-
tion; that at the time of its execution, the said S. J. Seals was
financially emliarrassed and in failing circumstances, which was
known to his wife; that it was executed and delivered by him with
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..., 
I' 
lield and own cl in hi own nam and right a larg amount of r al 
c ·~iaie and p r anal pr p rty) of gr at alu ) t -wit, eight or n 
tl au and dollar ) on i ting of aluable brick tor hou e in the 
city of Tr y) and d lling and lot · in aicl ·i y and tock in 
trade antl h in action) a r 'Ir ni. hy him, of th value 
of four th u and d llar ; and i.hat upon th faith of aid real 
and p r nal pr I rty o own 1 1 y him ancl h lcl and tanding 
in th nam I ai l 1 • J. al ) in hi own ri0 ht a. f re aid your 
orator w r inlu cl t 11 anl r lit and i.ru t aid f 1 • J. f al.., 
and 11 and 1 ·liv r to him good. 'varc an l rn rchandi up n 
th r <lit f r aid. rato further a r that) at th tim tl 
al ma 1 the pur ·ha al' r aid he had him lf 
r port 1 in ornrn rnjal ircl a b ing worth, av r and al ave all 
liabiliti ) in hi own right, tw lv thou and dollar ; and throuo-h 
th e r pr enta·tion , and hi property afore aid, he wa nal 1 
to obtain r dit and to be tru t d.' It j th n averred that on 
9th January, 1 , th aid . J. eal :fil d in the office of the 
judg of probate of aid county, for r cord, the ,...de d in que tion, 
whi h i made an hibit to the bill. Th con id ration 'expre d 
in th d d i th natural love and adfoction which~the grantor 
had and bore toward hi wife, the grant and the property i 
conv y d to her in f e imple, to hav and to hold "as her epadte 
property und r the tatutes of th tate governing the e tate of 
marri d women." fter averring th execution by . J. eal on 
l 1th ; bruary, 1 , of an a ignment of all hi property, then 
own 1 by him, to W. . W ldon, bi father-in-law, as as ignee or 
tn t f r th b n fit of hi r dit the bill proceed : ' our 
ou1~or further r pr nt to } our Honor, and av r th fact o to be, 
that th aid d d ma 1 b: ai 1 cal to hi aid wif R. eaL, 
'ra not .x cuted on th 1 th da of Jun 1 1 but wa e ecut 
om tim aft r that date to-wit about th 9th day of J anuar , 
18 ut rat r av r that if th r are mi tak n in thi th n 
the a\ r that ai 1 d wa not 1 li er d on aid da 
n v r in fat d liY rd until th th da· of Januar 
th am b am f r th :fir~t tim a matt r of r cord. 
t i al av IT d that aid c1 c1 wa without valuabl consid ra-
ii n · ihat ai th tim of it . cuti n th ai 1 . J. eal wa~ 
:finan iall. mbarra ~ 1 and in failin ir um tan ... , whi h wa, 
known to hi wif · that it wa x ut d an 1 ] liY r 1 h.Y him '1ith 
th int nti n and f r th puq o of hind rincr, 1 layincr an 
78 Stating Part
frauding the complainants and his other creditors; and that such
fraudulent intention and purpose were known to his wife, and the
deed was accepted hy her in furtherance thereof. The bill then
contains this averment: "And plaintiffs aver that if said deed
[was executed and delivered] at the time it purports to have been
executed and delivered, there was a secret understanding and
agreement between the said Seals and his wife, that the same
should not become a matter of record at said time; and so far
as the existence of the said deed was concerned, the whole com-
mercial world was kept in blissful ignorance thereof, until the said
Seals had purchased all the goods he wanted, amounting to several
thousand dollars [in value], and had disposed of the same; and
then, for the first time, it came to light, after the same had been
concealed from your orators, and all persons, for the period of
nearly seven whole months; and all this time the said Seals, his
wife consenting thereto, was holding liimself out to the world as
the owner, in his own right, of said property, for the purpose of
defrauding his creditors, and those with whom he might after-
wards deal on credit and trust." It is also charged that the deed
is fraudulent, as to prior and subsequent creditoi's, in that said
Seals 'Tiad a reservation therein in favor of himself, being the
trustee of his said wife, to control and enjoy the rents of said
property, without accounting to any one for the same." The bill
was subsequently amended, averring the death of S. J. Seals after
the filing of the original bill, and making his administrator a party
defendant.
To the bill as amended Mrs. Seals and W. A. Weldon filed a
demurrer, the character of which is stated in the opinion. The
demurrer was overruled, and the defendants answered. Mrs. Seals,
in her answer, which was not under oath, averred, and testimony
introduced on her behalf tended to show, that the deed in question
was executed and delivered at or about the time it bore date, for
the hona fide purpose, on the part of herself and husband, of
making a provision for her and three children, minors of tender
years, her husband being induced thereto by ba-d health, and an
apprehension of an early death from a chronic disease with which
he was then afflicted, and also a desire to avoid an administration
upon his estate; and that she did not have the deed recorded at
an earlier date, because she was not advised of the necessity of
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fraucling the complainants and hi other creditors; and that such 
fraudulent intention and purpo e were known to his wife, and the 
deed wa accepted by her in furtherance thereof. The bill then 
contains thi averment: "And plaintiffs aver that if said deecl 
[ wa executed and delivered] at the tim it purport to have been 
executed and delivered, there wa a cret under tanding and 
agr ement betwe n the aid S al and his wife, that the same 
hould not become a matter of recor l at aid time; and o far 
a the exi tence of the aid deed wa concerned, the whole com-
mercial world wa kept in blis ful ignorance thereof, until the said 
Seal had pur ha ed all the good he wanted, amounting to several 
thou and dollar [in value], and had di posed of th0 ame; and 
then for the :fir t time, it came to light, after the same had been 
concealed from your orators, and all person , for the period of 
nearly even whole month ; and all thi time the said Seals, hi· 
wife con enting thereto, wa holding him elf out to the world as 
the owner in hi own right of said property, for the purpose of 
defrauding hi creditor, and tho e with whom he might after-
ward deal on credit a:nd tru t." It is also charged that the deecl 
i fraudulent, a to prior and ubsequent creditors in that said 
eal "had a r ervation therein in favor of hims lf, being the 
tru tee of hi aid wife, to control and enjoy the rents of said 
property, without accounting to any one for the same." The bill 
wa ubsequently amended, averring the death of S. J. Seal after 
the :filing of the original bill, and making his admini trator a party 
defenaant. 
To the bill a amended Mrs. Seal and W. A. Weldon :filed a 
demurrer, the character of which i tated in the opinion. The 
demurrer wa overruled, and the defendant an wered. l\1r. Seal~ , 
in her answer which wa not under oath averr d, and t timony 
introduced on her behalf t nded to how, that the d d in que tion 
wa ex cuted and deliv r d at or about th time it bore date, for 
th bona fide purpo e on the part of her elf and hu band of 
making a provi ion for her and three children, minor of tender 
· ar her hu band being indu d th r t by bad health, and an 
appr hen ion of an arly d ath from a hroni di a with which 
h wa th n affiicted an 1 al o a 1e ir to a aid an admini tration 
upon hi tat ; and that h did not hav th d d r cord d at 
an arli r dat b cau he wa not a vi ed of the n ce ity of 
re i tration nd wa. :fi all indu c1 to h v it r ord l 1 y a ug-
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gestion from a third party, tliat the record would be proof of its
contents in the event of a loss. She admitted that her husband
owed debts at the time of the execution of the deed, but denied
that he was then financially embarrassed, and also the averments
of the bill charging fraud.
The material facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence
for the comi)hnnant,^, on whicli they relied to sustain the averments
of fraud contained in the bill, are sufficiently indicated in the
opinion. There was no direct or positive evidence introduced by
them, that the wife had any knowledge of the huslDand's finan-
cially embarrassed condition when the deed was executed, or of his
intention to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, or of any
other fraudulent intention or purpose on his part; or that she
combined and conspired with him for the purpose of perpetrating
any fraud; or that she withheld the deed from record for any
fraudulent purpose.
On the hearing, had on pleadings and proof, and on a motion
to dismiss the bill for want of equity, the chancellor caused a
decree to be entered, overruling the motion, declaring the deed
fraudulent and void, and granting relief to the complainants. The
decree also overrules "the exceptions to the testimony"; but the
record fails to disclose these exceptions, or their nature or extent.
Tlie rulings of the court, in overruling the demurrer, the motion
to dismiss, and the exceptions to tcstimon)-, and in granting relief
to the complainants, are here assigned as error.
Brickell, C. J. :
The rules of pleading in a court of equity, as to matters of
form, are not so strict as the rules originally prevailing in courts
of common law. The statutory requirement in reference to bills
in equity is, that they "must contain a clear and orderly statement
of the facts on which the suit is founded, without prolixity or
repetition, and conclude with a prayer for the appropriate relief."
A bill conforming to this requirement, under the practice and the
decisions of this court, would have been deemed unobjectionable
before the enactment of the statute. The statute has not, hovr-
ever, been construed as in derogation of the cardinal rule, as it
has been frequently termed, that the bill must show with accuracv
and clearness all matters essential to the complainant's right to
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ge tion from a third party, that the r cord would l e proof of it 
contents in th e nt of a lo . h admitt d that her hu band 
ow d d b at t1 tim of th eed, but enied 
that he wa th n £.nan jally emb rr c<l an 1 o the aYerments 
of the bill hargin .fraud. 
The mat rial Ia t an l circum tan e cli clo ed by th vidence 
for the complainan on which th y r li d to u tain the averment 
of fraud contain in th bill ar u ci ntly indicate in the 
opinion. Th r a no dir ct or po iti e vid nee intr luced by 
them, th t th wife had any knowl dg of th hu l and finan-
cially barra d condition wh n th d d wa execut d or of hi 
int ntion to hinder d lay and defraud hi reditor. , or of any 
other fraudulent intention or purpo e on bi part· or that he 
combin cl and on pired with him for th purpo e of perpetrating 
any fraud; or that he withh ld the deed from record for any 
fraudulent purpo e. 
On th h aring, had on pleading and proof, and on a motion 
to di mi the bill for want of equity, the chancellor cau ed a 
de r e to be ent r d overruling the motion, d clarin th deed 
fraudulent and void, and granting relief to the complainant . The 
de r e al o ov nule "th xc ption to the te timon ; but the 
r cord fail to di clo e th e x eption , or their nature or .rlent. 
The ruling of th court, in o erruling th demurrer th motion 
to di mi and the exception to t e timon and in granting relief 
to the omplainant , are here a igned a error. 
BRICKELL 0. J.: 
he rul of pl ading in a court of equit3 a to matter of 
form, ar not o trict a the rule originally pre ailing in ourt 
f common law. The tatutory requirement in r f r nee to bill 
in quit ' i that th 'mu t ontain a lear and rderl tat ment 
f the fa t on whi h the uit i found d without prohs:iiY or 
r p titi i1 and on lud with a pra ·er for th appropriat relief.' 
bill onf rmin0 to thi r guir m nt und r th pra ti and the 
d ci ion of thi court would ha en d em d un bj tionable 
b f r th na tm nt of th tatute. h tatut ha ~ not ho~-
,,. r b n on tru d a in d r cration f th cardinal rule a it 
ha · b n fr qu ntl t rm d, that th ill mu t how with accuracy 
an l 1 arn all matt r ntial to th omplainanf rirrht to 
reli f. h matt r mu t n t l ma l t l pen up n inf r n 
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nor will amljiguoiis averments of them be accepted as siifiicient.
The averments must be direct and positive, not uncertain and in-
conclusive. — Spcnce V. Duren, 3 Ala. 251; CochreU v. Gurley,
26 Ala. 405; Duclwortli v.. Duclworth, 35 Ala. 70. A bill may
be framed in a double aspect; alternative averments may be in-
troduced; but each alternative must present a case entitling the
complainant to the same relief. The bill is demurrable, if in either
alternative the complainant is not entitled to any relief, or is en-
titled to relief essentially differing in character. — Andrews v. Mc-
Coy, 8 Ala. 920; Lucas v. Oliver, 34 Ala. 626; Elves v. Walthall,
38 Ala. 329; David v. Shepard, 40 Ala. 587; Micoii v. Ashurst,
55 Ala. 607.
If the original bill contains alternative averments, and either
averment is insufficient to support the right of the complainant
to the relief prayed, the objection was not presented in the chancer}'-
court by demurrer. Advantage of it was claimed only by motion
to dismiss for want of equity. A motion to dismiss for want of
equity is not the equivalent of a demurrer; nor is it appropriate
to reach mere defects or insufficiencies of pleading curable by
amendment, which is matter of right at any time before final
decree. It should be entertained only when, admitting the facts
apparent on the face of the bill, whether well or illy pleaded, the
complainant is without right to equitable relief. When it is ap-
parent, if the facts were well pleaded, a case of relief would exist,
the defendant should be put to a demurrer, specifying the grounds
of objection, affording the complainant the opportunity of removing
them by amendment.— iZoo^^er v. 8. & M. R. R. Co., 69 Ala. 529.
The demurrer interposed was general ; it fails, in the words of the
statute, "to set forth the grounds," and the statute prohibits the
hearing of it. — Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. 490.
Objections to the admissibility of evidence, in chancery, ought
to bo reduced to writing, and a reference to them should be incor-
porated in the note of submission, or they should be otherwise called
directly to the attention of the chancellor. If the fact that they
have been made is not noted in the submission, or it is not otherwise
shown that they were called to the attention of the chancellor, and
he does not notice them, on appeal, the presumption is that they
were waived.
It is settled by a long line of decisions in this court, that a volun-

















































































































































80 STATING p ART 
nor will ambiguou averments of them be accepted as sufficient. 
The averment mu t be direct and positive, not uncertain and in-
conclu ive.-Spence v. Duren, 3 Ala. 251; Cockreill v. Gurley, 
26 Ala. 405; Duckworth v .. Duckworth, 35 Ala. 70. A bill may 
be framed in a double a pect; alternative averments may be in-
troduced; but each alternative must present a case entitling the 
complainant to the same relief. The bill is demurrable, if in either 
alternative the complainant is not entitled to any relief, or is en-
titled to relief essentially differing in character.-Andrews v. Mc-
Coy, 8 Ala. 920; Lucas v. Oliver, 34 Ala. 626; Rives v. Walthall, 
38 Ala. 329; David v. Shepard, 40 Ala. 587; 111icou v. Ashurst, 
55 Ala. 607. 
If the original bill contains alternative averments, and either 
averment is in ufficient to support the right of the complainant 
to the relief prayed, the objection was not presented in the chancery 
court by demurrer. Advantage of it was claimed only by motion 
to dismiss for want of equity. A motion to dismiss for want of 
equity is not the equivalent of a demurrer; nor is it appropriate 
to reach mere defects or insufficiencies of pleading curable by 
amendment, which is matter of right at any time before final 
decree. It should be entertained only when, admitting the facts 
apparent on the face of the bill, whether well or illy pleaded, the 
complainant is without right to equitable relief. When it is ap-
parent, if the facts were well pleaded, a case of relief would exist, 
the defendant hould be put to a demurrer, specifying the grounds 
of objection, affording the complainant the opportunity of removing 
th m by amendment.-H ooper v. S. & M. R. R . Co., 69 Ala. 529. 
The demurrer interposed was general; it fails, in the words of the 
statut , "to et forth the grounds," and the statute prohibits the 
h aring of it.-Hart v. Clark, 54 Ala. 490. 
Obj ction to th admissibility of evidence, in chancery, ought 
to b reduced to writing and a reference to them houll be incor-
porat d in th note of ubmi ion, or they hould be otherwise called 
dir ctly to th attention of th chancellor. If the fact that they 
have b en made i not noted in the ubmi ion, or it i not otherwise 
shown that they w r call d to the attention of th hancellor, and 
he do not notice them, on appeal, the pre umption i that they 
were waived. 
ti cttl d by a long line of d cj ion in thi ourt that a volun-
tary om' yan r a nv ran not r ting u on a rnlu 11 c n ... id r-
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ation, is void per se, without any regard to the intention of the
parties, however free from covin or guile they may have been, as to
the existing creditors of the donor, without regard to his circum-
stances, or the amount of his indebtedness, or of the kind, value or
extent of the property conveyed, if it be not exempt from liability
for the payment of debts. As to subsequent creditors, if it be not
shown that there was mala fides, or fraud in fact in the transaction,
the conveyance is valid and operative. But if actual fraud is shown,
it is not of importance whether it was directed against existing
or subsequent creditors ; either can successfully impeach and defeat
the conveyance, so far as it breaks in upon the right to satisfaction
of their debts. The distinction between existing and subsequent
creditors is, that, as to the former, the conveyance is void ;;er se,
for the want of a valuable consideration; as to the latter, because
it is infected with actual fraud. — Miller v. Thompson, 3 Port. 196;
Cato V. Easletj, 2 Stew. 214; Moore v. Spence, 6 Ala. 506; Costilla
V. Thompson, 9 Ala. 937; Thomas v. DeGraffenreid, 17 Ala. 602;
Foote V. Cohb, 18 Ala. 585; Stolces v. Jones, lb. 734; s. c. 21 Ala,
731; Gannard v. Eslava, 20 Ala. 732; Randall v. Lang, 23 Ala.
751; Stiles v. Lightfoot, 26 Ala. 443; Iluggins v. Perrine, 30
Ala. 396; Cole v. Varner, 31 Ala. 244; Pinksion v. McLemore,
lb. 308 ; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115. The right of the subse-
quent creditor depends upon the existence of actual fraud in the
transaction; the burden of proving it rests upon him. — Bump on
Fraud. Con. 308. The general rule applies, that fraud must be
proved; it will not be presumed, if the facts and circumstances
shown in the evidence may consist with honesty and purity of in-
tention. But it must not be supposed that fraud must be proved
by direct and positive evidence, or that it is incapable of proof by
circumstances leading to a rational, well grounded conviction of its
existence. There is no fact which may be the subject of controversy
in a judicial proceeding, civil or criminal, that is not the subject
of proof by circumstantial, as distinguished from positive or direct
evidence. As the fraud visiting a transaction at the instance of
creditors lies in the intention of the parties to it, %dcious intent
is not generally susceptible of proof otherwise than by evidence of
circumstances indicative of it. The intention is a mental emotion,
of which the external signs are the acts and declarations of the par-
ties, taken in connection with the concomitant circumstances. —
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ation, i oid z;er se, without any r gard to th inl ntion of the 
parti , however free from covin r guil th y may hav been, a to 
th xi ting r cliL r f th donor without r gard to hi ir ·um-
tan , or th am unt of hi incl bi cln , or f the kind Yalue or 
xt nt f th pro1 rt; onvey d if it be noL 'X mpt from liability 
for th paym nt of cl bt . A to ub qu nt r clitor , if it be not 
hown Urn th r wa 11iala fide , or fr ud in Ia t in the tran action, 
the conv ·an i valid and opcrativ . ut if a tual fraud i. hown 
it i not of importan wh th r it wa irect cl again t xi ting 
or ub qu nt r clitor ; ith r an u fully imp ach and cl f at 
th onv yanc , o far a it br ak in upon the right to ati faction 
of th ir d bt . The di tinction b tw en xi ting and ub equent 
er clitor i that, a to the former the conveyance i void per se 
for th want of a aluable con ideration; a to th latter, becau e 
it i inf ·ted with actual fraud.-Miller v. Thompson, 3 Port. 196; 
Gato v. Easley, 2 tew. 214; Moore v. Spence, 6 Ala. 506; ostillo 
v. Thomp on, 9 Ala. 937; Thomas v. DeGraffenreid, 17 Ala. 60 ; 
Foote v. Cobb, 1 Ala. 585; tokes v. Jones, Ib. 34; s. c. 21 Ala. 
731; Gannard v. Eslava, 20 Ala. 732; Randall . Lang, 23 Ala. 
751; tiles v. Lightfoot, 26 Ala. 443; Huggins . Perrine, 30 
Ala. 396; Cole . Varn er, 31 Ala. 244; Pink ton v. JJlcLemore, 
Ib. 30 ; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115. The right of the ub e-
qu nt creditor depend upon the exi tence of actual fraud in the 
tran action; th burden of proving it re t upon him.-Bump on 
Fraud. Con. 308. The general rule appli that fraud mu t be 
proved; it will not be pre urned, if the fact and circum tance~ 
hown in the vid nee may con i t with hon ty and purity of in-
t ntion. But it mu t not be uppo ed that fraud mu t be proved 
b dir ct and po itiv vidence or that it i incapable of proof b' 
cir cum tance 1 a din O' to a rational, well grounded on viction of it · 
xi t n e. Ther i no fact which ma; be the ubj ct of controversy 
in a judi ial pr9ce ding ci il or riminal that i not the ubj ct 
of proof b , ir um tantial a di tin ui h d from po itile or dire ·t 
vi 1 n . th frau i vi itinO' a tran a tion at the in tanc of 
r dit r · li in th int ntion of the partie to it viciou int nt 
i not g n rall u ptibl o.f proof oth rwi than by 1i 1 nee f 
cir urn tan in li ati of it. Th int ntion i a m ntal motion , 
of whi h th xt rnal irn are th acL an l l claration f the par-
ti tak n in onn tion with th oncomitant cir umstan 
Hubbard llen. \..la. 3 · llarrell . Jlitch ell 1 ... \la. 9 , • 
t5 
82 Stating Part
Thames v. Eembert, 63 Ala. 561; Pickett v. PipMn, 64 Ala. 520.
The conveyance now assailed by subsequent creditors of the
grantor is of real estate, is purely voluntary, founded upon no other
consideration than love and affection, and the controlling pui'pose
of its execution was a provision for the wife of the donor. It is
made directly to the wife, without the interposition of a trustee,
and at law is a mere nullity. All contracts and conveyances made
between husband and wife directly, at common law, are invalid, for
the reason that husband and wife are regarded as but one person,
and the legal existence of the wife is merged in that of the husband.
— Gamble v. Gamble, 11 Ala. 966 ; Puryear v. Puryear, 12 Ala. 13 ;
Bradford v. Goldsborougli, 15 Ala. 311; Frierson v. Frierson, 21
Ala. 5-19. The statutes creating and defining the separate estates
of married women are not in abrogation of this doctrine of the
common law; they are not intended to sever the unity of the hus-
band and wife, so far as to confer on them capacity to contract with,
or to convey directly to each other. — Short v. Battle^ 52 Ala. 456;
McMillan v. Peacocl-, 57 Ala. 127. Although this is the recognized
doctrine of the common law, a court of equity, when the contract or
conveyance is fair and just, will give to it full effect and validity. —
Williams v. Maull, 20 Ala. 721; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115;
McWilliams v. Ramsey, 23 Ala. 813; Andreivs v. Andrews, 28 Ala.
432; Spencer v. Godwin, 30 Ala. 355. As a gift or conveyance
by the husband to the wife directly is invalid at law, and is valid
only in a court of equity, it is regarded as creating in the wife an
equitable separate estate, though it may not contain words denoting
that it is for her sole and separate use, or words in exclusion of the
marital rights of the liusband; and that the estate is not conse-
quently within the influence or operation of the statutes enabling
the wife to take and hold the property owned by her at the time
of the marriage, or to which she may become entitled subsequently.
— McMillan v. Peacock, supra; EatcUffe v. Dovgherty, 24 Miss.
181; Warren v. Brown, 25 Miss. 66; Short v. Battle, supra.
Tlie conveyance is of all the visible, tangible property of the
donor, subject to execution at law. All that he retained, consisted
of choses in action, of uncertain, doubtful value. It is said by
Judge Stor\^ that, "if a husband should by deed grant all his estate
or property to his wife, the deed would be held inoperative in equity,
as it would be in law ; for it could, in no just sense, be deemed a
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Thames v. Rembert, 63 Ala. 561; Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 520. 
The conv 'ance now a ailed by subsequent creditors of the 
grantor i of real e tate, i purely voluntary, founded upon no other 
con icleration than love and affection, and the controlling purpose 
of it execution wa a pro i ion for the wife of the donor. It is 
made directly to the wif , without the interposition of a tru tee, 
and at law i a mere nullity. All contract and conve3 ances made 
between Im band and wife directl3 at ommon law, are invalid, for 
the rea on that hu band and wife are regarded as but one per on, 
and the legal eri tence of the wife is merged in that of the husband. 
-Gamble v. Gamble, 11 Ala. 966; Puryear v. Puryear, 12 Ala. 13; 
Bradford v. Goldsborough 15 Ala. 311; Frierson v. Frierson, 21 
Ala. 549. The tatute creating and defining the eparate e tate 
of married women are not in abrogation of thi doctrine of the 
common law; they are not intended to sever the unity of the hus-
band and wife o far a to confer on them capacity to contract with, 
or to convey directly to each other.- hart v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456 ; 
McMillan v. Peacock, 57 Ala. 127. Although this is the recognized 
doctrine of the common law, a court of equity, when the contract or 
conve ranee i fair and just, will give to it full effect and validity.-
TVilliams v. Maitll, 20 Ala. 721; Williams v. Avery, 38 Ala. 115; 
]Jc Williams v. Ramsey, 23 Ala. 813; Andrews v. Andrews, 28 Ala. 
432; Spencer v. Godwin, 30 Ala. 355. As a gift or conveyance 
by the husband to the wife directly i invalid at law, and i alid 
only in a court of equity, it is regarded as creating in the wife an 
equitable separate e tate, though it may not contain words denoting 
that it i for her ole and separate use or words in exclusion of the 
marital right of the hu band; and that the e tate i not conse-
quently within the influence or operation of the tatute enabling 
the wife to take and hold the property owned b her at the time 
of th marriage, or to which he may become entitled sub, equently. 
- :McMillan v. Peacock, supra; Ratcliffe v. Dougherty -1 Mi ~. 
181; Warren v. Brown, 25 Uiss. 66; hart v. Battle supra. 
The conveyanc i of all the vi ible tangible propert of the 
donor, ubject to xecution at law. 11 that h retain d con i tecl 
of bo e in a tion, of un rtain, doubtful valu . It i aid b 
ud ~ tory that, "if a hu hand hould b e d !!rant all hi fatv 
r prop rt to hi wife th d ed would be h ld inop rative in quit , 
a, it would b in law; for it could, in no ju t n e be de med a 
rea onal le provi ion for h r (which i all that court of equity hold 
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the wife entitled to) ; and, in giving her the whole, he would sur-
render all his own interests." 2 Story's Eq. § 1374. In Coates v.
Gerlach, 44 Pcnn. St. 4G, tlie court said : "A conveyance that de-
nudes a husband of all, or the greater part of his property, is much
more than a reasonaljle provision for a wife; for in considering
what is, and what is not a reasonable provision, the circumstances
of the husband are to l)e regarded, his probable necessities as well as
his debts. Equity will not assist a wife to impoverish her hus-
band." Whether a court of equity would refuse to enforce this
conveyance upon the ground that the provision for the wife is
unreasonable, and that giving to it effect would work injustice to
the husband, it is not necessary to consider. The circumstances
of each case must be considered as determining the reasonableness
of a provision for wife or children, and a conveyance may be valid
inter partes, which the court would not hesitate to pronounce fraud-
ulent as to creditors. — Jones v. Ohencliain, 10 Graft. 259; 1 Bish.
on Mar. Women, § 755. When the rights of creditors are in-
volved, the extent and value of the property conveyed, its kind and
character, are all facts to be considered in determining whether
the transaction is infected with a covinous intent. The fact that a
donor strips himself of all visible, tangible property w^hich is sub-
ject to execution at law, retaining only choses in action of uncertain,
doubtful value, may not be conclusive proof of fraud ; taken alone
it may be weak and inconclusive; but it will awaken suspicion
and add strength to other circumstances which may in themselves
be also insufficient to prove that his intent was fraudulent. And
it is his intent, not the intent of the donee, which is material ; the
fraud of the donor is visited upon the donee, though he mav be
doli incapax, or though his intentions may be fair and honest, for
he comes in as a volunteer, and has no equity which will protect
him against the rights of creditors. — Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala.
520.
The conveyance is not only of all visible property of the donor
subject to execution at law, the value of which far exceeds the
highest estimate of the value of the choses in action he retained
but it contains the unusual, if not remarkable provision, that the
donee shall hold the property conveyed "as her separate property
under the statutes of the State governing the estates of married
women." The effect which would be given this clause of the con-
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the wife entiLl cl to) ; an 1, in giving h r th whol , he woulcl ur-
render all hi wn int r t . ) . tory i 1· 1 4. In oates v. 
Gerlach, 44 nn. t. "1 th urt sai : con yance that de-
nud a hu ban of all, r th gr at r I art of hi property, i much 
mar than a r a nabl provi ion f r a wif ; :for in con idering 
what i , and what i n t a r a nabl pr vi ion the ircum tance 
of th hu band ar to b r gard d, hi pr b bl n c iti a w 11 a._ 
bi debt· . 1 quity will not a i t a wif to impoveri h her hu -
band. h th r a court of quity would r fu to nfor tbi: 
con eyan e up n tb ground that th provi ion for th wife j 
unr a onabl , and that gi ing to it effect would work inju tic to 
tb hu band, it is not n e ar to con id r. The ircum tanc : 
of each a mu t be con ider d a determining the r a onablene 
of a provi ion i r wife or children, and a conveyance may be valid 
inter parte , whi h the court would not he itat to pronounce fraud-
ulent a to reditor .-Jones . Obenchain, 10 Gratt. 2 -9; 1 Bi h. 
on Mar. W om n, § 55. When the right of creditors are in-
vol ed, the xt nt and valu of th property con eyed, it kind and 
charact r ar all fact to be con idered in det rmining wh ther 
the transaction i inf cted with a covinou intent. The fact that a 
donor trip him lf of all vi ible, tangible property which i uh-
ject to execution at law, r taining only cho e in action of uncertain 
doubtful value, may not be onclu i e proof of fraud; taken alone 
it may be w ak and inconclu ive; but it will ~waken u picion 
and add tr ngth to other circum tance which may in th m eli;e" 
be al o in ufficient to prove that hi intent wa fraudulent. nd 
i t i hi intent, not th intent of the donee, which i material ; the 
fraud of the donor i vi ited upon the donee, though he ma be 
doli incapax, or though hi int ntion may be fair and hon t for 
he com in a a volunteer and ha no quity which will protect 
hi again t the right of creditor .-Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 
520. 
Th conve anc i not only of all vi ible prop rty of th onor 
ubj t to e ecution at law th valu of which far exc the 
hio-h t "ti at of th alue f th cho, in a tion be r tain d 
but it ontain th unu ual if not r markabl pron ~ion that the 
lon hall h I th prop rty onv ' d a h r parate prop rh 
un] r th tatut of th ta o-o ruing th tat of married 
Th t whi h would b gi en thi lau of th n-
veyan or '' h i.h r it i apabl f b ino- on tru d a li1,1itin 
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and qualifying tlie estate, narrowing its incidents, lessening the
dominion of the donee, as the estate is created by the general words
which precede it, is not now of importance. Whether it is, or is
not valid and qualifying as a limitation, subjecting the estate and
the wife's dominion to the properties of a statutory estate, which
is, in but a limited sense, a separate estate, it is indicative of the
intention of the donor; and that intention is, in one aspect, now
of the highest importance. Subjecting the estate to the statute
would vest it in the donor as husband and trustee for the donee,
entitling him to his rents and profits, so long as he continues in
that relation, freed from liability to account to the donee, and
exempt from liability for his debts. In other words, he does not
part with the property absolutely, but reserves to himself a specific
benefit which it is to yield, though the ownership is vested in the
donee.
Another circumstance it is of importance to consider. More
than six months passed after the execution of the conveyance be-
fore its registration. AMiatever may have been the general circum-
stances of the donor at the time of the execution of the conveyance,
and upon this point the evidence is not so clear and satisfactory
as it could probably have been made, the fact is, that when the
conveyance was delivered to the judge of probate for registration,
he was insolvent, and, in but little more than a month thereafter,
made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. During
the interval between the execution and registration of the con-
veyance, he continued in possession, claiming ownership of the
property, vouching the ownership as entitling him to credit, and
upon the faith of it obtained credit. The omission to register the
conveyance is but a fact or circumstance indicative of fraud, and
is open to explanation, which, if just and reasonable, would neutral-
ize all unfavorable inferences that may be drawn from it. The
only explanation now offered is, that the donee was ignorant of the
necessity for registration; ignorant that the law required regis-
tration to protect her from the claims of subsequent purchasers
from the husband, or from the claims of judgment creditors. This
is ignorance of law, which can not be accepted as explanatory of
the omission. But she was not ignorant that the husband, after
the execution of the conveyance, and before its registration, em-
barked in a new mercantile enterprise, contracting debts to a large

















































































































































84 STATING PART 
and qualifying the e tate, narrowing it incidents, les ening the 
dominion of the donee, a the e tate i created by the general word::; 
which precede it, i not now of importanc . Whether it is, or is 
not -valid and qualifying a a limitation, ubjecting the tate and 
the wif ' dominion to th propertie of a tatutory e ta.te, which 
i in but a limited sen e, a separate e tate, it i indicative of the 
intention of the donor; and that intention i , in one a pect, now 
of the highe t importance. Subjecting the e taite to the statute 
would vest it in the donor a husband and tru tee for the donee, 
entitling him to his rents and profit , o long as he continues in 
that relation, freed from liability to account to the donee, and 
exempt from liability for his debt . In other word , he doe not 
part with the property a:bsolutely, but reserves to him elf a specific 
benefit which it is to yield, though the ownership is ve ted in the 
do nee. 
Another circumstance it is of importance to con ider. More 
than six months passed after the execution of the conveyance be-
fore its registration. Whatever may have been the general circum-
stances of the donor at the time of the execution of the conveyance, 
and upon this point the evidence is not so clear and sati factor. 
a it could probably have been made, the fact is, that when the 
conveyance was delivered to the judge of probate for registration, 
he was insolvent, and, in but little more than a month thereafter, 
made a general assignment for the benefit of creditor . During 
the interval between the execution and regi tration of the con-
veyance, he continued in pos ession, claiming owner hip of the 
property, vouching the owner hip as entitling him to credit, and 
upon the faith of it obtained credit. The omis ion to regi ter the 
conveyance i but a fact or circumstance indicative of fraud, and 
i op n to explanation, which, if just and rea onable, would neutral-
ize all unfavorable inference that may be drawn from it. The 
only explanation now offered i , that the donee was ignorant of the 
nece ity for regi tration; ignorant that the law requir d regi -
tration to protect her from the claim of ub equent purcha ers 
from th hu band, or from the claim of judgm nt er di tor . Thi:-
1 ignoran of law whi h can not b ace pt d a xplanatory of 
th omi ion. But h wa not ignorant that the hu band after 
th execution of the on yanc and b for it r · tration m-
bark d in a n w m r antil nt rpri , ontra tina d bt to a large 
amount. or i ignoranc of th n it of regi trati n or o E 
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the duty of giving public-it}- to the fact that he was not the owner
of the property, imputed to him. The evidence is conclusive that he
concealed the fact of the conveyance, and represented himself as
having title.
The omission to register the conveyance, the want of notoriety
of its existence, the magnitude of the property conveyed, when
compared with the value of that which was retained, the attempted
reservation of a specific benefit to the donor, which he could hold
free from liability for debts, his engagement in business very soon
after the execution of the conveyance, obtaining a false credit be-
cause of his possession and representations that he was the owner
of the property, to which, to say the least, the donee by her supine-
ness contributed, are all badges of fraud, or circumstances indicative
that the intent of the donor was the hinderance, delay, and fraud
of creditors. Bump on Fraud. Con. 308. It is not of importance,
whether the intent was directed against present or subsequent
creditors ; in either event, the conveyance may be successfully ira- [/
peached by a subsequent creditor. We concur in the conclusion ; (/-
of the chancellor, that the conveyance must be deemed fraudulent Jf^ y
as to creditors, prior or subsequent, and the decree is of consequenjB^^ » b w^'
affirmed. ,^- '-^ ^^
Born V. GeuAer, 111 III. 363. (1898.) {f^ J^ '^cT' J" ^
Appeal from the AppeUate Court for the First Distinct ;-^ear^'^ OV^ y
in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County ; /jT y^
the Hon. 0. H. Horton, Judge, presiding. v^^ , t^
This was a bill in chancery filed on the 30th day of April, ISO-'lf^ e/^M
by the appellee Philip Geuder, as executor of the last will and testal; ^
ment of Johann Geuder, deceased, and Edward S. Dreyer, truste1rV\jj/^
against Gay Dorn, the appellant, and his wife and others, for th^^ ^ l^
foreclosure of a certain trust deed. The bill alleged "that on MarchV^'^^C^ . <^
3, 1890, Gay Dorn, for value received, made his one principal ^^ vA"
promissory note of that date, and thereby promised to pay to the J^^lm^
order of Emil Dickmann the suin of six thousand dollars ($6000) ^ J:^^ '
in three years after said date, with interest at the rate of six^ ^^
per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, said several install-i^^;;;^i^<
ments of interest being evidenced and secured by six interest note?/ ^ "^
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ing puhli ·ity th fact that he wa not the owner 
of th pr p rty, imput to him. The idence i conclu i e that he 
on al th fact o.f'. th on eyance, and repre ented him elf a. 
having ti 
Th omi ~ i n to r gi l r th conv 'ancc the want of no tori ty 
f it n th ma uitutl f th prop :ty onv y d, wh n 
ompa•r 1 with th valu f Lha.t whi h wa r tain d, the attempt d 
r r ation of a p ifi b n fit t th don r, which he coul hold 
fr :from liabili y f r d l hi nc;ag m nt in l u in ry oon 
aft r the x uti n of the n anc obtaining a fal e er di be-
au e of hi po ion and repr entation that he wa the owner 
of th prop rt t hi h to a r the 1 a t, th donee by her upine-
n ontributed ar all badg of fraud or circum tanc indicative 
that the intent of th donor wa the hinderance, delay, and fraucl 
of er ditor . Bump on Fr ud. Con. 30 . It i not of importance, 
whether the int nt wa directed again t pre ent or ub equent 
creditor ; in either event, the conveyance ma be ucc folly im- & 
peached by a ub equent er ditor. We concur in th conclusion 
of the chancellor, that the conveyance mu t be deemed fra7.dulen 






Dorn v. Gewler, 171 Ill. 36B. / \.. '/ ..,.r 
PPEAL from the ppellate Court for the Fir t Di tfrft ;-hear rv - / 
in that court on app al from the Circuit Court of Cook County; /' 
the on. 0. H. HORTON, Judge pre iding. vJ . 
Thi wa a bill in hancer · fil d on th · Oth day of pril 1 9 .~ 
b' the app 11 e Philip u 1 r a ex cutor of the la twill and test 
ment of Johann uder d a .. ed an dward . Dr ·er tru t e, 
aaain t a orn the app llant and hi wif an 1 other , for th 
for lo ur of a c rtain tru t d ed. Tb bill all d that on :Jiar · 
3 1 
f that dat 
or up n 
ur 
orn to th 
·' \ - 1 
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Dickmann, each for the sum of one hundred and eighty dollars
($180), which were due, respectively, in six, twelve, eighteen,
twenty-four, thirty and thirty-six months after the date thereof,
both i^rincipal and interest to bear interest at the rate of eight per
cent per annum after maturity, and payable at the banking office
of E. S. Dreyer & Co., Chicago, Illinois ; that said notes were after-
wards endorsed by said payee, Emil Dickmann, and delivered to
Johann Gender, who became the legal holder and owner thereof,
and so remained up to the day of his death, to-wit, August 11,
189-1; that to secure the payment of the said notes the said Gay
Dorn executed and delivered to complainant Edward S. Dreyer,
trustee, a deed of trust of even date with said notes, thereby con-
veying to said trustee, in fee simple, the following described real
estate, with all the buildings and improvements thereon, to-wit:
(Here follows description of mortgaged premises;) that said prin-
cipal note was given to evidence, and said trust deed to secure, the
balance of the purchase money for the property above described,
together with interest thereon for said period of three years; that
it is provided in said trust deed that if default be made in the
payment of the said notes or the interest thereon, or any part
thereof, or in case of waste or non-payment of taxes or assessments,
or neglect to procure or renew insurance, or in case of the breach
of any of the covenants therein contained, then the whole of the
principal of said notes shall thereupon, at the option of the legal
holder thereof, become immediately due; that default has been
made in the payment of the principal sum of said note, together
with a large amount of interest thereon ; that there is now due the
whole of the principal of said notes, being the sum of six thousand
dollars ($6000), with interest thereon from March 3, 1890." The
bill also alleged the trust deed contained an agreement to pay
solicitor's fees of the complainants' solicitor in case of a foreclosure,
and that the other parties defendant claim some interest in the
mortgaged premises, and concluded with a prayer that a decree be
entered foreclosing the trust deed and for sale of the property, and
for a decree in personam for any deficiency, and for such other and
further relief as the nature of the case might require.
The appellant filed an answer to the bill, alleging payment of
each of the said six interest notes or coupons mentioned in the bill,
and that by agreement between the parties the time of the payment
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Dickmann, each for the sum of one hundr d and eighty dollars 
($1 0), which were due, respectively, in six, twelve, eighteen, 
twenty-four, thirty and thirty-six months after the dafo thereof, 
both principal and intere t to bear inter st at the rate of eight per 
cent per annum after maturity, and payable at the banking office 
of E. S. Dreyer & Co., Chicago, Illinois; that said notes were after-
wards endorsed by said payee, Emil Dickmann, and delivered to 
Johann Geuder, who became the legal holder and owner thereof, 
and so remained up to the day of hi death, to-wit, August 11, 
1 9-±; that to secure the payment of the said notes the said Gay 
Dorn executed and delivered to complainant Edward S. Dreyer, 
trustee, a deed of trust of even date with said notes, thereby con-
yeying to said tru tee, in fee simple, the following described re~l 
estate, with all the buildings and improvements thereon, to-wit: 
(Here follows description of mortgaged premises;) that said prin-
cipal note was given to evidence, and aid tru t deed to secure, the 
balance of the purchase money for the property above described, 
together with interest thereon for said period of three years; that 
it is provided in said trust deed that if default be made in the 
payment of the said notes or the interest thereon, or any part 
thereof, or in case of waste or non-payment of taxes or assessments, 
or neglect to procure or renew insurance, or in case of the breach 
of any of the covenants therein contained, then the whole of the 
principal of said notes shall thereupon, at the option of the legal 
holder thereof, become immediately due; that default has been 
made in the payment of the principal sum of said note, together 
with a large amount of interest thereon; that there is now due the 
whole of the principal of said notes, being the sum of six thousand 
dollars ($6000), with interest thereon from March 3, 1890." The 
bill al o alleged the tru t deed contained an agreement to pay 
olicitor's fees of the complainants' solicitor in ca e of a foreclosure, 
and that the other parties defendant claim ome intere t in the 
mortgaged premi e , and concluded with a prayer that a decree be 
ntered foreclo ing the tru t deed and for sale of the property and 
for a ecree in per onam for any deficiency, and for uch other and 
further reli f a the natur of the ca might require. 
The appellant :fil d an an wer to th bill, all ing payment of 
each of th aid ix int r t note or oupon mentioned in th bill, 
and that by agr m nt b tw n the p rti the tim of th payment 
of th principal in 1 btedne s was ext nded for th term of one year, 
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to-wit, to the 3d day of March, 1894, in consideration of the pay-
ment by appellant of the sum of $G0 as a bonus for said extension,
and the execution by the appellant of two interest notes for the
payment of the interest semi-annually upon the said principal sum
for the period of time to which payment of the said principal note
was so extended; that appellant paid both of said last mentioned
two interest notes or coupons, and that on or about the said 3d
day of March, 1894, — the date to which the said principal note
was extended by the said agreement, — the parties again agreed that,
in consideration of the sum of $120 paid by the said appellant, the
time of the maturity of the said principal debt should be and was
extended for the further term of three years, until, to-wit, March
3, 1897; that the appellant executed and delivered to the com-
plainants his certain six notes or interest coupons for the semi-
annual interest to accrue upon the said principal sum for and dur-
ing the time to which, by the said agreement, the maturity of the
principal sum was extended; that said appellant paid the interest
for the said period of six months evidenced by the first of said
interest or coupon notes, and said first note was delivered to him;
that the second of said last mentioned interest notes fell due under
said agreement on the said 3d day of March, 1895, and that by a
further agreement between the parties, based upon a sufficient con-
sideration, it was agreed that for the convenience and accoimnoda-
tion of the complainants the appellant would endeavor to negotiate
a loan from other parties of a sufficient amount to discharge the
principal sum (which, aside from the said last mentioned agree-
ment, would not mature until March 3, 1897), and the interest
coupon which fell due March 3, 1895, and that while he was in
good faith endeavoring to negotiate said loan, complainants, in
violation of the agreement, filed the bill for foreclosure. The
answer contained other averments, which, in the view we take of
the case, need not be adverted to.
To this answer the complainants filed a general replication,
averring that the allegations of their bill of complaint were true,
and that they would aver, maintain and prove the same to be true,
and that the answer of the appellant was uncertain, untrue and
insufficient.
The issue thus raised l)y the bill, answer and replication was
referred to the master to take proof, and report his conclusions
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to-wit, to the 3d day of Mar h, 1 , in con ideration of th pay-
m nt by app llant of th ·um of $ ·o a a bonu · for aid xtcn ion, 
and th x ution by th app llant of two int r t ote for the 
payment of th int r ·t ' 111U-annuaJly ur on th aid principal um 
for the period of time to whi h payment of the aid prin ·ipal not 
wa o xt 1n<l.ed; that app llant paid both of aid la t m nti nec.l 
two int r L note or oupo , and that on or about th aid d 
day o.f arch, 1 94,-the dat to whi h the aid principal note 
wa xt nd d by the aid agr em nt,-th parti again agre d that, 
in on ideration of the um of $120 paid by the aid app llant the 
time of th maturity of the aid principal debt hould be and wa 
xtcnded for th further term of three y ar ' until to-wit, niarch 
3 1 97; that the appellant executed and deliver d to, th com-
plaina·nt hi certain i:x note or intere t coupon for the emi-
annual intere t to accrue upon the aid principal um for and dur-
ing the tim to which by the aid agreement the maturity of the 
principal um wa extend d; that aid appellant paid the intere t 
for th aid period of ix month videnced by the :fir t of aid 
int r t or coupon note and aid :fir t note wa delivered to him; 
that the cond of aid la t mentioned interest note f 11 due under 
ail agreement on the aid 3d day of March, 1 95 and that by a 
further agre m nt between the parties ba ed upon a uffici nt con-
ideration, it wa agr ed that for th convenience and accommoda-
tion of th complainant the aiJpellant would endeavor to neaotiate 
a loan from other partie of a ufficient amount to di charg the 
principal um (which, a id from the aid la t mentioned agree-
ment would not mature until Mar h 3 1 97), and the inter t 
coupon whi h fell due March 3 1 95, and that while he wa in 
good faith nd avoring to n o-otiat aid loan complainants in 
violation of the a!ITe ment :fil d th bill for for lo ur . The 
an w r contain d other a rm nt which in the i w w tak of 
th ca e ne d not b ad rt d to. 
T'o thi answer th complainant :filed a g neral replication 
a erring that the all o-ation of th ir bill of omplaint wer true 
and that they would av r maintain and prov th am to be true 
and that the an w r o.f the a1 p llant wa unc rtain untrue and 
in uffi i nt. 
Th i u thu rai by th bill an w r and r plication wa · 
r f rr d t the ma ter to tak proof an r p rt hi on lu ion:; 
of both la and fact. The proof wer _ tak n and th r p r of 
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the master filed. The substance of the report of the master wa^*,
that the allegations of the appellant that the time of the maturity
of the principal note had been extended to March 3, 1897, were
sustained by the proofs, and that the appellant had paid the interest
coupons mentioned in the bill, and also each of the interest notes
or coupons afterwards executed by and in pursuance of the agree-
ments extending the time of the payments of the principal sum,
except the interest note or coupon due on the 3d day of March,
1895. As to the allegations of the answer as to an extension of the
time of the payment of the interest note which fell due March 3,
1895, the report of the master is as follows: "I find from this
evidence that no agreement for an. extension on the said March
3, 1895, coupon was made; that the language testified to by Dorn
is too indefinite to constitute an agreement for an extension; that
Dorn fails to show that at any time he had any substantial negotia-
tions pending for the procurement of the principal, and as no
definite time is stated by Dorn to which said note was extended,
it was an assumption on his part, which was not justified by the
language, that the time of payment of the interest was extended.
I therefore conclude that complainants had a right to declare the
principal due for non-payment of the interest due March 3, 1895."
The master found and reported that said interest coupon falling due
March 3, 1895, was paid by the appellant to the appellee executor
on the 25th day of May, 1895, which was a little over a month after
the filing of the bill herein.
Appellant filed exceptions to the findings of the master as to the
facts relative to the alleged agreement for the extension of the
payment of the interest coupon which fell due March 3, 1895, and
to the legal conclusions of the master as to the right of the
appellees, under the allegations of the bill, to foreclose the trust
deed. The exceptions were overruled and a decree of foreclosure and
sale entered, and the decree was affirmed by the Appellate Court
on appeal. This is a further appeal of the said mortgagor, Dorn,
to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
Mr. Justice Boggs delivered the opinion of the court:
The case made by the allegations of the bill is, that the appellant
had made default in the payment of the principal note according
t",o its tenor and effect, and also in the payment of the six coupon
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the master filed. The substance of the report of the master watl, 
that the allegations of the appellant that the time of the m&turity 
of the principal note had been extended to March 3, 1897, were 
sustained by the proofs, and that the appellant had pa·id the interest 
coupon mentioned in the bill, and also each of th interest notes 
or coupons afterwards executed by and in pursuance of the agree-
ments extending the time of the payments of the principaJ. sum, 
except the interest note or coupon due on the 3d day of March, 
1895. As to the allegations of the answer as fo an extension of the 
time of the payment of the int rest note which fell due March 3, 
1895, the report of the master is as follows: "I find from this 
evidence that no agreement for an extension on the sa·id March 
3, 1895, coupon was made; that the language testified to by Dorn 
is too indefinite to constitute an agreement for an extension; that 
Dorn fails to show that at any time he had any substantial negotia-
tions pending for the procurement of the principal, and as no 
definite time is stated by Dorn to which said note was extended, 
it was an assumption on his part, which was not justified by the 
languaige, that the time of payment of the interest was extended. 
I therefore conclude that complainants had a right to declare the 
principal due for non-payment of the interest due March 3, 1895." 
The master found and reported that said interest coupon falling due 
Ma·rch 3, 1895, was paid by the appellant to the appellee executor 
on the 25th day of May, 1895, which was a little over a month after 
the filing of the bill herein. 
Appellant filed exceptions to the findings of the master as to the 
facts relative to the alleged agreement for the extension of the 
payment of the interest coupon which fell due March 3, 1895, and 
to the legal conclu ions of the master as to th right of the 
appellees, under the allegations of the bill, to foreclo e the trust 
deed. The exceptions were overruled and a decree of foreclosure and 
ale entered, and the decree was affirmed by the Appellate Court 
on appeal. Thi is a further appeal of the said mortgagor, Dorn, 
to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. 
Mr. JUSTICE BOGGS delivered the opinion of the court: 
The ca made by the all gation of th bill i that th appellant 
had made d fault in th payment of th prjn ipal not ac ording 
ro it t nor and ff ct, and al o in th paym nt of th ix oupon 
note · given at the time the principal not wa x cut d to evidence 
DoRN V. Geuder 89
the liability of the appellant to pay interest semi-annually on the
principal note from the date thereof to the 3(1 day of March, 1893,
the date of its maturity.
It appeared from the report of the master, which, in this respect,
it is conceded is fully supported by uncontroverted testimony, that
appellant had paid each of said intercut notes mentioned in the bill,
and was not, in respect of any of them, in default. It also appeared
from the master's report and from like uncontroverted testimony,
that the payment of the principal note had been extended, by an
agreement based upon a good and sufficient consideration, for the
term of one year, to-wit, to the 3d day of March, 1894, and again
extended by a like binding agreement for the further period of
three years, to-wit, to the 3d day of March, 1897, and way not due
when the bill was filed, to-wit, on the 20th day of April, 1895. The
case made by the bill was fully met and overcome by the proofs.
The master found that the maturity of the mortgage debt had been
extended to March 3, 1897, but that it was proven appellant had not
paid the interest coupon which, under the terms of the contract
of extension, fell due on the 3d day of March, 1895, promptly at
maturity, and that the appellees had the right to declare the mort-
gage debt due and payable because of such default, and on this
finding decree was entered against the appellant. The case, then,
upon which the appellees succeeded, was, that the principal of the
indebtedness to them did not fall due until March 3, 1897, but that
by reason of the failure of appellant to pay the semi-annual in-
stallment of interest promptly on the 3d day of March, 1895, the
right accrued to them, under the terms of the agreement extending
the maturity of the note to March 3, 1897, to declare the principal
sum due and payable, and to proceed at once to foreclose the mort-
gage. But the appellees made no such case by the pleading. They
were not entitled to a decree of foreclosure upon the case alleged
in their bill, for it was disproved. It is not sufficient, if true, that
the evidence disclosed a state of case upon which a bill could have
been framed which would have entitled them to a decree, for the
reason such evidence is not applicable to the allegations of the bill.
If the allegations of a bill are overcome by the proof, the com-
plainant cannot have a decree because it may appear that issues
might have been made by other pleading upon which he would have
been entitled to relief. Appellees might, upon the coming in of the

















































































































































DORN . EUDER 9 
t.he liability of th app llant to I ay int r t semi-annually on the 
principal not fr m ih dat ther of to the cl day of March, 1 93, 
the date of i · matarity. 
It app ar d from th report of the ma t r, which, in thi respe -t, 
it i con ded i full upported by uncon rov rtecl t timony, that 
app llant had paid a h of aicl int re t note mentioned in th bill, 
and wa not, in r ·p ct of any of h m, in d fault. It al o app ar d 
.from th t r r p rt an fr m like uncontrov rted testimony, 
that th p ym t of the principal not had b en xt nded, b an 
agreem nt ba d upon a good and ufficient con ideration, for the 
term of on y ar, to-wit, to the 3d day of farch, 1 4, and again 
ext na d by a like binding agr ment for the further p riod of 
three y ar , to-wit, to the 3d fay of March, 1 9 , and wa not due 
when th bill wa :fil d, to-wit, on th 20th day of pril, 1895. The 
ca. mad by the bill wa fully met and overcom by th pr f . 
The ma t r found that the maturity of the mortgag d bt ha lb en 
extend d to Mar h 3, 1 97, but that it wa proven appellant had not 
paiJ th inter t coupon which, under the term of the contract 
of exten ion, fell du on the 3d day of March, 1 95, promptly at 
maturity, and that the appellee had the right to declare the mort-
gage debt due and payable becau e of uch default, and on thi 
:finding d cree wa entered again t the appellant. The ca e, then, 
upon whi h the appellee ucceeded, wa , that the principal of the 
indebtedne to them did not fall due until March 3, 1 97, but that 
by rea on of th failure of app llant to pay the emi-annual in-
tallment of int re t promptly on th 3d day of March, 189 , the 
right a ru d to th m, under th t rm of th agr ement extending 
th maturity of th note to March 1897, to declare the principal 
um du and payabl and to proc ed at once to for lo e the mort-
gage. ut th app lle made no u h ca b th pleading. They 
wer not ntitl d to a decree of for lo ure upon the ca e all g d 
in their bill, for it wa di pro ed. t i not u:ffi ient if true that 
the e id e di clo ed a tat of a upon which a bill could have 
been framed wbi h would ha e entitled them to a d cree for the 
rea on u h idenc i not applicable to th all ation of the bill. 
f th all cration of a bill ar r om by th proof, th co -
plainant ann t ha a d r e b au it ma app ar that i u 
might ]rnv b n ma 1 b · th r pl a Jing up n whi h he would lHwe 
b n ntitl d to r li f. pp 11 " mi ht upon fo coming in f th 
ma t r r p rt or at any time before th r n ition of th 
;• 
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have applied for and obtained leave, u^wn such terms as the court
should deem just, to make such amendments to their bill as might
be found necessary to state a case entitling them to a decree under
the evidence produced upon the hearing. But no such course was
taken, and the question presented by the record is, whether the
appellees were entitled to a decree under the allegations of their bill.
It is a fundamental rule of equity pleading, that the allegations
of a bill, the proof and the decree must correspond, and that the
decree cannot give relief that facts disclosed by the evidence would
warrant where there are no averments in the bill to which the
evidence can apply, and that if the evidence disproves the case made
by the bill the complainant cannot be given a decree upon other
grounds disclosed by the proofs, unless the court permits the com-
plainant to amend his bill so as to present the case disclosed by the
evidence. McKay v. Bissett, 5 Gilm. 499 j Morgan v. Smith, 11
111. 194; White v. Morrison, id. 361; Roivan v. Bowles, 21 id. 17;
Chaffin v. Heirs of Kimhall, 23 id. 36; Bremer v. Canal Co., 123
id. 104; Russell v. Conners, 140 id. 660; Ohling v. Luitjens, 32
id. 23 ; Burger v. Potter, id. 66.
We make no ruling on the contention of appellant that under
the agreement between the parties with reference to the interest
note which fell due March 3, 1895, it was necessary to the right of
appellees to institute the suit, they should have first given appellant
notice and an opportunity to pay the coupon. If the bill is
amended, and the right to declare the mortgage debt due because
of the alleged default in the payment of that interest coupon be
made the basis of the right to institute the suit to foreclose the
mortgage, the appellant may answer the amended bill and raise an
issue on the point upon which both parties can be fully heard and
the right of the matter properly determined.
Tlie decree of the circuit court and the judgment of the Appellate
Court are reversed and the cause will be remanded to the circuit
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ha e applied for and obtained leave, upon such terms as the court 
hould deem ju t, to make uch amendments to their bill a might 
be found nece ary to tate a ca e entitling them to a decree under 
the e idence produced upon the h arin0 . But no uch course was 
taken, and the qu tion pre ~ent c1 by the record i , whether the 
appellee were entitled to a decree under the allegations of their bill. 
It i a fundam ntal rule of equity pleading, that the allegation::; 
of a bill, the proof and the decree mu t corre pond, and that the 
decree cannot give relief that facts di clo ed by the evidence would 
warrant where there are no averments in the bill to which the 
evidence can apply, and that if the evidence di prove the ca e made 
by the bill the complainant cannot be given a decree upon other 
ground di clo ed by the proofs, unle the court permit the com-
plainant to amend hi bill o a to present the ca e di closed by the 
evidence. McKay v. Bissett, 5 ilm. 499; Morgan v. mith, 11 
Ill. 194; White v. Morrison, id. 361; Rowan v. Bowles, 21id.17; 
Chaffin v. Heirs of Kimball, 23 id. 36; Bremer v. Canal Go., 193 
id. 104; Russell v. Conners, 1±0 id. 660; Ohling v. Luitjens, 32 
id. 23; Burger v. Potter, id. 66. 
We make no ruling on the contention of appellant that under 
the agreement between the partie with reference to the interest 
note which fell due March 3, 1895, it wa nece sary to the right of 
appellees to in titute the uH, they hould have fir t given appellant 
notice and an opportunity to pay the coupon. If the bill i., 
amended, and the right to declare the mortgage debt due becau e 
of the alleged default in the pa·yment of that inter t coupon be 
made the basi of the right to in titute the uit to for clo e the 
mortgage, the appellant may answer the amended bill and rai e an 
is ue on the point upon which both partie can be fully heard and 
the right of the matt r properly determin d. 
Th de r of the ircuit court and the judgment of the Appellate 
Court are rev r d and th cau e will be remanded to th circuit 
court, where appellee may proce d furth r, a they may be advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Pehuy v. Carr
Perry v. Carr, U N. II. 371. (1860.) ^Aa^ ^11)^
The facts in this case suiliciently appear Uom [iM o])'imon W ^
the court. , ^^JJ ^ j^ ^f \ y fi
Bellows, J.: \j - r j^ /n>
This is a bill in equity to redeem a tract of \md in Hopkinton,,.
from a sale on execution of the equity of redemption, to the de- \y
fendant, in May, 1859, and to compel the release to the plaintiff ^^ O^
of the interest acquired by such sale. The bill alleges that th^ji ^ »
plaintiff, having acquired by deed the title of Bowers, the execu- J^j
tion debtor, tendered to the defendant, November 29, 1859, the ^ v
amount of the purchase money and interest and reasonable charges, A/
and demanded a release of his interest; to which the defendanv^ - l)
demurs for want of equity, and in his argument assigns for cause y^A
that the bill docs not allege that the plaintiff has always lieen ready
and is still ready to pay the money tendered; and makes no offei
Upon examination, it appears that the bill contains no sucli^ ^/^
allegations, and we are therefore of the opinion that the demurrerji/ y\ .
is well taken. In general, the plaintiff must state in his bill a case V) 0^ ^ V
upon which, if admitted by the answer, or proved at the hearing,'^ 1 ^
this court can make a decree. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 412. The right, title, LvV o
or claim of the plaintiff should be stated with accuracy and clear- i)\^ i
ness, so that the defendant shall be informed what he is to meet. -^
Story, Eq. PI., sees. 240, 255, 257. Where the plaintiff, in a bill
to redeem, claimed under a levy of execution, but failed to state a ,
return of the execution and record, on demurrer the bill was held ~)^
to be defective. Ilohart v. Frishe, 5 Conn. 592; and see Crocker v. , A'
Iliggins, 7 Conn. 342. On a bill to enforce a reconveyance of land, '^ \]
it was held that the plaintiff should aver a readiness to pay the
money. Buffum v. Buffiim, 11 X. H. 459. In Frost v. Flanders,
37 N. H. 547, Perley, C. J., holds that a bill to enforce a contract
for the conveyance of land, when the plaintiff relies upon a tender
of the price, should contain an offer to pay; and so in a bill or
other proceeding to obtain a release, after tender of the appraised
value of land set off on execution. In that case it is held that when
an execution is extended upon land, and the debtor, in a writ of





















































































































































P rry arrJ 41 . II. 3 1. (1 800.) 
Tu · I t l thi ulli ·i ntly ap 
the ourt. 
. . 
Thi l ' . bill in qui y to r d 
po xamination it app ar that th bill ontain no ucb'. 
all ·ation , and we ar ther fore of the opinion that the demurr r 
a. ontra ·t 
apprni- 1 
on _ uti n. n that a tha wh n 
n i xt nd 1 upon land and th d btor, i a writ f 
on a l ncl r to li . harcr th 1nnd f1 m th r .· t nt , 1 
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must bring the amount tendered into court. For auglit we can see,
the case of a sale of the equity of redemption stands upon the same
footing, the provisions for the redemption and release being sub-
stantially the same. The offer to pay the money tendered should
therefore have been made in the bill, and the money brought into






JJ" ^J^JT Charging PART.
nF. 0^ ^^ K^/^nith V. Clarh, ^ Paige (N. Y.) 368. (1831^.)
f P * This case came before the chancellor on appeal. The facts Ol
^^ f. the case, so far as they are necessary to the understanding of the
decision, are stated in the former report of the case referred to in
the opinion of the chancellor.
The Chancellor :
This is an appeal from the final decree of the vice chancellor of
the eighth circuit, in the same cause which was formerly before me,
on appeal from the equity court of that circuit, to reverse an order
in relation to the injunction. (1 Paige's Rep. 391.) The case is
substantially the same as it then appeared on the bill and answer.
y^rid upon a careful examination of the case, and the voluminous
» ' ' Tjriefs of the counsel for the respective parties, I see no reason to
' "^ change the opinion I then entertained. The error into which the
^ plaintiff's counsel appears to have fallen, is in supposing that an
answer responsive to the charging part of the bill is not evidence,
' in favor of the defendants. The charging part of a bill is as
* necessary to be answered as the stating part. So far as the charges
are material to anticipate and defeat a defence which may be set
up by the defendant, they may be considered in the nature of a
©^ special replication. But the complainant has the same right to
\^ the defendant's answer to the charging part of the bill, to prove
-^ the truth of his special replication, as he has to an answer to the
A P' stating part, to prove the truth of that. If he does not waive an
answer on oath from the defendant, he makes him a witness in
favor of the complainant, against himself, and interrogates him

















































































































































92 CHARGING p ART 
mu t bring the amount tendered into court. For aught we can see, 
the ca e of a ale of the equity of redemption stand upon the same 
footing, the provisions for the redemption and relea e being sub-
stantially the ame. The offer to pay the money tender d should 
therefore have been made in the bill, and the money brought into 
court, without which the plaintiff would not be entitled to a d cree. 
The bill, therefore, 
Must be dismissed. 
CHARGING p ART. 
Smith v. ClarkJ 4 Paige (N. Y.) 368. {1834.) 
THIS case came before the chancellor on app al. The facts o-f 
the cas , o far as they are necessary to the understanding of the 
decision, are stated in the former report of the case referred to in 
the opinion of the chaincellor. 
THE CHANCELLOR: 
T'his is an appeal from the final decree of the vice chancellor of 
the eighth circuit, in the same cause which was formerly before me, 
on appeal from the equity court of that circuit, to reverse an order 
in relation to the injunction. (1 Paige's Rep. 391.) The case is 
sub tantially the same as it then appeared on the bill and answer. 
And upon a careful examination of the case, and the voluminous 
brief of the counsel for the respective parties, I see no rea on to 
change the opinion I then entertained. The error into which the 
plaintiff's coun el appears to have fallen, is in suppo ing thait an 
an wer respon i ve to the charging part of the bill is not evidence, 
in favor of the def ndants. The charging part of a bill is as 
nece ary to be answered as the stating part. So far as the charges 
are material to anticipate and defeat a defence which may be set 
up by the def ndant, they may b con idered in the nature of a 
f\P cial r plication. But the omplainant ha th amc right to 
th d f ndant' an w r to the char ing part of th bill to prove 
th truth of hi p ial r plication, a he ha to an an w r to the 
, tating part t pr v th trutl of that. :f h do not waiv an 
an w r on oath fr m the d f ndant h mak him a witne in 
favor of th omplainant, again t him lf an int rrogat s him 
as to ev rv tat ment and charge in th bill. Hi an w r th r fore, 
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which is responsive to an)' such statement, or charge, in whatever
part of the hill it is contained, is evidence in his own favor as
well as in favor of tlie complainant. I know it has been supposed
by many that the charging part of a bill is mere form; and that
they might therefore put any thing they pleased in that part, by way
of charge, even in a sworn bill. It is frequently, however, as ma-
terial a part of the bill as the stating part ; and the decision of the
cause frequently turns upon the issue formed by the denial of some
averment in the charging part of the bill. It is therefore perjury
for a complainant to make a false charge, or averment, in the
charging part of a sworn bill, in the same manner as it would be for
him to make a false statement in the stating part.
The answer, as to the assignment and the consideration thereof,
being evidence in favor of the defendants, the prior equity of
Clark, to the extent of his debt, is undoubted; and as the com-
plainant claims a mere equitable right of set-off, which accrued after
the defendant Clark had an equitable right to the assignment, it is
perfectly immaterial whether the complainant ever had notice of
the assignment, or of Clark's equity or not. If he had paid the
bond and mortgage, to the original holder, or had discharged any
security which he held against him, under an actual agreement for
a set-otf, and without notice, it would have been a very different
case from that which is now presented. I have no doubt as to the
correctness of the vice chancellor's decision upon the equity of this
case. He was also right as to the costs. If the complainant wished
to exempt himself from costs, and to put the defendants in the
wrong, he should have offered to pay the amount justly due to
Clark, and have requested him to re-assign the mortgage to Am-
brose Smith, so that a set-off between him and the complainant
could be made. It is a general rule that a mortgagor who comes
into this court and is permitted to redeem, must pay the costs of
the adverse party.
The decree of the vice chancellor must be affirmed, with costs;
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which i r pon i t any ·nc:h tat m nt or charg , in whatever 
part 0£ the bill it i · contained, i , vid nc in hi own favor a. 
well a in :fa or f th· · mplainant. know it ha. b en uppo ed 
by many that th ·barging part f a Lill i m r form ; ancl that 
th y might th r f r put any thing they I l · din that part, by way 
of cbarg , v n in a w rn bill. It i , frcqu ntl} howe er, as ma-
tcrjal a part f th bill a th . ta ting part; and the deci ion of the 
a i fr' u ntly turn ipon th i ue form d by the denial of ome 
av rm ni in th harging part of the bill. It i th refore perjury 
for a omplainant t make a fal harg , or a erment, in th 
chargin part of a worn bill, in th am mann r a it would be for 
him to mak a fal e tatcm nt in th tating part. 
Th a to th a i nm nt and the con ideration thereof 
in fa or of th d f ndant , the prior equity of 
t nt of hi d bt, i undoubted ; and as the com-
plainant laim am re quitable right of et-off, which accrued after 
th def ndant Clark had an quitabl right to th as ignm nt, it i 
perf ctl r immat rial whether the complainant v r had notice of 
th a ignm nt, or of Clark' equity or not. If he had paid the 
bond and mortgag , to the original holder, or had di charged any 
ecurity which he h Id again t him, under an actual agreement for 
a t-o:ff, and without notic , it would have been a very different 
ca from that which i now pre ented. I hav no doubt a to the 
corr ctn of the ic hancellor' deci ·ion upon the equity of thi 
ca e. H wa al o right a to the co ts. If the complainant wi hed 
to xempt him If from co t , and to put the defendant in the 
wrong, he hould have offered to pa·y the amount ju tly due to 
lark, and have reque t d him to re-a ign th mortgage to m-
bro mith o that a et-off betw n him and the complainant 
could b made. It i a general rule that a mort acror who ome, 
into thi ourt and i p rmitted to redeem mu pa} the co t of 
party. 
re f th v1 hancellor mu t b affirmed, with o t ; 
and th proc ding r to be remi t d. 




Goodwin v. Smith, 89 Me. 506. (1S97.)
Walton, J. :
This is a suit in equity. The plaintiff says that, being a shipper
A of granite, he bargained with the defendant for a parcel of land,
consisting of about five-eighths of an acre, over which he was
ij- desirous of constructing a road for the transportation of his granite
to the Saco Eiver; that for said parcel of laud he agreed to pay
p4ier and she agreed to accept three hundred dollars; that in pur-
X y^ suance of said agreement, and in part performance of the same,
V\, he paid the defendant one hundred dollars, and entered upon and
{x J. took possession of the land and expended a large sum of money
y ^y^ (about one hundred and seventy-five dollars) in building a culvert
(} and making a passable road over the same, and has at all times
been ready to pay the balance due for the land, and has several
times offered so to do, if the defendant would give him a deed of
it ; but that the defendant, although she accepted and still retains
the one hundred dollars advanced to her, has hitherto refused, and
still refuses to give the plaintiff a deed of the land, falsely giving
as an excuse for such refusal, that the contract was for a lease and
not for a sale of the land ; and the prayer of the plaintiff's bill is
that the defendant may be compelled to specifically perform her
said agreement, and give the plaintiff a good and sufficient deed of
said land.
It is insisted in defense that the plaintiff's bill is fatally defect-
ive because it does not contain an allegation that the plaintiff has
not a "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law." If such an
allegation was ever necessary, it is not so now. It is known as
the jurisdiction clause, and to avoid unnecessary prolixity, has
been abolished by a rule of this court. (Rule IV.) It has also
been abolished by the United States Supreme Court. (Piulc XXI.)
And Judge Story says it was never necessary; that if the other
facts stated in the bill do not show jurisdiction, this clause will
not give it; and if the other facts stated in the bill do show
jurisdiction, and are sustained by the proof, the bill will be sus-

















































































































































94 CLAUSE OF JURISDICTION 
I 
CL USE OF JURISDICTION. 
Goodwin v. mith, 89 Me. 506. {1897.) 
\\" LTON, J.: 
Thi i a uit in equity. The plaintiff ay that, being a hipper 
of granite, he bargained with th defendant for a parcel of land, 
con i ting of about :five-eighth of an acre, over which he was 
V de irou of con tructing a road for the tran portation of his granite 
t1 to the Saco River; that for aid parcel of land he agreed to pay 
,plier and h agre d to accept thr e hundr d dollar ; that in pur-
../ / suance of aid agreement, and in part performan e of th same, 
. ./\ , he paid the defendant one hundred dollar , and enter d upon and y / ~ ,, 
w ( 1 •• ;. took po., e ion of the land and expended a large sum of money 
Y . p (about one hundred and eventy-:five dollars) in building a culv rt 
J and making a pa able road over the same, and ha at all time ' 
been ready to pay the balance due for the land and ha several 
time offered o to do, if the def ndant would give him a deed of 
it; but that th defendant, although he ace pted and ·till retain' 
the one hundred dollar advanced to her, ha hitherto refu ed, and 
till refu e to give the plaintiff a de d of the land, fal ely giving 
a an excu e for uch r fusal, that the contract wa for a lease and 
not for a ale of the land; and the prayer of the plaintiff bill i 
that the d fendant may be compelled to peci:fically perform her 
aid agreement, and give the plaintiff a good and ufficient deed of 
aid land. 
It i insi t d in defense that the plaintiff bill is fatally defect-
i e becau it doe not ontain an all gation that the laintiff ha 
not a "plain ad quat and ompl te rem dy at law." If uch an 
all gation wa v r n ce ary, it i not o now. It i known as 
th juri di tion lau and to avoid unn e ary prolixity ha. 
b n aboli h d by a rule of thi court. (Rul V.) It ha al o 
een aboli hed by the nit d tat upr m ourt. ( ul .LT.LT .) 
nd ud tory a it wa n er nece arr; that if the other 
fa t tate in th bill do not how juri di tion thi clau e will 
not giv i · and if the oth r fa t tat d in the bill do how 
juri. di tion and ar u tain by th I ro f th bill will be u -
tain c1 thouah thi lau e i omitt d. tory 1 quit 1 adino- , 
Miles v. Miles 95
§ 3-4; and note 2, citing the rule of tlie United States Supreme
Court.
It is further insisted in defense that the contract was oral, and
that tlie evidence is insullicient to take it out of the operation of
the statute of frauds. Wc think the evidence is sufficient. It is
true that to take an oral contract for the sale of land out of the
operation of the statute of frauds, the proof of a part performance
of the contract, and the proof of the contract itself, must be clear
and convincing. Or, as the rule is stated in Bennett v. Dyer,
ante, 17, "the party making the attempt to take the case out of
the statute of frauds must establish the existence of the oral con-
tract by clear and satisfactory evidence." But we think the evi-
dence in this case is clear and satisfactory. Viewed in the light
of the undisputed acts of the parties, we think the oral proof shows
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did make such a
contract as is set out in the plaintiff's bill, and that she accepted
a hundred dollars in part performance of the contract, and per-
mitted the plaintiff to take possession of the land and expend a
large sum of money in constructing a road over it. And we think
she must now be required to complete the performance of her con-
tract, and give the plaintiff a good and sufficient deed of the land,
as prayed for in his bill.
Decree accordingly, with costs.
Interrogatixg Part.
Miles V. Miles, 21 N. H. UO. (1S53.)
In Equity. The bill alleges that on the •?6th day of March,
18-il, Eeuben Miles of Madbury, father of the orator, Abraham
Miles, made and published his last will and testament ; and on the
7th of August, 1841, made and published a codicil to his will. That
Eeuben died in Madbury, on the 23d day of June, 1845, and on the
1st day of July, 1845, the will and codicil were duly proved and
allowed. That Reuben, by his will, among other things, devised to
his daughter, Betsey Meserve, wife of Joseph Meserve, now of
Wilson's Village, in the county of Niagara and State of New York,
one-half in common and undivided of his homestead fann in ]\[ad-

















































































































































1 ILES V. nfILES 95 
§ 34 ; and note , citing he rule of the nitcd ates upreme 
Court. 
It i furth r in i t ontract wa oral, and 
that th id n e i in uff i L to tak it out of th operation of 
the statute of :fraud . v c think th idence i ufficient. It is 
true that to take an oral oniract for th al of land ou of the 
operation of th tatut of fraud , the proof of a part performance 
of .th ontra t, an l th proof of the ontract it elf, mu t be lear 
and con incing. r, a th rule is tated in Bennett v. Dyer, 
ante, 1 , th party making the attempt to take the ·a out of 
th tatut of fraud mu t c tabli h th exi tence of the oral con-
tract by lear and ati factory viden e. But we think the evi-
denc i thi ca e i cl ar and ati factory. Viewed in the light 
of the undi puted act of the parti , w think the oral proof how 
beyond a r a onable doubt that the defendant did mak uch a 
contract a i t out in th plaintiff bill, and that he accepted 
a hundr d dollar in part performance of the contract, and per-
mitted the plaintiff to take po e ion of the land and exp nd a-
large um of money in constructing a road over it. And we think 
she mu t now be requi1~ed to complete the performance of h r con-
tract, and give the plaintiff a good and ufficient deed of the land, 
as pray d for in his bill. 
Decree accordingly, with costs. 
INTERROGATI NG p .A.RT. 
Miles v. Miles,, 7 N . H. 440. {1853.) 
I N EQUITY. The bill all ge that on th 9 6th da of larch, 
1841 Reuben Mile of Madbury, father of the orator Abraham 
Mile ... , mad and publi h d hi la twill and te tament; and on the 
th of uITTl t 1 -±1 mad and publi h d a codicil to hi will. That 
Reub n di d in Iadbur r on th 3d ia. of June 1 -±5 and on the 
1 t day of Jul 1 -±5 the will and odicil were dul pro ed and 
allowed. That R ub n b hi will amo g other thin de i ed to 
bi dau ht r Bet e 1 rv wife of Jo eph f er now of 
\ il on Villag in the count of Niacrara and ta t f _._ w ork 
one-half in mmon and undivid d of hi home ... t ad fan11 in :.Had-
bur including all th land wbi h R ub n th n oc upi with 
V6 Interrogating Part
one-half of all the buildings thereon, and one-half in common and
undivided of his wood lot, in Barrington, called the Waldron Hill
lot, to have and to hold the same to her and her assigns, for and
during the term of her natural life, and from and immediately after
her decease, to such child or children of said Betsey, if any she
should ever have, as might be living at the time of her decease, to
have and to hold the same to such child or children, and its or
their heirs and assigns forever; but in case Betsey should die with-
out leaving any child of hers alive at the time of her decease, then
and in that case, from and immediately after the decease of Betsey,
to Abraham Miles, the orator, and Tichenor Miles of Madbury, one
of the defendants, sons of the testator, in equal shares, to have and
to hold the same to Abraham and Tichenor, their respective heirs
and assigns forever.
That Reuben, also, among other things, devised to his daughter,
Nancy Miles, another of the defendants, the other half in common
and undivided of said farm, including all the land which Eeuben
then occupied, with one-half of the buildings thereon, and one-half
in common and undivided of the Waldron Hill lot, to have and
to hold the same to her and her assigns, during her natural life,
and from and immediately after her decease, to such child or
children as she might at that time have living, and to its or their
heirs and assigns forever; but in case Nancy should die without
leaving any child alive at the time of her decease, then and in that
case, from and immediately after her decease, to Abraham Miles
and Tichenor Miles, in equal shares, to have and to hold the same
to them and their respective heirs and assigns forever.
That it was ordered by the will that the devises to Betsey and
Nancy, and their heirs, should be subject to and charged with am''
devise that the testator might thereinafter make to his wife, Lydia
Miles, another of the defendants, and to any incumbrance that he
might order in her favor.
That Eeuben gave to his wife one-third part of his homestead
and the Waldron Hill lot, in common and undivided, so long as
she should remain his widow.
The bill then charges that Betsey and Joseph Meserve, on the
14th of July, 184G, by their deed of that date, for a valual)le con-
sideration, conveyed to the orator all their right in the premises.
That Nancy and Lydia Miles applied to the judge of probate


















































































































































one-hall of all the buildings thereon, and one-half in common aind 
undivided of his wood lot, in Barrington, called the Waldron Hill 
lot, to have and to hold the same to her and her assigns, for and 
during the term of her natural life, and from and immediately after 
her decease, to such child or children of said Betsey, if any she 
should ever have, as might be living at the time of her decease, to 
have and to hold the arne to such child or children, and its or 
their heirs and a igns forever; but in case Betsey should die with-
out leaving any child of hers alive at the time of her decease, then 
and in that case, from and immediately after the decease of Betsey, 
to Abraham Miles, the orator, and Tichenor Miles of Madbury, one 
of the defendants, sons of the testator, in equal shares, to have and 
to hold the ame to Abraham and Tichenor, their respective heirs 
and assigns forever. 
That Reuben, al o, among other things, devised to his daughter, 
Nancy Miles, another of the defendants, the other half in common 
and undivided of said farm, including all the land which Reuben 
then occupied, with one-half of the buildings thereon, and one-half 
in common and undivided of the ·waldron Hill lot, to have and 
to hold the same to her and her assigns, during her natural life, 
and from and immediately after her decease, to such child or 
children as she might at that time have living, and to its or their 
heirs and assigns forever; but in case Nancy should die without 
leaving any child alive at the time of her decease, then and in that 
case, from and immediately after her decease, to Abraham Mile5 
and Tichenor Miles, in equal shares, to have and to hold the same 
to them and their respective heirs and assigns forever. 
That it was ordered by the will that the devises to Betsey and 
Nancy, and their heirs, should be subject to and charged with any 
devi e that the testator might thereinafter make to his wife, Lydia 
Mile , another of the defendants, and to any incumbrance that he 
might order in her favor. · 
That Reuben gav to his wif one-third part of hi home teaJ 
and the Waldron Hill lot, in common and undivided, so long as 
she should remain his widow. 
The bill then charg that Betsey and Jo eph M erve on the 
14th of July, 1846, by their d d of that date, for a valuable con-
sideration, conveyed to the oraitor all their right in the premise . 
That Nancy and Lydia Mil a pp lie to the ju e of probate 
for partiti n of the premi s, an th am w r duly divided and 
Miles v. Miles ^'^
set off to the parties by a comniittee, and the decree of the judge
of probate made thereon, the 4th of April, 1848. The particular
parts assigned to the several parties interested are set forth in
the bill.
That on the ITth of April, 1811, the complainant released to
Betsey Meserve and her husband all his interest in the premises;
and that John Kingman of Durham, another of the defendants,
claims to hold that part of the premises set off to Betsey Meserve
and Joseph, by a lease from them.
That Lydia Miles is about eighty years of age, and is still the
widow of Keuben; that Betsey Meserve is fifty-six years of age,
and never had any child; that Nancy Miles is forty-seven years old,
and was never married, and never had any child.
That the complainant has reason to believe, and does believe,
that the defendants intend to commit strip and waste on the prem-
ises so devised and divided, and that there is an understanding,
if not an express agreement among them for that purpose; and
that when the premises were divided, there was standing thereon
a large amount of pine and oak wood and timber, and that there
is still standing on some parts a large amount of pine and oak wood
and timber.
That John Kingman has, as the orator has been informed and
believes to be true, for about two years last past, cut and drawn
away wood and timber to a large amount from that part of the
premises devised and set off to Betsey Meserve ; and that Kingman,
during that time, has cut and drawn from the premises full twenty
cords of pine wood, and sold the same ; also pine logs, sufficient to
make from five to ten thousand feet of boards, and converted the
same to his own use, but not on said premises, and that the wood
and timber were worth from $100 to $150; and that Kingman
told tlio complainant, in the month of January before the filing of
the l)ill, that he intended to cut wood on the premises that winter
sufficient to last his fire two winters, and that Kingman never lived
on any part of the premises.
The bill also charges Nancy Miles with having committed waste
upon the premises to a considerable amount, and sets forth the
particulars of the same. It also makes the same charges against
Tichenor j\[iles, and states that tho defendants pretend that thev
have a right to cut, as set forth in the bill.


















































































































































MILES v. MILES 97 
et off to the partic by a committ , and the decree of the judge 
of probate mad thereon, th 4th of pril, . The particular 
parts a ign d io the cv ral parti int re t cl are , et forth in 
the bill. 
That on th 1 th of pril, 1 .J- , h ·om plainant relea ed to 
Bet ey M r and h r hu band all b.i ir i ,r · ·t in the premi e. ; 
ancl that ohn Kingma:n of Durham, anoU r of the defendant , 
claim to hold that part of th pr mi et off to Bet;sey M erve 
and Jo ph, by a lea e from them. 
That Lydia Miles is about ighty years of age, and i still the 
wiclow of Reub n ; that Bet ey Me erve is fifty- ix year of age, 
and nev r had any child ; that an y Mil s i forty-seven years old, 
and wa n ver married, and nev r had any child. 
That the complainant has rea on to believe, and doe believe, 
that the defendant;s intend to commit trip and waste on the prem-
ises o devised and divided, and that there is an under tanding, 
if not an express agreement among them for that purpo e; and 
that wh n th premises were divided, there was standing thereon 
a lare;e amount of pine and oak wood and timber, and that there 
is still tanding on some part;s a large amount of pine and oak wood 
and t imber. 
Tha.t John Kingman has, as the orator has been informed and 
believ to be true, for about two years last pa t, cut and drawn 
away wood and timber to a large amount from that part of the 
premi e devi ed and et off to Bet ey Me erve; and hat Kingman, 
during that time, ha cut and drawn from th premi e full twenty 
·cords of pin wood, and sold th ame; al o pine log , sufficient to 
make from fi.ve to ten thousand f et of boards, and conv rted the 
same to hi own u e, but not on said premi e , and tha·t the wood 
and timber w r worth from $100 to $1 0; and that Kingman 
told th complainant in the month of January b fore th :fl.lino- of 
th bill that h int nded to cut wood on the premi es that winter 
suffi i nt to la t hi fir two wint r and that ingman never li"red 
an with having committ d wa te 
pr mi on i rabl amount, a·nd et forth th 
of tl1 t a1 mak th ame harg a ·ain t 
Iil and tat that tl1 1 f ndant pr tend that th :: 
hay a ri crht t ut, a t forth in th bill. 
Th bill h n tate that to the en 1 thcr "'for . that th d 
'1 
98 Interrogating Part
fendants may, upon their several and respective corporal oaths, to
the best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge,
remembrance, information and belief, full, true, direct and perfect
answer make to all and singular the matters aforesaid, and that
as fully and particularly as if the same were here repeated, and
they and every of them distinctly interrogated thereto, and that
more especially said confederates may, in manner aforesaid, answer
and set forth" —
Whether Eeuben Miles made his will and codicil, and the devises
therein set forth, and whether the will was proved, as in the bill is
alleged.
When Eeuben Miles died, and whether the real estate was divided,
as set forth in the bill.
Whether deeds were given, as in the bill of complaint is alleged,
and what deeds were given, and where.
What is the age of Lydia Miles, and Nancy Miles and Betsey
Meserve, and whether Betsey and Nancy ever had any child.
Whether Kingman has any right to any part of the premises
so divided ; and what right and to what part and from whom, and
when and on what terms and conditions.
Whether the defendants, or either of them, and which, have cut
and hauled, or permitted to be cut and hauled, or caused to be cut
and hauled, any wood and timber from the premises, and where
and how much by each, and the value of the same, and what disposi-
tion each has made of the wood and timber so cut and hauled, or
permitted or caused to be cut and hauled.
Whether the defendants, jointly or severally, have not sold the
wood and timber, by them and each of them taken from the prem-
ises, and how much each has sold, and the value of the same, and
where the same was sold, and whether there is not now a large
amount of oak and pine wood and timber on the premises.
The bill then prays an injunction against the defendants and
their agents from committing any further strip and waste on the
premises, and from cutting and hauling wood and timber there-
from, beyond what tenants for life have a right to cut; and that
the defendants be compelled to account for all the illegal cutting
done by them, and to pay to the orator his just proportion of the
value of the same. There is also a prayer for general relief.
To the answers of Betsey Meserve and Joseph Meserve and John

















































































































































98 lNTERROGATI G PART 
fendant may, upon their everal and respective corporal oaths, to 
the best and utmost of their several and respective knowledge, 
remembrance, information and belief, full, true, direct and perfect 
an wer make to all and ingular the matters aforesaid, and that 
a fully and particularly as if the ame were here repeated, and 
they and every of them di tinctly interrogated thereto, and that 
more e pecially said confederates may, in manner aforesaid, answer 
and et forth"-
Whether Reuben Miles made his will and codicil, and the devises 
therein set forth, and whether the will was proved, as in the bill is 
alleged. 
When Reuben Miles died, and whether the real estate was divided, 
as set forth in the bill. 
Whether deed were given, as in the bill of complaint is alleged, 
and what deeds were given, and where. 
What is the age of Lydia Miles, and Nancy Miles and Betsey 
Meserve, and whether Betsey and Nancy ever had any child. 
Whether Kingman has any right to any part of the premi es 
so divided ; and what right and to what part and from whom, and 
when and on what terms and conditions. 
Wh ther the defendants, or either of them, and which, have cut 
and hauled, or permitted to be cut and hauled, or caused to be cut 
and hauled, any wood and timber from the premises, and where 
and how much by each, and the value of the same, and what dispo i-
tion each has made of the wood and timber so cut and hauled, or 
permitted or caused to be cut and hauled. 
Whether the ddendants, jointly or severally, have not sold the 
wood and timber, by them and each of them taken from the prem-
i ., and how much each ha sold, and the value of the same, a:nd 
wh r the ame was sold, and whether there is not now a large 
amount of oak and pine wood and timber on the premi es. 
he bill then pray an injunction again t th defendant and 
th ir agents from committing any forth r strip and wa te on the 
pr mi e , and from cutting and hauling wood and timb r there-
from b yond what tenant for life hav a right to cut; and that 
th d f ndant b omp 11 d to account for all the illegal cutting 
don by th m, and to pay to the orator hi ju t proportion of the 
valu of th am . Ther i al o a prayer for g n ral r li f. 
T th an w r of B t y M rv and Jo ph M er an 1 John 
ingi a:n replication w r :fil d, an t th an w r of t11 oth r 
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defendants, Nancy Miles, Lydia Miles and Tichenor Miles, excep-
tions were filed.
The defendants not submittinfr to the exceptions, the questions
arising upon the same are for the determination of the court.
Eastman, J. :
To the answer of Lydia Miles, the exception is taken that she has
not answered and set forth whether the orator has reason to Ije-
lieve, and does believe, that the several defendants, naming them,
intend to commit strip and waste on the premises devised by Keubeu
Miles, and whether there is not an understanding, if not an express
agreement among them for that purpose.
Upon looking into the bill, we do not find any particular inter-
rogatory specihcally interrogating the defendants upon this point-
But in the general allegations of the bill, the charge is made as
set forth in the exception. There is also in the bill the general
interrogatory or requisition that the defendants may severally and
respectively, full, true, direct and perfect answers make to all and
singular the premises, as fully and particularly as if the same were
repeated, and they and every of them distinctly interrogated thereto.
There is nothing in the answer particularly denying this charge
in the bill — nothing except the general and usual denial of all
unlawful combination and confederacy; and the question is raised
whether a defendant is obliged to answer the statements and charges
in a bill, unless specifically interrogated thereto.
According to the present English practice, the general inter-
rogatory is not sufficient. By the 16th of the orders of August,
1841, it is provided that a defendant shall not be bound to answer
any statement or charge in the bill, unless specially and particu-
larly interrogated thereto. 2 Danl. Ch. PI. & Prac. 820. But such
was not formerly the practice.
Tlie same rule has been adopted by the supreme court of the
United States. Rules in Equity, 40 January term, 1842.
*\Yith us no rule of the kind has been adopted, and we adhere to
the gener al pra ctice ofcourts oif chancery, which have no particular
rules upon the subject, and require a defendant to answer all the
allegations and charges in the bill which may be material to the
plainliff's case; and although, to prevent evasion on the part of the
defendant, it may be well, and is usual, to add interrogatories con-

















































































































































IILE v. 1ILE 
cl l ,uclant ·, an y Mile , Lydia 1il an Tichenor ~files, xcep-
ti n w r fi.l 
'l'he d fend nt"' not ul miLting to the . ption , the que tions 
ari. ing up n the ame ar for the cl termination of the court. 
1 . \. 'T~I ) .. 
ydia Iil , th ex ption i. taken that she has 
not n wer cl an t forth wh th r th orator ha rea on to be-
liev and oe beli ve that th ev ral d fondant , naming them, 
int nd to ommit trip and wa t on the pr mi e devi eel by euben 
Mil and wh h r th r i not an uncl r tanding if not an expre , 
agr m nt amonb th m for that purpo e. 
I n 1 okino' into the bill, we do not find any particular inter-
rogat r.r p ifi ·all r interrogating the cl fendant upon thi point. 
But in th gen ral allegation of the bill, the charge i made a.· 
et forth in th ception. There i al o in the bill the g neral 
interr gatory or r qui ition that the defendant may everally and 
re p ti v 1 ' full, true, direct and perfect an wer make to all and 
singular the pr mi a full3r and particularly a if the ame w re 
repeat d and th and every of them di tinctly int rrogated thereto. 
Ther i nothing in the an wer particularly denying thi charge 
in th bill-nothing except th general and u ual denial of all 
unlawful combination and confederac ; and th qu tion i rai ed 
wh th r a defendant i oblig d to an wer the tatement and charges 
in a bill, unle p i:fically interrogat d th reto. 
cording to the pre ent Engli h practice, the general inter-
roo-atory i not uffici nt. y th 16th of the order of Augu t, 
1 -±1, it i provid that a def ndant hall not b bound to an wer 
any ta ment or barge in the bill unle pecially and particu-
larl int rrogated th reto. Danl. Ch. Pl. & Prac. 820. But uch 
wa n t form rl3 th practice. 
Th am rul ha b en adopted by the upreme court of the 
nit d tate . Rule in 1 quity, 40 January term, 1 4 . 
"\\ith u no rule of the kind ha b n adopted and we adh r to 
h CT 11 ral racti Of 0Urt Of Chan r ' Wll h ha nO particular 
rule u n th ul>j t and require a d fendant to a w r all the 
all aati n and harg in th bill which may be material to th 
plain iff' a · and althouah to pr v nt a ion on the part of the 
lefon laut, it ma: b w 11, and i u ual to add interroo-atori o 1-
c ming h matt rs on~id r d to mo t ., ~ n ial yet un er b 
lUO Interrogating Part
general interrogatory, .an answer is ojjen to exception, if it omits
to notice material charges and statements in the bill, concerning
which no specific interrogatories are introduced. 1 Danl. Ch. PL
& Prac. 432; Story's Eq. PI. § 38; Methodist Episcopal Church
V. Jaques, 1 Johns. Ch. Eep. 65; Hagthorp v. FIoolc, 1 Gill. &
Johns. 270; Salmon v. Claggett, 3 Bland. 125;" Banh of Utica v.
Messereau, 7 Paige 517; Parkinson v. Trousdale, 3 Scam. 380;
Ciiijler V. Bogert, 3 Paige 186.
That matter has been settled in the same way in Massachusetts,
by rule of court. Mass. Kules for the Eegulation of Practice in
Chancery, rule 5.
According to these suggestions, the defendant should have made
answer to this charge in the bill. It is a material allegation of an
intent to commit waste, and the exception must be sustained.
To the answ^er of Nancy Miles, two exceptions are taken. The
first is, that she has not, to the best of her knowledge, remembrance,
information and belief, answered and set forth whether John King-
man, during the time stated in the bill, cut and hauled from the
premises full twenty cords of pine wood, and sold the same, and
cut and drew from the premises pine logs sufficient to make from
five to ten thousand feet of boards, and converted the same to his
own use, but not on the premises ; and whether the wood and timber
were worth from one hundred to one hundred and fifty dollars,
and that Kingman told the orator, in the month of January then
last, that he intended to cut wood on said premises, the present
winter, sufficient to last his fire two winters, and that Kingman
never lived on any part of the premises.
The bill contains the allegation set forth in the exception, the
answer to which is as follows : that Kingman held the premises,
by lease from the Meserves, for two years, and that during said two
years he had some pine trees cut for fencing, and sawed the same
into boards; and during the latter part of the winter of 1850, or in
the spring of that year, he caused some of the boards to be hauled
and left at or near the different bars on the premises, and the same
were afterwards used in repairing said bars. That Kingman used
no fuel on the premises while he so occupied the same, and this
defendant does not know that he took any from the place to be used
elsewhere.
The answer to this allegation of the bill is far fi-om being explicit.

















































































































































100 INTERROGATING PART 
0 eneral interrogatory an an wer i open to exception, if it omita 
to notice mat rial charg and tatem nt in the bill, concerning 
whi h no :IJe ifi interrogatorie are introduceu. 1 Danl. Ch. Pl. 
r Prac. 43 ; Story Eq. PL § 38; Methodist Episcopal Church 
v. Jaques, 1 John. Ch. Rep. 65; Hagthorp v. Hook, 1 Gill. & 
John. 0; almon v. Claggett, 3 Bland. 125 ;· Bank of Utica v. 
Messereau, 7 Paige 517; Parkinson v. Trousdale, 3 Scam. 380; 
uyler v. Bogert, 3 Paige 186. 
That matter ha b en ttled in the ame way in Ma achu etts, 
by rule of court. 1\Ia . Rules for the Regulation of Practice in 
Chancery, rule 5. 
According to these uggestions, the defendant should have made 
an wer to this charge in the bill. It is a material allegation of an 
intent to commit wa te, and the exception mu t be su tained. 
To the answer of Nancy Miles, two exception are taken. The 
:fir ti , that she ha not, to the best of her knowledge, remembrance, 
information and belief, an wered and set forth whether John King-
man, during the time stated in the bill, cut a·nd hauled from the 
pr mises full twenty cords of pine wood, and sold the ame, and 
cut and drew from the premises pine logs sufficient to make from 
:five to ten thousand feet of boards, and converted the same to hi·· 
own use, but not on the premises; and whether the wood and timber 
were worth from one hundred to one hundred and :fifty dollars, 
and that Kingman told the orator, in the month of January then 
la t, that he intended to cut wood on said premises, the present 
winter, sufficient to last his :fire two winters, and that Kingman 
never lived on any part of the premises. 
The bill contains the allegation set forth in the exception, the 
an w r to which i a follows: that Kingman held the premises, 
by 1 a e from the Me erve, for two years, and that during aid two 
year he had ome pine trees cut fo1• fencing, and awed the ame 
into board ; and during the latter part of the winter of 1 50, or in 
the pring of that year, he cau d ome of the board to b hauled 
and 1 ft at or near the diff rent bar on the pr mi and the ame 
w re afterward u din r pairing aid bar . That Kingman u d 
no fu 1 on the premi whil h o occupie 1 th am and thi 
d f ndant cloe not know that he took any from th pla to be u ed 
L wh re. 
Th an w rt thi all at.ion f th bill i far from b ina explicit. 
m an might hav ut th ti b r all g d in th bill and th de-
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fendant, jSTancy Miles, have known the fact, and still the answer be
true ; for he might have cut timber to be sawed for bars in addition
to that specified in the bill.
She says, also, that she does not know that Kingman took any
fuel from the premises to be used elsewhere. But if she had no
knowledge upon the subject, she may have had information.
The answer to the part of the bill contained in this exception
is entirely insufficient, and the exception must be sustained.
A defendant must answer as to his knowledge, remembrance,
information and belief. If a fact is charged as within liis personal
knowledge, he must answer positively, and not as to his remem-
brance or belief. If facts are charged as having happened, but they
are not within his own knowledge, he must answer as to his informa-
tion and belief. And he must answer directly and without evasion.
He must answer the substance of each charge, as well as literally
the several matters charged. A general denial, also, is not sufficient,
but there must be an answer to all the special circumstances and
particular inquiries. Hall v. ^Yood, 1 Paige 404; Devereaux v.
Cooper, 11 Vt. Rep. 103; Utica Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 3 Paige 210;
Coop. Eq. PI. 314; Smith v. Lasher, 5 Johns. Ch. Eep. 247; Tay-
lor V. Luther, 2 Sumner 228; Woods v. Morrell, 1 Johns. Ch. Eep.
103; Petit v. Candler, 3 Wendell 618; Story's Eq. PI. 852;
Mountford v. Taylor, 6 Vesey, 792 ; 2 Dan'l Ch. PI. & Prac. 830 ;
Morris v. Barker, 3 Johns. Ch. Eep. 297; Bank v. Lewis, 8 Pick.
119.
Tlie other exception to the answer of Nancy Miles is the same
as that taken to the answer of Lydia Miles, and must be sustained
accordingly.
To the answer of Tichenor JVIiles six exceptions are filed. The
fifth and sixth are the same as those filed to the anwser of Nancy
Miles, and they must be sustained for the reasons already given.
The disposition of the other four involves the same question as that
stated in deciding the first exception to the answer of Nancy Miles,
and it is unnecessary to state here anything further than to say that
upon the principles there laid down, we think, the first and second
exceptions should be overruled, and the third and fourth should be
sustained. Tlie answer to the allegations embraced in the first and
second exceptions is sufficient, while the answer to the allegations


















































































































































fILE V. fILES 101 
fendant, an y Mil hav known th fa t, and till the an wer be 
tru ; f r l mi0 ht hav ut timber to be sawed for bars in addition 
to that p i.fi in the bill. 
h ay, al o that h do not know that Kingman took any 
fu l from th prcmi to b u l wh r . ut if h had no 
knowl clg upon th ubj t, he may hav had information. 
The an w r t th part of th ill ontain d in till xception 
i ntir ly in uffi i nt, and the x ption mu t be u tained. 
!\.. 1 .f ndant mu t an w r a to bi knowl dge, rem mbrance, 
inf rmati n and b li f . If a fact i charged within hi p r onal 
knowl dg , h mu t an wer po itiv ly, and not a to bi r mem-
brane orb li £. If fact are charg d as having happened, but th y 
arc not within hi wn knowl dg h mu tan w r a to hi inf rma-
tion and b lief. nd he mu t an wer directly and without ev ion. 
He mu t an w r the ub tance of ach charge, a well a literally 
the several matt r harg d. Ag neral denial, al o, i not suffici nt, 
but th re mu t be an answer to all the p cial circum tance and 
particular inquirie . H atl v. Wood, 1 Paige 40± ; Devereaux . 
Ooope1·, 11 Vt. Rep. 103 ; Utica Ins. Go. v. Lynch, 3 Paig 10; 
Coop. Eq. PL 31±; mith v. Lasher, 5 John . h. Rep. 24 ; Tay-
lor v. Luther, 2 umner 228 ; Woods v. Morrell, 1 John . Ch. Rep. 
103; P etit v. Candler, 3 Wend 11 618; tory' Eq. PL 5 ; 
Mountford v. Taylor, 6 Vesey, 79 ; Dan 1 h. PL & Prac. 830; 
Morris . Barker, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 29 ; Bank v. Lewis, ick. 
119. 
Th other xc ption to the an wer of Nancy Mile i the ame 
as that tak n to the an wer of Lydia Miles, and mu t be u tained 
accordingly. 
To th an wer of Tichenor . .Uil ix exception are filed. The 
fifth and ixth ar the ame a tho fil d to th anw er of an y 
Mil and they mu t b u tain d for th r a on alr ady oi1 n. 
Th di p ition .f th other four in ol th am qu tion a ~ thai 
tat cl in d idinc; lh fir t e pti n to th an w r of _._ an y :Jiil 
and it i unn e ar t tate h r an 'thing forth r than to ay that 
up n th prin ipl th r laid d w hink, th fir" t and .. c nd 
hould b o rrul d and th third and fourth houh1 b 
1 an w r to th all ation mbra d in th fir t anc.1 
ption i u ci nt whil th an w r to the all cration 
ntain ll in th thir and fourth xc ption i 1a iv and in~uffi-
i nt. 
^ ' flW*^ VyV ' V^ I^f^ROGATING PaRT '^ 1\V / ^
r^^ J^'fj^ 5anJk V. Levy, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 606^ (1832.)^
\V"^A V* ' Tnis cause came before the chancellor on appeal by the defend-
■^ . p^ ants from the de^on of the vice chancellor of the first circuit,
overruling thdifexceptions to the master's report on exceptions to
their ^se^j^'^Ll answers. The bill was filed by judgment creditors of
the^eiendant Levy, after the return of their execution at law
tff ainst him unsatisfied. The bill alleged, among other things, that
the defendant Levy obtained moneys from the complainants' bank
fraudulently, and by collusion between him and the defendant
\Yolfe, who was his son-in-law, by overdrawing his account; and
charged that Wolfe received the money thus obtained from the bank,
and still had the same, or a very large amount thereof, in his pos-
session. The bill also charged that after Levy had so overdrawn his
account with the complainants he petitioned for the benefit of the
insolvent law. That the granting of his discharge was opposed;
and upon that occasion both of the defendants in this suit were
sworn and examined. That from such examination it appeared
Levy had knowingly and fraudulently overdrawn his account with
the complainants, for the purpose of placing the moneys thus ob-
tained in the hands of Wolfe; that the moneys were placed in his
hands accordingly, and he knew at the time that they had been
obtained by such overdrawing; and that those moneys, or the
greater part thereof, were in the hands of Wolfe at the time of
uch examination. The exceptions which were sustained by the
vice chancellor, related principally to the neglect of the defendants
^^ to answer interrogatories founded upon the specific allegations in
^ • the bill as to what appeared from the examination of the defendants
on that occasion.
A \ ^y '" ■
V ' T^ Chancellor :
A ^[i' Before going into the examination of the several exceptions par-
r**/' ^ ^ticularly, it may be proper to notice a general objection, by the
'^ t^^A^ Mefendants' counsel, which is supposed by him to apply to the
whole. It is said there are no charges in the l)ill to sustain the
\ "■^ interrogatories upon which the exceptions are based ; and therefore
that the defendants were not bound to answer the matters enquired
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~ - (}._,J ~"~yr 
~~J- c/? 
,.;? Yri Bank v. Levy 3 Paige (N. Y.) 606. {183fJ.) 
.,.., f) , Trrr cau e came before the hancellor on app al by the defend-r- ant from the de~on of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, 
V ~ overrul~ing th~xceptions to the ma ter report on exceptions to 
their e an wer . The bill wa filed by judgment creditors of 
--"\ the~e ndant Levy after the return of their execution at law 
,.,,-
1 A ~ain t him un ati :fied. The bill alleged, among other things, that 
~ / the defendant L€vy obtained money from the complainants' bank 
/ _/ fraudulently, and by collusion between him and the defendant 
~ r/' \\olfe, who wa his son-in-law, by ov rdrawing his account; and 
~ charged that Wolfe received the money thu obtained from the bank, 
~ and till had the same or a v ry lar e amount thereof in his po -
; ~ esc::ion. The bill al o charged that after Levy had so overdrawn hi , 
,.) ~ account with the complainants he petitioned for the benefit of the 
~ . in olvent law. That the granting of hi di charge wa opposed; 
·· ~ and upon that occa ion both of the defendant in thi suit were 
~,) worn and examined. That from such examination it appeared 
~ V Levy had knowingly and fraudulently overdrawn hi account with 
~. ~. the complainant, for the purpo of placing the money thus ob-
~ I tained in the hands of Wolf ; that the man y were placed in hi· 
' ~ hand accordingly, and he knew at the tim that they had been 
. obtained by uch overdrawing; and that tho e money , or the 
~p~grea.ter part thereof, were in th hand of Wolfe at the time of 
y- such examination. The exception which were su tained by the 
f . 
vice chanc llor, related principally to the neglect of the def ndant 
to an wer int rrogatorie founded upon the peci:fic all gations in 
the bill a to what app ared from. the examination of the defendant. 
on that occasion. 
HE CHANCELLOR : 
efor going into the examination of th everal xception par-
ticularl) jt may b pr p r to noti a g n ral obj ction by the 
1 f ndan oun 1, whi h i uppo d by him to apr ly to the 
whol . It i aid th r ar no hara in th bill to u tain the 
interr gatorie up n whi h the xc ption are ba ed · and th r for' 
that th d f ndant w r not boun to an w r th matt r nquired 
of by uch int rro atorie . The oun 1 i undoubt dly correct in 
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the principle that a defendant cannot be called upon to answer any
interrogatory which is not founded upon some allegation or charge ,
in the bill. (Miti'ord, 1th Lond. ed. 45. 1 Xowl. Prac. 3d Lond. '
ed. 255.) But it is not necessary that the interrogatory should arise
directly out of one of those material averments in the bill upon
which the complainants' right to relief essentially depends. It is
sufficient to entitle him to an answe r to_ thc interrogatory, if IF is
foundedjjjjojj: ^ statement in the bil l which is set upjnerely ^s
evidence in support of the main charges therein . In framing an
ordinary bill in chancery the pleader has a two-fold object, dis covery
and relief. The allegations in the bill, so far as the question of the
complainants' right to relief is concerned are substantially in the
same form as the averments in a declaration at law. And the
pleader must state his clients' cause of action in such a manner that
the main facts upon which his right to relief depends may be put
in issue and tried. But the complainant, jn additioii to this, has
aj2Sh^io_cxanij^e_thc^defe^ oath, in support of the mam
charges upon which his claim to the in tej:pi)gition_of_tlic_court in liis
favor is based, and also as to any collateral f acts, which m ay be
material in determining th e extent, or ki nd of rehef to which he i s
e ntitled, Tf the main cEargesTn the bill are admitted or^ proved.
He may, therefore, state any matters of evidence in his biUwhich
may be material in establishing the main charge, or in ascertaining
the nature or kind of relief proper to be administered; and may
interrogate the defendant as to those matters. In tliis case some
of the main facts, upon which the complainants seek relief against
the defendant Wolfe, are, that the money was fraudulently obtained
from the bank, and was placed in his hands without consideration,
where it remained at the time of the examination before the recorder,
when the circumstances of the fraud appeared upon the examination
of these defendants on oath. And there can be no doubt, in this
case, that if the fact is established that the money was improperly
and fraudulently obtained from the complainants' clerks, and that
Wolfe had notice of that fact before he parted with the money or
paid a valuable consideration therefor, he cannot in equity be per-
mitted to retain the same as against the just claims of the complain-
ants thereon. (Tradesmen Bank v. Merritt, 1 Paige's Rep. 302.)
The allegations in the bill as to what took place before the recorder
are therefore material, not only to show that Wolfe then had notice

















































































































































B K . LEVY 103 
the principle that ad fondant canno b called upon to answer any 
interrogatory which i not found d upon o all gation r harg~ 
in th bill. (Mitford, h nd. d. . 1 -wl. ra . d Lond. 
ed. 255.) But it i not n ·' ·ary that th int nogatory houlcl ari e 
directly out f on oi th mat rial a rm nt in l bill upon 
whi h th omplainant right to r li i tially d p nd . It is 
uffi.ci nt to ntitl him to n an w r to th , in rro ator if~ 
foUfill d upon a tatcment in th bill which i et up m rel a 
, vid n in upport of th main charge th r in. n framing an 
ordinary bill in chancery th pleader ha a two-fold obj ct, di covery 
and rcli f . Th allegations in the bill, o far a th que ti.on of the 
omplainan right to r lief i cone rn d are ub tantially in the 
ame form a the av rm nts in a d claration at law. And the 
pleader mu t tat hi cli nt ' cause of action in uch a manner that 
the main fa t upon which hi right to relief d pend may be put 
in i ue and tri d. But the complainant, in i to thi ha 
a ri ht to examine the defendant, on oath in u ort of th main 
charg upon which his claim to the interposition of the court in · 
fa or i ba 1, and al o a to any collateral fact , which may be 
material in det rmining th xtent, or kind of relief to whic. he i 
entit e , i e main c arg m the bill are admitted or roved. 
e may, th r fore, state any matter of evidence in hi bill which 
may be material in e tabli bing the main charge or in a certaining 
the natur or kind of relief proper to be admini tered; and may 
interrogate th d fendant a to tho e matters. In thi ca e ome 
of the main fact , upon whi h the complainants e.k relief again t 
the def ndant Wolfe, are that th money wa fraudulently obtained 
from the bank and wa placed in hi hand without con ideration 
where it r main d at th tim of the examination b fore the recorder 
when th ir um tanc of the fraud app ared upon the xaminaition 
of the e d f ndants on oath. And th r can b no doubt, in thi" 
ca hat if th fact i tabli h d that the money wa improperly 
and fraudul ntly obtain d from the complainant clerk and that 
Wolf had notic of that fa t b fore h part d with the money or 
paid a rnluabl on id ratio th refor h cannot in equit ' per-
mitt d tor tain th am a o-a·in t th ju t clai of h omplain-
ant th r on. (Trade nien Bank . Merritt 1 p. 02.) 
Th all ation in th bill a to what t k place b for th r cord r 
ar th r f r mat rial n t nl r t h w that olf th n ha notic 
of th fraud, whil th mon y wa till in hi" hand but al"o a~ 
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evidence in support of the main charge of fraud and collusion, upon
which the complainants' claim as against Wolfe mainly rests.
Tlie fourth exception to the answer of Levy, which is the first
allowed hy the vice chancellor, relates to the amount due the com-
plainants on their judgment. In a case of this kind the 189th
rule requires the complainant to state the true sum due on his judg-
ment, over and above all just claims of the defendant by way of
set-off or otherwise. This allegation in the bill was therefore ma-
terial; and the defendant probably intended to admit the whole
amount of the judgment and the interest thereon to be due, as stated
in the bill. But by a slip in the phraseology of the answer the
proper admission is not made. I must therefore, though with some
hesitation, affirm the decision of the master and the vice chancellor
as to this exception.
The fifth exception is for not answering an interrogatory which
calls upon Levy to disclose whether the overdrawing at the bank
was not voluntary and premeditated. The charges in the bill are
that the moneys were obtained by overdrawing, and by fraud and
collusion between him and Wolfe, his son-in-law; and that it ap-
peared on the examination before the recorder that the overdrawing
was voluntary and premeditated. The discovery called for by this
exception is material in the establishment of a fraud in obtaining
the money from the bank. A wilful and intentional overdrawing,
by a person who knew he had not the means of making good his
account, might be a gross fraud, considering the manner in which
business is done in the banks of our large commercial cities ; espe-
cially if it should appear that several checks were drawn at the same
time and presented separately, or by different individuals, so as to
elude the vigilance of the officers of the institution, by giving to
such checks the appearance of ordinary business drafts. Whereas
if the drawer overdrew by mistake, or under the supposition that he
would have funds there to meet the drafts at the time they were
presented, or before the bank closed, the transaction would be per-
fectly fair and honest, if no means were resorted to for the purpose
of preventing the officers of the bank from noticing the fact that
he had not funds in the bank at the time. This exception was there-
fore properly allowed.
The sixth exception is founded upon an interrogatory, in the bill,
calling upon Levy to disclose whether he delivered the checks, on

















































































































































104 INTERROGATING PART 
evidence in support of the main charge of fraud and collusion, upon 
which the complainants' claim as a:gainst Wolfe mainly rests. 
The fourth exception to the answer of Levy, which is the first 
allowed by the vice chancellor, relates to the amount due the com-
plainants on their judgment. In a case of this kind the 189th 
rule requir the complainant to state the true sum due on his judg-
ment, over and above all just claims of the defendant by way of 
set-off or otherwise. This allegation in the bill was therefore ma-
terial; and the defendant probably intended to admit the whole 
amount of the judgment and the interest thereon to be due, as stated 
in the bill. But by a slip in the phra eology of the answer the 
proper admission is not made. I must therefore, though with some 
hesi ta ti on, affirm the decision of the master and the vice chancellor 
as to this exception. 
The fifth exception is for not answering an interrogatory which 
calls upon Levy to disclose whether the overdrawing at the bank 
was not voluntary and premeditated. The charges in the bill are 
that the moneys were obtained by overdrawing, and by fraud and 
collusion between him and Wolfe, his son-in-law; and that it ap-
peared on the examination before the recorder that the overdrawing 
was voluntary and premeditated. The discovery called for by tills 
exception is material in the establishment of a fraud in obtaining 
the money from the bank. A wilful and intentional overdrawing, 
by a person who 1.'"Ilew he had not the means of making good his 
account, might be a gross fraud, considering the manner in which 
business is done in the banks of our large commercial cities; espe-
cially if it should appear that several checks were drawn at the same 
time and presented separately, or by different individuals, so as to 
elude the vigilance of the officers of the institution by giving to 
such checks the appearance of ordinary business drafts. Whereas 
if the drawer overdrew by mistake, or under the uppo ition that he 
would have fund there to meet the drafts at the time they were 
presented, or before the bank closed, the transaction would be per-
fectly fair and hone t, if no mean were re orted to for the purpo e 
of preventing the officers of the bank from noticing the fact that 
he had not fund in the bank at the time. This exception was there-
fore properly allowed. 
The ixth exception is founded upon an interrogatory, in the bill, 
calling upon Levy to di clo e whether he delivered the checks, on 
which th money was obtained, to Wolf or to any other per"on for 
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his use; and to whom in particular. He says lie delivered two of
the cheeks to the clerk of Wolfe, hut does not disclose who that clerk
was. It may be material to ascertain who that clerk was, not only
for the purpose of showing that the complainant's money went
directly into the hands of Wolfe, but also to ascertain how much
went there. Even if the separate answer of Wolfe could be referred
to as an admission that the money came to his hands, it does not
remove the difficulty ; as he only admits the receipt of two thousand
dollars, and there are no two of the checks corresponding in amount
with such admission. The discovery of the particular individual
to whom the checks were given may also be very material on other
grounds, which it is not necessary here to state. The complainants
having distinctly called for a discovery as to the person to whom the
checks were given, there is no good reason assigned for withholding
his name.
The eighth exception is founded upon an interrogatory calling
upon Levy to state whether Wolfe is not now indebted to him;
and if so, in what amount. I have not been able to find any allega-
tion in the bill on which to sustain this interrogatory, to the extent
claimed by this exception. Except from the allegation that it ap-
peared on the examination before the recorder that Wolfe was then
indebted to Levy, there is nothing on wliich to found a presumption
that he was indebted to him at the time of filing the complainant's
bill, or at any time since. And a defect in the charging part of
the bill cannot be supplied by a subsequent interrogatory; which
is to be construed by the charging part, and is not to be considered
more extensive. The fact of the indebtedness at the time of the ex-
amination before the recorder, is admitted by the answer of Levy.
But he further states, that subsequently, and before the filing of
this bill, he compounded with Wolfe at the rate of twenty-five cents
on a dollar, and received the amount thus agreed upon, in full
satisfaction and discharge of his debt. As there is no suggestion of
any subsequent indebtedness by Wolfe to him, I must consider this
a perfect answer to every thing that could properly be inquired of,
or which he was bound to answer under this interrogatory. This
exception cannot therefore be sustained.
The tenth exception is evidently well taken; as the defendant
Levy admits, by implication at least, that he has still in his posses-
sion a part of the moneys received from Wolfe on the compromise

















































































































































BANK v. LEVY 105 
his use; and to whom in particular. He ays he delivered two of 
the check to the clerk of Wolfe, but doe not disclo e who that clerk 
was. It may be material to ascertain who that clerk wa , not only 
for the purpo e of hawing that the complainant' money went 
directly into the hands of Wolfe, but al o to a certain how much 
w nt there. Even if th eparat answer of Wolfe could be referred 
to as an admi sion. that the money came to hi hand , it does not 
remove the difficulty; a he only admits the receipt of two thou and 
dollar , and there are no two of the checks corresponding in amount 
with such admi sion. The discovery of the particular individual 
to whom the checks were given may al o be very material on other 
grounds, which it is not necessary here to state. The complain.ants 
having distinctly called for a di covery as to the person to whom the 
checks were given, there is no good reason assigned for withholding 
hi name. 
The eighth exception is founded upon an interrogatory calling 
upon Levy to state whether Wolfe is not now indebted to him; 
and if so, in what amount. I have not been able to find any allega-
tion in the bill on which to sustain this interrogatory, to the extent 
claimed by this exception. Except from the allegation that it ap-
peared on the exaanination before the recorder that Wolfe was then 
indebted to Levy, there is nothing on which to found a presumption 
that he was indebted to him at the time of filing the complainant's 
bill, or at any time since. And a defect in the charging part of 
the bill cannot be supplied by a subsequent interrogatory; which 
i to be con trued by the charging part, and is not to be considered 
more exten ive. The fact of the indebtedne sat the time of the ex-
amination. before the recorder, is admitted by the answer of Levy. 
But he further tate , that ubsequently, and before the :filing of 
thi bill, he compounded with Wolfe at the rate of twenty-five cents 
on a dollar, and received the aanount thu agreed upon, in full 
ati faction. and di charge of hi debt. A there i no suggestion of 
an , ub equent in.debtednes by Wolfe to him, I must con ider this 
a p rf ect an wer to every thing that could properl be inquired of, 
or which he wa bound to an wer under thi interrogator}. Thi 
ex eption. cannot therefore be u tained. 
The tenth xception. i evidently well taken; a the d f n.dant 
L vy admit , by implication at 1 a t that he ha till in hi po e~ ­
ion a part of the mone3 recei ed from Wolfe on the compromi e 
ith him. The complainants are en.titled to a di co'\'er r of the 
106 Intereogating Part
nature and amount of all the property and effects of their judgment
debtor, as well to sustain and prove the allegation in the bill that
he had property to the value of $100 or more, so as to give this court
jurisdiction to make a decree in their favor, as to have such property
applied to the satisfaction of their debt.
The eleventh exception is not well taken. As there is no allega-
tion or suggestion in the complainants' bill that the purchasers of
the notes, or the other Carolina property, did not purchase that
property fairly and bona fide, it would not benefit the complainants
if Levy should admit that he sold the notes, and his interest in the
other property, for less than half their value. Although the court
might b€ satisfied that he parted with the property in that manner
for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, yet, if the vendees pur-
chased it in good faith, their title cannot be disturbed. And the
establishment of the fraud against Levy would not make him liable
to the complainants beyond the amount of their debt, for which
he is liable in any event. If there had been any allegation in the
bill, suggesting a fraudulent agreement between him and Wolfe
to overdraw the bank, and then to sell off his property and to put
the proceeds in the hands of the latter to keep it out of the reach of
legal process, it might have presented a different question.
The permission to the complainants to amend their bill was a
matter of course, under the -ISth and 190th rules, upon the allow-
ance of any of the exceptions for insufficiency. A majority of the
exceptions to the answer of Levy not having been finally allowed,
the complainants are only entitled to the costs of the original ex-
ceptions which were allowed. And neither party is to have any costs
upon the reference, or upon the hearing before the vice chancellor,
or upon this appeal. The order of the vice chancellor is to be modi-
fied accordingly.
The second exception to the answer of Wolfe is founded upon the
neo-lect of this defendant to state in his answer whether he was the
son-in-law of his co-defendant Levy. The fact of relationship is
not material to the relief sought by this bill against either of the
defendants. But I agree with the vice chancellor that, in connec-
tion with the facts charged, it might not be unimportant as a cir-
cumstance to sustain the charge of fraud. The difficulty, however,
in sustaining this exception is, that the relationship is stated in the
bill by way of recital merely, and not as a positive allegation. And

















































































































































106 INTERROGATING PART 
nature and amount of all the property and effects of their judgment 
debtor a well to ustain and prove the allegation in the bill that 
he had property to the value of $100 or more, o a to give this court 
juri diction to make a decree in their favor, as to have such property 
applied to the atisfaction of their debt. 
The eleventh exception is not well taken. As there is no allega-
tion or sugge tion in the complainant ' bill that the purchasers of 
the notes, or the other Carolina property, did not purchase that 
property fairly and bona :fide, it would not benefit the complainants 
if Lev3 hould admit that he old the notes, and his interest in the 
other property, for less than half their value. Although the court 
might be atis:fied that he parted with the property in that manner 
for the purpo e of defrauding his creditors, yet, if the vendees pur-
chased it in good faith, their title cannot be disturbed. And the 
establishment of the fraud again t Levy would not make him liable 
to the complainants beyond the amount of their debt, for which 
he i liable in any event. If there had been any allegation in the 
bill, ugge ·ting a fraudulent agreement between him and Wolfe 
to overdraw the bank, and then to ell off hi property and to put 
the proceeds in the hand of the latter to keep it out of the reach of 
legal proce s, it might have pre ented a different question. 
· The permission to the complainants to amend their bill was a 
matter of course, under the 45th and 190th rules, upon the allow-
ance of any of the exceptions for insufficiency. A majority of the 
exception to the answer of Levy not having been :finally allowed, 
the complainants are only entitled to the co t of the original ex-
ceptions which were allowed. And neither party is to have any costs 
upon the reference, or upon the hearing before the vice chancellor, 
or upon thi appeal. The order of the vice chancellor is to be modi-
fied accordingly. 
The econcl xception to the answer of Wolfe is founded upon the 
n gl ct of thi def ndant to tate in his an wer whether he wa the 
on-in-law of hi co-d fendant Levy. The fact of relationship i 
not material to the relief ought by thi bill again t ither of the 
defendant . But agree with the vice chan llor that in connec-
tion with the facts charged, it might not be unimportant a a cir-
cum tance to u tain the charg of fraud. Th diffi ulty how ver, 
in u taining thi exception i , that the r lation hip i tated in the 
bill by way of recital mer ly, ancl not a a p. itiv all gation. And 
there i no int rrogatory alling up n ih d f ndant to a wer a to 
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his relationship to Levy. Altliough a mere recital of a fact may
perhaps be sufficient to justify an interrogatory calling upon the
defendant to answer as to that fact, so that it may be used as evi-
dence, yet I do not tliink he was called upon in this case without
such an interrogatory, to admit or deny the fact recited. This ex-
ception should therefore have been disallowed. (See Alhretcht v.
Sussmanii, 2 Ves. & Bea. 323.)
The matters of the third and fourth exceptions, to the answer
of this defendant, appear to be very material to the establishment
of the complainants' claims against him, for the moneys alleged
to have been obtained from their bank by fraud and collusion. The
defendant is particularly interrogated as to the matters of these ex-
ceptions; and the particular sums of money received by him from
Levy, and the precise time at which each particular sum was re-
ceived by him, appear to be material when taken in connection with
other facts in the case. He must also answer, not only as to his
knowledge of the fact of the money having been overdrawn from
the bank, but as to his understanding, belief and reasons for sup-
posing that the money had bc^n thus obtained, and as to the time
when that information was first received by him. These two excep-
tions were therefore properly allowed.
The fifth exception calls upon this defendant to answer whether
he admitted, when under oath before the recorder, that he had re-
ceived the sum of $4,300 of Levy, with a knowledge that the same
had been overdrawn from the complainants' bank. By the pre-
ceding exception, the defendant was called upon to answer as to the
fact of his knowledge of the overdrawing at the time he received
the money from Levy. If, in answering that exception, he admits
he had such knowledge, it cannot be material for the complainants
to show that he made a similar admission on his examination before
the recorder. On the contrary, if he denies that he had such knowl-
edge, the complainants cannot compel him to answer whether he
swore differently on the occasion alluded to : as that might subject
him to a prosecution for perjury. The complainants must therefore
confine themselves to the answer to the main fact ; and this excep-
tion must be overruled, as one which the defendant may not answer
with safety to himself. As the money was still in his hands at the
time of his examination before the recorder, if he was then informed
that it had been obtained from the bank, by Levy, illegally and


















































































































































hi r lation hip t L vy. Although a m r r cital of a fact may 
perhap b uili i nt to ju tify an interrogatory calling upon the 
defendant to an wer a to that fa t, o that it may be u ed a i-
dence, y t I do not think he wa call d upon in thi ca e without 
uch an interrogator , to admit or deny th fact recited. Thi ex-
c ption hould h r fore ha e been di allow d. ( ee Albretcht . 
us'mann~ · . & a. . ) 
Th matt r of the third and fourth x · ption , to th an wer 
of thi def ndant, appear to be ry mat rial to the tal li hm nt 
of the complainant claim again t him, for th man y alleged 
to hav been obtained from their bank by fraud and collu ion. The 
d f ndant i parti ularly interrogated a to the matt r of the e ex-
ception ; and th particular um of man y r cei ed by him from 
Levy and the pr ci time at whi h each particular um wa re-
cei ed by him, appear to be material when taken in connec ion with 
oth r fact in the ca e. He mu t al o an w r, not only a to hi 
knowledge of the fact of the man y having b en o erdrawn from 
the bank, but a to hi understanding, belief and rea on for up-
po ing that the money had been thu obtain d, and a to the time 
wh n that information wa fir t received by him. The e two excep-
tion w re therefore properly allowed. 
Tbe fifth exc ption call upon thi defendant to an wer whether 
he admitt d, when under oath b fore the recorder that he had re-
ceived th um of $-± 300 of Le , with a knowledge thait the ame 
had b en overdrawn from the complainant ' bank. By the pre-
cedin exception the defendant wa called upon to an wer a to the 
fact of hi knowl dge of the o erdrawing at the time he received 
th money from Le y. If, in an wering that exc ption, he admit, 
he had uch knowl dge it cannot be material for the complainant, 
t how hat he mad a imilar admi ion on hi examination before 
th record r. n th contrary, if he deni that he had uch knowl-
d th omplainant cannot amp 1 him to an wer wheth r he 
w re di:ff r ntl on the occa ion alluded to : a that micrht ubject 
him to a pro ecution for perjury. The complainant mu t therefore 
onfin them l v t th an wer to the main fact · and thi excep-
ti n mu t be overrul d a one which the d f ndant ma not an wer 
with af t to him elf. th man wa till in hi hand at th 
tirn of hi :xamination before th r order if he wa then inform 
that it had b obtain d from the bank b L \ illeo-all and 
i pr p rl it i p rhap not r mat rial inquir wh th r he 
108 Prayer for Belief
had any previous knowledge of the fact : as he could not afterwards
pay it over to Levy, so as to deprive the complainants of their rights
as against himself.
The sixth exception calls upon Wolfe to disclose what disposition
was made of the money received by him from Levy, and what has
become of that part of it which remained in his hands at the time
of his examination before the recorder. This exception is evidently
well taken; as the complainants are entitled to follow their money,
so long as it can be traced and identified, into the hands of any per-
son who has not actually received it for a valuable consideration
without notice of their rights.
The order of the vice chancellor, which is appealed from by this
defendant, must therefore be modified so as to conform to this de-
cision. And as a majority of the exceptions to this answer are not
allowed, the complainants are not entitled to the costs of the refer-
ence. And neither party is to have costs as against the other upon
the exceptions taken to the master's report, or upon the hearing
before the vice chancellor, or upon this appeal.
Prayer for Eelief.
"j> ^ holden V. Holden, 2h HI App. 106. (1881.)
tJ^f' y^MoRAN, P. J.:
m , ^ The question is whether, under the facts stated in the bill, a case
1 jK is made for equitable cognizance. It is contended that a court of
^ 'yf equity has no jurisdiction to quiet title or remove a cloud upon the
V +Ulo \(\ rpal psfflfp nnlpss tbp cnmnlainant is in nossession. or the
^ title to real estate, unless the complainant is in possession, or the
cr- -Japd is unimproved or unoccupied. Such is no doubt the general
y\ Jy\xi\!d, but there are well recognized exceptions.
A Where a complainant is seeking to remove a cloud which is in the
nature of a legal title, which is being or may be asserted adversely
to the title which he desires to protect, then he must show that he
is in possession and therefore can not bring ejectment, or must
allege and prove that the real estate whose title is clouded, is vacant
or unimproved and unoccupied land. But when the facts stated in
the bill show that the legal title claimed by the complainant is not
disputed by the defendant in possession, but that such defendant

















































































































































108 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
had any previous know ledge of the fact: as he could not afterwards 
pay it over to Levy, so as to deprive the complainants of their rights 
as against himself. 
The sixth exception calls upon Wolfe to disclose what disposition 
was made of the money received by him from Levy, and what has 
become of that part of it which remained in his hands at the time 
of his examination before the recorder. This exception is evidently 
well taken; as the complainants are entitled to follow their money, 
o long as it can be traced and identified, into the hands of any per-
son who has not actually received it for a valuable consideration 
without notice of their rights. 
The order of the vice chancellor, which is appealed from by this 
defendant, must therefore be modified so as to conform to this de-
cision. And as a majority of the exceptions to this answer are not 
allowed, the complainants are not entitled to the costs of the refer-
ence. And neither party is to have costs as against the other upon 
the exceptions taken to the master's report, or upon the hearing 
before the vice chancellor, or upon this appeal. 
' / -
' 1~ ¥;-~ ,/ PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 
~ - ii v" t:lden v. Holden, 24 Ill. App. 106. (1887.) 
1 jYMoRAN, P. J.: 
I' ~ ~ The question is whether, under the facts stated in the bill, a case 
'tJ.-Y. is made for equitable cognizance. It is contended that a court of 
~ equity has no jurisdiction to quiet title or remove a cloud upon the 
I\, title to real estate, unless the complainant is in pos ession, or the 
v- . ·.Jaµd is unimproved or unoccupied. Such is no doubt the general 
/! /J-'\Y ~ule, but there are well recognized exceptions. 
~ Where a complainant i eeking to remove a cloud which is in the 
nature of a legal title, which is being or may be as erled adversely 
to the title which he de ir to protect, then he mu t how that he 
is in po e sion and therefore can no,t bring ej ctment, or must 
allege and prov that the real e tate who titl i clouded, i vacant 
or unimprov d and uno cupi d land. But when the fa tated in 
the bill how that th legal title claimed by the complainant i not 
disputed by th defendant in po e ion, but that uch defendant 
sets up some equity not affecting the legal right of po e ion, but 
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which operates as a cloud on the legal title and prevents a sale of
the property, or renders the title unmarketable, then equity has
jurisdiction, because an action at law would not afford an adequate
remedy, and in such case the possession by the defendant, in subor-
dination to complainant's legal title, will not defeat the jurisdiction.
Taking the facts as alleged in the bill as true, it is very plain
that complainant could maintain forcible detainer or ejectment
upon the contract, and that defendant could not set up in such
suit at law in bar of plaintiffs right of possession, that the contract
in fact constituted a mortgage. But a judgment at law would not
silence defendant's claim that the contract was but a security for
money and that he had a right of redemption, and thus after a suc-
cessful action at law defendant's claim of an equitable right in the
land would be as complete a cloud upon complainant's title as it is
now with defendant in possession.
The chancery court has jurisdiction in such a case under the
ancient head of equity, that the action at law furnished no adequate
remedy, and such jurisdiction has been sustained by the Supreme
Court in a case not distinguishable in principle from this case.
Shays v. Norton, 48 111. 100.
And in cases where there is fraud as a ground of equitable juris-
diction, and removing the fraudulent instrument as a cloud is inci-
dental to the general relief, even though the fraudulent title is in
its nature a legal title, and the holder of such title is in possession,
a court of chancery will have jurisdiction to remove the cloud.
Booth V. Wiley, 102 111. 84.
It is well settled that when equity has jurisdiction for one pur-
pose, it will go on and do complete justice between the parties, and
will not send them to a court of law because part of the relief may
be purely legal relief. So here the court would be authorized to
put complainant in possession if upon a hearing he maintained the
allegation of his bill as to the nature of the contract Green v.
Spring, 43 111. 280.
But there is also another ground of plain chancery jurisdiction.
Tlie contract set out is claimed by complainant in his bill to be,
and on its face is, a contract for the sale of real estate, and defend-
ant is shown to be in possession under the contract, and to be in
default.
In such case the vendor may go in the first instance into a court

















































































































































HOLDEN v. HOLDEN 109 
which operates a a cloud on the legal title and prevents a sale of 
the property, or renders the title unmarketal le, then equity ha' 
juri di tion, becau an action at law w uld not afford an adequate 
rem dy, and in uch ca the po e ion by the defendant, in ubor-
dination to complainant' legal titl , will not d f at the juri diction. 
Taking the fa t a all g d in the bill a true, it i very plain 
that complainant could maintain for ible detainer or ejectm nt 
upon the ontract, and that defendant could not et up in uch 
uit at law in bar of plaintiff' right 0£ po ion, that the contract 
in fact con titut d a mortgage. But a judgment at law would not 
ilence defendant claim hat the contract wa but a ecurity for 
mon y and that he had a right of redemption, and thus after a suc-
ce ..,ful action at law defendant' claim of an equitable right in the 
land would b a complete a cloud upon complainant' title a it is 
now with def ndant in posse ion. 
The chanc ry court has jurisdiction in such a case under the 
ancient head of equity, that the action at law furnished no adequate 
remedy, and such jurisdiction ha been sustained by the Supreme 
Court in a case not distinguishable in principle from thi case. 
Shays v. Norton, 48 Ill. 100. 
And in cases where there is fraud as a ground of equitable juris-
diction, and removing the fraudulent instrument as a cloud is inci-
dental to the general relief, even though the fraudulent title i in 
its nature a legal title, and the holder of such title is in possession, 
a court of chancery will have juri diction to remove the cloud. 
Booth v. Wiley, 102 Ill. 84. 
It i well ettled that when equity has juri diction for one pur-
po e, it will go on and do complete justice between the parties, and 
will not end them to a court of law because part of the relief may 
be purely legal relief. o here the court would be authorized to 
put omplainant in po e ion if upon ah aring he maintained the 
allegation of hi bill as to the nature of the contract. Green v. 
pring 43 Ill. 280. 
Bu there i al o another ground of plain chancery juri diction. 
The contract t out i claim d by complainant in hi bill to be, 
and on it face i a contract for the al of real e tate, and d fend-
ant i hown to be in po ion under the contract and to be in 
d fault. 
In uch ca e the endor may go in the first in tanc into a ourt 
of quity and call on the purcha er to come forward and pa the 
IIQ Prayer for Eeliep
money due, or be forever thereafter foreclosed from setting up any
claim against the land; and under some circumstances such is his
only safe remedy. Hanshroiigh v. Peclc, 5 Wall. -197; Derickson
V. Chicago South Branch Doch Co., 18 111. App. 531.
It is true complainant has specially prayed for entirely different
relief, but it is for the court to determine from the material allega-
tions 'of the bill and the proofs on the hearing, what relief he is
entitled to, and to decree him the appropriate relief and thus ter-
minate the suit, unless, to avoid taking the relief which he is found
by the court to be entitled to, he voluntarily dismisses his bill.
There was in this bill the prayer for general relief, as follows:
"That your orator may have such other and further relief in the
premises as equity may require, and this court may deem Just."
Under this general prayer the court could grant the relief appro-
priate to the facts, although the bill was not framed with a view
to getting such relief. If the facts stated entitled the complainant
to a certain relief, it matters not that such statement of facts may
have been made with the purpose and belief, on the part of the
solicitor who drafted the bill, that the relief sought might flow
from a different source of equitable jurisdiction. McNairy v. East-
land, 10 Yerg. 309; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 111. 30.
The dismissing of the bill in this case on motion was, in effect,
sustaining a demurrer to the bill, and a demurrer can not be sus-
tained on the ground that a party has prayed for the wrong relief
where there is also a prayer for general relief, because at the hearing
the complainant may ask at the bar for the proper specific relief.
Wilhinson v. Beal, 4 Mod. 408; HopTcins v. Snedaker, 71 111. 449;
Curyea v. Berry, 84 111. 600; Stanley v. Valentine, 79 111. 544;
Westcott V. ^Vicls, 72 111. 524 ; Crane v. Hutchinson, 3 111. App. 30.
There was error, therefore, in dismissing the bill on the motion
of the defendant for want of equity, or for want of jurisdiction,


















































































































































110 PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
money due, or be forever thereafter foreclosed from setting up any 
claim again t the land; and under some circumstances such is his 
only safe remedy. Hansbrough v. Peck, 5 Wall. 497; DM-ickson 
v. Chicago South Branch Dock Co ., 18 Ill. App. 531. 
It i true complainant has specially prayed for entirely different 
relief, but it is for the court to determine from the material allega-
tion of the bill and the proofs on the hearing, what relief he is 
entitled to, and to decree him the appropriate relief and thus ter-
minate the uit, unless, to avoid taking the relief which he is found 
by the court to be entitled to, he voluntarily dismisses his bill. 
There was in this bill the prayer for general relief, as follows : 
"That your orator may have such other and further relief in the 
premises as equity may require, and this court may deem just." 
Under this general prayer the court could grant the relief appro-
priate to the facts, although the bill was not framed with a view 
to getting such relief. If the facts stated entitled the complainant 
to a certain relief, it matters not that such statement of facts may 
have been made with the purpose and belief, on the part of the 
solicitor who drafted the bill, that the relief sought might flow 
from a different ource of equitable jurisdiction. McNairy v. East-
land, 10 Yerg. 309; Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30. 
The dismissing of the bill in this case on motion was, in e:ff ect, 
sustaini!:l.g a demurrer to the bill, and a demurrer can not be sus-
tained on the ground that a party has prayed for the wrong relief 
where there is al o a prayer for general relief, because at the hearing 
the complainant may ask at the bar for the proper specific relief. 
Wilkinson v. Beal, 4 Mod. 408; Hopkins v. Snedaker, 71 Ill. 449; 
Curyea v. Berry, 84 Ill. 600; Stanley v. Valentine, 79 Ill. 544; 
Westcott v. Wicks, 72 Ill. 524; Crane v. Hutchinson, 3 Ill. App. 30. 
There was error, therefore, in dismissing the bill on the motion 
of the defendant for want of equity, or for want of jurisdiction, 
and the decree must therefore be rever ed and the ca e remanded. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Prater for Process,
Wright V. Wright, 8 N. J. Eq. U3. (18Jt9.)
The Chancellor:
It is a bill for dower: this is the substantial relief prayed. The
bill anticipates that a decree for divorce, obtained by the husband,
in his lifetime, will be set up as a defence; and asks dower
notwithstanding that decree; alleging that it was fraudulently
procured, and setting out the facts on which the allegation of fraud
is founded. The complainant might have filed her bill for dower
saying nothing of the decree for divorce, and left that to come up
in defence. But I see no objection to framing a bill as this is
framed; and I think the defence should be by plea and answer,
and not by demurrer. The grounds of demurrer, therefore, which
go to the matter of the bill are not well taken. As to these, the
demurrer will be overruled.
The want of prayer for process, and of signature of counsel, are
defects which require amendment. As to these the demurrer is
allowed.
Order accordingly.
Eowe V. BoUns, 36 N. J. Eq. 19. (1882.)
The Chancellor:
The bill is filed to follow trust funds which, it alleges, were
invested by a trustee by malversation in property, the title to
which he took in his own name, and which he, at his death,
claimed to own as his individual estate. It prays for a decree
establishing the rights of the cestiiis que trustent in the premises,
and incidentally for a discovery; also for a distribution of the
fund and an injunction to protect it pendente lite. Various ob-
jections are made to the bill under the notice, some in the nature
of a general and others of a special demurrer. The former are
not well taken : the latter are. The prayer for process is fatally
defective. While the bill prays for process against "the said de-

















































































































































HOWE V. OBINS 111 
PR YER OR RO E . 
Wright . Wright, 8 . J. Eq. 143. (1849.) 
TIIE 0 A ELLOR : 
It i a bill for dower: thi i th ub tantial relief pray d. The 
bill anti ipate that a decree for divorc , obtained by th hu bancl, 
in hi lif time, will be t up a a def nee; and a k dower 
notwith tanding that d cree; all ging that it wa fraudul ntly 
procur d, and tting out th fact on whi h th allegation of fraud 
i faun 1 d. Th complainant might have :fil d her bill for dower 
ayin nothing of the decree for divorce, and left that to come up 
in d fence. But I ee no obj ction to framing a bill a thi is 
fram d; and I think the d fen e hould be by plea and an wer, 
and not by demurrer. The ground of demurrer, ther fore, which 
go to the matter of the bill are not well taken. A to the e, the 
demurrer will b overruled. 
Th want of pray r for proc s and of i!!Il.ature of coun 1, are 
d f t which require amendment. A to th e the demurr r i 
allow d. 
Ord r a cordingly. 
Howe v. Robins, 36 N. J. Eq. 19. {1882.) 
Trrn H NCELLOR: 
Th bill i :fil d to follow tru t funds which it alleO'e were 
inve t d b a tru t e by malversation in prop rty, the titl to 
whi h he took in hi own name and which h , at hi d ath, 
claim a to own a hi individual e tate. It pra for a a cree 
tabli bing th ri ht of the ce tui que frusten t in the premi e 
and in id ntall for a di cover · al o for a di tribution of the 
fund and an injunction to prate t it pendente lite. \ ariou ob-
j tion ar mad to the bill und r the notice om in th nature 
of a n ral and otb r of a p cial d murr r. The form r are 
n t w 11 tak n ; th latt r ar . Th pra r for proce i fatally 
a f ti . \\1 il the bill pra for proc a crain t th ai 
i ndant without namin an. per on it do not app ar from 
112 Prayer for Process
the other parts of the bill, with reasonable certainty, who arc
referred to as "the said defendants." The persons mentioned in
the preceding part of the bill as the defendants, are the heirs of the
trustee alone — his children. His executrix and his widow have
both been subpoenaed to answer, but there is no prayer for process
against either of them. They are necessary parties, and so are
the other persons interested with the complainant as distributees
of the fund which the suit is brought to recover, and of which
the bill prays distribution. The complainant will have leave to
amend on payment of costs.
>joTE.— Defendants must be specially named in the bill, and process
prayed against them. None are parties against whom process is not
prayed, Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Fawkes v. Pratt, i P. Wms.
592; Elmendorf v. Delancey, Hopk. 555; Talmage v. Pell, 9 Paige, 413;
Bondurant v. Sibley, 37 Ala. 565; Bond v. Hendricks, i A. K. Marsh.
592; Huston V. McClarty, 3 Litt. 274; see Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.)
Eq. 113; unless out of the jurisdiction, Haddock v. Tomlinson, 2 S. & S.
219; Erwin v. Ferguson, 5 Ala. 158; see Brooks v. Burt, i Beav. 109;
Lttc'as V. Bank, i Stew. (Ala.) 280; or an infant heir whose name is
unknown, Preston v. Dunn, 25 Ala. 507; Botsford v. O'Conner, 57 111.
72; Kirkham v. Justice, 17 111. 107.
A prayer that, in a certain contingency, which has not happened, another
person be made a defendant, does not make him a party, Doherty v. Ste-
venson, I Tenn. Ch. 518; see Valentine v. Fish, 45 111. 462. _
The character in which defendant is sued must also appear m the prayer,
Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78; Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch.
242; Laii'son v. Kolbenson, 61 111. 405. _ ,
The following cases show what has been held a sufficient designation of
the defendant in the prayer for process : Where several stockholders, in-
cluding the objecting defendant, were mentioned by name, and that the
subpoena be directed "to the aforesaid stockholders hereinbefore meri-
tioned and stated," Carey v. Hillhouse, 5 Ga. 251; where a grantor left
many children, all of whom are dead but the defendants A, B and C, and
process prayed against the defendants, Williams v. Burnett, Busb. Eq. 209.
The following were deemed insufficient : "That the clerk be ordered to
issue subpoenas to the proper defendants," Hoyle v. Moore, 4 Ired. Eq.
17s; where a corporation was defendairt, and the process was prayed
against its president and directors, Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 2
Paige 438, I Edw. Ch. 84; Walker v. Hallett, i Ala. 379- tt , r-u
Objection may be raised by demurrer, Wright v. Wnght, 4 Hal. Lh.
143: Archibald v. Means, 5 Ired. Eq. 230; Palmer v. ^/^z^fji^ 100 Mass.
461 ; see Boon v. Picrpont, i Stew. Eq. 7; Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.)
Eq 113; but is waived by the defendant appearing and answering, Seger
v. Thomas. 3 Blatchf. 11; Airs v. Billops, 4 Jones Eq. 17; Belknap v.
Stone, I Allen, 572; or appearing and allowing a decree pro confesso to

















































































































































112 PRAYER FOR PROCESS 
the other parts of the bill, with reasonable certainty, who are 
referred to a "the said defendants." The persons mentioned in 
the preceding part of the bill as the defendants, are the heirs of the 
tru tee alone--hi children. Hi executrix and hi widow have 
both been subpamaed to answer, but there is no prayer for process 
again t either of them. They are necessary parties, and so are 
the other persons intere ted with the complainant a distributees 
of the fund which the uit i brought to recover, and of which 
the bill prays di tribution. The complainant will have leave to 
amend on payment of costs. 
NoTE.-Defendants must be specially named in the bill, and process 
prayed again t them. None are parties against whom proce s is not 
prayed, Windsor v. Windsor, 2 Dick. 707; Fawkes v. Pratt, l P. Wms. 
592; Elmendorf v. Delancey, Hopk. 555; Talmage v. Pell, 9 Paige, 413; 
Bondurant v. Sibley, 37 Ala. 565; Bond v. Hendricks, l A. K. Marsh. 
592; Huston v. McClarty, 3 Litt. 274; see Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.) 
Eq. II3; unless out of the jurisdiction, Haddock v. Tomlinson, 2 S. & S. 
219; Erwin v. Ferguson, 5 Ala. 158; see Brooks v. Burt, l Beav. 109; 
Liicas v. Bank, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 280; or an infant heir whose name is 
unknown, Preston v. Dimn, 25 Ala. 507; Botsford v. O'C onner, 57 Ill. 
72; Kirkham v. Justice, 17 Ill. 107. 
A prayer that, in a certain contingency, which has not happened, another 
person be made a defendant, does not make him a party, Doherty v. Ste-
venson, 1 Tenn. Ch. 518; see Valentine v. Fish, 45 Ill. 462. 
The character in which defendant is sued must also appear in the prayer, 
Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78; Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 
242; Lawson v. Kolbenson, 61 Ill. 405. 
The following cases show what has heen held a sufficient designation of 
the defendant in the prayer for process: Where several stockholders, in-
cluding the objecting defendant, were mentioned by name, and that the 
subpcena be directed "to the aforesaid stockholders hereinbefore men-
tioned and stated," Carey v. Hillhouse, 5 Ga. 251; where a grantor left 
many children, all of whom are dead but the defendants A, B and C, and 
process prayed against the defendants, Williams v. Burnett, Bush. Eq. 209. 
The following were deemed insufficient: "That the clerk be ordered to 
issue subpcenas to the proper defendants," Hoyle v. Moore, 4 Ired. Eq. 
175; where a corporation wa defendant, and the process was prayed 
again t its president and director , Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 2 
Paige 438, 1 Edw. Ch. 84; Walker v. Hallett, 1 Ala. 379. 
Objection may be raised by demurrer, Wright v. Wright, 4 Hal. Ch. 
143; Archibald v. Means, 5 Ired. Eq. 230; Palmer v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 
461; ee Boon v. Pierpont 1 Stew. Eq. 7; Ferguson v. Hass, Phil. (N. C.) 
Eq. 113; but i waived by the defendant appearing and answering, Seger 
v. Tltonias, 3 Blatchf. II; Airs v. Billops, 4 Jones Eq. 17; Belknap v. 
Ston e, l Allen, 572; or appearing and allowing a decree pro confesso to 
be taken, Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 242.-REP. 
,t^
rj
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'\y
Carter v. Ingraham, 43 Ala. 78. (1869.)
Peck, C. J. :
his case originated in the chancery court of Lawrence county.
Tljrcase appears ta have been conducted, in that court, with great
carelessness anq^tfregularity, from the beginning to the end; and
the transcrji^f is miserably made up, with little or no regard as to
oi3ieT of time when the different parts of the proceedings in the
cafcwere had.
1^ ^ The bill was filed by the appellee, Moses Ingraham, against the
f \ appellants, as the heirs at law of Joel W. J. Carter, deceased, the
'^ ^y children and grand children of the said Joel W. J. Carter, ten in
^*^ number, four of whom are infants under the age of twenty-one
{J^ years, two under, and two over fourteen years.
j:^ The bill states that complainant, in the year 1860, recovered a
(^ judgment in the circuit court of said county, against the said Joel
^ k- W,^. Carter, and one Malachi A. Carter, for the sum of fourteen
'^ ^r^undred and fifty dollars, debt, and eighty-six dollars, damages,
^ I ^ and costs of suit; that in 18G4, the said Malachi A. Carter de-
^y^^ parted this life, wholly insolvent; that the said Joel W. J. Carter,
1^ in the year 1862, departed this life, at his residence, in said county
■^ of, Lawrence, leaving his last will and testament, which was ad-
^ A^^mltPpd to record in the office of the probate court of said county,
O'^ v^but it does not state the said last will and testament was proved.
y^^)^ The bill further states, that by said will, the said Ichabod "W.
^jZy /Carter, and one L. H. Carter were appointed executors; that
yk> shortly afterwards, the said L. H. Carter died, leaving the said
-^ ,.-+r Ichabod TV. Carter the sole surviving executor ; that both of said
iy\ ^ executors qualified as such. It further states, that the said Joel
/^ cW. J. Carter, was the owner, and was seized and possessed at the
^^Jh^^ iuwe the said judgment was rendered, of certain lands, and died
J^"^ seized and possessed of the same, lying and being in the said county
' i>f Lawrence; the lands are described. The bill then states the
^ "names of the heirs-at-law, the said Ichabod "W. Carter being one.
Tlie bill also states that an execution was duly issued upon said
judgment, and afterwards alias and pluries executions were issued,
but it does not state when they were issued ; that neither of them
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? 
/'Ir Garter . Ingraham, 48 Ala. 78. (1869.) 
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r. A, . PECK, • J. = 
· i ca e originat d in the chancery court of Lawrence county. 
T a e appears ~.9 have be n onducted, in that court, with great 
arel n arn,lAfregularity, from the beginning to the end; and 
the tran c~{ i mi erably made up, with littl or no regard a to 
\ ~<?~of time when the different parts of the proceeding in the 
, ci'CaW'Were had. 
tr' The bill wa filed by the appellee, Moses Ingraham, against the 
~ appellant , a the heir at law of Joel W. J . arter, decea d, the 
// children and grand children of the aid Joel W. J. Carter, ten in 
v~ number, four of whom are infant under the age of twenty-one 
(...V. ear , two under, and two over fourteen year . 
~ The bill tate that complainant, in the year 1860, recovered a 
~ judgment in the circuit court of said county, again t the aid Joel 
. Carter, and one Malachi A. Carter, for the um of fourteen 
-"' red and fifty dollar , debt, and eighty- ix dollars, damage , 
co t of uit; that in 1 64, the said Malachi A. Carter de-
. parted thi life, wholly insolvent; that the aid Joel W. J . Carter, 
~ in the year 1862, departed this life, at his re idence, in aid county 
of :\iawrence, leaving hi la t will and te tament, which wa ad-
rnit~d to record in the office of the probate court of aid county, 
~ /hut it doe not tate the aid la t will and te tament was proved. 
/ ~The bill further tate, that by aid will, the aid Ichabod W. 
,;:;.J ~er, and one L. H. Carter were appointed executors; that 
_ ;t.. hortly afterward , the aid L. H . Carter died, leaving the aid 
-· ~ Ichabod W. Cart r the ole urviving executor; that both of aid 
/ ' ex cutors qualifi d a uch. It further tat , that the aid Joel 
tif/ . J. Carter wa the owner, and wa eized and po e ed at the 
'~-  tim th aid judgm nt wa r ndered, of certain land , and died 
~ .. """ ' iz d and po e d of th am 1 ing and being in the aid county 
~ £ Lawrence; th land are de crib d. The bill then tat the 
,-v-1'"' nam of the heir -at-law the aid I ha.bod W. arter b inO' one. 
, ,.,-11 Th bill al o ta te that an ex cution wa ul ' i ued upon ai 
_,..,,.- ju Q"1Il nt and afterward alia and plurie :s: ution wer is u 
but it do not tate when th · w re i u that n ither of them 
w r ati fi ith r in whole or part an that aid ju gm nt 
8 
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remains wholly unpaid. He makes a transcript of said Judgment
and execution, an exhibit to his bill, by which it appears that the
first execution was issued the 20th of March, 1866, but the exhibit
does not show that it ever went into the sheriff's hands, nor does
it show that any other execution was issued. The object of the
bill is to set up and enforce an alleged lien, under this judgment,
against said lands, for the purpose of satisfying the same ; although
the bill indirectly states that said Ichabod W. Carter is executor,
&c., and also one of the heirs-at-law, it only prays process against
him as an individual. Process is prayed against the other heirs-at-
law, and they are all made defendants; the bill prays that
guardians ad litem may be appointed for the infants; that the
judgment may be decreed to be a lien on said lands, and that they
may be sold for the payment of the same. The bill is not sworn
to. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the said infants, but
without an affidavit as to the fact of infancy, or that the infants
were believed to be under, or over fourteen years of age.
It appears, in the proceedings, that two summons were issued,
one to the defendants, who are of age, and the other to the infant
defendants, and they are both returned by the sheriff, "executed in
full, November 13th, 1866," without stating, in any manner, how
they were executed. The 20th rule of chancery practice prescribes
how summons issued against infants may be served. By this rule
they may be served upon their parents, or either of them, if in
life, or in case they are dead, upon the general guardian of such
infants. When there is no parent or guardian, or the interest of
the parent, or parents, or the guardian, is adverse to the infants,
if they are over fourteen years of age, then the service must be
upon said infants personally; and if the infants are under the
age of fourteen, then the service must be upon such person or per-
sons as may have the maintenance and charge of such infants,
unless opposed in interest; and if there is any case not provided
for by statute, or by said rule, or some other rule, and proof be
made before the chancellor or register, he may direct the mode of
service, or appoint a guardian ad litem for such infants, Avithout
service. It may be stated here that the bill docs not say whether
there were any parents, or general guardian, nor does it state who,
if any person, had the maintenance or charge of the said infants.
The summons against the defendants of age, is against the said

















































































































































114 PRAYER FOR PROCESS 
remains wholly unpaid. He makes a transcript of said judgment 
and execution, an exhibit to his bill, by which it appears that the 
:first execution was issued the 20th of March, 1866, but the exhibit 
does not how that it ever went into the sheriff's hands, nor does 
it show that any other execution was i sued. The object of the 
bill i to set up and enforce an alleged lien, under this judgment, 
against said lands, for the purpose of satisfying the same; although 
the bill indirectly states that said Ichabod W. Carter is executor, 
&c., and also one of the heirs-at-law, it only pra1ys process against 
him as an individual. Process is prnyed against the other heirs-at-
law, and they are all made defendants; the bill prays that 
guardians ad litem may be appointed for the infants; that the 
judgment may be decreed to be a lien on said lands, a.nd that they 
may be sold for the payment of the same. The bill is not sworn 
to. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the said infants, but 
without an affidavit as to the fact of infancy, or that the infants 
were believed to be under, or over fourteen years of age. 
It appears, in the proceedings, that two summons were issued, 
one to the defendants, who are of age, and the other to the infant 
defendants, and they are both returned by the sheriff, "executed in 
full, November 13th, 1866," without stating, in any manner, how 
they were executed. The 20th rule of chancery practice prescribes 
how summons issued against infants may be served. By this rule 
they may be served upon their parents, or either of them, if in 
life, or in case they are dead, upon the general guardian of such 
infants. When there is no parent or guardian, or the interest of 
the parent, or parents, or the guardian, is adverse to the infants, 
if they are over fourteen years of age, then the service must be 
upon said infants personally; and if the infants are under the 
age of fourteen, then the service must be upon such per on or per-
on a may have the maintenance and charge of such infants, 
unle · oppo ed in intere t; and if th re is any ca e not provided 
for by tatute, or by aid rul , or ome other rule, and proof be 
mad before the chanc llor or regi ter, he may dir ct the mode of 
ervi e, or appoint a guardian ad litem for uch infants, without 
service. It may be tat d here that the bill do not ay whether 
there were any parents, or g neral guardian, nor do it state who, 
if any person, had the maintenanc or charge of the aid infants. 
Th summons against the defendant of age, is agaiin t the aid 
Ichabod W. arter, a executor, and a heir-at-law. The bill, how-
Caetee v. Ingeaham 115
ever, gave the register no authority to issue it against him as
executor, because no process is prayed against him in that char-
acter, and besides, he answered the bill as heir-at-law, or as Ichabod
W. Carter merely, and not as executor. In his answer this de-
fendant admits substantially all the statements in the bill, but
denies the lien, and says there is no equity in the bill, and states
that he demurs to the bill, but does not show any reasons why he
demurred. Section 3350, Revised Code, says, "a defendant to a
bill must set forth the ground of demurrer specially, or otherwise
must not be heard." A decree pro confesso was taken against the
other defendants of age. The guardian ad litem, so irregularly
appointed, answered the bill, and says he knows nothing of the
truth of the allegations of the bill.
There was no evidence by depositions taken in the case, and it
was submitted (the demurrer of the said Ichabod W. Carter to
the bill of complaint having been overruled), upon the bill, answer
of said Ichabod W. Carter, answer of the guardian ad litem,
exhibit to the bill, and the decree pro confesso entered against the
defendants of age, who had not answered the bill. A decree was
rendered by which it is declared, that the said judgment is a lien
on the lands described in the bill, and unless the amount due on the
said judgment be paid in thirty days after the adjournment of the
court, the register should proceed to sell the said lands, and report
to the next term of the court.
The money not being paid, the register sold the lands, and they
were bought by the appellee, and one Crittenden ; the master made
his report to the court at the next term ; the report was confirmed,
and it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the register make
deeds to the purchasers and put them in possession of the lands.
Tlie defendants have appealed to this court, and assigned several
errors in the decree of the court below. It is, for the purpose of
this opinion, only necessary to notice the assignment, that brings
to the attention of this court, the appointment of the guardian
ad litem for the infant defendants. The appointment of the
guardian ad litem, without complying with the said 23d rule of
chancery practice, is an error, for which the decree must be re-
versed, on the authority of Bliett and Wife et al. v. Mastin, Trustee,
decided at this term. The appellee's counsel insists that the
executor, the said Ichabod W. Carter only, is a necessary party

















































































































































CARTER . I GRAHAM 115 
ever, gave the r gi t r no authority to i ue it against him al:l 
executor, becau no proce i pr y d again t him in that char-
acter, and besicl , he an w r d the bill a h ir-at-law, or as Ichabod 
W. art r mer ly, and not a exe utor. In hi an wer this de-
fendant admit ub tantially all the tatement in the bill, but 
deni th lie , and ay th r i no quity in the bill, and tates 
that h demur to the bill, but do s not how any reasons why he 
demurr d. cction 3350, R vi ed Code, ay , "a defendant to a 
bill mu t t forth the ground of demurrer pecially, or otherwi e 
mu t not be heard." A decree pro conf esso wa taken again t the 
other d .fendant of age. The guardiaID ad Zitem, so irregularly 
appoint d, an w r d the bill, and says he knows nothing of the 
truth of the allegation of the bill. 
There wa no vidence by depo itions taken in the ca e, and it 
wa ubmitted (the demurrer of the said Ichabod W. Carter to 
the bill of complaint having be n overruled), upon the bill, an wer 
of said Ichabod W. Carter, answer of the guardian ad Zitem, 
exhibit to the bill, and the decree pro confesso entered against the 
defendant of ag , who had not an wered the bill. A decree wa 
rend red by which it is declared, that the aid judgment i a lien 
on the land de cribed in the bill, and unless the amount due on the 
said judgment b paid in thirty days after the adjournment of the 
court, the regi t r hould proceed to sell the said lands, and report 
to the next term of the court. 
The mon y not b ing paid, the regi ter sold the lands, and they 
were bought by the appellee, and one Crittenden; the master made 
hi r port to the court at the next term ; the report was confirmed, 
and it wa order d, adjudged and decreed, that the register make 
deed to the pur ha ers and put them in po ion of the land . 
The d fendant ha e appeal d to this court, and assigned everal 
error in the d cree of the court below. It is, for the purpo e of 
thi opinion, only ne s ary to notice the as ignment, that bring-
to th attention of thi court, the appointm nt of the guardian 
ad litem for th infant def ndant . Th appointment of the 
guardian ad litem, without compl ing with the aid 3d rule of 
chanc r pra ti i an error, for which th d er e mu t b r -
r d on th authority of Rhett and Wife et al. v. Ma tin Tru tee, 
d ci 1 at thi t rm. The app 11 coun 1 in i t" that the 
.· ut r, th ail.d I habod W. art r onl i a nee ary party 
d f ndant in thi a , and a he admit all the important ullega-
IIQ Prater for Process
tions of the bill, the decree should be permitted to stand, as to
him, in his character as executor. He says, "the only error in the
decree was in not dismissing the bill as to all the defendants
except the executor," and that this court should correct this error,
by dismissing the bill as to the other defendants, and affirming
the decree, thus corrected, against the executor. This can not be
done, for the reason that the bill is not sufficient to authorize any
decree against the said lehabod W. Carter as executor. The bill
does not state that the will was proved, but only, that it was
recorded in the probate court. This is not sufficient; it should
have stated that the will was proved. Stating that the will was
recorded, is not equivalent to stating that it was proved ; besides,
no process is prayed against him as executor ; true, the summons,
in the nature of a subpoena, was issued against him as heir-at-law,
and as executor, but this does not help the matter, as the register
had no authority to issue such a summons ; he should have followed
the prayer of the bill. Nor does the answer filed by him, cure this
defect, for he does not answer as executor, but as Ichabod W.
Carter merely. He is, therefore, not a party defendant to the bill
in such manner as to authorize any decree against him in that
character.
The bill is full of defects and infirmities, and the subsequent
proceedings are full of irregularities, but under our liberal laws
on the subject of amendments, it is possible the bill may be so
amended as to make out a good case for the complainant; and
that he may do so, if it can be done, the case will be remanded for
that purpose.
The demurrer to the bill of complaint was rightly overruled,
because no grounds of demurrer are stated, as required by said
section 3350 of the Revised Code; but if proper grounds of de-
murrer had been stated in the answer, then the demurrer should
have been sustained; for the bill, as it is, is clearly insufficient.
The decree is clearly erroneous, not merely because of the error
in the appointment of the guardian ad litem for the infant de-
fendants, but because there is no evidence to sustain it, especially
as to them. The admissions in the answer of the said Ichabod W.
Carter, is no evidence against the infants, nor is the decree pro
confcsso against the other defendants ; in fact, there is no evidence
whatever against them.

















































































































































116 PRAYER FOR PROCESS 
tions of the bill, the decree should be permitted to stand, as to 
him, in hi character a executor. He a} "the only error in the 
decree, wa in not di mi ing the bill a to all the d f endants 
except the executor, ' and that thi court hould correct thi error, 
by di mi ing the bill a to the other defendants and affirming 
the d er e thu corr cted, against the executor. Thi can not be 
done for the rea on that the bill i not sufficient to authorize any 
decree again t the aid Ichabod W. Carter as executor. The bill 
doe not tate that the will was proved, but only that it wa~ 
recorded in the probate court. Thi i not ufficient; it hould 
have tated that the will was proved. Stating that the will was 
recorded, i not equivalent to ta.ting that it wa proved; be ide , 
no proce i prayed again t him a executor; true, the ummon , 
in the nature of a ubpama, was i u d again t him a heir-at-law, 
and as executor, but this does not help the matter, as the register 
had no authority to i sue uch a summons; he should have followed 
the prayer of the bill. Nor does the answer filed by him, cure thi ~ 
defect, for he does not an wer as executor, but a Ichabod \\. 
Carter merely. He is, therefore, not a party defendant to the bill 
in uch ma,nner as to authorize any decree against him in that 
character. 
The bill is full of defects and infirmities, and the subsequent 
proceedings are full of irregularities, but under our liberal laws 
on the ubject of amendments, it is pos ible the bill may be so 
amended as to make out a good case for the complainant; and 
that he may do so, if it can be done, the case will be remanded for 
that purpose. 
The demurrer to the bill of complaint wa rightly overruled, 
becau e no grounds of demurrer are tated, a required by aid 
section 3350 of the Revised Code; but if proper grounds of de-
murrer had be n tat d in the answer, then the demurrer hould 
hav been u ta.in d; for th bill, a it i i clearly in ufficient. 
The deer e is clearly erroneous, not merely becau e of th error 
in th appointm nt of th guardian ad litem for the infant de-
fendamt ut b cau ther i no e id nee to u ta.in it e p cially 
a to th m. Th admi ion in the an wer of th aid I habod W. 
Carl r i no vid n again t the infant nor i the decree pro 
conf e o a ain t th other d fendant · in fact th r i no vid nee 
what ver acrain t th m. 
It i d m d unn ce ary to pur u thi in e tigation further; 
Martin v. Palmeu 117
the decree of the court below is reversed, with all the proceedings
back to the bill of complaint, at the costs of the appellee, with
leave to the complainant to amend his said bill as he may be
advised.
Peters^ J., not sitting in this case, having been of counsel.
te
Signing the Bill. 'XiJ^\
Martin v. Palmer, 72 Vt. 409. (1900.)^^^'' J^ '
Chancery. Heard on bill and motion to dismiss. Orange vt^
County, December Term, 1899, Munson, Chancellor. Decree ren- i -O. r
dered dismissing the bill. The orator appealed. The appeal was ,^
filed as of course. ^r^ ^
Watson, J. :
The bill of complaint was brought to foreclose a mortgage, and
it was signed by the orators' solicitor, but not by the orators.
The defendant moved to dismiss the bill for that there was no
signature of the orators thereto. The motion w^as granted, and
the cause is here upon appeal therefrom.
The bill is usually drawn by the orators' solicitor, and he is
responsible for its contents. If it contains matter criminal, im-
pertinent, or scandalous, such matter may be expunged, and the
solicitor ordered to pay costs; and, from an early time, the gen-
eral rule of practice has been imperative that the signature of
counsel must be subscribed thereto.
It was declared by Lord Eldon that such signature of counsel
is to be regarded as a security'' that, judging from written instruc-
tions laid before him of the case of the defendant as well as of
the plaintiff, there appeared to him, at the time of framing the
bill good ground of suit. Mit. & Ty. Eq. PI. & Pr. 145 ; 1 Dan.
Ch. PI. & Pr. 357. And so it is regarded under the chancery
practice in this State (Chancer}' Eule 8), and in the Federal
Courts. Equity Rule 24.
A party may sue in person and so bo his own solicitor, in
which event only, the practice requires that his signature be sub-
scribed to the bill. 1 Hoff. Ch. Pr. 97.

















































































































































:JIARTI AL:MER 11 
the d er of the court low i r v r ed, with all the proc eding 
back to the bill of omplaint, at th o t of the app llee, with 
1 av t the mplainant to amend hi aid bill a he may he 
ad i d. 
PET • n J • not it ing in thi a. ha i g b en f oun el. 
lit/~ 
if,~~' J!~ 
Martin . Palmer, 7 Vt. 409. {1900.) >4 "'Y ~Q f. 
IG I.i: TIIE ILL. 
C - A CERY. ard on bill and motion to di mi , Oranierl . Y 
County D cemb r T rm, 1 99, Mun on, hancellor. Decree r en- ~ rY v-
dered di mi ing the bill. The orator appealed. The appeal was V' .'cl 
filed a of cour e. ~ / 
W TON J.: 
Th bill of complaint wa brought to foreclo._ a mortgage and 
it wa igned by th orator ' olicitor, but not by the orator . 
Th d f ndant moved to di mi the bill for that ther wa no 
ignature of the orators thereto. The motion wa granted, and 
the cau e i here upon appeal therefrom. 
The bill i u ually drawn by the orator ' olicitor, and he i, 
r pon ible for it contents. If it contain matter criminal im-
pertin nt or candalou , uch matter may be expunged, and the 
olicitor ordered to pay co · and, from an arl time, the er. n-
eral rul of practice ha b n imperati e that the ignature of 
coun 1 mu t be ub cribed thereto. 
It wa declar d b Lord Eldon that uch irnature of coun el 
i to r o-arded a a curity that judging fro written in truc-
tion laid b for him of th ca e of the d f ndant a well a f 
th plaintiff th r app ared to him at the tim of framino- th 
bill, o-ood Q"TOund of uit. l\lit. & T . Eq. I. & Pr. 1-± ~ · 1 Dan. 
Ch. 1. ., Pr. 3 nd o it i r o-ard d under the chan ery 
practi in thi tate ( hancery Rule ) an m the Fed ral 
ourt . quit Rul 2-±. 
\. party ma u in p rson and o b hi own olicitor in 
whi h nt onl ·. h ra ti reguir that hi ignature ub-
crib d t th ill. 1 off. h. r . 
Th d er wa not f r th for 1 ur of a mortcrage, a 
/ 
118 Cektainty in Pleading
therefore, the orators could take an appeal without permission of
the court therefor. V. S. 981.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded with mandate that the
motion to dismiss he overruled, and hill adjudged sufficiejit.
Certainty in Pleading.
Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Blaclcstone 527. (1795.)
Eeplevin for taking the cattle of the plaintiff. Avowry, that
the defendant was seised in fee of the locus in quo, and took the
cattle damage feasant. Plea, that the locus in quo "lay contiguous
and next adjoining to a certain common and publick king's high-
way, and that the defendant and all other owners, tenants and
occupiers of the said place in which &c. with the appurtenances,
for the time being, from time whereof the memory of man is not
to the contrary, have repaired and amended, and have been used
and accustomed to repair and amend, and of right ought to have
repaired and amended, and the said defendant still of right ought
to repair and amend the hedges and fences between the said place
in which &c. and the said highway, when and so often as need
or occasion hath been or required, or shall or may be required
to prevent cattle heing in the said highway from erring and escap-
ing thereout into the said place in which &c. through the defects
and defaults of the said hedges and fences, and doing damage
there. And because the said hedges and fences between the said
place in which &c. and the said highway, before and at the time
when &c. were ruinous, broken down prostrated and in great decay
for want of needful and necessary repairing and amending thereof,
the said cattle in the said declaration mentioned just before the
said time when &c. heing in the said highway erred and escaped
thereout, into the said place in which &c. through the defects and
defaults &c. &c." To this plea there was a special demurrer. For
that it is not shewn in or by the said plea, that the said cattle
before the said time when &c. when they escaped out of the said
highway into the said place in which &c. were passing through and
along the said highway, nor that they had any right to he there
at all, &c."

















































































































































118 CERTAINTY IN PLEADING 
therefore, the orator could take an appeal without permission of 
the court ther for. V. S. 98l. 
Decree rever ed, and cause remanded with mandate that the 
motion to dismiss be overruled, and bill adjudged sufficient. 
CERTAINTY IN PLEADING. 
Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. Blackstone 527. {1 795.) 
REPLEVI r for taking the cattle of the plaintiff. Avowry, that 
the defendant was eised in fee of the locus in quo, and took the 
cattle damage feasant. Plea, that the locus in quo "lay contiguous 
and next adjoining to a certain common and publick king's high-
way, and that the defendant and all other owners, tenant and 
occupiers of the said place in which &c. with the appurtenances, 
for the time being from time whereof the memory of man is not 
to the contrary, have repaired and amended, and have been used 
and accustomed to repair and amend, and of right ought to haive 
repair d and amended, and the said defendant still of right ought 
to repair and amend the hedges and fences between the said place 
in which &c. and the aid highway, when and o often as need 
or occasion hath been or required, or shall or may be required 
to prevent cattle being in the said highway from erring aind escap-
ing thereout into the aid place in which &c. through the defect. 
and default of the said hedges and fences, and doing damage 
th re. And b cause the said hedges and fence between the said 
place in which &c. and the said highway, before and at the time 
when &c. were ruinou , broken down prostrated and in great decay 
for want of n edful and necessary repairing and amending thereof, 
th aid cattle in the aid declaration mentione just before the 
ajd time wh n &c. being in the aid highway rred and escaped 
th rcout, into the aid place in whi h &c. throu h the defect and 
d faults & . & ." To thi pl a ther wa a pe ial d murrer, For 
that it i not h wn in or by th aid pl a, that th aid cattle 
b for th aid tirn when &c. when th y e ap d out of th aid 
highway into the aid place in which &c. were pa ing through and 
along the said highway, nor that th y had any right to be there 
at all &c." 
'I'h . upport of th demurrer William S rjt. argu d a follows: 
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It is a rule in pleading, that if the defendant admits the fact
complained of ho must shew some good reason for or justification
of it. If the cattle in this case had escaped from an adjoining
close through the default of the plaintiff's fences, the defendant
must have shewn that he had an interest in that close, or a licence
from the owner to put his cattle there; Dyer, 3G5. a. Sir F. Leke's
case, recognized Hob. 104. Digby v. Fitzherhert; for a man is
bound to repair against those who have right, but not against
those who have no right. So if cattle escape from a highway,
the party justifying a trespass must shew they were lawfvdly
along the highway, that is, were passing and repassing on it,
which is material and traversable. It is not sufficient that they
were simply in it, the being there is equivocal and not traversable.
The owner of the soil may have trespass, if the cattle do any
thing but merely pass and repass, Bro. Abr. Tresp. pi. 321, and
according to this principle the entries state in pleas of this kind,
that the cattle were super viam prcedictam transseuntes. Thomp.
Entr. 296, 397, and in Heme's Plead. 822 that they were "driven
along the highway."
Hey wood, Serjt, contra. The same strictness is not required in
a plea in bar to an avowry in replevin, as in a justification in
trespass. Here the plaintiff pleads the plea, and it is sufficient
for him to shew that his cattle were wrongfully taken. The
fassing on the highway is as uncertain as the being there, and as
little traversable. But the material issues on the record would be,
■whether the fences were out of repair, and whether the defend-
ant was bound to repair them. If he were, it is immaterial whether
the cattle were passing on the highway or not. In a plea in bar
certainty to a common intent is sufficient. It may therefore be
intended that the cattle were lawfully in the highway.
Lord Ch. J. Eyre:
I agree with my brother Williams as to the general law, that'
the party who would take advantage of fences being out of repair,
as an excuse for his cattle escaping from a way into the land of
another, must shew that he was lawfully using the easoment when
the cattle so escaped. This therefore reduces the case to a single
point, namely, Wliother it does not apjx^ar on the plea, to a
common intent, that tlio cattle were on the highway using it in

















































































































































Dov STO v. AYNE 119 
It i a rule in pl ading, that if the defendant admit th fact 
complain d of h mu t hew om g d r a on for or ju tifi tion 
of it. f tl ttl in thi c:a ha ·ap d from an adjoining 
clo e thr ugh the d fault of tl plaintiff f n ·e the d fondant 
must ha h wn that h ha 1 an int r t in that lo e, or a lie nee 
from th own r o put hi cattl ther ; y r, 365. a. ir F. J_,cke 
case, r gniz d lob. 104. Digby . Fitzherbert.; for a man i:, 
bound to r pair again t tho e who hav right but not again t 
tho who ha no right. o if cattl cape from a highwa , 
t he party ju tifying a tre pa mu t hew th y were lawfully 
along tl highway that i , w re pa ing and repa ing on it, 
which i material and trav r able. It i not ufficient hat they 
were imply in it, the being there i equivocal and not traver able. 
The own r of th oil may have tr pa , if the cattle do any 
t hing but merely pa and repa , Bro. Abr. Tre p. pl. 3 1 and 
according to thi principle the entrie state in pl a of thi kind, 
that th attle were super viam prwdictam transseunte . Thomp. 
Entr. 2 6, 397, and in Herne' Plead. 822 thait th y were 'driven 
along the highway.n 
H ywood, Serjt, contra. The ame trictne i not required in 
a pl a in bar to an avowry in r plevin, as in a ju tification in 
t respa . Here the plaintiff plead the plea, and it is suffici nt 
for him to h w that hi cattle were wrongfully taken. The 
passing on the highway i as uncertain as the being there, and as 
little traver able. But the material i ue on the r cord would be, 
wheth r th f nc w re out of r pair, and whether the def nd-
ant wa bound tor pair th m. If he were, it i immaterial wh ther 
the attl were pa ing on the highway or not. In a plea in bar 
certainty to a common intent i ufficient. It may therefore be 
intend d that the cattle were lawfully in the highway. 
Lord h. J. E RE: 
I a r with m brother Williams a to the g neral law that I 
the part who would ake advantag of fenc b in out of r pair \ 
a an e u for hi attle e ca ping from a wa3 into the lan 1 of 
anoth r, mu t h w that he wa lawfull u ing th ea em nt when 
th attl o ap d. rnhi th r for r duce th a to a ino'le 
p int, nam 13, th r it d not ap ar on the pl a. t a 
conimon int nt that th attlc w r on th hio-hway usin ... it in 
u h a mann r a h own r ha 1 a right to do from th w rd~ 
120 Certainty in Pleading
"being in the said highway?" Tliis is a different case from cattle
escaping from a close, where it is necessary to shew that the owner
had a right to put them there, because a highway being for the
use of the public, cattle may be in the highway of common right ;
I doubt therefore whether it requires a more particular statement.
It would certainly have been more formal, to have said that the
cattle were passing and repassing, and if the evidence had proved
that they were grazing on the way, though the issue would have
been literally, it would not have been substantially proved. But
I doubt whether the being in the highway might not have been
traversed, and if the being in tlie highway can be construed to be
certain to a common intent, the plea may be supported, notwith-
standing there is a special demurrer, for a special demurrer does
not reach a mere literal expression. The precedents indeed seem
to make it necessary to state that the cattle were passing and re-
passing, but they are but few; yet upon the whole, I rather
think the objection a good one, because those forms of pleading
are as cited by my brother Williams.
BULLER, J. :
This is so plain a case, that it is difficult to make it a ground
of argument. But my brother Heywood says, there is a difference
between trespass and replevin in the rules of pleading. In some
cases there is certainly a material difference in the pleading in
the two actions, though in others they are the same. One of the
cases in which they differ, is that if trespass be brought for taking
cattle which were distrained damage feasant, it is sufficient for
the defendant to say that he was possessed of the close, and the
cattle were doing damage : but in replevin the avowant must deduce
a title to the close. Wherever there is a difference, it is in favour
of trespass and against replevin : for in trespass an excuse in a plea
is sufficient, but in an avowry a title must be shewn. This brings
me to the question, Whether the plea on this record be good to a
common intent? Now I think that the doctrine of certainty to
a common intent will not support it. Certainty in pleading has
been stated by Lord Coke (Co. Litt. 303) to be of three sorts, viz.
certainty to a common intent, to a certain intent in general, and to
a certain intent in every particular. I remember to have heard
Mr. Justice Afton treat these distinctions as a jargon of words,

















































































































































120 CER'r.AINTY IN PLEADING 
'being in the said highway?" This is a different ca e from cattle 
e caping from a clo e, where it is nece ary to h w that the owner 
had a right to put them there, becau e a highway being for the 
u e of th public, cattle may be in the highway of common right; 
I doubt therefore wh ther it requires a more particular statement. 
It would certainly have been more formal, to have aid that the 
cattle were pa ing and repa ing, and if the evid nc had proved 
that they w re grazing on the wa3, though the i ue would have 
been literally, it would not have been ub tantially proved. But 
I doubt whether the being in the highway might not ha1e been 
traver ed, and if the being in the highway can be construed to be 
certain to a common intent, the plea may be supported, nohvith-
standing there is a -special demurrer, for a special demurrer does 
not reach a mere literal expres ion. The precedents indeed seem 
to make it necessary to state that the cattle were passing and re-
pas ing, but they are but few; yet upon the whole, I rather 
think the objection a good one, because those forms of pleading 
are as cited by my brother Williams. 
BULLER, J.: 
This is so plain a case, that it is difficult to make it a ground 
of argument. But my brother Heywood says, there is a difference 
between trespas and replevin in the rules of pleading. In some 
case there is certainly a material difference in the pleading in 
the two actions, though in others they are the same. One of the 
ca es in whicli they differ, i that if trespass be brought for taking 
cattle whh~h were di trained damage feasant, it is sufficient for 
the defendant to ay that he wa possessed of the clo e, and the 
·attle w re doing damage: but in replevin the avowant must deduce 
a title to the clo e. Wherever there is a difference, it i in favour 
of tr pa and again t repl vin : for in tre pas an excu e in a plea 
I uffici nt but in an avowry a title mu t be hewn. Thi bring 
me to the qu tion Wh ther the plea on thi record b good to a 
common int nt? ow I think that the do trine of c rtaint. to 
a common int nt will not support it. Certainty in pl a<lina ha 
b en tated by Lord oke (Co. Litt. 303) to be of thr ort , viz. 
tainty to a ommon intent to a rtain intent in a n ral and to 
a rtain int nt in every particular. I r meml er to hav h arcl 
Mr . .Ju. ti fton tr at th e di tin tion a a jar on of word 
without m aning. h ha how ver Ion een made, and ought 
DovASTON V. Payne
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not altogether to be departed from. Concerning the two last kinds
of certainty it is not necessary to say any thing at present. But
it should be remembered, that the certain intent in every particular
applies only to the case of estoppels (Co. Litt. ibid.). By a com-
mon intent I understand that when words are used, which will bear
a natural sense, and also an artificial one^ or one to be made out by
argument or inference, the natural sense shall prevail: it is simply
a rule of construction and not of addition: common intent cannot
add to a sentence words which are omitted. There is also another
rule in pleading, which is, that if the meaning of words be equivo-
cal, they shall be taken most strongly against the party pleading
them. There can be no doubt that the passing and repassing on
the highway was traversable; for the question. Whether the plain-
tiff was a trespasser or not? depends on the fact whether he was
passing and repassing and using the road as a highway, or
whether his cattle were in the road as trespassers; and that which
is tJie gist of the defence must necessarily be traversable. A
most material point therefore is omitted, and I think the plea
would 1)0 bad on a general demurrer. But here there is a special
demurrer, and as the words are equivocal they are informal.
Heath, J. :
The law is as my brother Williams stated, that if cattle of one
man escape into the land of another, it is no excuse that the fences
were out of repair, if they were trespassers in the place from whence
they came. If it be a close, the owner of the cattle must shew an
interest or a right to put them there. If it be a way, he must shew
that he was lawfully using the way; for the property is in the
owner of the soil, subject to an easement for the benefit of the
public. On this plea it does not appear whether the cattle were
passing and repassing, or whether they were trespassing on the
highway; the words used are entirely equivocal.
EooKE, J. of the same opinion.


















































































































































OVASTO YNE 121 
not altogether to b part d from. 10n rning th two la t kind 
of rtainty it i n t n c ary t ay any hing at pr ent. But 
it hould b re mb r <l, that th rtain int nt in very particular 
appli nly to h ·a of top 1 ( io. Litt. ibid.). By a com-
11ion intent I uncl 'I tand that v h n word a:re u d, which will bear 
a natural en eJ an<l. al ·o an artificial oneJ or on· to be made out by 
argum nt or inf r ne; , the natural sense shaU pre ail: it i imply 
a rule of consflruciion and not of addition: common intent ·annot 
add to a ent nc word which are omitted. There i al o an th r 
rul in pl ading, which i , that if the meani g of word be qui o-
cal, th y hall tak n mo t strongly again t the party pl ading 
them. Th r an b no doubt that the pa ing and repas ing on 
th highway wa trav rnable; for the que tion, \Vhether th plain-
tiff wa a tre pa er or not? depend on the fact whether he wa 
p ing and r ep ing and u ing . the road a a highway, or 
wh th r hi cattle w re in the road a tre pa rs; and that which 
i the gi t of the defence mu t n ce arily be traver able. A 
mo t mat rial point therefore i omitted, and think the plea 
would b bad on a general demurrer. But here there i a p€Cial 
demurrer, and a th words aire quivocal they are informal. 
HEATH, J.: 
The law is as my brother Williams stated, that if cattle of one 
mane cape into the land of another, it i no excu e that the fences 
were out of repair, if they were tre pa er in th place from whence 
they came. If it b a clo e, the owner of the cattle mu t hew an \ 
int re t or a right to put them there. If it be a way he mu t hew 
that h wa lawfull u ing the wa ; for the prop rty i in the 
owner of the oil, ubject to an ea em nt for the benefit of the 
public. On thi plea it doe not app ar wheth r the cattle were 
pa in and repa ing or wheth r they w re tre pas ing on the 
highway- the word u ed ar entirely quivocal. 
RooKE J . of the ame opinion. 
Judgment for the defendant. 
122 \r \ Certainty in Pleading
^y
Eartwell v. Blocker, 6 Ala. 581. (18U-)
-Hrli.
RiT of error to the Court of Chancery sitting at Mobile.
. ^Jf(y^n the 27th of February, 1843, the defendant in error filed his
P'^'^''^ bill, setting forth that on the eighteenth of August, 1836, Eleazer
iy^ /) Hartwell and John Hartwell were indebted to Abner S. Lips-
^ y^^ comb and George W. Owen, since deceased, in the sum of sixteen
^ j£>hundred and five dollars, by six promissory notes (particularly
jACi described), for different sums, payable at different times at the
'^ ^ Planters' and Merchants' Bank of Mobile. In order to secure
^/-^^^ the payment of these several notes, Eleazar and John Hartwell
/ v*^ / conveyed five tracts of land situate in Mobile county, containing
a^ IT ten acres each; conditioned that the same should be void if the
^y^^^^ mJi' notes should be paid according to their tenor and effect. The
[(4^j^ bill alleges, that the notes are due and unpaid; and recites, that
' -^ ^ t]£e complainant is the assignee of Abner S. Lipscomb and Louisa
^^ rA-^. Owen, the administratrix of George W. Owen, deceased; and
^ O^ that Eleazar Hartwell, by deed bearing date the 26th of July,
1838, conveyed his interest in the lands in question to John
1.
^1^ ' /A/Uohn Hartwell and Josiah Wilkins, who, it is alleged, holds
Af rounder him, are made defendants. The bill concludes with a prayer
9^^^ than an account may be taken, the equity of redemption in the
A mortgaged premises foreclosed, and the lands sold, &c. Fur-
j£^ . ther, that process of subpoena may issue, &c.
"^^^'^ \ v"*^ Subpoena issued on the 1st March, 1843, was executed on Wil-
J<y^' o kins on the 2d, and on Hartwell on the 3d of the same month;
''Ar^ and on 4th of April thereafter, a decree iwo confesso was entered
/ij'*' ^ against the defendants. Thereupon, the notes and mortgage,
^^ being produced and proved to the court, were, with the bill, re-
/y^ -ijt ferred to the master to ascertain the amount due and owing to
\ « A^ the complainants ; and report accordingly at the then term of the
'\. ■jiAm' court. The master reported, "that on examination of the mort-
em gage, bill and notes, he finds due as follows, to wit : on the 18th
J^ August, 1837, a note for $356 34; on the 18th February, 1838, a
C> note for $368 34; with interest on the said notes from the times
<?-A when they respectively fell due."

















































































































































122 CERTAINTY IN PLEADING 
Hartwell v. Blocker~ 6 Ala. 581. (1844.) 
~ ,.tt . .WRIT of error to the Court of Chancery itting at Mobile. 
~ v V / tV"Dn the 27th of February, 18±3, the defendant in error filed his 
fJV/1 bill, etting forth that on the eighteenth of August, 1836, Eleazer 
V .\'lt Hartwell and John Hartwell were indebted to Abner S. Lips-
_,,.,. ~ comb and George W. Owen, since deceased, in the um of sixteen 
~ ;}-hundred and five dollar , by six promi ory notes (particularly 
-It C1 {;V~ de ~ribed), for different sum , payable at different times at the 
rt. ~ Planters' and Merchants' Bank of Mobile. In order to secure 
Y,d .,, the payment of these everal note , Eleazar and John Ha-dwell / ttY1 conveyed five tracts of land situate in Mobile county, containing 
, ....,JV ten acres each; conditioned that the same hould be void if the 
~ ~. ,t,- notes should be paid according to their tenor and effect. T'he 
~ t,J{..r-v bill aUege , that the notes are due and unpaid; and recites, that 
• ~t e complainant is the a signee of Abner S. Lip comb and Louisa 
P S. Owen, the administratrix of George W. Owen, d ceased; and 
/ that Eleazar Hartwell, by deed bearing date the 26th of July, 
, ~ .~838, conveyed his interest in the lands in question to John 
vr . ~ar r. 
~ ohn Hartwell and Josiah Wil~ins, who, it is alleged, holds 
/,,_ _ ~J under him, are made defendants. The bill concludes with a prayer 
yJV- than an account may be taken, the equity of redemption in the 
~ mortgaged premises foreclosed, and the lands sold, &c. Fur-A ther, that proce s of subpama may is ue, &c. 
~ ,.i) ~ Subpama issued on the 1 t March, 1843, was executed on Wil-
~-~ kin on the 2d, and on Hartwell on the 3d of the same month; 
~ and on 4th of April thereafter, a decree pro confesso was entered 
~ .,,<.. against the d f ndants. Thereupon, the notes and mortgage, 
, being produced and proved to the court, were, with the bill, re-
!J f tJ f rr d to the ma ter to a certain the amount due and owing to G ~ th omplainants; and r port accordingly at the then t rm of the 
f o/ court. T'h ma ter report d, "that on examination of the mort-
~ gag bill and note, h find due a follow to wit: on the 18th 
_...,.._,, Augu t 1 7 a note for $ <>6 3-±; on th 1 th F bruary 1 3 , a 
_,..v CY- not f r $ G 34; with inter t on the aid not from the times 
wh n they re p tively fell due." 
n th 11th of pril 1 3, during the ame term, a moti.on 
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was made for the confirmation ol' the report and a decree for the
sale of the mortgaged premises. Thereupon, reciting that it was
shown to the court, that the parties have had two days' notice of
the contents of the report; that no exceptions were filed, and no
objection made, it was decreed that the report be in all things
confirmed ; that the defendants pay into the hands of the register,
within sixty days, the amount rei^orted due, with interest and
costs of suit : in default thereof, the master proceed to sell the prop-
erty described in complainant's bill and mortgage, or so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the decree, in separate par-
cels or entire, as may best promote the defendant's interest, at
public auction, in front of the couiijiouse of Mobile county, under
the same rules and regulations that govern sheriffs in making
sales of like property under execution. Further, that he give
public notice once a week for thirty days previous thereto, by
publication in some newspaper printed in the city of Mobile; and
also, by posting notice on the door of the courthouse of the county.
The master was directed to report his proceedings to the next
term of the court.
At a further day of the same term, the defendants moved to set
aside the report and order of reference, on the ground that Eleazar
Hartwell had not been made party to the suit. But the chancellor
was of opinion, that as he had made an absolute assignment of
his interest in the mortgaged property, there was no necessity for
making him a party; and accordingly he overruled the motion.
Collier, C. J. :
It was said by Lord Hardwicke, that in pleading, "there must
be the same strictness in equity as at law." (2 Atk. Eep. 632.)
But Mr. Justice Story says, "however true this may be as to a plea
in equity, technically so called, it can hardly be affirmed to be true
in the framing of bills or answers, in respect to which more liber-
ality prevails. And it may, perhaps, be correctly affirmed, that
certainty to a common intent is the most that the rules of equity
ordinarily require in pleadings for any purpose." (Eq. Plead.
206.)
Uncertainty in a bill, it is said, may arise in various ways : 1.
In the case intended to be made by the bill. 2. Though the case
intended to be made be certain, yet the allegations of the bill may
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was made for th onfirmation of the r port ancl ai decree for the 
al of the mortg g d pr mi e . Th r upon, re ·iting that it wa 
hown to the court, that the partie hav, had two day ' notice of 
th cont nt of th report; that no x eption w re filed, and no 
obje tion mad , it wa d er d that the report be in all things 
confirm d; that the def ndant pay into th hand of the regi ter, 
within ixty day , the amount r ported due, with intere t and 
cost of uit: ind fault th reof, the ma ter proc d to ell the prop-
rty d cribed in omplainant bill and mortgage, or o much 
thereof a may b n c a·ry to ati fy the d er , in eparate par-
cel or entire, a may be t promote the def ndant' int.ere t, at 
public auction, in front of the courthou e of Mobile county, under 
the ame rule and regulation that govern heriff in making 
sale of like property under ex ution. Further that he give 
public notice one a week for thirty day previou thereto, by 
publication in ome new pap r printed in the ity of Mobile; and 
also, by po ting notice on the door of the courthou e of the county. 
The mast€r wa directed to report his proceedings to the next 
term of the court. 
At a further day of the same term, the defendants moved to et 
aside the report aiild order of r ference, on the ground that Eleazar 
H artwell had not been made party to the uit. But the chancellor 
was of pinion, that a he had mad an ab olute a ignment of 
hi intere t in th mortgaged property, there wa no nece ity for 
making him a party; and accordingly he overruled the motion. 
COLLIER, c. J . : 
It wa aid b Lord Hardwicke, that in pl ading, "there mu t 
be the ame tri tn in equity a at law." (2 Atk. Rep. 632.) 
But Mr. Ju tice tory ay , ''however true thi may be a to a plea 
in equity, te hni ally o called, it can hardly be affirmed to be true 
in th framing of bill or an wer in re pect to which more liber-
alit pr ail . nd it may, p rhap , be corr ctly affirmed, that 
ertaint to a common intent i the mo t that the rule of quity 
ordinaril requir in pleadings for any purpo e." (Eq. Plea . 
2 G.) 
n rtainty in a bill, it i aid may ari e in ariou wa · : 1. 
In th ca intend d to be made b th bill. . Thouah the ca e 
int nd d to be ma be certain, yet th all gation of th bill may 
b -rao-u and a n ral. 3. oru of th mat rial fa t rua be 
124 Certainty in Pleading
stated with sufficient certainty, and others again with so much
indistinctness or incompleteness as to their nature, extent, date,
or other essential requisites, as to render inefficient those with
which they are connected, or upon which they depend. (Story's
Eq. Plead. 207, et post, and cases there cited.) In Cresset v.
Milton (1 Ves. jr. Eep. 449), the bill was brought to perpetuate
a right of common and way; the allegation was, that the tenants,
owners and occupiers of certain lands of a manor, "in right
thereof or otherwise" from, &c., had and of right ought to have
common of pasture, &c. The bill was held bad on demurrer;
for "it was not set forth as common appendant, or as common
appurtenant, but as that, "or otherwise," which was no specifica-
tion at all, and left any sort of right open to proof. So, in Jones
V. Jones (3 Meriv. Eep. 160), which was a bill by an heir at law
to restrain the defendant from setting up an outstanding term,
&c.; but as there was no averment of any outstanding terms, it
was held bad on demurrer. And where a bill sought a general
account upon a charge of fraud, it is not sufficient to make such
charge in general terms; but it should point out particular acts
of fraud. {Palmer v. Mure, 2 Dick. Eep. 489.) But the com-
plainant is not bound to state all the minute facts; the general
statement of a precise fact is usually sufficient. The circum-
stances which confirm or establish it, more properly constitute
matters of proof than of allegation. (Story's Eq. Plead. 213.)
In the present case, the complainant describes himself as the
assignee of A. S. Lipscomb and the administratrix of G. W.
Owen, deceased; and after describing the date, and amount in-
tended to be secured by a mortgage to L. and the intestate, the
bill continues, "whose interest has been legally transferred and
assigned over unto your orator, that certain part or parcel, situ-
ate," &c. (here follows a description of the mortgaged premises).
The notes are described as bearing even date with the mortgage,
payable some of them to the order of the defendant Wilkins, the
others to the order of the makers; and all of them for unequal
sums, payable and negotiable at the Planters' and Merchants'
Bank of Mobile. It is charged, that although the notes have since
been due and payable, yet the mortgagors have failed and re-
fused to pay the same, "whereby the legal estate to the said prem-
ises has become absolute in your orator." In all this, there is

















































































































































124 CERTAINTY IN PLEADING 
stated with sufficient certainty, and others again with so much 
indistinctnes or incompleteness as to their nature, extent, daite, 
or other es ential requisites, as to render inefficient those with 
which they are connected, or upon which they depend. (Story's 
Eq. Plead. 207, et post, and cases there cited.) In Cresset v. 
Milton (1 Ves. jr. Rep. 449), the bill was brought to perpetuate 
a right of common and way; the allegation was, tha,t the tenants, 
owners and occupiers of certain lands of a manor, "in right 
thereof 01· otherwise," from, &c., had and of right ought to have 
common of pasture, &c. The bill was held bad on demurrer; 
for "it was not set forth as common appendant, or as common 
appurtenant, but as that, "or otherwise," which was no specifica-
tion at all, and left any sort of right open to proof. So, in Jones 
v. Jones (3 Meriv. Rep. 160), which was a bill by an heir at law 
to restrain the defendant from setting up an outstanding term, 
&c.; but as there was no averment of any outstanding terms, it 
was held bad on demurrer. And where a bill sought a general 
account upon a charge of fraud, it is no.t sufficient to make such 
charge in general terms; but it should point out pairticular acts 
of fraud. (Palm er v. Mure, 2 Dick. Rep. 489.) But the com-
plainant is not bound to state ())ll the minute facts; the general 
statement of a precise fact is usually sufficient. The circum-
stances which confirm or establish it, more properly constitute 
maitters of proof than of allegation. (Story's Eq. Plead. 212.) 
In the present case, the complainant describes himself as the 
assignee of A. S. Lipscomb and the administratrix of G. W. 
Owen, deceased; and after describing the date, and amount in-
tended to be secured by a mortgage to L. and the intestate, the 
bill continues, "whose interest has been legally transferred and 
assigned over unto your orator, that certain part or parcel, situ-
ate," &c. (here follows a description of the mortgaged premise ) . 
The notes are de cribed as bearing even date with the mortgage, 
payable ome of them to the order of the defendant Wilkins, the 
others to the order of the maker ; and all of them for unequal 
um , payable and n gotiable at the Planters' and Merchants' 
Bank of Mobile. It i charg d, that although the notes have since 
been ue and payable, y t the mortgagors have failed and re-
fused to pay the ame, "wher by the 1 gal e tate to the said pr m-
i es ha becom ab olute in your orator." In all thi there is 
no allegation that the omplainant i the a i n of th note , or 
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either of them ; the inference that such is the fact, is not necessary
and direct. It may or may not be so. If the terms in which the
case is attempted to be stated, are to be understood as having
been employed according to their appropriate use, and with their
usual meaning, they raUier show that the complainant is the as-
signee of the mortgage than the notes. And it is not only not
alleged that the complainant was the assignee of all the notes, but
it is not stated that if either or any of them was assigned to him,
which it is.
It may be true, that tlie mortgage may have been assigned to
the complainant by the mortgagees, yet this would not authorize
him to file a bill for a foreclosure. In Doe ex dem. Duval's heirs
V. McLosley (1 Ala. Eep. X. S. 708), it was determined, that a
mortgagee cannot assign the right to the mortgaged property
without also assigning the debt to which it is an incident, yet it
seems he may relinquish, hy contract, the possession of the mort-
gaged premises to a third person until the debt is paid.
Without amplifying the point, it sufficiently appears from what
has been said, that the bill is obnoxious to the objection of uncer-
tainty. That even if the case intended to be made by the bill is
certain, the allegations are too vague and general to authorize a
court of equity to entertain it.
Although some of the notes are payable to the order of the
makers, and do not, upon their face, import a promise to pay any
one, yet the mortgage is an acknowledgment that they were the
property of the mortgagees — that the mortgagors were bound to
pay them; and in order to their security, conveys the land de-
scribed in it. This is quite sufficient to show, that the notes have
been transferred by the maker, whether by writing, or mere de-
livery is wholly immaterial in the present case. True, in order
to maintain an action at law upon them, the plaintiff should show
a regular transfer; but it is competent for the holder to entertain
a suit in equity, thougji they were transferred by delivery only.
The bill should state of which of tlie notes the complainant is
the proprietor; if any one of them maturing before those he holds
is paid, or outstanding, unpaid, the fact should be stated, and the
holder made a party. In respect to subsequent incumbrancers,
although they are proper, 3'et they are not indispensable parties.
(Judson V. Emaiutc'l, ct al 1 Ala. Eep. X. S. 598; CuIJum, et ah

















































































































































HARTWELL • BLOCKER 125 
either of them; th inf r nc that uch i the fact, i not nece ary 
and dir ct. It may or m y not be o. If the term in which the 
case i att mpt d to b tat d, are to b und r too as having 
been employed a ording to their appropriate u e, and with their 
usual m aning th y rath r how that the complainant i the a:,-
sign e of the mortgag than th not . nd it i not only not 
alleg d that the co plainant wa th a ignee of all the note , but 
it i not tat d that if ither or any of them wa a igned to him, 
which it i . 
It may be tru , that the mortgage may have been a igned to 
the complainant by the mortgagee , yet thi would not authorize 
him to file a bill for a foreclosure. In Doe ex dem. Duval s heirs 
v. 111cLo key (1 la. ep. N. . 08), it wa determined, that a 
mortgag cannot a ign the right to the mortgaged property 
without al o a igning the debt to which it i an incident, yet it 
seem he may relinqui h, by contract, the po e sion of the mort-
gaged pr mi e to a third per on until the debt i paid. 
Without amplifying the point, it sufficiently appears from what 
has been aid, that the bill is obnoxious to the objection of uncer-
tainty. That ven if the case intended to be made by the bill is 
certain, the allegation are too vague and general to authorize a 
court of quity to entertain it. 
Although om of the note are payable to the order of the 
maker , and do not, upon their face, import a promise to pay any 
one, yet the mortgage is an acknowledgment that they were the 
property of the mortgagee -that the mortgagor were bound to 
pay them; and in order to their ecurity, con ey the land de-
cribed in it. Thi i quite ufficient to how, that the notes have 
b en tran f rred by the maker, wh ther by writing or mere de-
liv ry i wholly immaterial in th pre ent case. True, in order 
to maintain an action at law upon them, the plaintiff hould how 
ai regular tran fer; but it i comp t nt for the hold r to entertain 
a uit in equit thougp. the were transferred by deli ery only. 
Th bill hould tate of which of the not the complainant is 
the propri tor; if any on of th m maturing before tho h hold 
i paid or out tanding unpaid the fact houl be tated and be 
h 11 r made a I art . In r p ct to ub qu nt incumbrancer 
althou h the ar prop r yet th y are not indi p n~ abl parti . 
(Jud on . Emanzl q t al. 1 la. p. K. . 9 ; ullu.m, t al. 
at re e~t r ... la. p. -±1 . ) 
136 Certainty in Pleading
In respect to the other questions made by the plaintiffs in error,
it is unnecessary now to consider them. They are mere questions
of practice, about which it is not probable that any controversy
will arise in the ulterior progress of the cause; especially if the
decisions we have heretofore made touching the interest of sur-
viving payees, the powers of executors and administrators, parties
in equity, the registration of deeds, and the duties of masters in
chancery, are consulted.
It follows from what has been said, that the decree of the court
of chancery must be reversed, and the cause remanded. But inas-
much as no objection to the frame of the bill was taken in the
primary court, the defendant in error will not be taxed with the
tire^feosts ; each party will pay their own costs in this court.
y^^ —
i V. Inman, Jf Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) W- (1820.)
Exceptions to the defendant's answer: 1. That the answer
sets forth, in hcec verba, a copy of the power of attorney from the
plaintiff to the defendant and William Lang, mentioned in the
bill, though the defendant was not requested so to do, and though
^he substance of the power was fully stated in the bill, and when,
by setting it forth in hcec verba, the sense and legal effect of it
ara not, in the least, qualified or varied from the same instrument
a& set forth in the bill.
-v^ 2. Because the defendant has, in his answer, from a part of the
17th page thereof, to a part of the 19th page thereof, beginning,
^ &c. stated matters not necessary to answer any allegations in the
,y^ bill, to which he is not interrogated, and upon which no pertinent
^ ^interrogatories can be framed, or depositions given, and wliich are
' /^^ totally irrelevant, immaterial, and highly scandalous.
-^ i^^i^ 'T3a€ exceptions, having been referred to a master, were allowed
y him, and the defendant excepted to liis report. And the ques-
(/- ^ ition now came upon the exceptions to the report.
ffJ^ The Chancellor:
/^/^^ t _, 'i- It was not necessary to set forth the power of attorney in
^ , V"^ 7i(Ec t;er?ja, in the answer. The substance of it was accurately stated
^ i^ in the bill, and to give it at length in the answer, was impertinent.


















































































































































126 ERTAINTY IN PLEADING 
In re~pect to the other que~tions made by the plaintiffs in error, 
it i unn c ary now to con icler them. They are mere que tions 
of practice about which it i not probable that any controversy 
will ari in the ult rior progre of the cau e; especially if the 
cl i ion we ha e heretofore made touching the interest of stu-
vi ing pay e , the powers of executors and administrator , partie.s 
in quity the regi tration of de cl , and the duties of ma ters in 
hancery, are con ulted. 
It follow from what ha been said, that the decree of the court 
of chancery mu t be reversed, and the cau e remanded. But inas-
much as no objection to the frame of the bill was taken in the 
primary court, the defendant in error will not be taxed with the 
~ ~7., 0h 1-arty will pay their own co t in this court. 
j. -~ ~oj v. Inman, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 437. (1820.) 
r <)/ J- ~ {fa~cE~TIONS to the defendant' an wer: 1. That the answer 
/ set forth, in hwc verba, a copy of the power of attorney from the 
/ ~ plaintiff to the defendant and William Lang, mentioned in the 
c/- bill, though the defendant was not reque ted o to do, and though 
/, fihe ubstance of the power was fully tated in the bill, and when, 
~ , _./ by etting it forth in hwc verba, the en e and legal effect of it 
~.J .J~ not, in the lea t, qualified or varied from the same instrument 
y -~a~ i et forth in the bill. 
~ . -vP ·2. Because the defendant has, in his an wer, from a part of the 
" n ~ c:,_ 1 th page thereof, to a part of the 19th page thereof, b ginning, 
~ ~ & . tated matter not necessary to an wer any allegation in the 
~ bill, to which he i not interrogated, and upon which no pertinent 
~ ~~nt rrogatorie can be framed, or cl po ition given and which are 
1 1 ~ totally irr 1 vant immat rial, and highly candalou.s . 
.rj . l-p exc ption having been referred to a ma ter, were allowed 
~._,.µ y him, and the cl fendant exc pted to hi report. And the que -f ion now came upon the exceptions to the report. 
T':rrn CHA CELLoR : 
.L 1. It wa not n c ary to s t forth th power of attorney in 
hwc verba in th an w r. Th ub tanc of it w accurately fated 
Y / in the bill and to Qiv it at 1 ngth in the an wer wa impertinent. 
r> mp rtin n on. i t. (1 Harr. r. 101. 30 ) in etting forth what 
( 
u rVv1G 
0 IV- ~ 
/ A./ ' 
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is not necessary to be set forth, as where the pleadings are stuffed
with long recitals, or with long digressions of matters of iax:i which
are totally immaterial. An answer, or a bill, ought not, ordinarily,
to set forth deeds in hcec verba; and if the pleader sets forth only
so much thereof as is material to the point in question, it is suf-
ficient. They are matter of evidence to be shown at large at the
hearing. In Alsager v. Johnson (4 Ves. 217) a bill of costs was
given at large in the schedule to the answer, when a reference to
the bill of costs delivered would have fully answered the purpose,
and it was dcH^med impertinent. The present is not an instance of
gross abuse of this rule of pleading ; but I am glad to see the excep-
tion taken, and the point brought up, for the opportunity it affords
of laying down the rule. I have frequently perceived the pleadings,
and particularly the bill, encumbered with a recital, in hcec verba,
of deeds, mortgages, and ot^er documents, which, unless checked,
will lead to great oppression of the suitor, and to the reproach of
the Court, Whenever a proper case arises, I shall certainly mark
it with animadversion; and shall endeavor to enforce, by all suit-
able means, precision and brevity in pleading. The objection to
unnecessary folia, may be taken on the taxation of costs.
The ancient rules and orders of the English Court of Chancery,
are very explicit, and powerfully monitory on this subject.
If any pleading should be found of an immoderate length, Lord
Bacon declared, that both the party and the counsel, under whose
hand it passed, should be fined. And Lord Keeper Coventry, with
the advice of Sir Julius Caesar, the master of the rolls, in 1635,
ordained, that bills, answers, &c., "should not be stuffed ^\^th the
repetitions of deeds or writings in hcec verba, but the effect and sub-
stance of so much of them only as was pertinent and material to
be set down, and that in brief and effectual terms, &<?., and upon
any default therein, the party and counsel, under whose hand it
passed, should pay the charge of the copy, and be further punished
as the case should merit."
The same rule was, afterwards, adopted, or re-enacted, by the
lords commissioners in 1649, and in Lord Clarendon's Digest or
System of Eulcs (Beame's Orders, 25, 69, 1G5).
But we have a domestic precedent on this point, which is too
interesting to be unnoticed.
In 1727, Governor Burnet, of the colony of Xew York, exercis-
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is not n c ary i. b et forth, a wh r th pleading are tuffed 
with long r cital , or with 1 ng digr i n of m tte of fact which 
ar totally immaterial. An an w r, r bill ought not, ordinarily, 
to et forth d d in hmc verba.; ncl if th pl ad r e forth only 
i material to th point in que tion, it i uf-
fici nt. They ar ma ter of id nee to b hown at large at the 
h aring. In lager . John on (4 . 1 ) a bill of co w:L 
gi en at large in th chedul o the an w r, when a refer nc to 
the bill of o cl li ered would hav fully an wered the purpose, 
and it wa d m d impertinent. The pre ent i not an in tance f 
gro abu of thi rul of pleading; but I am glad to see the x ep-
tion tak n, an the point brought up, for the opportunity it affords 
of laying down the rule. I have frequently perceived the pleadings, 
and parti ularly the bill, encumbered with a r cital, in hmc verba, 
of deed , mortgag , and otper document , which, unles checked, 
ill 1 ad to gr at oppres ion of the suitor, and to the reproacli of 
the Court. Whenever a proper case ari e , I hall certainly mark 
it with animadver ion ; and hall ndeavor to enforce, by all uit-
able mean , preci ion and bre ity in pleading. The objection to 
unnec ary folia, may be taken on the taxation of co t . 
The ancient rul and orders of the Engli h ourt of Chancery, 
are very xpli it, and powerfully monitory on thi ubject. 
f any pleading hould be found of an immoderate length, Lord 
Bacon declared, that both the part and the coun el, under whose 
hand it pa ed, hould be fined. And Lord Keeper Coventry, with 
th ad ice of ir J uliu Cre ar, the ma ter of the roll, in 1635, 
ordained, that bill , an wers, &c., 'hould not be tuffed with the 
repetition of de d 00' writings in hmc verba_, but the effect and ub-
tan e of o much of them only a wa pertin nt and material to 
be et down, and that in brief and effectual term , &c., and upon 
any d fault th rein the party and coun el, und r who e hand it 
pa ed, hould pay the harge of the copy, and b further puni hed 
a th ca hould merit." 
The am rul wa afterward , adopted or re-enacted b the 
in 16-±9 and in Lord la.rendon Dige t or 
( am 2 69 16 ). 
ut we ha a dom tic preced nt on thi point, which i too 
int r ting b unnoticed. 
1 2 o rnor urnet of th colon r of ~ ew York r i -
ing in c01oicil the pow of a ourt of bane IJ" appointed :fi e 
128 Certainty in" Pleading
of the most distinguished counsel of tlie Court, as a committee,
*'to consider and report on the fees and dilatory proceedings in the
Court of Chancery, as true and great grievances." This commit-
tee, consisting of Archibald Kennedy, Eip Van Dam, Cadwallader
Colden, James Alexander, and Abraham A'^an Horn, reported to
the counsel a number of abuses in the practice of the Court of
Chancery, and the remedy. This report, which is inserted at the
end of Bradford's edition of the Colony Laws, is a curious and in-
structive document ; but my concern, at present, is only with what
is termed the first abuse and remedy. It declares, "as an abuse, the
inserting, at too much length, in bills, matters of inducement only.
Thus, if A. has been entitled to the thing in question, who con-
veyed it to B., who conveyed it to C, who conveyed it to the plaint-
iff; after tlie thing is certainly set forth in A., it is enough to say,
he conveyed it to B,, and he to C, and he to the plaintiff, as, by
the deeds ready to be produced, will appear." No counsel, say they,
ought to set their hands to any hill that is unduly long, and if he
does, he ought to pay all the charges arising from such needless
length.
The exception to the master's report, allowing this first excep-
tion, is overruled.
2. The same objection applies to the matter forming the ground
of the second exception. It was matter argumentative, rhetorical,
irrelative, and, consequently, impertinent. Pleadings should con-
sist of averment, or allegations of fact, and not of inference and
airgument.
The exception to the report is, also, overruled; and as the fault
of the pleader was of a venial character, I am content that the costs



















































































































































128 CERTAINTY IN PLEADING 
of the mo t distinguished counsel of the Court, as a committee, 
"to con ider and report on the fees and dilatory p.roceedings in the 
Court of Chancery, as true and great grievances." This commit-
tee, con i ting of Archibald Kennedy, Rip Van Dam, Cadwallader 
Colden, J a.me Alexander, and Abraham Van Horn, reported to 
the coun el a number of abu es in the practice of the Court of 
Chancery, and the remedy. This report, which is in erted at the 
end of Bradford's edition of the Colony Laws, is a curious and in-
structive document; but my concern, at pre ent, is only with what 
is termed the first abuse and remedy. It declares, "as an abuse, the 
inserting, at too much length, in bill , matters of inducement only. 
Thu , if A. has been entitled to the thing in que tion, who con-
veyed it to B., who conveyed it to C., who conveyed it to the plaint-
iff; after the thing is certainly set forth in A., it is enough to say, 
he conveyed it to B., and he to C., and he to the plaintiff, as, by 
the deeds ready to be produced, will appear." No cownsel, say they, 
ought to set their hands to any bill that is unduly long, and if he 
does, he ought to pay all the charges arising from such needlei:;s 
length. 
The exception to the master's report, allowing this :first excep-
tion, is overruled. 
2. The same objection applies to the maitter forming the ground 
of the second exception. It was matter argumentative, rhetorical, 
irrelative, and, consequently, impertinent. Pleadings should con-
si t of averment, or allegations of fact, and not of inference and 
ai:rgument. 
The exception to the report is, also, overruled; and as the fault 
of the pleader was of a venial character, I am content that the costs 




PROCEEDINGS ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
Filing the Bill.
Bank v. Iloyt, 7Jf Miss. 221. (189G.) ^"^ j^
ir
From the chancery court of Lauerdale county, /ff
Hon. N. C. Hill, Chancellor. A/^ c^
The opinion states the case. v ^ i j^
Whitfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court. ^
The question which lies at the threshold in the decisio
case is whether the bill of appellant was filed, within the contempla- \ /
tion of law, on May 5, 1893. Tlie facts are these: On May 5,1^^-^
1892, appellant's counsel took the bill and the exhibits in one cover
to the chancery clerk, and had him indorse on the bill the word^
''filed," etc., and the clerk made a corresponding entry in the gen-
eral docket, and prepared a regular court wrapper, and put it
around the papers. But counsel immediately took the bill and j > , 'J^
exhibits back to his office, telling the clerk that he did not wish a"/
process issued then, but not giving him any reason for not issuing /^ \
process. The clerk charged the counsel with the papers in his at- ,^^ ^h
torney's docket. The bill was kept by counsel in his office until ■^ .a
tlie ninth of JMay, when he returned the bill, and process was issued V- ^
and served on the tenth. In the meantime, on May 7, 1892, counsel (r ^>^
for appellees took their bill to the clerk of the chancery court, and ,L/ "y
it was filed on that day, and process issued and served that day.^/v"
Said counsel had, on the fifth of May, gone to the clerk's office, ,y^ \iJ
to see what bill, if any, had been filed, and was told a bill had been i *<' ^
filed by counsel for appellant, and was shown the entry on the" ;/^
general docket, and informed that the papers were at the office r^ J^ .
of appellant's counsel. These are all the facts bearing on this iJ^ /
question. aA
The code of 1892, § 4G3, provides that the clerk "shall not sufferj^ V
11 ny paper so filed to be withdrawn but by leave of the chancellor, t
and then only by retaining a copv, to be made at the costs of the



















































































































































E 1 IN 1 ' r L INTIFF. ~ 
IL! THE ILL. ~ ~ 
1
1/ ·~ , 
anlc . Iloyt 4 Mi . 2 1. {1 96.) f i' ,_r J( 
,;- ~ /..;) 0 
Th~:om th han1L: :::t c~~or. aucrdal aunt~ :t; 0 ~ (; ~ opm1on tat the ca . V r} / k~ 
W IIT IELD . J liY r d th opinion of th{ ourt. JY ~ ~ {l tJ 
Tb qu ~tion whi h lie at th thr hold in th deci ion of tlii~~.Y / 
ca i wh th r th bill of app llant wa fil d, within the contempla- / . 
tion of law, on May 5, 1 9 . Th fac are the e : n lay 5,~ / / 
1 92, appellant oun el took th bill and the exhibit in one cover 1 
to the chancery cl rk, and had him indors on the bill the word 
"filed," etc., and the clerk made a orre ponding ntry in the gen_v~' . ,)~ ~ 
eral do k t, and prepared a r gular court wrapper, and put it V V. 1 
around th paper . ut coun el immediatd took the bill and V f7,, 
exhibits back to hi office, telling the clerk that he did not wi h ~ 
proce i ued then, but not giving him any r a on for not i uing · ,./// ; 
proce . The clerk barged the counsel with the papers in bi at- ~ 'f--
torn y' docket. Th bill wa kept by coun el in hi office untif Y'"' ~ 
th ninth of May, wh n he return d the bill, and proces wa i u d { 
and er on th t nth. In th meantime on ~Ia) , 1 9·, oun el - r!.J-
for app lle took th ir bill to th 1 rk of the hancer court an .r iV y 
it wa filed on that da · and proc i u d and rved that day.f" 'J 
1 
aid oun el had on the fifth of fa gon to the cl rk offic ~ ~i 
to what bill, if any had been £.1 d, and wa told a bill had b n t; t 
fil d b oun cl for appellant, and wa hown the entry on th • v-
rr neral do k t and inform d that th pap were at the o v 
f app Hant oun 1. Th are all the fact bearing on thi 1 
qu tion. 
Th od of 1 463 pro id 
<111 ' pap r fil b withdrawn but 1 a of th chancellor, 
an th n only b ' r taining a co1 y, to b mad at th co~t f th 
party o taining th 1 av . 11 th pap 1 ~ and pleading ~ :fil 
9 1 ... 9 
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a cause shall be kept in the same file, and all the files kept in
numerical order." In Cooper v. Frierson, 48 Miss. 310, in con-
struing the clause under the agricultural lien law of 1867, 'Tie
must file the contract, or a copy thereof, in the clerk's oflace," the
court said : "The statute is not satisfied by the indorsement on the
contract that it was filed, if the creditor withdraws it, and keeps
it. . . . The term 'filing' imports that the paper shall remain
with the clerk as a record, subject to be inspected by those who
have an interest in it, and to be certified by him as any other paper
properly lodged in his office and committed to his custody. It is
admitted that Frierson's contract was not, in this sense, 'filed' in
the clerk's office. It follows, then, that he has no lien."
Anderson's Law Dictionary defines the noun "file" as follows:
"At common law, a thread, string, or wire upon which writs or
other exhibits are fastened for safe-keeping and ready reference."
And the definitions of Webster's International Dictionary and the
Century Dictionary are to the same effect. The verb Anderson
thus defines: "To leave a paper with an officer for action or
preservation"; and he adds: "In modem practice, the file is the
manner adopted for preserving papers. The mode is immaterial.
Such papers as are not for transcription into records are folded
similarly, indorsed with a note or index of their contents, and tied
up in a"^ bundle— a file." Webster quotes Burrill, as follows : "To
file a paper on the part of a party is to place it in the official cus-
tody of the clerk. To file on the part of the clerk is to indorse upon
the paper the date of its reception, and retain it in his office, subject
to inspection by whomsoever it may concern." Mr. Freeman, in a
learned note to Beehe v. Morrell (Mich.), 15 Am. St. Eep. 295 (42
N. W. 1119), thus sums up: "Filing consists simply in placing
the paper in the hands of the clerk, to be preserved and kept by him
in his official custody as an archive or record, of which his office
becomes thenceforward the only proper repository; and it is his
duty, when the paper is thus placed in his custody, or filed with
him, to indorse upon it the date of its reception, and retain it in
his office, subject to inspection by whomsoever it may concern;
and that is what is meant by filing the paper. But, when the law
requires a party to file it, it simply means that he shall place it in
the official custody of the clerk. This is all that is required of
him; and, if the officer omits the duty of indorsing upon it the

















































































































































130 FILING THE BILL 
a cause hall be kept in the same file, and all the file kept in 
numerical order." In Cooper v. Frierson, 48 Mis . 310, in con-
truing the clause under the agricultural lien law of 1867, ''he 
mu t file the contract, or a copy thereof, in the clerk' office," the 
court aid : "The statute i not sati fied by the indorsement on the 
contract that it was filed, if the creditor withdraws it, and keeps 
it. The term 'filing' imports that the paper hall remain 
with the clerk as a record, subject to be inspected by those who 
have an interest in it, and to be certified by him as any other paper 
properly lodged in his office and committed to his cu tody. It is 
admitted that Frierson's contract was not, in this sen e, 'filed' in 
the clerk's office. It follows, then, that he has no lien." 
Ander on' Law Dictionary defines the noun "file" as fallows : 
"At common law, a thread, string, or wire upon which writs or 
other exhibit are fa tened for safe-keeping and ready reference." 
And the definitions of Webster's International Dictionary and the 
Century Dictionary are to the same effect. The verb Anderson 
thus defines: "To leave a paper with an officer for action or 
preservation"; and he adds: "In modern practice, the file is the 
manner adopted for pre erving pa1per . The mode is immaterial. 
Such paper as are not for transcription into records are folded 
imilarly, indorsed with a note or index of their contents, and tied 
up in a bundle-a file." Webster quotes Burrill, as follows: "To 
file a paper on the part of ai party is to place it in the official cus-
tody of the clerk. To file on the part of the clerk is to indorse upon 
the paper the date of its reception, and retain it in his office, subject 
to inspection by whomsoever it may concern." Mr. Freeman, in a 
learned note to Beebe v. Morrell (Mich.), 15 Am. St. Rep. 295 (-!2 
N. W. 1119) , thus sums up: "Filing consists simply in placing 
the paper in the hand of the clerk, to be preserved and kept by him 
in hi officia1 cu tody a an archive or record, of which his office 
become thenceforward the only proper r po itory; and it i hi~ 
duty, when the paper is thus placed in hi cu tody, or filed with 
him, to indorse upon it the date of it reception, and retain it in 
bi office, ubject to in pection by whomsoever it may concern; 
and that is what is meant by filing the paper. But, when the law 
require a party to file it, it imply mean that he hall plac H in 
the official cu tody of the clerk. Thi i all that i required or 
him; and, if the officer omits the duty of indor ing upon it the 
date of the filing, that will not prejudice the right of the part . . 
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This seems to be universal in its application to all documents, of
whatever nature, which the law requires to be filed," citing many
authorities, to the following among which we especially refer:
Ilolman v. Chevallier, 14 Tex. 339; Bishop v. Cooh, 13 Barb. 329;
Phillips V. Beencs Admr. 38 Ala. 251.
In Ffirmann v. Ilenlel, 1 111. App. 145, cited in 7 Am. & Eng.
Enc. L. (1st series), 962, the case was this: "A certificate and
affidavit required to be filed under a limited partnership act, were
sent by a messenger to the clerk's office, and there presented for the
purpose of being filed. The deputy clerk, to whom they were pre-
sented, instead of retaining them, by mistake added a certificate
of the official character of the notary before whom they were
acknowledged, and returned them to the messenger, by whom they
were carried away. Several months afterwards they were returned
to the county clerk's office and properly filed. As against a creditor
whose debt accrued before tlie papers were returned to the clerk's
office, it was held that the first presentation of them did not con-
stitute a filing. "Filing a paper," said the court, "ex vi termini,
means placing and leaving it among the files. The memorandum
indorsed by the officer in whose custody it is placed is merely evi-
dence of the filing, and not the filing itself."
We close the citation of authorities with the result in modem
practice, as stated by Mr. Freeman in the note above referred to
(page 294, vol. 15, Am. St. Eep.) : "The word 'file' is derived
from the Latin 'filum' signifying a thread, and its present appli-
cation is evidently drawn from the ancient practice of placing
papers upon a thread or wire for safe-keeping. The origin of the
term clearly indicates that the filing of a paper can only be effected
by bringing it to the notice of the officer, who anciently put it
upon the thread or wire; and accordingly, under the modem
practice, the filing of a document is now generally understood
to consist in placing it in the proper official custody by the party
charged with the duty of filing it, and the receiving of it by the
officer, to be kept on file. The most accurate definition of filing
a paper is that it is its delivery to the proper officer, to be kept on
file."
In Christian v. O'Neal, 46 Miss. 672 (a case of an attempt to
enforce a mechanic's lien, in which, as in a chancery suit, the

















































































































































BANK v. HOYT 1 1 
Thi em to be un·versal in it application to all documents, of 
whatever natur , wh.i h the law re uire to be :fil d/' citing matny 
authorities, to th following among which we e pecially refer : 
Holman . Chevallier, 1 Tex. ishop . Coale, 13 Barb. 3 9; 
Phillips . Beene s Aclmr. 38 Ala. 1. 
In Pfirmann . Henkel, 1 Ill. pp. 1-1 , cited in 7 Am. & Eng. 
Enc. L. ( 1 t erie ) , 9 6 , the cas a thi : " certificate and 
affidavit requir d to be £.1 d under a limited partnership act, were 
sent by a me eng r to the clerk' office, and there pre ented for the 
purpo e of bein0 £.1 d. The deputy clerk, to whom the were pre-
sented, in tead of retaining them, by mi take added a certi£.cate 
of the official haracter of the notary before whom they were 
acknowledged, and returned them to the me enger, by w horn they 
were carried away. Se eral month afterward they were returned 
to the county clerk's office and prop rly £.led. A against a creditor 
who e debt accrued before the papers were return d to the clerk's 
office, it was held that the :fir t presentation of them did not con-
stitute a :filing. "Filing a paper," aid the court, "ex vi termini, 
mean placing and leaving it among the :file . The memorandum 
indorsed by the officer in whose cu tody it is placed i merely evi-
dence of the filing, and not the filing itself." 
We close the citation of authorities willi the result in modern 
practice, as stated by Mr. Freemam. in the note above referred to 
(page 294, vol. 15, Am. St. Rep.) : "The word '£.le' i derived 
from the Latin 'fifom,' signifying a thread, and its present appli-
cation is evidently drawn from the ancient practice of placing 
papers upon a thread or wire for safe-keeping. The origin of the 
term clearly indicates that the £.ling of a paper can only be effected 
b bringing it to the notice of the officer, who anciently put it 
upon the threaid or wire; and accordingly, under the modern 
practice, the £.ling of a document i now generally under tood 
to con ist in placing it in the proper official cu tody by the part 
charged with the duty of £.ling it, and the receiving of it by the 
officer, to be kept on file. The mo t accurate dennition of :filino-
a pap r i that it is its delivery to the proper officer, to be kept on 
file. ' 
In Christian v. O'Neal, 46 Mi . 6 2 (ai ca e of an attempt t 
nforce a m hanic' li n in which a in a chancery .. uit th 
filing of the p tition i the commencement of the ui ) it "a 
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said : "If a petition was not on file when this or the writ of June,
1861, was issued, suit was not begun."
We have quoted thus largely from the authorities, because the
determination of this point will be decisive of the case. It is clear
that marking the paper "filed" is not filing it. A paper may be
marked filed, and yet not be in fact filed; and a paper may be in
fact filed, though not marked filed. And the entry on the general
docket does not constitute filing. All these indorsements of the
clerk are evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of a filing. What-
ever the nature of the paper, it can only be filed by dehvering it
to the proper officer, to be by him received and dealt with in the
manner usual with the particular character of paper. If a deed,
for example, or other paper required to be recorded, it must be kept
by the clerk until recorded; if any paper, in respect to which a
statute requires the original or a copy to be filed, the original may
not be withdrawn till a copy has been filed. If a bill in chancery,
it must be delivered to the clerk, to be by him received, indorsed,
and dealt with in the manner usual with such bills. It must be
delivered and recorded with the purpose of having process issue in
due course. Suits in chancery begin, of course, from the filing of
the bill, and at law from the issuance of process, under the code of
1857 (for present practice, see § 670, code of 1892) ; but just as,
under code of 1857, at law, the suit is not begun, though process
be issued, unless it is intended that it be served as in regular course
.(Lamkin v. Nye, 43 Miss. 252), so, in equity, the suit will not be
begun unless the bill is delivered with the purpose that the usual
steps shall be taken. In the one case, there is no issuance of
process, and in the other, no filing of the bill, within the meaning
of the law. Clearly, there was no such filing here. The error of
counsel for appellant was in supposing that merely having the bill
marked "filed," and placed in a court wrapper, or docketed, with-
out more, and with the declared purpose that the process should
not issue, would constitute filing, because of the rule that in chan-
cery the suit is begun by the filing of the bill. But the filing
meant, as we have shown, must be a filing in the legal sense, with
the purpose that process and all usual steps shall follow in due
course. Lamkin v. Nye, 43 Miss, 252, explains the principle. It
it is not necessary to decide whether the provision in our statute
against withdrawing papers (§ 463, code 1892) means to prohibit

















































































































































132 FILING THE BILL 
aid : 'If a petition wa not on :file when this or the writ of June, 
1861, was is ued, suit was not begun." 
We ha e quot d thu largely from the authoritie , becaiu e the 
determination of this point will be deci ive of the case. It is clear 
that marking the paper ":filed" is not :filing it. A paper may be 
marked :filed, and yet not be in fact :filed; and a pa1per ma.y be in 
fact :filed, though not marked :filed. And the entry on the general 
docket does not constitute filing. All these indorsements of the 
clerk are evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of a :filing. What-
ever the nature of the paper, it can only be filed by delivering jt 
to the proper officer, to be by him received and dealt with in the 
manner usual with the particular character of pa per. If a deed, 
for example, or other paper required to be recorded, it mu t be kept 
by the clerk until recorded; if any paper, in respect to which a 
statute require the original or a copy to be :filed, the original may 
not be withdrawn till a copy has been filed. If a bill in chancery, 
it must be delivered to the clerk, to be by him received, indorsed, 
and dealt with in the manner usual with such bills. It must be 
delivered and recorded with the purpose of having process issue in 
due course. Suits in chancery begin, of course, from the :filing of 
the bill, and at law from the issuance of process, under the code of 
1857 (for present practice, see § 670, code of 1892) ; but just as, 
under code of 1857, at law, the suit is not begun, though process 
be issued, unless it is intended that it be served as in regular course 
. (Lamkin v. Nye, 43 Miss. 252), so, in equity, the suit will not be 
begun unless the bill is delivered with the purpose that the usual 
steps shall be taken. In the one case, there is no issuance of 
process, and in the other, no :filing of the bill, within the meaning 
of the law. Cl arly, there was no such :filing here. The error of 
counsel for appellant was in supposing that merely having the bill 
marked ":filed," and placed in a court wrapper, or docketed, with-
out more, and with the declared purpo e that the proce should 
not i ue, would con titute :filing, because of the rule that in chan-
cery the suit i b gun by the filing of the bill. But th :filing 
meant, a we ha e shown, must be a :filing in the legal ense, with 
the purpo e that proce and all u ual t p hall follow in due 
cour . Lamkin v. Nye 3 Mi . 252, explain the principl . It 
it i not n c ary to d cide wh ther th provi ion in our tatute 
again t withdrawing paper ( § 463, ode 1 92) mean to prohH>it 
th taking out of a pl ading by coun 1 for examination c.- cpt 
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on the terms named in the statute, or whether withdrawal means
permanent withdrawal from the files.
It is doubtless true, as suggested by learned counsel, that it is
the custom for attorneys to take out pleadings, giving their re-
ceipt, and usually no question would arise, as the instances are rare
in which the priority of a lien is determined by the filing of a par-
ticular pleading. But we desire to be understood as deciding
nothing on this precise point, resting our decision in this case on
its own facts. We cannot hold that what was done with this bill
constituted a filing of it, under the general rule as to the filing of
pleadings, nor under the terms of this statute, without deciding
that the mere marking upon a pleading of the word "filed," etc.,
and a docket entry thereof, and a placing momentarily of the bill
in a court file, without more, in a cover, where it was at once
handed back and taken away, and kept away until another bill
had been filed regularly, with the direction not to issue process
added, constitute filing; and this, manifestly, is in the face of all
principle and of all the authorities. We have gone carefully
through all the questions in the case, but it is unnecessary, in the
view we have taken, to remark upon them.
When is Suit Commenced ?
Clarlc V. Slatjton, 63 N. H. 402. (18S5.)
A suit in equity is not commenced until the bill is'^led
Bill in Equity, to recover money verbally promised in support
of a base-ball club. The defendant in his answer alleges that there
is no equity in the bill, that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy
at law, and sets up the statute of limitations.
In 1877 the plaintifl: was the manager of a base-ball club in
Manchester. He, the defendant, and three others, verbally agreed
to pay each one sixth part of the excess of the expenses over the
receipts of the club. The plaintiff, as manager, advanced the ex-
penses, and at the end of the season, in the fall of 1877, demanded
payment of the defendant of his share of the excess over the re-
ceipts, Avhich the defendant refused to pay. About the first of
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on th' t rm· n m ·d in th tatut , r wh th r withdrawal mean 
p rman nt withdrawal from th fil . 
It i doubtl · · lru , a ugg t d by 1 arn d oun cl that it is 
th u ·tom for attorne to tak out 1 ading , giving th ir re-
c jpt, and u ually n qu ' tion would ari: , a th in tan e ar rare 
in whi h th priorit .r a li n i · d l rmincd by the filing of a par-
ticular pl acling. ut w d ir to be under tood a deciding 
nothing on t.b.i pr i point, re ting our deci ion in thi a n 
ii own fa t . \ annot holcl that hat wa clan with thi bill 
on tituwd a filing of it, und r th g n ral rul a to th filing of 
pl ading , nor un 1 r the t rm o:f thi ta.tute, without deciding 
that th m r marking upon a pl ading of he word ' fil cl, tc., 
and a clo k t ntry th reo.f, and a placing mom ntarily of the bill 
in a court fil , without more, in a co er, where it wa at once 
handed back and tak n away, and kept away until another bill 
had b en filed r gularly, with the direction not to i sue proce 
added, con titute filing; and this, manife tly, i in the face of all 
principle and of all the authoritie . We have gone carefully 
through all the que tion in the ca e, but it i unneces ary, in the 
view we haive taken, to remark upon them. 
Affirmed. 
'--{ ' 
WHEN IS UIT OMMEN CED? ~ ~ ;,. ~ 
Clark v. layton, 63 N. H. 402. (1885.)~ ti7 / 
A suit in quity i not ommenc d until the bill i Illed. ~ 
BILL IN EQUITY, to reco er money verbally promi ed in upport 
of a ba e-ball club. The d fondant in hi an wer allege that there 
is no equity in the bill, that the plaintiff ha no ad quate remedy 
at law and et.s up th tatui:e of limitation . 
In 1 th plaintiff wa th manaa r of a ba e-ball club in 
Man h t r. th d f ndant and thr oth r v rbally agreed 
to pay a h on ixth part f th x f the p nse ov r the 
r c ipt of th lub. Th plaintiff a rnanaa r, advan th e. -
p n an 1 at th nd of th ea on in th fall of 1 
pa 1 nt f th d I ndant of hi hare of th 01 r th r -
ip which the d fendaint r fu d to pay. bout th fir t of 
Jun , 1 ' l th plaintiff dr w the bill and nt it to the l rk who 
]^34 When is Suit Commenced
Qotified him that by the rule it could not be iiled and entered until
the entry fee was paid. February 12, 1884, the necessary fees
havino- been provided, the bill was filed and an order of notice
issued, which was served upon the defendant February 28, 188-1.
The court dismissed the bill, and the plaintiff excepted.
Cakpentek, J. :
An action at law is in general regarded as commenced, so as to
avoid the statute of limitations, when the writ is completed with
the purpose of making immediate service. But when there is no
intention to have it served, or it cannot be served until some fur-
ther act is done, the action is not deemed to be commenced until
such act is performed. BoUnson v. BuAeigli, 5 N. H. 225 ; Graves
V. Ticknor, 6 N. H. 537; Hardy v. Corlis, 21 N. H. 356; Mason v.
Cheney, 47 N. H. 24; Brewster v. Brewster, 52 N. H. 60. The
same rule is applicable to suits in equity. Leacli v. Noyes, 45 N. H.
364. A bill in equity must be filed in the clerk's of&ce, and an
order of notice obtained, before it can be served upon the defend-
ant. Rules 11, 13. The date of the filing is therefore the earliest
time which cam be taken as the commencement of the suit.
The plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations.
This result makes it unnecessary to consider other questions raised
by the ease.
Exceptions overruled.
Allen, J., did not sit; the others concurred.
L,^
^^nited States v. Am. Lumber Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 827. (1898.)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
tkern District of California.
I yOiLBERT, Circuit Judge:
jL^ The United States brought a suit in equity against the American
^ Lumber Company and the Central Trust Company to declare null
U and void certain patents issued by the United States for lands in
California, the title to which is vested in the American Lumber
Company, subject to the lien of a trust deed to the Central Trust
6^^ Company, securing bonds of the former company to the amount of

















































































































































134 WHEN IS SUIT COMMENCED 
notified him that by the rule it could not be fil d and entered until 
the entry fee wa I aid.. February 12, 1884, the necessary fees 
ha ing been pro ided, the bill wa filed and an order of notice 
i ued, which wa.. rved upon the defendant February 28, 1884. 
I1h court dismissed the bill, and the plaiintiff excepted. 
ARPE TTER, J. : 
An action at law is in general regarded as commenced, so as to 
avoid the tatute of limitation , when the writ i completed with 
the purpose of making immediate ervice. But when there is no 
intention to have it served, or it cannot be served until ome fur-
ther act i done, the ruction is not deemed to be commenced until 
,uch act is performed. Robinson v. BU'J~leigh, 5 N. H. 225; Graves 
v. Ticknor, 6 N. H. 537; Hardy v. Carlis, 21 N. H. 356; Mason v. 
Cheney, 47 N. H. 2-±; Brewster v. Brewster, 52 N. H. 60. The 
,ame rule i applicable to suits in equity. Leach v. Noyes, 45 N. H. 
364. A bill in equity must be filed in the clerk's office, and an 
ord r of notice obtained, before it can be erved upon the defend-
ant. Rule 11, 13. The date of the filing i therefore the earliest 
time which cain be taken as the commencement of the suit. 
The plaintiff's action is barred by the tatute of limitations. 
Thi result makes it unnecessary to consider other questions raised 
by the case. 
Exceptions overruled. 
ALLEN, J., did not sit; the others concurred. 
States v. Am. Lumber Co., 85 Fed. Rep. 827. {1898.} 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the 
f ?' ....~rn District of California. 
"" ~~ILBERT Circuit Judge: 
rY"'... Th Unit d tatcs brou ht a uit in equity again t th American 
~ Lumber ompany and th ntral Tru t ompany to d clare null 
l,v and void ertain pat nt i u d by th Unit i tat for land jn 
\ /~· alifornia, the titl to whi h i v t d in the m ri an Lumber 
.}YI' _: Company, ubj t to the li n of ai tru t d ed to th ntral Tru"t 
e u v -·~ ornpany uring bond of th former company to th amounJ of 
,;Y'~ poo 000. Th d fendants pl add in bar of th uit that by an 
~~~J· 
~).· (\~ / / ./ ~<YV" 
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act of congress approved March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1093, § 8), it is
provided that "suits by the United States to vacate and annul any
patent heretofore issued shall only 1x3 brought within five years from
the passage of this act," and that the patents which it was the
object of the suit to annul and vacate had been issued before the
enactment of said statute, and that the suit had not been brought
within five years from the passage of the act. The bill was filed
on rel)ruary 3, 1890, in the circuit court for the Xorthern district
of California. It contained the allegation that the defendant the
American Lumber Company is a corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Illinois, and that the Central Trust Company
is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Xew
York. On the day on which the bill was filed, two subpcenas bear-
ing date February 3, 1896, were issued out of the clerk's oflBce,
upon a prsecipo which reads as follows:
"To the Clerk of Said Court — Sir: Please issue two originals
and two copies of subpoena ad respondendum herein, for service
upon respondents, returnable March 2, 189G; one original and copy
being necessary for service upon, and for marshal to make return
of service upon, the res|)ondent American Lumber Co., in Chicago,
and the other original and copy of subpoena ad respondendum being
necessary for marshal to serve upon, and to make return of service
upon, the respondent Central Tnist Co., in Xew York."
Both of the subpcenas so issued were sent as soon as issued, the
one to the United States marshal for the Northern district of Illi-
nois, and the other to the LTnited States marshal for the Southern
district of Xew York. The marshal for the Northern district of
Illinois returned the subpoena with the indorsement that the de-
fendants were not found within his district. A subpoena was again
issued February 18, 1896, and was sent to said marshal, and was
thereafter returned with the indorsement that on February 24,
1896, it had been served upon the secretary of the American Lum-
ber Company, in that district. Tlie marshal for the Southern
district of New York served the subpoena on the Central Trust
Company, in New- York, on February 11, 1896. On March 5, 1896,
and two days after the expiration of the five-years period of limi-
tation for the commencement of the suit, an order was entered in
the suit, reciting that it appeared from the affidavit of Benjamin
F. Bergen, solicitor for tlie complainant, that the defendants were
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act of ongr approv d nfar ·h 'tat. 1093, 8), it i.· 
provid d that uit 1 y th nit a at and annul any 
patent h r t for' i : uccl hall I ly b br ugh wi hin five years from 
the pa ,ag oi thi ncl an that th pat nt ' which it wa th 
obj ·t f th uit i.o annul and v ·at hacl l n i ued before the 
na trn nt of aicl ta UL " and that th uit had not been brought 
within fiv ' ar fr m the pa ag of h act. r he bill wa fileJ 
on F bruary 1 G, in the ir uit ourt .f r th .J._ orthern di triet 
of alifornia. t ontainecl the all gati n that th d fendant th 
umb r 10 pany i a orporatio rganized under the 
f h tat f Illinoi , and that th { ntral Tru t ompany 
i a orporation rganiz d und r the law f the tate of l. ew 
r ork. n th day on whicili. th bill wa filed, two ubpama bear-
ing date F bruary 1 96 wer i ued out of the clerk office, 
upon a prrecip which r ad a follow : 
To th 1 rk of aid ourt- ir : Plea e i ue two oriainal 
and two copi of ubpamai ad T pond ndum herein, for ervice 
upon r pond nt , r turnable Mar h 2, 1 96; on original and copy 
being ne ary for ervice upon, and for mar hal to make r turn 
of er i upon, the re pondent American Lumb r o., in hicago, 
and th other original and copy of ubpama ad re pondendum being 
ne e ary for marshal to erve upon, and to make return of rv1ce 
upon th re pondent entral Tru t o., in ew r ork. ' 
Both of the ubpcena o i ued were ent a oon as i ued the 
on to the United ta mar hal for the T orthern di trict of Illi-
noi and the oth r to the nited tat marshal for the outhern 
di tri t of ~ w ork. Th mair hal for the Northern di trict of 
llinoi r turned th ubpcena with the indor ement that the de-
f ndan were not found within hi di trict. ubpcena wa aaain 
i u d February 1 , 1 96, and wa ent to aid marshal, and a" 
thereafter r turned with th indor ment that on ebruary 2-± 
1 9 it had b en rv d upon the cretary of th American Lum-
ber ompany in that di trict. The mar hal for the outhern 
di trict of ew r ork erved th ubpcena on the entral Tru t 
ompan · in ~ w York on 1 bruary 11 1 96. n Iarch 1 9 , 
an l two day atft r th xpiration of he fiv - ' ar period of limi-
tation for th comm n m n of th uit an ord r wa ~ ent r m 
th ui r citing that it appear d from th a davit of njamin 
rrr n licitor for the omplainant that th d fen ant w r 
ior irru or oration having no o r r r pr ~ ntati e or acrent, 
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nor any office or place of business, within the state of California,
and that the defendants could not be found in said state, and had
not voluntarily appeared in the suit, and requiring them to appear
on April 6, 1896. A copy of this order was served on the Amer-
ican Lumber Company March 9, 1896, and on the Central Trust
Company March 16, 1896. On June 22, 1896, the service of this
order was quashed upon the motion of the defendants; and on
June 25, 1896, another order was thereupon entered, containing
recitals similar to those of the first order, and directing the defend-
ants to appear on August 3, 1896. It was upon the service of this
last order that the defendants appeared and filed the pleas of the
statute of limitations above set forth. Upon the hearing before
the circuit court, the pleas were sustained, and the bill was dis-
missed. The case upon appeal to this court presents the single
question whether or not, upon the record above set forth, the suit
was begun within five years after March 3, 1891.
Was the suit begun on or before March 3, 1896 ? It is contended
by the appellant that by filing the bill in equity and causing process
to be issued thereon, for both the defendants, in good faith, before
that date, it took all the steps necessary to bring or commence the
suit before the expiration of the time limited by the act of congress.
Just at what point of time a suit in equity may be said to have been
begun under the practice of the federal courts has not been deter-
mined by any statute, or by any rule of court, or by any authorita-
tive decision. A solution of the question must be found by reference
to the English chancery practice, which has been made the rule of
procedure in those courts.
The origin of the English chancery practice is involved in some
ol)scurity, but from tlie earliest treatises upon the subject it ap-
pears that the jurisdiction of the court of chancery was invoked
formerly, as now, by filing a petition or bill setting forth the com-
plainant's grounds for relief, and praying that a writ of subpoena
issue. Upon the petition so presented, the chancellor determined
whether a cause was made for the issuance of the writ. He had
the power to grant or to withhold the writ. If the writ was
granted, the suit was begun; otherwise, there was no suit. The
issuance of the writ was the commencement of the suit. In Harg.
Law Tracts, 321, 435, may be found treatises on the writ of sub-
poena, in which the suit in chancery is designated a suit by sulipoena'.

















































































































































136 WHEN IS SUIT COMMENCED 
nor any office or pla e of bu in , within the tate of California, 
and that th d f nclan could not be found in aid tate, and had 
not voluntarily app ared in the uit, aind r quiring them to appear 
on pril 6, 1 96. A opy of thi ord r was erved on the Amer-
ican Lumber ompany March 9, 1896, and on the C ntral Tru ' t 
ompany Mar h 16, 1 96. On June 22, 1896, th ervice of thi , 
ord r wa qua ied upon the motion of th defendants; and on 
June 25, 1 96, another order wa thereupon ent red, containing 
recital imilar to tho of th :fir t order, and directing the defend-
ant to app ar on Augu t 3, 1 96. It wa upon the ervice of thi 
la t order that the defendants appeared and :filed the plea of the 
tatute of limita·tion above set forth. Upon the hearing before 
the circuit court, th plea wer su tained, and the bill was dis-
mi ed. The ca e upon appeal to thi court pr ents the single 
question whether or not, upon the r cord above et forth, the suit 
wa begun within :five y ars after March 3, 1 91. 
Wa the uit begun on or before March 3, 1896? It is contended 
by the a·ppellant that by :filing the bill in quity and causing proce , 
to be i ued thereon, for both the defendant , in good faith, before 
that date, it took all the steps neces ary to bring or commence the 
suit before the expiration of the time limit d by the act of congre s. 
Ju t at what point of time a suit in equity may be aid to have been 
begun under the practice of the federal courts has not been deter-
mined by any tatute, or by any rul of court, or by any authorita-
tive deci ion. A olution of the qu tion mu t be found by reference 
to the Engli h chancery practice, which has been made the rule of 
proc dure in tho e courts. 
The origin of the Engli h chanc ry practice i involved in ome 
ob curity but from the earli t treati e upon the subje t it ap-
p ar that the juri di tion of the court of chanc ry wa invoked 
form rly as now by filin a petition or bill tting forth th com-
plainant ground for r lief, and prayino- that a writ o.f ubpama 
i u . pon th p tition o pr n d, th hancellor det rmin d 
wh th r ai cau wa ad for th i uan f th writ. ha 
th pow r to grant r to withhold th writ. If th writ wa 
grant cl th . ujt wa b gun; therwi th r wa no uit. The 
i uan of th writ wa th om n m nt f t11 uit. n arg. 
aw Tra ts, 1 4 , ay b .f und tr ati n th writ f ub-
p na in which th uit in han ry i cl i nat d a uit b ubp na·. 
n urB of tim th practi wa m clifi cl , o that th imature 
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of counsel for tlie complainant was taken as sufficient authority
for the issuance of the writ, and it wan no longer necessary for the
chancellor to pass upon the case made in the petition. It was held
that the suit was pending from the teste of the subpoena. Pigott
Vi Noiuer, 3 Swanst. 534. Such, in brief, was the English chan-
cery practice at the time of its adoption as the rule of procedure
in the courts of the United States. And while it is true that, in
cases where the suit was instituted on behalf of the crown, the
matter of complaint was presented to the court by way of informa-
tion instead of by petition or bill, it was only in form that the in-
formation differed from a bill; and it appears that from the filing
of the information the subsequent procedure was substantially the
same as iu other suits. Mitf. Ch. PI, 7, 22, 119; Attorney General
V. Vernon, 1 Vem. 277, 370. The present suit on behalf of the
United States might, no doubt, have followed the procedure of
the English courts upon information (1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 34) ; but
no warrant would be found from that fact for departing from the
ordinary course of a suit in equity. Our equity rule Xo. 7 follows
the English statute (4 Anne, c. 16, § 22) in providing that "no
process of subpoena shall issue from the clerk's office in any suit in
equity until the bill is filed in the office." Rule 5 provides that
while all motions for the issuance of mesne process in the clerk's
office shall be grantable, of course, by the clerk of the court, "the
same may be suspended or altered or rescinded by any judge of the
court upon special cause shown." In tiie frame of the bill there
is still inserted the prayer that the writ of subpcena may issue;
but, under equity rule 24, signature of counsel is "an affinnation,
upon his part that, upon the instructions given to liim and the
case laid before him, there is good ground for the suit in the man-
ner in which it is framed"; and it takes the place of an examina-
tion of the bill by the chancellor under the original practice. The
writ of subpo3na in the English chancery practice ran in the name
of the king, and was returnable before the chancellor. Our writ
is issued in the name of tlie president of the United States, and
is returnable before the court in chancer3\ It has been the inter-
pretation of the English chancerv practice, as the same has been
followed and appliwl l>y the American state courts, that a suit is
begun, within the meaning of the statute of limitations, when the
subpoena has been issued, provided that its issuanc-e has been fol-
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of coun el for the omplainan wa tak n a ufficient authorit 
for th• i uan · of th writ, and it was no longer n c ary for the 
han llor t pa up n the ·as mad in th petition. t wa held 
that th ·uil wa · 1 ndinb from lh' t ' t of the ubpama. Pigott 
ower 3 • 1wan . .)' -±. • 1u ·h, in bri f, wa the Engli.'h ·han-
ry pra ti e at th' tim f it adoption as the rule f pro ·edure 
in th our f th• nit cl tat . nd while it i rue that, jn 
a wh r fue ui w· in tituted on b half of the r wn the 
matt r f omplaint w pr ent d to the ourt by way of inf rma-
tion i t ad of by p ti i n or bill, it was only in form that the in-
formaiti n di:ff, r d fr m a bill; and it appears that from the filing 
of th information the ub quent procedure was ub tantially the 
am a in oth r uits. Uitf. h. 1. , 2 119; Attorney General 
. Vernon, 1 Vern. , 3 0. Th pre nt uit on b half of the 
nitecl tate might, no doubt, have follow d the procedure of 
the ngli h cour upon information ( 1 arb. h . ra . 3-1) · but 
no warrant would be found from that fact for d parting from the 
orclinar ou e of a uit in quity. Our equity rule X o. follow 
th Engli h tatut ( 4 Anne, c. 16, ) in providing that 'no 
pro of ubpIBna hall i ue from the cl rk office in any uit in 
equity until th bill i filed in th offic . ' Rule 5 provid that 
whil all motion for the i ua.nce of m n proc in the cl rk 
.ffi hall b grantable, of ourse, by the 1 rk of th court, the 
am ma b u p nded or altered or r cinded by any judge of th 
court u n p ial cau e hown. ' In the fram of the bill there 
i ill in rt d th prayer that th writ of ubpama may i ue; 
but und r quity rul 4, ignatur of oun el i 'an affirmation 
up n hi ' part that upon the in truction given to him and th 
a lai l f r him her i good ground for th uit in the man-
n r in whi ·h it i fram · and it take th place of an xamina-
ti n f th bill b ' th han ellor und r th original pra tice. The 
wri of ul p na in th n li h cha.n ry pra tice ran in the nam 
f the kinO' and w r urnabl b for th hancellor. ur writ 
i i. f'u' in th nam of th pr id nt of th nit d tat ~ and 
is r lurnahl b f r h urt in bane ry. ha b en the int r-
pr 'la i n of th ; no-li h han ry practi a th am ha b en 
f II w d ancl appli 1 by h meri an tate ourL tha a uit i 
h •gun, within th 111 aninO' f th ,:;ta tut f limitation . "h n the 
ulip1 ' 11 <1 ha~ h n i ' u ' l prond d that it ~ i~suan ha , b n fol-
l " 1 by a bona fi 1 art to ' IT th am . 
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In the case of Hayden v. Buchlin, 9 Paige, 512, Chancellor Wal-
worth thus stated the law:
"At the present day the filing of a bill, and taking out a subpoena
thereon, and making a bona fide attempt to serve it without delay,
may be considered as the commencement of the suit for the purpose
of preventing the operation of the statute of limitations, if the suit
is afterwards prosecuted with due and reasonable diligence."
The language of the opinion so quoted is adopted as an authorita-
tive formulation of the law in Busw. Lim. § 365, and in Ang. Lim.
§ 330.
In Fitch V. Smith, 10 Paige, 9, the chancellor again declared
the rule:
"It is true, in common parlance we use the expression 'filing of
the bill' to denote the commencement of a suit in chancery, instead
of referring to the issuing and service of subpcena, or the making
of a bona fide attempt to serve it after the bill has been filed, which
is the actual commencement of the suit in this court."
In Pindell v. Maydiv&U, 7 B. Mon. 314, the supreme court of Ken-
tucky said:
"In bringing a suit in chancery, the first step taken by the com-
plainant is to file his petition or bill; and hence writers on this
subject frequently speak in general terms of this act as the com-
mencement of the suit. But, so far as it relates to the defendant,
the suing out process against him is the commencement of the
suit, preferring the bill being only preparatory to this being done."
Counsel for appellant rely upon the language of the court so
quoted, and upon similar expressions of other courts, to sustain
the doctrine that suing out process is beginning the suit, and con-
tend that the present suit was begun on February 3, 1896, for the
reason that process was sued out upon that date. They argue that
it does not follow from the fact that the defendants were non-
residents of the state of California, and were corporations created
under the laws of other states, that they might not have been found
within the Northern district of California for the purpose of service
of the writ, and that there is nothing in the bill to indicate that
the defendants had not agents or officers within the district upon
whom such service might have ])een had. In short, they contend
that process was sued out in good faith, and that, therefore, the
suit was begun.

















































































































































138 WHEN IS SUIT COMMENCED 
In the ca e of Hayden v. Bucklin, 9 Paige, 512, Chancellor Wal-
worth thus tated the law: 
"At the pre ent day the filing of a bill, and taking out a subpama 
thereon, and making a bona: fide attempt to serve it without delay, 
may be con id red a the commencement of the suit for the purpose 
of preventing the operation of the statute of limitation , if the suit 
is afterwards pro ecuted with due and rea onable diligence." 
The language of the opinion so quoted is adopted as an authorita-
tive formulation of the law in Busw. Lim. § 365, and in Ang. Lim. 
§ 330. 
In Fitch v. Smith, 10 Paige, 9, the chancellor again declared 
the rule: 
"It is true, in common parlance we use the expression 'filing of 
the bill' to denote the commencement of a suit in chancery, instead 
of referring to the i suing and ervice of subpama, or the making 
of a bona fide attempt to serve it after the bill has been filed, which 
is the actual commenoement of the suit in thi court." 
In Pindell v. Maydw~ll, 7 B. Mon. 314, the supreme court of Ken-
tucky said: 
"In bringing a suit in chancery, the first step taken by the com-
plainant is to file his petition or bill; and hence writers on this 
subject frequently speak in general terms of this act as the com-
mencement of the suit. But, o far as it relates to the defendant, 
the suing out proce s against him is the commencement of the 
suit, preferring the bill being only preparatory to this being done." 
Coun el for appellant rely upon the la:nguage of the court o 
quoted, and upon similar expres ions of other court , to su tain 
the doctrine that uing out proce s i beginning the suit, and con-
tend that the pre ent suit wa begun on February 3, 1896, for the 
rea on that proce wa ued out upon that date. They argue that 
it doe not follow from the fact that the defendants were non-
re ident of the tatc of California, and were corporation created 
und r the law of oth r ta:te , that they might not have been found 
within th North rn di trict of California for th purpo e of ervice 
of th writ, and that there i nothing in the bill to indicate that 
th d fendant had not agents or offic r within the di trict upon 
wh m uch s rvice might have been ha . n hort, they contend 
that pro wa u d out in good faith, and that, therefor the 
uit wa b gun. 
Thi lead u to inquire what i m ant by the t rm " uinc; out 
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process." From the authorities it appears that suing out process
in equity is the same in meaning as suing out process in an action
at law. It means that, upon the filing of a bill, a writ of subpana
is filled out by the clerk, and is delivered for service. Blain v.
Blain, 15 Vt. 538; Day v. Lamb, 7 Vt. 426; Mason v. Cheney,
47 X. H. 24; Hardy v. Corlls, 21 N. H. 356; Updike v. Ten
Broech, 32 N". J. Law, 105; Burdich v. Green, 18 Johns, 14;
Jackson v. Brooks, 14 Wend. 650; Haughton v. Leary, 3 X. C. 21;
Webster v. Sharpe (?s\ C), 21 S. E. 912; IlailY. Spencer, 1 R. I.
17; Gardner v. Webber, 17 Pick. 407; Evatis v Galloway, 20 Ind.
479; Whitaker v. Turnbull, 18 X. J. Law, 172. In order that the
writ be deemed to be sued out, it must have left the possession of
the officer who issued it, and must cither have reached the possession
of the officer who is to serve it, or the possession of some one who
is the medium of transmission to such officer. But this is not suffi-
cient to toll the statute of limitations. The delivery of the writ
must be followed either by a service of the same or by a bona fide
effort to serve it. If nothing be done with the writ after its issu-
ance, if it be returned unserved, or without the bona fide effort to
serve it, and a new writ be taken out, the date of the commence-
ment of the suit will be postponed to the date of the second writ.
Equity rule 7 prescribes that '*the process of subpoena shall consti-
tute the proper mesne process in all suits in equit}', in the first
instance, to require the defendant to appear and answer the exi-
gency of the bill." There can be no doubt, in view of the averments
of the bill, that if the subpoena in this case had been delivered
upon its issuance to the marshal for the Northern district of Cali-
fornia, for service upon the defendants in case they could be found
in that district, and a bona fide effori; had been made to serve them
therein, and that effort had been followed by timely proceedings
to acquire jurisdiction by substituted service, the commencement
of the suit would relate back to the date when the writ was so
issued. So, also, it would seem that if, under the bill in this case,
without the issuance of a subpoena, proceedings had been had ac-
cording to the act of March 3, 1875, to obtain the special order
therein provided for, the suit would have been begun at the moment
wlien the special order was issued and delivered for service. For-
syth V. Picrson, 9 Fed. 801 ; Batt v. Proctor, 45 Fed. 515. But
see, contra, Branson v. Keokuk, 2 Dill. 498, Fed. Cas. No. 1,928.
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proc " From th authoriti it app ar that uing out proce ~ 
in quity i th am in meaning a uing out proce in an action 
at law. It mean that upon the filing of a bill, a writ of ubpama 
is fill d out by the clerk, and i deli er d for ervice. Blain v. 
Blain, 45 t. 53 ; Day v. Lamb, Vt. 4 ; MMon v. 'heney, 
4 . H. 4 ; llardy v. Carlis, 1 56 ; Updike . Ten 
Broeck, 3 . J. Law, 105; Burdick . Green, 18 J ohn . 1-!; 
Jack on . Brooks, 14 Wend. 650; llaughton . Leary, 3 . 21; 
Web ter . harpe ( . C.), 1 . E. 912; Hail . pencer, 1 R. I. 
1 ; Gardner . lV ebb er, 1 Pick. 40 ; Evans v Galloway, 20 Ind. 
4 9; Whitaker . T urnbull, 18 N. J. Law, 1 2. I n order that the 
writ be d emed to be ued out, it mu t have left the po ion of 
the offic r who i ued it, and mu t either have reached the po e ion 
of the officer who i to erve it, or the po e ion of ome one who 
i the medium of tran mi ion to uch officer. But thi i not uffi-
cient to toll the tatute of limitations. The delivery of the writ 
mu t be followed either by a ervice of the ame or by a bona fide 
effort to erve it. If nothing be done with the writ after it i u-
ance, if it be returned un er ed, or without the bona fide effort to 
er e it, and a new writ be taken out, the date of the commence-
ment of the suit will be po tpon d to the da.te of the econd writ. 
Equity rule 7 pre cribes that athe proce s of subpcena hall con ti-
tut the proper me ne proces in all ui in quity, in the :fir t 
in t nc to r quire the defendant to a pp ear and answer the exi-
gen ·of the bill. ' There can be no doubt, in view of the a erment 
of th bill, that if the ubpcena in thi ca e had been delivered 
upon it i ua•nc to the marshal for the Northern di trict of ali-
fornia for ervice upon the d f ndant in ca e they could be found 
in that di trict, an a bona fide effort had been made to erve them 
ther in and that ort had b n followed by timely proceeding 
to acquire juri di tion by ub titut d rvic , the commencement 
of th uit would r lat ack to th dat when the writ was o 
i su . o al o it ould m that if under the bill in thi ca e, 
with ut th i uan of a ubpcena proceeding had been had ac-
or ling to th a t of farch 3 1 to obtain the pecial order 
th r i pro i e for the uit would ha e n b o-un at the moment 
wh n th p cial order wa · ued and d li ered for ervioo. For-
·yth . Pier on 9 F d. 01 · Batt . Proctor -±5 Fe . 15. But 
, contra Bron on eokuk ill. 4 Fed. a . o. 1 
ut, wh th r w rn a ur th ffort to mak r ic in thi 
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by what was actually done or by the intention, the steps that were
taken come short of the requirement of the rule. The only informa-
tion we have concerning the intention of complainant or its counsel
in suing out the writ is afforded — First, by the prsecipe, and, sec-
ond, by what was done with the writ. From the praecipe it appears
that the intention was to send the subpoenas forthwith without the
state for service. From the writs themselves it appears that they
never came into the hands of the officer who was authorized to
serve them, the marshal of the Northern district of California, but
that they were sent to persons who were without authority to serve
the same, and were by them subsequently returned to tlie clerk's
office. It is needless to say that the process of the court could not
run beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction. In deciding whether
there was an effort to serve the subpcenas in good faith, we must be
guided by a consideration of what the law required in order to effect
a valid service. It does not aid the bona fides of the attempt to
serve that the appellant's counsel thought that the subpoenas could
be legally served by the persons to whom they were sent. It is
immaterial what may have been his belief or his opinion in that
regard. The bona fides must be shown by proof that an effort was
made to proceed according to law, and that use was made, or at-
tempted to be made, of the means which the law prescribes. After
the writs were issued in this case, not a step was taken in the line of
lawful procedure. Sending the writs without the district in which
only they could be served, and to persons who were without power
to serve them, were vain and futile acts. The delivery of copies of
the subpoenas to the defendants at their offices in Illinois and New
York, while it was sufficient to give them actual notice that a bill
had been filed against them, was neither a service nor an attempted
service upon them, and was of no greater effect than any other
notice which they might have received of the same fact. In short,
it may be said that up to the 5th day of March, 1896, nothing had
])cen done to begin the suit except to file the bill, and to cause sub-
pcenas to issue, which subpoenas were subsequently returned to the
clerk's office.
It is argued that the court should construe liberally, in favor of
the United States, a self-imposed statute of limitations, and the
case of U. 8. v. American Bell Td. Co., 159 U. S. 548, 16 Sup. Ct.
69, is cited. The doctrine of that case, and of the precedents on

















































































































































140 WHEN IS SUIT COMMENCED 
by what wa actually done or by the intention, the steps that were 
taken come hart of the requirement of the rule. The only informa-
tion we have concerning the intention of complainant or its counsel 
in suing out the writ is afforded-First, by the prrecipe, and, sec-
ond, by what wa done with the writ. From the prrecipe it appears 
that the intention wa to send the subpama forthwith without the 
tate for service. From the writs themselv s it appears that they 
never came into the hands of the officer who wa authorized to 
serve them, the marshal of the Northern district of California, but 
that they were sent to persons who were without authority to serve 
the same, and were by them subsequently returned to the clerk's 
office. It i needless to say that the process of the court could not 
run beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction. In deciding whether 
there was an effort to erve the subpamas in good faith> we must be 
guided by a consideration of what the law required in order to effect 
a valid service. It does not aid the bonai :fides of the attempt to 
erve that the appellant's counsel thought that tlie subpcenas could 
be legally served by the persons to whom they were sent. It is 
immaterial what may have been his belief or his opinion in that 
regard. The bona: £.des must be shown by proof that an effort was 
made to proceed according to law, and that use was made, or at-
tempted to be made, of the means which the la·w prescribes. After 
the writs were issued in this case, not a step was taken in the line of 
lawful procedure. Sending the writs without the district in which 
only they could be served, and to persons who were without power 
to erve them, were vain and futile acts. The delivery of copies of 
the subpcenas to the defendants at their offices in Illinois and New 
York, while it was sufficient to give them actual notice that a1 bill 
had been filed against them, was neither a service nor an attempi:ed 
ervice upon them, and was of no greater effect than any other 
notice which they might ha:ve received of the same fact. In short, 
it may be aid that up to the 5th day of March, 1896, nothing had 
l n done to begin the suit except to file the bill, and to cause sub-
p na to i u , whi h subpcenas were subs quently returned to the 
lerk's office. 
t i argued that th court hould con true liberally in favor of 
the United Stat , a lf-impo d statute of limitation , and the 
case of U. S. v. American Bell Te'l. Co. 15 U. S. 548, 16 Sup. Ct. 
6 , is cited. The doctrine of that a , and of the pr cedents on 
whi hit i . . u. tain d i confined in it applicati n to ca in whi h 
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uncertainty exists as to the intention of the legislature to' impose
the limitation In the present case no doubt is suggested by the
language of the statute, and there is no room for construction. It
is clear that congress has said that all suits by the United States
to vacate patents shall l)e l)rought within the period limited by the
act. The only question we are called uix)n to decide is whether
this suit has been within that period. In determining at what
point in the proceedings a suit shall be dcHjmed to be commenced,
we have no warrant for holding that the rule applicable id a suit
on behalf of the United States shall differ from that applicable
to other cases. When the United States, through its congress, has
said that suits in its favor shall be brought only within a stated
period, we have no criterion for determining whether a given suit a
was commenced within that period, except to apply the rules and ^'j^
principles applicable to all suitors. The decree of the circi^^^ourt
will be atlirmed.
Process. ^Y ^f fyi^^y
Crowell V. Botsford, 16 N.J. Eq. 1^58^ (186^) ^^^^ J-
The bill in this cause was filed to foreclose a chattel mortgage.-
The subpoena was issued before the filing of the bill, but no notice
was taken of the irregularity, and the cause was allowed to proceed"
to final decree and execution. The defendant now asks to set
aside all the proceedings in the cause, on the ground that the sub-iV
poena was issued and served before the bill was filed. ^ • ji
The Chancellor: ih)^"^^^\, '^^ \<\
The defendant asks to set aside the execution, final decree, ancr"^ v ^
all the proceedings in the cause, on the ground that the subpoenfKj/\ n^
was issued and served licfore the bill was filed. k/^S
The statute provides that no subpoena or other process for appear4^^ ^f^ .
ance, shall issue out of the Court of Chancery, except in cases toM^ ^
stay waste, until after the bill shall have been filed with the clerk ^fi^ •
I of the court. Nix. Dig. 97, § 6. ^ k ^^
' Tlie proceeding on the part of the complainant was clearly ir-'A^ i^
regular, and had the irregularity l)een promptly brouglit to the V" ^\
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t th int ntion of th 1 gi lature to· impo e 
nt · e no doubt i ugg ted by th1:: 
thcr i no room for o tru ·tion. t 
1 icl that all uit by the nited tates 
to va at paten · br ught within tl~ rio limited by the 
act. Th nly qu tio w ar all cl u1 u t d ide i whether 
thi uit ha b n within tlmt p riod. In d ·t rmining at what 
point in th pr e ·ng a uit hall b d m d t be mm nc d, 
w ha no warrant for holding that the rule appli able te1 a suit 
on b hall o.f th Unit d tat hall diff r from that applicable 
to oth r a e . h n th nit d tat , through i ongre , ha 
aid that uii:s in ii:s fa or hall b brought only within a tat d 
p riotl, w hav no rit rion for d t Tmining wheth r a gi en uit 
wa omm n d ' ithin that period, x pt to apply the rules and ; 
pri i11 appli able to all uitor . The decree of the ci~c~ourt , 
will be affirm d. / ~ ~ x:. ""-
PROCESS. ~ u ~"' 
Crowell v. Botsford, 16 N. J . Eq. 45s.?r1_s6.f.) / /{,,J' 
Th bill in thi cau w fil d to for lo e a chattel mortgage. ~ 
Th ubp na w i ue b for the filing of the bill, but no notice 1 
wa taken of th irr gularit and the cau e was allowed to proc d / 
to final d er and x ution. The defendant now a k to t 
a id all th procee · n0 in t:!i cause, on the ground that the ub 
p and er ed b for the bill wa fi led. ~ /. 
IE II ELLOR : . . ~ ~ 
Th d £ n ant a k to t a id the execution final decree anP \ 
all th pr e ding in th au e on th ground that the ubpren. 
wa. i u and r b for th bill wa fil d. "'" \ / 
Th ta tut pro id that no ubp na or oth r proc for app ar~ ,, .' 
anr hall i u ut f th ourt f ban pt in a ~ t tr-
tay wa t until aft r the bill hall ha b n fil d with th 1 rk , 
f th urL L. ~ V 
'I h pr diner on th p· rt f th omplaina t wa I arh· ir- V / 
r g~1lnr, nn 1 ha 1 th irre!!ularit · b n promptly r ught t · th~ J ~ 
n ti· f th our th ·ub1 ii., on motion f r that I uq ,.. . w ul ~ ~ • 
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have been set aside as illegally issued. The effect would have been
to compel the complainant to pay the costs of the motion and to
sue out a new subpoena.
But no such motion was made. The complainant was permitted,
without objection, to proceed to final decree and to sue out exe-
cution.
Where a party seeks to set aside the proceedings of his adversary
for an irregularity which is merely technical, he must make his
application for that purpose at the first opportunity. If a solicitor,
after notice of an irregularity, takes any step in the cause, or lies
by and sufi^ers his adversary to proceed therein under a belief that
his proceedings are regular, the court will not interfere to correct
the irregularity, if it is merely technical. Hart v. Small, 4 Paige
288; Parher v. Williams, Ibid. 439.
It is now insisted that the irregularity is not technical ; that the
statute is not directory merely, but imperative; and that no valid
decree can be made, except there be a strict compliance with its
requirements.
The provision of the statute is a regulation of the practice of
the court, directing the mode in which its proceedings shall be con-
ducted. The time or form in which the thing is directed to be
done is not essential. The proceedings in such cases are held valid,
though the command of the statute is disregarded or disobeyed.
Sedgwick on Statutes, 368.
That this is the effect and operation of the statutes is apparent,
not only from the nature and design of the enactment, but from a
reference to its origin and the history of the practice under it.
The commencement of a suit in chancery was originally by bill,
before the issuing of a subpoena. The bill contained, as it still does,
a prayer for subpcena, which issued as soon as the bill was filed.
Gilbert's For. Eom. 64; 3 Bl. Com. 442-3.
Yet in a very early treatise upon the proceedings of the Court
of Chancery, it is stated that "notwithstanding the practice before
this time hath been that no subpcena should be sued forth of the
Court of Chancery, without a bill first exhibited; yet of late, for
the ease of all suitors and subjects, it hath been thought good that
every man may have a subpoena out of the same court, without a
bill first exhibited." Tothill's Proceed. 1.
And by Lord Clarendon's orders in chancery, in 1661, it is


















































































































































have been set aside as illegally issued. The effect would have been 
to compel the complainant to pay the cost of the motion and to 
sue out a new subpama·. 
But no uch motion was made. The complainant was permitted, 
without objection, to proceed to final decree and to sue out exe-
cution. 
Where a party seeks to set aside the proceedings of his adversary 
for an irregularity which is merely technica1, he must make his 
application for that purpo e at the :first opportunity. If a solicitor, 
after notice of an irregularity, takes any tep in the cause, or lies 
by and suffer hi adversary to proceed therein under a: belief that 
his proceedings are regular, the court will not interfere to couect 
the irregula.rity, if it is merely technical. Hart v. Small, 4 Paige 
288; Parker v. Williams, Ibid. 439. 
It is now insisted that the irregularity is not technical; that the 
statute is not directory merely, but imperative; and that no valid 
decree can be made, except there be a strict compliance with its 
requirements. 
The provi ion of the statute· is a regulation of the practice of 
the court, directing the mode in which its proceedings shall be con-
ducted. The time or fonn in which the thing is directed to be 
done is not e sential. T'he proceedings in such cases are held valid, 
though the command of the statute is disregarded or disobeyed. 
Sedgwick on Statutes, 368. 
That thi is the effect and operation of the statutes is apparent, 
not only from the nature and design of the enactment, but from a. 
reference to its origin and the history of the practice under it. 
The commencement of a suit in chancery was originally by bill, 
before the i uing of a subpama. The bill contained, a it still does, 
a prayer for subpama, which issued as soon as the bill was filed. 
Gilbert' For. Rom. 64; 3 Bl. Com. 442-3. 
Yet in a very early treatise upon the proceedings of the Court 
of Chancery, it i stated that "notwithstanding the practice before 
thi time hath been that no subprena should be u d forth of the 
Court of Chancery, without a bill first exhibited; yet of late, for 
the ease of all suitors amd ubj cts, it hath b n thought good that 
ev ry man may have a ubprena out of the ame court, without a 
bill :first exhibited." Tothill Proceed. 1. 
And by Lord Clarendon's orders in chancery, in 1661, it is 
directed, "that all plaintiff may have liberty to take forth sub-
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pcenas ad respondendum before the filing of their bills, if they
please, notwithstanding any late order or usage to the contrary.*'
Beames' Orders in Chan. 1C8.
This order continued in force until 1705, when it was enacted
(by statute of Ann, ch. 16, § 22), that no "subpoena or any other
process for appearance, do issue out of any court of equity, till
after the bill is filed, except in cases of bills for injunctions to stay
waste, or stay suits at law commenced." The statute is equally
peremptory in its terms with our own, yet it has always been re-
garded as directory only, and a departure from its requirements
a mere irregularity, which subjected the party to costs.
In Hinde's Ch. Pr. 76, it is said that, notwithstanding the
statute, "solicitors, through ignorance and inattention, frequently
sue out and serve this writ before the bill be filed, taking care to
file the bill on the return day, yet that practice is altogether irregu-
lar (except in cases in the statute excepted), and the complainant
does it at the risk of costs.''
The elementary books all treat the issuing of the subpoena l^efore
the filing of the bill, since the passage of the statute, as an irregu-
larity, which exposes the complainant to the hazards of costs.
1 Xewland's Pr. 62; 2 Maddock's Ch. Pr. 197; 1 Smith's Ch. Pr.
110; 1 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 592.
The same rule prevailed under the ancient practice of the court,
prior to the adoption of Lord Clarendon's order, authorizing the
subpoena to be issued before the filing of the bill.
Cases are very frequent, during the reign of EKzabeth, where
costs are adjudged to the defendant, for want of a bill after the
service of a subpana. Cary's E. 98, 103, 105, 114, 118, 143, 145,
153, 156.
Although the defendant was entitled to costs, yet by "preferring
costs" he was not relieved from appearing when the bill was filed,
and so little was gained by the proceeding, that the practice has
become obsolete. It is considered most advantageous for the de-
fendant, when he has been improperly served with a subpoena before
filing the bill, to wait till the attachment has been issued against
him, and then to move to set the process aside for irregularity.
The effect of such a proceeding is to oblige the plaintiff to sue out
and serve a fresh subpoena. 1 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 593.
This, in its operation, is in accordance with the practice in this
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pcenas ad respondendum befor th filing of th ir bill , if they 
pl a e, notwith tanding any late order or u age to the contrary." 
Beame ' rd r in han. 1 
Thi ord r continu d in force until 1 0 , wh n it wa nacted 
(by tatut of nn h. 16, ) , that no "ubpama or any other 
proce for app aranc , do i ue out of any ourt of equity, till 
after the bill i fil d, c p in a of bill for injunction to stay 
' a te, or tay uits at la1w commenced." The tatute i qually 
p r mptory in it term with our own, yet it ha alwa; be n r 
garded a dir ctory onl , and a departure from it requirement 
a mer irregularity, which ubj cted the party to co t . 
n Hind h. Pr. 76, it i aid that, notwith tanding the 
tatute, ' oli itor , through ignorance and inattention, frequently 
u out and erve thi writ before the bill be :fil d, taking care to 
:file the bill on the return day, yet that practice i altogether irregu-
lar ( xcept in ca e in the tatute excepted), and the complainant 
do it at th ri k of co t ." 
The elem ntary book all t reat the i uing of the ubpama before 
the filing of the bill, ince the pas age of the tatute, a an irregu-
larity, which xpo e the complainant to the hazard of cost . 
1 ewland Pr. 6 ; 2 :Uaddock Ch. Pr. 19 ; 1 mith Ch. Pr. 
110; 1 ani ll' h. Pr. 592. 
T11e ame rule pr vailed under the ancient practice of the court, 
prior to the adoption of Lord Clar ndon order, authorizing the 
ubpama to be i ued befor the filing of the bill. 
a are v ry frequent, during he reign of Elizabeth, where 
o t are adjudg d to the defendant, for want of a bill after the 
r ice of a ubpcena. Cary R. 9 , 103, 105, 114, 118, 143, 145, 
1 156. 
lthough the defendant wa ntitled to co t , yet by 'preferring 
o t h wa not r liev d from appearing when the bill wa filed, 
and o littl wa gained by the proceeding that the practice h 
b ome ob ol t . t i con idered mo t advantageou for the de-
f ndant wh n h ha been improp rl erved with a ubpcena before 
filing th bill to wait till the attachm nt ha b en i ued acrain. t. 
him and th n to mo e to et the proce aside for irregularity. 
Th e t of uch a proce ding i to oblig th plaintiff to ue out 
and en' a fr h ubp na. 1 ani 11 h. r. 93. 
hi in i ration i in ace rdan with th practic in this 
ourt althou h no re ort i had with u to th writ of attachment. 
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The issue of the subpoena before bill filed, is an irregularity so
purely technical, that it is waived by an appearance. 1 Daniell's
Ch. Pr. 593.
There is another objection which is equally decisive against the
motion. It appears, by the evidence, that the subpoena was issued
before the filing of the bill, in consequence of a written offer by the
defendant's solicitor to enter an appearance for the defendant. An.
acknowledgment of the legal service of the subpoena was endorsed
upon the writ. At the time of the endorsement, the defendant's
solicitor knew that the bill had not been filed. The complainant's
solicitor was justified in regarding the acts of the defendant's
solicitor, as an appearance for the defendant, and as a waiver of
the irregularity in the issue of the writ. Nix. Dig. 98, § 20.
There is no evidence of surprise or merits. The application,
rests solely on the ground of illegality of the proceedings on the
part of the complainants.
The motion must be denied, and the rule to show cause dis-
charged, with costs.
/^
{r,i fPhcen^ Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 9 Bissl. (U. S.) 2S5. (1880.)
^J^J dfiESHAM, J. :
(/ fty^^^he defendant. Bertha Wulf, owned certain real estate in In-
\ /v ^'^dianapolis, which she conveyed, her husband joining, to a third
/^ person, who conveyed it back to her husband, Henry Wulf. The
r y husband, the wife joining, then mortgaged the same property to
rr the Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company to secure a loan.
The mortgage showed upon its face that it was to secure a loan
to the husband. The loan was not paid at maturity, and afterward
J^\Q mortgage was foreclosed in this court. Bertha Wulf subse-
y qucntly brought suit in this court to set aside her deed to the third
^^ party, his deed to her husband, and the mortgage of herself and
"^ husband to the insurance company, on the sole ground that she
was a minor when she executed those instruments. The service in
the foreclosure suit was after Bertha Wulf had attained her ma-
jority, and the decree against her was by default.
The marshal's return shows that the subpoena in the foreclosure




















































































































































The i ue of the ubpama before bill filed, is an irregularity so 
purely technical, that it is waived by an &ppearance. 1 Daniell's 
Ch. Pr. 593. 
There i anoth r objection which is equally deci ive against the 
motion. It appears, by the evidence, that the ubpama was issued 
before the filing of the bill, in con equence of a written offer by the 
defendant' olicitor to enter an appearance for the defendant. An 
acknowledgment of the legal ervice of the subpama was endorsed 
upon the writ. At the time of the endorsement, the defendant's 
olicitor knew that the bill had not been filed. The complainant's 
olicitor was ju tified in regarding the acts of the defendant's 
solicitor, as an appearance for the defendant, and as a waiver of 
the irregularity in the is ue of the writ. Nix. Dig. 98, § 20. 
There is no evidence of surprise or merits. The application 
re ts olely on the ground of illegality of the proceeding on the 
part of the complainants. 
The motion mu t be denied, and the rule to show cause dis-
~ arged, with co ts. 
jH Y:r~ 
~ ,,J tf'hre !.: Ins. Co. v. Wulf, 9 Biss!. (U. S.) 285. {1880.) 
- ti . 
~~ ESH.AM, J.: 
. The defendant, Bertha Wulf, owned certain real estate in In-
\ dianapolis, which she conveyed, her husband joining, to a third 
~ v per on who conveyed it back to h r hu band, Henry Wulf. The 
r,I' / hu band, the wife joining, then mortgaged the ame property to 
v ..1\.-rv the hcenix Mutual Life In urance ompany to ecure a loan. 
v \ Th mart age how d upon its face that it wa to secure a loan 
to the hu ban 1. Th loan wa not paid at maturity, and afterward 
f ~ 'Vl~ mortgage wa for clo ed in thi ourt. B rtha Wulf ubse-
y (1~ qu ntly brou ht uit in thi court to et a id her d d to th third y party hi d d to h r hu band, and th mart a10· of her elf and 
hu band to the in uran e company on th 1 i:/Otmd that she 
)'.· wa a minor wh n h ex cut d tho in trum n . Th crvicc in 
th for lour ertha Wulf had attain d h r ma-
jority, and th again t h r wa by d fault. 
The mar hal r turn ubp na in the f oreclo ure 
uit wa pr p rl r • rv d n - enr ulf in ompliance with quity 
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rule 13. As to the wife, the return read thus: "I served Bertha
Wulf by leaving a copy for her vrith her husband." Sometime
after the wife commenced her suit, as already stated, the marsh.il
appeared and asked leave to amend his return, so as to show that
he had sensed the subpoena on her by leaving a copy for her with
her husband, at her dwelling house or usual place of abode.
The defendant Henry Wulf, occupied a building at the comer
of Virginia avenue and Cobum street, in Indianapolis, both as a
dwelling and a family grocery. In the lower story there were two
rooms, the main one being occupied as a grocery and the back
smaller one for storage purposes. These two rooms were separated
by a hall wliich was entered by a door from Cobum street, and
also from Virginia avenue through the grocery. A stairway led
from the hall to the second story, where the family dwelt, eating
and sleeping. The hall and stairway were accessible in both ways,
and were, in fact, approached in both ways. The deputy marshal
found the husband in the grocery and there served the subpoena
on him and then inquired for his wife, and was informed that it
was early in the morning and she was upstairs in bed where the
family lived. The officer then, in the grocery, handed to the
husband a copy of the subpoena for his wife.
Upon these facts was there a valid service on the wife under the
13th equity mle, which declares that the service of all subpoenas
shall be by delivery of a copy thereof, by the officer serving the
same, to the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at
the dwelling house or usual place of abode of each defendant with
some adult person who is a member or resident in the family?
It is urged by counsel that the officer handed to the husband a
copy of the subpoena when he was not at the "dwelling house or
usual place of alx)de"— that the grocery room was as distinct from
the residence in the upper story, as if the two had been in separate
buildings wide apart. That construction of the rule is narrow and^
unreasonable. It is conceded that if the officer had handed the copy
to the husband in the hall the service would have been good, be-
cause the upper story was approached only through the hall, and
it was therefore connected with the dwelling. There were but two
ways of ingress to the residence or upper story — one from Virginia
avenue, through the grocery, and the other through the door open-
ing from Cobum street. The family passed in and out both ways,
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rule 13. A to the wif , the return read thu : erved Bertha 
Wulf by leaving a copy for her with h r hu band." > ometime 
after th wife mm enc her ui t, a alr ad y tated, the mar h:il 
app ared and a ked 1 a to am nd hi return, o as to how that 
he had er ed the ubp na on her by lea ing a copy for h r with 
h r hu band,. at h r dwelling hou e or u ual place of abode . 
. h d fendant nry ulf, occupied a building at the corner 
f irginia a nu and oburn tr t, in ndianapoli , both a a 
dwelling and a family gro ery. In the lower tory th re w r two 
room the main on b ing occupi d as a grocery and the back 
maller one for torage purpo e . The e t o room were eparated 
b a hall which wa enter d by a door from oburn tr t, and 
al o from Virginia avenue through the grocery. A tairway led 
from th hall to the econd tory, wher the family dwelt, ating 
and 1 ping. The hall and tairway were acce ible in both way , 
and w r , in fact, approM:hed in both way . The deputy marshal 
found the hu band in th grocery and there erved the ubpama 
on him and then inquired for hi wife, and wa informed that it 
wa early in the morning and he wa up tair in bed where the 
family lived. The officer then, in the grocery, handed to the 
hu band a copy of the ubpama for hi wife. 
pon these facts wa there a valid ervice on the wife under the 
1 th equity rule, which declares that the ervice of all ubpama~ 
hall be by d livery of a copy thereof by the officer erving the 
am to the def ndant personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at 
th dwelling house or u ual place of abode of each defendant with 
ome adult pe on who i a member or re ident in th family? 
t i urged by coun 1 that the officer handed to the hu band a 
opy of th ubp na wh n he was not at the "dwelling hou e or 
u ua·l plac of ab d -that the grocer room was a di tinct from 
the r icl nee in th upp r tory a if th two had been in eparate 
buil lin wide apart. That co truction of the rule i narrow ana' 
unrea onable. t i cone d d that if the offic r had handed the copy 
t th hu band i th hall th r ice would haive been good b -
au th upper tor wa approa h d onl throuah the hall an 
it wa therefor onn ct d with the dw llina. Ther w re but tw 
t the r id nee or upp r tory-one fr m Yir!rinia 
a\· nu , Ou ucrh th "TO r: and h oth r hrouah th d or pen-
in cr from l urn tr t . Tb famil · a ... d in and out b th ay ... , 
, . 1 t uit cl th ir onv ni nee. wh 
10 
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understood its contents and was likely to deliver it to the person
for whom it was intended.
The ease of Kihhe v. Benson, 17 Wallace, 625, is cited against
the sufficiency of the service. That was an action of ejectment in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the JSTorthem District
of Illinois, which had adopted the statute of that state relating
to actions of ejectment. After judgment was entered for the
plaintiff by default, the defendant filed a bill in equity to set aside
the judgment on the ground that he had no notice or knowledge
of the pendency of the suit, and for fraud. The Illinois statute
required that in actions of ejectment, when the premises were
actually occupied, the declaration should be served by delivering
a copy to the defendant named therein, who should be in the occu-
pancy of the premises, or, if absent, by leaving the same with a
white person of the family of the age of ten years or upwards "at
the dwelling house of such defendant."
On the trial of the equity suit one Turner swore that when he
called at Benson's house to serve upon him the declaration, he was
informed by Benson's father that Benson was not at home, and
that while the father was standing near the southeast corner of
the yard, adjoining the dwelling house and inside the yard, and
not over 125 feet from the dwelling house, he handed him a copy
of the declaration, explaining its nature, and requesting him to
hand it to his son, after which the father threw the copy upon the
ground muttering some angry words.
There was a conflict in the testimony, but the Circuit Court
decided that even if the copy was handed to the father, as testified
to by Turner, the service was not sufficient, and set aside the judg-
ment which had been entered by default, and the decree was
affirmed on appeal. In deciding the case the Supreme Court say
"it is not unreasonable to require that it (copy of the declaration)
should be delivered on the steps or on a portico, or in some out
house adjoining to or immediately connected with the family man-
sion, where, if dropped or left, it would be likely to reach its
destination. A distance of 125 feet and in a corner of the yard
is not a compliance with the requirements."
Eule 13 should receive a liberal construction. It does not require
the copy of the subpoena to be left with a person in the dwelling


















































































































































under tood its contents and was likely to deliver it to the person 
for whom it was intended. 
The case of Kibbe v. Benson~ 17 Wallace, 625, is cited against 
the ufficiency of the service. That was an action of ejectment in 
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Di trict 
of Illinois, which had adopt d the statute of that state relating 
to actions of ejectment. After judgment was entered for the 
plaintiff by default, the defendant filed a bill in equity to set aside 
the judgment on the ground that he had no notice or knowledge 
of the pendency of the suit, and for fra:ud. The Illinois statute 
required that in actions of ejectment, when the premises were 
actually occupied, the declaration should be served by delivering 
a copy to the defendant named therein, who hould be in the occu-
pancy of the premise , or, if absent, by leaving the same with a 
white per on of the family of the age of ten years or upwards "at 
the dwelling hou e of uch defendant." 
On the trial of the equity suit one Turner swore that when he 
called at Ben on' hou e to serve upon him the declaration, he was 
informed by Benson's father that Benson was not at home, and 
that while the father wa standing near the outhea t corner of 
the yard, adjoining the dwelling house and inside the yard, and 
not over 125 feet from the dwelling house, he handed him a copy 
of the declaration, explaining its nature, and reque ting him to 
hand it to his on, after which the father threw the copy upon the 
ground muttering ome angry words. 
There was a conflict in the testimony, but the Circuit Court 
decided that even if the copy was handed to the father, as testified 
to by Turner, the ervice wa not sufficient, and set aside the judg-
m nt which had been entered by default, and the decree was 
affirmed on appeal. In d ciding the ca e the Supreme Court say 
"it i not unr a enable to require that it (copy of the declaration) 
hould be deliv red on the tep or on a portico, or in ome out 
hou e adjoining to or immediately connect d with the family man-
ion, where, if dropped or left, it would b likely to reach its 
d tination. A di tan e of 1 5 f et and in a corner of the yard 
i not a compliance with the r quirem nt ." 
Rule 13 hould rec ive a lib ral con tru tion. It doe not require 
the opy of th ubpcena to be 1 ft with a p r on in th dw lling 
hou e ; it is sufficient if th person who receive the copy is at the 
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dwelling house. The rule is satisfied by a service outside the dwell-
ing house at the door, just as v/ell as inside the house.
I think Bertha Wulf was in court when the decree of fore-
closure was entered. This is not a motion to correct the pleadings,
judgment or process.
Courts have the power to pennit officers to amend their returns
to both mesne and final process, and the power is exercised li])crally
in the interest of justice, especially when the rights of third parties
are not to be afi!ected by the amendment.
In the exercise of a sound discretion they have allowed officers
to amend their returns according to the real facts after the lapse
of several years, and when there is no doubt ahout the facts such
amendments have been allowed after the officer's term has ex-
pired.*
I think justic^ Tequires that the amendment should be allowed
in this case. . > -'
7 r
s^ ^Default and Decree Pro Confesso. "yr .SJ ^
.<■ \^homson v. Wooster, lU U. S. lOJt. (188JfJi .)} J^ A ^
Tlie appellee in this case, who was complainant below, filed his ll^i/t
bill against the appellants, complaining that they infringed certainxA' ^^\ f
letters patent for an improved folding guide for sewing machines, ^ U
granted to one Alexander Douglass, of which the complainant was Jr ^'^
the assignee. The patent was dated October 5, 1858, was extended ^ y ^
for seven years in 1872, and was reissued in December, 1872. The rT" v (/^
suit was brought on the reissued patent, a copy of which was V/^^
annexed to the bill, which contained allegations that the invention .Jj^ ^
patented had gone into extensive use, not only on the part of the r f y
complainant, but by his licensees; and that many suits had been L^ J/^
brought and sustained against infringers. The bill further alleged r ^
that the defendants, from the time when the patent was reissued^^^^i-^
down to the commencement of the suit, wrongfully and withoutC l^^ i
license, made, sold and used, or caused to be made, sold and u?cd,U-
one or more folding guides, each and all containing the said im-
* Adams v. Rohiiison. i Pickering, 461; Johnson v. Dav. 17 Pickering, l/^^ ^
106: People V. Ames. 35 xN'ew York, 482: Jackson v. O. '& M. R. R.. 15 ^^
Indiana. 102; DeArmon v. Adams. 25 Indiana, 455. Freeman on Execu*^ » ^J^^

















































































































































148 Default and Decree Pko Confesso
provement secured to the complainant by the said reissued letters
patent, and that the defendants derived great gain and profits
from such use, but to what amount the complainant was ignorant,
and prayed aj disclosure thereof, and an account of profits, and
damages, and a perpetual injunction.
The bill of complaint was accompanied with affidavits verifying
the principal facts and certain decrees or judgments obtained on
the patent against other parties, and Douglass's original applica-
tion for the patent, made in April, 1856, a copy of which was an-
nexed to the affidavits. These affidavits and documents were
exhibited for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary injunction,
which was granted on notice.
The defendants appeared to the suit by their solicitor, May 3,
1879, but neglected to file any answer, or to make any defence to
the bill, and a rule that the bill be taken pro confesso was entered
in regular course June 10, 1879. Thereupon, on the 2d of August,
1879, after due notice and hearing, the court made a decree to the
following effect, viz. : 1st. That the letters-patent sued on were
good and valid in law. 2d. That Douglass was the first and
original inventor of the invention described and claimed therein.
3d. That the defendants had infringed the same hy making, usipg
and vending to others to be used, without right or license, certain
folding guides substantially as described in said letters patent.
4th. That the complainant recover of the defendants the profits
which they had derived by reason of such infringement by any
manufacture, use or sale, and any and all damages which the com-
plainant had sustained thereby; and it was referred to a master
to take and state an account of said profits, and to assess said
damages, with directions to the defendants to produce their books
and papers and submit to an oral examination if required. It was
also decreed that a perpetual injunction issue to restrain the de-
fendants from making, using, or vending any folding guides made
as theretofore used by them, containing any of the inventions
described and claimed in the patent, and from infringing the
patent in any way.
Under this decree the parties went before the master, and the
examination was commenced in October, 1879, in the presence of
counsel for both parties, and was continued from time to time
until lsroveml)cr 3, 1880, when arguments were beard upon the

















































































































































14:8 DEFAULT AND DECREE PRO CONFESSO 
provement secured to the complainam.t by the said reissued letters 
patent, and that the defendants derived great gain and profits 
from such u e, but to what amount the complainant wa ignorant, 
and prayed ai di clo ure thereof, and an account of profits, and 
damage , and a p rpetual injunction. 
The bill of complaint was accompanied with affidavits verifying 
the principal facts and certaiin decrees or judgments obtained on 
the patent against other parties, and Douglas 's original applica-
tion for the patent, made in April, 1856, a copy nf which was an-
nexed to the affidavits. These affidavits and documents were 
exhibited for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary injunction, 
which was granted on notice. 
The defendants appeared to the suit by their solicitor, May 3, 
1879, but neglected to :file any answer, or to make any defence to 
the bill, and a rule that the bill be taken pro confesso was entered 
in regular course June 10, 1879. Thereupon, on the 2d of August, 
1879, after due notice and hearing, the court made a decree to the 
following effect, viz.: 1st. T'hat the letters-patent sued on were 
good and vaJid in law. 2d. That Douglass was the first and 
original inventor of the invention described and claimed therein. 
3d. That the defendants had infringed the same by making, usi:p.g 
and vending to others to be used, without right or license, certain 
folding guides substantially as described in said letters patent. 
4th. Tha:t the complainant recover of the defendants the profits 
which they had derived by reason of such infringement by any 
manufacture, use or sale, and any and all damages which the com-
plainant had sustained thereby; and it was referred to a master 
to take and state an account of said profits, and to assess said 
damages, with directions to the defendants to produce their books 
aind paper and submit to an oral examination if required. It wa 
al o decreed that a perpetual injunction i sue to restrain the de-
fendants from making, using ·or vending any folding guides made 
a theretofore used by them, containing any of the invention 
d cribed and claimed in the pat nt, and from infringing the 
patent in any way. 
Und r thi d cree th partie went b fore the ma ter and the 
examination was commenc d in Octob r, 1879, in the pr ence of 
coun 1 for both parti and wa continued from time to time 
until o mber 3 1 0 wh n ar ument w re heard up n the 
matter, and th a e wa ubmitt d. On ovember 12th the r port 
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was prepared and submitted to the inspection of counsel. On the
18th motion was made by the defendants' counsel, before the mas-
ter, to open the proofs and for leave to introduce newly discovered
evidence. This motion was supported by affidavits, but was over-
ruled l)y the master, and his report was filed December 10, 1880, in
which it was found and stated that the defendants had used at
various times, from January 18, 1877, to the commencement of
the suit, twenty-seven folding guides infringing the complainant's
patent, and had folded 1,217,870 yards of goods by their use, and
that during that period there was no means known or used, or
open to the public to use, for folding such goods in the same,
or substantially the same manner, other than folding them by
hand, and that the saving in cost to the defendants by using the
folding guides was three cents on each piece of six yards, making
the amount of profit which the complainant was entitled to re-
cover, $6,089.35 ; and that during the same period the complainant
depended upon license fees for his compensation for the use of
the patented device, and that the amount of such fees constituted
his loss or damage for the unauthorized use of his invention : and
that, according to the established fees, the defendants would have
been liable to pay for the use of the folding guides used by them
during the years 1877, 1878 and 1879 (the period covered by the
infringement), the sum of $1,350, which was the amount of the
complainant's damages. The evidence taken by the master was
filed with his report.
By a supplemental report, filed at the same time, the master
stated the fact of the application made to him to open the proofs
on the ground of surprise and newly discovered evidence (as
before stated), and that after hearing said application upon the
affidavits presented (which were appended to the report), he was
unable to discover any just ground therefor.
Tlio defendants did not object to this supplemental report, but
on the 10th of January, 18S1, they filed exceptions to the principal
report, substantially as follows:
1. That instead of the double guide or folder claimed in the
complainant's patent being the only means for folding cloth or
strips on ea^ edge during the period of the infringement (other
than that of folding by hand), the master should have found
that such strips could have been folded by means of a single guide
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wa pr •p;1r l an 1 ul mjtt d to th in. p tion of oun l. n the 
1 th m ti n ' a mad 1 y th d f ndant ' un el, before th ma -
t r, to p n th, Ir I ' ncl 1' r 1 a t intr du e n wly di v r d 
•vi 1 n . Thi: m ti n wa upr ort cl by affidavit , but wa o er-
rul 1 1 by th ma t r and hi r:>p rt wa fil cl mh r 1 1 0, in 
' hi h iL ' a f uncl an . tat d that he cl f ndan hacl u d at 
ari u tim ' fr m anuar 1 1 t th ommen m nt of 
th uiL tw nty- v n f ldin guid infringing th omplainant' 
at •nt and ha l foll cl 1, 1 , 0 yard of good by th ir u , and 
thuL lurin()" that p riod th r wa no m an kn wn r u cl, or 
p •n t th publi to u , for folding uch good in th ame, 
or .·ub.· tantiall th am mann r, oth r than folding th m by 
hand and that th a ing in o t to th d f ndant by u ing the 
f 1 lino- uic1 wa thr nt n a h pi e of ix yard , making 
th amount of profit whi h the omplainant wa ntitl d to re-
ov r, 0 .3 ; and that during th am period th complainant 
d p nd 1 upon li n fe for hi ompen ation for the u e of 
th pat nt d devi e, and that the amount of uch f con tituted 
bi lo or <la.mag for the unaiuthoriz d u e of hi invention: and 
that a ording to the tabli hed fee , the defendants would have 
b n liabl to pay for the u e of th folding guide u ed by them 
luring th ) ar 1 77, 187 and 1 9 (th period covered by the 
infrinCT m nt) the um of $1,350, whi h wa th amount of the 
·omplai an damag The vid nee taken by the master was 
:fil d with hi r port. 
y a uppl m ntal report filed at the ame time the mater 
tat <l. th fa t of th appli ation made to him to open the proof 
on th T und o.f urpri and n wly di cover d vidence (a 
b f r fat 1) and that aft r hea·rin aid application upon the 
affida it pr nt d ( whi h w r app n 1 d to t.h report he wa 
unahl t Ji , o r an ' ju t gr und th r for. 
1 1 f n lant di 1 not obj t to thi uppl m ntal r port but 
n th 1 th f anuar 1 1 th y :fil d xc ption t th principal 
r p rt :ub tani.iall , a follow : 
1. hat in ' t ea l f th fouble gui 1 or .f 1 er laim d in th 
complainant-' pat nt b ino- th onl) m an for foldin<T loth or 
. trip. n a 1 10' huin<T th p ri l f th infrina mcnt ( th r 
than that of f llinCT b · hand), th ma t r ~hould h <.11 found 
tha t ·u ·h . trips uld ha b n foll 1 hy m an f a ~in crl '"'uid 
r fol 1 r, an 1 that th u of uch O'uid wa known an l n t 
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the public long before 1877, and that such guides were not em-
braced in the complainant's patent.
2. That the amount of profits found by the master was
erroneous, because it appeared that folded strips such as those
used by the defendants were an article of merchandise, cut and
folded by different parties at a charge of 25 cents for 144 yards.
3. That the profits should not have been found greater than
the saving made by the use of the double guide as compared with
the use of a single guide, or greater than the amount for which
the strips could have been cut and folded by persons doing such
business.
4. That the damages found were erroneous.
Other exceptions were subsequently filed, but were overruled
for being filed out of time.
Before the argument of the exceptions the defendants gave
notice of a motion to the court to refer the cause back to the
master to take further testimony in reference to the question of
profits and damages chargeable against them under the order of
reference. In support of this motion further affidavits were pre-
sented.
The exceptions to the report and the application to refer the
cause back to the master were argued together. The court denied
the motion to refer the cause back, overrviled the exceptions to
the report, and made a decree in favor of the complainant for the
profits, but disallowed the damages. That decree the respondents
brought here by appeal.
They assigned fourteen reasons for appeal, of which the first
nine related to the proceedings before the master and his report,
and the last five to the validity of the reissued patents.
Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court. After
stating the facts in the foregoing language, he continued:
The appellants have assigned fourteen reasons or grounds for
reversing the decree. The first nine relate to the taking of the
account before the master and liis report thereon ; the last five
relate to the validity of the letters patent on which the suit was
brought. It will be convenient to consider the last reasons first.
The bill, as we have seen, was taken pro confesso, and a decree
pro confesso was regularly entered up, declaring that the letters
patent were valid, that Douglass was the original inventor of the

















































































































































150 DEFAULT A D DECREE PRo Co FEsso 
the public long before 1877, and that such guides were not em-
braced in the complainant's patent. 
2. That the amount of profits found by the master was 
erroneous, because it appeared that folded strips such as those 
used by the defendants were an article of merchandise, cut and 
folded by different parties at a charge of 25 cents for 144 yards. 
3. That the profits should not have been found greater than 
the saving made by the use of the double guide as compared with 
the use of a single guide, or greater than the amount for which 
the strips could have been cut and folded by persons doing such 
business. 
4. That the damages found were erroneous. 
Other exceptions were subsequently filed, but were overruled 
for being filed 1out of time. 
Before the argument of the exceptions the defendants gave 
notice of a motion to the court to ref er the ca use back to the 
master to take further testimony in reference to the question of 
profits and damages chargeable against them under the order of 
reference. In support of this motion further affidavits were pre-
sented. 
The exceptions to the report and the application to refer the 
cause back to the master were argued together. The court denied 
the motion to refer the cause. back, overruled the exceptions to 
the report, and made a decree in favor of the complainant for the 
profits, but disallowed the damages. That decree the respondents 
brought here by appeal. 
They assigned fourteen reasons for appeal, of which the first 
nine related to the proceeding before the master and his report, 
and the last five to the validity of the reissued patents. 
MR. JusTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. After 
stating the facts in the foregoing language, he continued: 
The appellants have assign d fourteen reasons or grounds for 
reversing the decre . The first nine relate to the taking of the 
account before the ma ter and his report thereon; the last five 
relate to the validity of the letters patent on which the suit was 
brought. It will be convenient to con id r the la t reasons fir t. 
The bill, as we ha1ve een, wa taken pro confessoJ and a decree 
pro confe so was r gularly entered up d daring that the l tters 
patent wer vali 1, that Douglass wa th ori O']nal inv ntor of the 
invention therein d cribed and claimed, that the defendants were 
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infringing the patent, and that they must account to the com-
plainant for the profits made by them by such infringement and
for the damages he had sustained thereby; and it was referred
to a master to take and state an account of such profits and to
ascertain said damages.
The defendants are concluded by that decree, so far at least
as it is supported by the allegations of the bill, taking the same
to bo true. Being carefully based on these allegations, and not
extending beyond them, it cannot now be questioned by the
defendants unless it is shown to be erroneous by other statements
contained in the bill itself. A confession of facts properly pleaded
dispenses with proof of those facts, and is as effective for the
purposes of the suit as if the facts were proved; and a decree
pro confcsso regards the statements of the bill as confessed.
By the early practice of the civil law, failure to appear at the
day to which the cause was adjourned was deemed a confession
of the action; but in later times this rule was changed, so that
the plaintiif, notwithstanding the contumacy of the defendant,
only obtained judgment in accordance with the truth of the case
as established by an ex parte examination. Keller, Proced. Eom.
§ 69. The original practice of the English Court of Chancery
was in accordance with the later Eoman law. IlawTcins v. Crook,
2 P. Wms. 556. But for at least two centuries past bills have been
taken pro confcsso for contumacy. Ibid. Chief Baron Gilbert
says : "Where a man appears by his clerk in court, and after lies
in prison, and is brought up three times to court by habeas corpus,
and has the bill read to him, and refuses to answer, such public
refusal in court does amount to the confession of the whole bill.
Secondly, when a person appears and departs without answering,
and the whole process of the court has been awarded against him
after his appearance and departure, to the sequestration; there
also the bill is taken pro confcsso, because it is presumed to be
true when he has appeared and departs in despite of the court and
withstands all its process without answering." Forum Eomanum,
36. T^rd Hardwicke likened a decree pro confesso to a judgment
by nil dicit at common law, and to judgment for plaintiff on
demurrer to the defendant's plea. Davis v. Davis, 2 Atk. 21. It
was said in IlatvJcins v. CrooTc, qua supra, and quoted in 2 Eq. Ca.
Ab. 170, that "The method in equity of taking a bill pro confess^
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infringing th pa ent, and that th y mu t account to the com-
plainant for th profit made by th m by uch infringement and 
for th 1amag h ha 1 u tain d thereby; and it wa r ferrecl 
io a ma t r t tak ancl tate am account of such profit and to 
a c rtain aid damage . 
Th d f n ant are concluded by that de r e, o far at lea t 
a it i upp rted by th all gation of the bill, taking the same 
to b tru . ing carefully ba d on the e allegation , and not 
. t nding b ond· th m, it .cannot now be qu tionedi by the 
de.f ndant unle it i hown to be erroneou by other tat men 
ontain cl in th bill itself. A confe sion of fact properly pl aded 
di p with proof of tho e fact , and is as effective for the 
purp of th ui t as if the facts wer proved; and a decree 
pro conf e so regard the tatements of th bill as conf ed. 
By the early practice of th civil law, failure to appear at the 
day to which th cause wa adjourned was deemed a confes ion 
of the action; but in later times this rule was changed, so that 
the plaintiff, notwith tanding the contumacy of the defendant, 
only obtain d judgm nt in accordance with the t ruth of the case 
as tabli hed by an ex parte examination. Keller, Proced. Rom. 
~ 69. The original practice of the English Court of Chancery 
wa in accordance with the later Romam law. Hawkins v. Crook, 
2 P. Wm . 556. But for at lea t two centuries pa t bills have been 
taken pro confesso for contumacy. Ibid. Chief Baron Gilbert 
ay : "Where a man appear by hi clerk in court, a:nd after lies 
in pri on, and i brought up three times to court by habeas corpus, 
and ha the bill read to him, and refuses to answer, such public 
refu al in court do amount to the confes ion of the whole bill. 
econ ly, when a per on aippear and departs without an wering, 
and the whole proce of the court has been awarded again t him 
after hi appearance and departure, to the seque tration; there 
al o the bill i tak n pro confesso, becau e it is pre urned to be 
tru when he ha appeared and d part in de pite of the court and 
with tand all it proces without an wering.' Forum Romanum, 
36. Lord Hardwicke likened a decree pro confesso to a judgment 
b ' nil dicit at ommon la· and to judgment for plaintiff on 
d murr r to th d f ndant plea. Davi . Davis, 2 tk. 1. It 
ai in Ilawkins \. rook, qua upra and quoted in 2 Eq. Ca. 
b. 1 that The method in equit of taking a bill pro confe ~ 
i~ on onant to the rul and practic of th court at law 1rher , 
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if the defendant makes default by nil dicit, judgment is imme-
diately given in debt, or in all cases where the thing demanded
is certain; but where the matter sued for consists in damages, a
judgment interlocutory is given; after which a writ of inquiry
goes to ascertain the damages, and then the judgment follows."
The strict analog}' of this proceeding in actions of law to a general
decree pro confesso in equity in favor of the complainant, with a
reference to a master to take a necessary account, or to assess
unliquidated damages, is obvious and striking.
A carefully prepared history of the practice and effect of taking
bills pro confesso is given in WMliams v. Corwin, Hopkins Ch.
471, by Hoffman, master, in a report made to Chancellor Sanford,
of New York, in which the conclusion come to (and adopted by
the Chancellor), as to the effect of taking a bill pro confesso, was
that "when the allegations of a bill are distinct and positive, and
the bill is taken as confessed, such allegations are taken as true
without proofs," and a decree will be made accordingly; but
"where the allegations of a bill are indefinite, or the demand of the
complainant is in its nature uncertain, the certainty requisite to a
proper decree must be afforded by proofs. Tlie bill, when con-
fessed by the default of the defendant, is taken to be true in all
matters alleged with sufficient certainty; but in respect to mat-
ters not alleged with due certainty, or subjects which from their
nature and the course of the court require an examination of
details, the obligation to furnish proofs rests on the complainant."
We may properly say, therefore, that to take a bill pro confesso
is to order it to stand as if its statements were confessed to be
true; and that a decree pro confesso is a decree based on such
statements, assumed to be true, 1 Smith's Ch. Pract. 153, and
such a decree is as binding and conclusive as any decree rendered
in the most solemn manner. "It cannot be impeached collaterally,
but only upon a bill of review, or [a bill] to set it aside for fraud.
1 Daniell Ch. Pr. 696, 1st Ed. ;* Ogilvie v. Heme, 13 Ves. 563.
*Note by the Court. — Reference is made to the ist Edition of Daniell
(pub. 1837) as being, with the 2d Edition of Smith's Practice (published
the same year), the most authoritative work on English Chancery Prac-
tice in use in March, 1842, when our Equity Rules were adopted. Sup-
plemented by the General Orders made by Lords Cottenham and Lang-
dale in August, 1841 (many of which were closely copied in our own
Rules), they exhibit that "present practice of the High Court of Chancery
in England," which by our 90th Rule was adopted as the standard of equity
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if the defendant makes default by nil dicit judgment i imme-
diately giv n in debt, or in all ca e where the thing demanded 
is c rtain; but where the matter sued for consists in damage , a 
judgment interlocutory is given; after which a writ of inquiry 
goe to a cerfain the damage , and then the judgment follow . ' 
The trict analogy of thi proceeding in action of law to a general 
deer pro confesso in equity in favor of the complainant, with a 
reference to a ma ter to take a nece ary account, or to assess 
unliquidat cl damag , is obvious and striking. 
A carefully prepared hi tory of the practice and effect of taking 
bill pro confesso i given in Wvlliams v. 001·win, Hopkins Ch. 
471, by Hoffman, ma6ter, in a report made to Chane llor Sanford, 
of New York, in which the conclu ion come to (and adopted by 
tlie Chancellor), as to the effect of taking a bill pro conf esso, was 
that "wh n the allegations of a bill are distinct and positive, and 
the bill i taken a conf e eel, uch allegation are taken as true 
without proof ," and a decree will be made accordingly; but 
"where th allegations of a bill are indefinite, or the demand of the 
complainant i in it nature uncertain, the certainty requisite to a 
proper decree must be a:fforded by proofs. The bill, when con-
fessed by the default of the defendant, is taken to be true in all 
matter alleged with sufficient certainty; but in re pect to mat-
ters not alleged with due certainty, or subjects which from their 
nature and the course of the court require an examination of 
details, the obliga·tion to furni h proofs re ts on the complainant." 
We may properly say, therefore, that to take a bill pro confesso 
is to order it to tand a if its statements were oonfe ed to be 
true; and that a decree pro conf esso i a decree based on uch 
stat ment , a urned to be true, 1 Smith's Ch. Prad. 153, and 
su h a decre i a binding and conclu ive as any cl cree rendered. 
in the mo t olemn manner. 'It cannot be impeach d collaterally, 
but only upon a bill of review, or [a bill] to et it aide for fraud. 
1 Daniell h. Pr. 696, 1 t Ed.;* Ogilvie v. Herne, 13 Ve . 56 . 
*Note by the Court-Reference is made to the r t Edition of Daniell 
(pub. 1837) a being, with the 2d Edition of mith' Practi e (publi hed 
the sam y ar . the m t auth ritat ive work on E ngli h Chane ry rac-
tice in u e in farch, I 42 when our Equity Rul were adopted. up-
plem nted by the Gen ral rd r mad by L rd Cottenham and Lang-
dal in Augu t, I 4r many of whi h w r lo ly c pi d in ur wn 
Rul ), th y xhil it that "pr ent pra tice of th Iigh C urt f Chane ry 
in England,' which by ur goth ule wa adopt d a the tandard f quity 
practice in case wh re th Rul pr scrib d by thi urt, or by the 
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Such being the general nature and effect of an order taking
a bill pro confesso, and of a decree pro confesso regularly made
thereon, we are prepared to understand the fuU force of our rules
of practice on the subject. Those rules, of course, are to govern
so far as they apply; but the effect and meaning of the terms
which they employ are necessarily to be sought in the books of
authority to which we have referred.
By our rules a decree jjto confesso may be had if the defendant,
on being served with process, fails to appear within the time re-
quired; or if, having appeared, he fails to plead, demur or answer
to the bill within the time limited for that purpose; or, if he fails
to answer after a former plea, demurrer or answer is overruled or
declared insufficient. The 12th Rule in Equity prescribes the time
when the subpoena shall be made returnable, and directs that "at
the bottom of the subpo3na shall be placed a memorandum, that
the defendant is to enter his appearance in the suit in the clerk's
office on or before the day at which the writ is returnable; other-
wise the bill may be taken pro confesso." The 18th Rule requires
the defendant to file his plea, demurrer or answer (unless he gets
an enlargement of the time) on the rule day next succeeding that
of entering his appearance; and in default thereof the plaintiff
may at his election, enter an order (as of course) in the order
book, that the bill be taken pro confesso, and thereupon the cause
shall be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the bill may Ije
decreed by the court at any time after the expiration of thirty
days from the entry of said order, if the same can be done without
an answer, and is proper to be decreed; or the plaintiff, if he,
requires any discovery or answer to enable him to obtain a proper
decree, shall be entitled to process of attachment against the de-
fendant to compel an answer, etc. And the 19th Rule declares that
the decree rendered upon a bill taken pro confesso shall be deemed
absolute, unless the court shall at the same term set aside the
Circuit Court, do not apply. The 2d Edition of ^Ir. Daniell's work, pub-
lished by Mr. Hcadlam in 1846. was much modified by the extensive
changes mtroduced by the English Orders of May 8, 184^; and the 3d
Edition, by the still more radical changes introduced by "the Orders of
April, 1850, the Statute of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, and the General Orders after-
wards made under the authority of that statute. Of course the subse-
quent editions of Daniell are still further removed from the standard
adopted by this court in 1842: but as they contain a view of the later
decisions hearing upon so much of the old system as remains, they have
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Such being the g n ral nature and effect of an order taking 
a bill pro confe so, and of a decree pro confesso regularly made 
ther on, we are pr pared to und tancl the full force of our rule 
of practice on th ubject. Tho e rule , of course, are to go ern 
o far a they apply; but the eff ct and meaning of the term 
h1 ·h they mploy ar nece arily to be ought in the book of 
authorit o whi h ' have ref rred. 
y our rul a d r pro conf e so may be had if the defendant, 
on b ing ervcd with proc , fails to appear within the time re-
uir d; or if having app ared, be fail to plead, demur or an wer 
t th bill within th time limited for that purpo e ; or, if he fail 
to an wer aft r a form r plea, d murrer or an wer i o erruled or 
lar l in uffici nt. The 1 th Rule in Equity pr crib the time 
wh n the ubp na hall be made returnable, and directs that "at 
th bottom of the ubpama ball be placed a memorandum, that 
the def ndant i to enter hi app arance in the uit in the clerk 
offi on or before th day at which the writ i returnable ; other-
wi the bill ma b taken pro conf es o." The 1 th Rule require 
th fendant to file bi plea, demurrer or an wer ( unle be gets 
an nlargemen t of the time) on the rule day next ucceeding that 
of entering hi appearance ; and in default thereof the plaintiff 
may at hi el ction, enter an order (a of course) in the order 
book, that the bill be taken pro confesso, and thereupon the cau e 
hall be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the bill may be 
d r d by the ourt at any time after the expiration of thirty 
day from th entry of aid order, if the ame an b done without 
an an w r, a·nd i proper to be decreed; or the plaintiff, if be 
r quir an3 di cov ry or answer to enabl him to obtain a proper 
d er , hall b entitled to proce o-f attachment agaJinst the de-
f nd nt to comp 1 an an w r etc. nd th 19th Rule d lare that 
th d r rend r d upon a bill taken pro conf esso hall be deemed 
a olut , unl the court hall at the ame term et a ide the 
Circuit Court, do not apply. The 2d Edition of Ir. Daniell' 'rnrk pub-
li hed by ).fr. H eadlam in I _.i6 wa much modified by the exten ive 
hang . introduced by the Eno-Ji h rder of May , 1 ; and the d 
diti on. by the till m re radical change intr duced by the rder of 
• ril, I 50, the tatute of 15 16 Viet. c. 86 and the General r der after-
" a rd made und r th authority of that tatute. Of cour e the uh e-
qu nl edition of a ni II a re till further removed from the tanda rd 
acloptccl hy thi court in I .f2: but a they conta in a v iew of the la ter 
cl ci ion hea rin up n o mu h of the old tern a remain-. they have. 
11 tha t account, a valu of their O\ n pro ided one i not mi led -b , the 
ne' portion . 
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same, or enlarge the time for filing the answer, upon cause shown
upon motion and affidavit of the defendant.
It is thus seen that by our practice, a decree pro confesso is
not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the bill, nor
merely such as the complainant chooses to take it ; but that it is
made (or should be made) by the court, according to what is
proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to
be true. This gives it the greater solemnity, and accords with,
the English practice, as well as that of New York. Chancellor
Kent, quoting Lord Eldon, says: "Where the bill is thus taken
pro confesso J and the cause is set down for hearing, the course (says
Lord Eldon, in Geary v. Sheridan, 8 Ves. 192), is for the court
to hear the pleadings, and itself to pronounce the decree, and not
to permit the plaintiff to take, at his own discretion, such a decree
as he could abide by, as in the case of default by the defendant at
the hearing." Rose v. Woodruff, 4 Johns. Ch. 547, 548. Our
rules do not require the cause to be set down for hearing at a
regular term, but, after the entry of the order to take the bill
pro confesso, the 18th rule declares that thereupon the cause shall
be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the hill may he decreed
hy the court at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the
entry of such order, if it can be done without answer, and is proper
to he decreed. This language shows that the matter of the bill
ought at least to be opened and explained to the court when
the decree is applied for, so that the court may see that the decree
is a proper one. The binding character of the decree, as declared
in Eule 19, renders it proper that this degree of precaution should
be taken.
We have been more particular in examining this subject be-
cause of the attempt made by the defendants, on this appeal, to
overthrow the decree by matters outside of the bill, which was
regularly taken pro confesso. From the authorities cited, and the
express language of our own Rules in Equity, it seems clear that
the defendants, after the entry of the decree pro confesso, and
whilst it stood unrevoked, were absolutely barred and precluded
from alleging anything in derogation of, or in opposition to, the
said decree, and that they are equally barred and precluded from
questioning its correctness here on appeal, unless on the face of the
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ame, or enlarge the time for filing the answer, upon ca;use shown 
upon motion and affidavit of the defendant. 
It i thu een that by our practice, a decree pro confesso is 
not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the bill, nor 
merely uch as the complainant choo es to take it; but that it is 
made (or hould be made) by the court, according to what is 
proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to 
be true. Thi gives it the greater solemnity, and aocords with 
the Engli h practice, a well as that of New Yark. Chancellor 
Kent, quoting Lord Eldon, ays: "vVbere the bill is thu taken 
pro confesso, and the cau e i set down for hearing, the course ( ays 
Lord Eldon, in Geary v. Sheridwn, 8 Ves. 192), is for the court 
to hear the pleading, and itself to pronounce the decree, and not 
to permit the plaintiff to take, at hi own di cretion, such a decree 
a he could a:bide by, as in the case of default by the defendant at 
the hearing." Rose v. Woodruff, 4 John . Ch. 547, 548. Our 
rule do not require the cau e to be et down for hearing at a 
regular term, but, after the entry of the order to take the bill 
pro confesso, the 18th rule declares that thereupon the cau e shall 
be proceeded in ex parte, and the matter of the bill may be decreed 
by the court at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the 
entry of such order, if it can be done without an wer, and is proper 
to be decreed. This language shows that the matter of the bill 
ought at least to be opened and explained to the court when 
the decree i applied for, so that the court may ee that the decree 
is a proper one. The binding character of the deer e, as declared 
in Rule 19, renders it proper that this degree of precaution should 
be taken. 
We have been more particular in examining thi subje.!t be-
cause of the attempt made by the defendant, on thi appeal, to 
overthrow the decree by matters outside of the bill, which was 
rernlarly taken pro confesso. From the authoritie cited, and the 
ex1 r language of our own Rul in Equity, it eem clear that 
the defendant , after the entry of th decree pro confesso, and 
whil t it tood unr vok d, w re ab olutely barr d and precluded 
:from all ging anything in derogation of, or in opp ition to, the 
aid decree, and that they are equally baned and precluded from 
ue tioning it correctn her on appeal, unle on th fac of the 






PROCEEDINGS ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT.
Appearance. %^0^
Flint V. Comly, 95 Me. 251. (1901.)
Exceptions by defendants. Overruled. \ ^
Bill in equity by Lucy M. Flint of Cornish, in the county of
York, administratrix of the goods and estate of Fred T. Flint, late
of said Cornish, deceased, against Eobert Comly of Philadelphia,
and William Flanigen of Woodbury, New Jersey, co-partners in
business under the firm name and style of Comly and Flanigen, and
against Charles E. Perkins of Portland. The bill asserts a lien or
interest in certain mortgages and pledges of real estate and per-
sonal property held by the non-resident defendants, and against the
estate of the said Fred T. Flint.
After several hearings the plaintiff moved to convert the cause
into an action at law. This motion having been granted the
defendants excepted.
Sitting: Wiswcll, C. J., Emery, Whitehouse, Strout, Fogler, JJ.
WiSWELL, C. J. :
The plaintiff commenced a bill in equity against three defend-
ants, one a resident of the state, the other two non-residents, which
was duly entered and filed in the office of the clerk of this court
for Cumberland county, on July 7, 1899. Thereupon a subpoena
issued against the resident defendant, who subsequently entered
his appearance, and an order issued as to the non-resident de-
fendants to appear and answer within one month from the first
Tuesday of August, 1899. There was no service of this order in
this state, but upon November 8, 1899, counsel for the non-resident
defendants entered upon the docket a general and unconditional
appearance in the manner provided by Chancery Rule YIII, and
on Janua-ry 23, 1900, the joint answer of these non-resident de-
fendants was filed, signed in their names by their solicitors.




















































































































































PRO EEDI G 0 ~ H L ~ OF DEFENDANT. 
APPEAR CE. 
Flint . Comly> 95 Me. 51 . {1901 .) 
E c ption by defendant . Ov rruled. 
ill in equity by Lucy M. ~lint of Corni h, in the county of 
York admini tratrix of the good and e tate of Fred T . Flint, late 
of aid orni h decea ed, again t Robert Comly of Philadelphia, 
and William Flanigen of Woodbury, ew Jersey, co-partner in 
bu ine under the firm name and tyle of Comly and Flanigen, and 
again t har 1 E. Perkin of ortland. The bill as ert ai lien or 
intere t in certain mortgage and pledge of real e tate and per-
onal property held by he non-re ident defendants, and again t the 
e tat of th aid Fred T'. Flint. 
fter everal hearing the plaintiff moved to convert the cau e 
into an action at law. Thi motion having been granted the 
defendant xcepted. 
it incr: \\i well C. J . Emery Whitehouse, trout, Fogler, JJ. 
\\I WELL . J.: 
The plaintiff commenced a bill in equity again t three defend-
ant one a re ident of the tate the other two non-resident which 
wa dul entered and filed in the office of the clerk of thi court 
umberland county on Jul , 1 99 . Th reupon a ubpama 
again t the re ident defendant, who ub equently entered 
hi app aranc and an ord r i ued a to the non-re ident de-
f ndant t app ar and an wer ithin one month from the fi t 
Tu day of uru t 1 99. There wa no ernce of thi order in 
thi tate but upon ovember 1 99 coun"el for the non-re ident 
a r ndant nt r d upon the do ket a g neral and unconditional 
in th manner pro id d b r hancer ule VIII, an 
on anua•r 190 the joint an w r of th e non-re ident e-
f n ant wa fil 1 irned in th ir nam by their olicitor . 
Prior to hi on Jul 1 9 a p liminary injunction had 
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been issued against the resident defendant, without a hearing, but
upon the filing of the statutory bond. Later, he filed a motion to
dissolve this injunction, upon which motion a hearing was had, but
before a decision had been rendered, on January 24, 1900, the
plaintiff moved to discontinue as to the resident defendant and
three days later this motion was granted with costs for him. On
January 24, 1900, the plaintiff also filed this motion: "Now
comes the plaintiff in the above entitled cause and shows unto your
Honors that the matter in controversy may be adequately and com-
pletely determined in a suit at law, and that the issues presented
may be more conveniently described according to the course of the
common law, than in equity. Wherefore, she prays leave of the
court to convert her said action into an action at law upon such
reasonable terms as the court may be pleased to order, etc." The
docket shows this entry under date of January 27, 1900 : "Motion
to convert cause into an action at law granted."
To this order the defendants took exception and, without any
thing further being done in the case, entered the same at the next
law court. It might be questioned as to whether this bill of
exceptions was not prematurely brought forward, as the exception
was to an interlocutory order and perhaps should not have been
entered until the completion of the case, when it might have
become unnecessary to prosecute the exceptions. K. S., c. 77, §§
22 and 25; Maine Benefit Association v. Hamilton, 80 Maine, 99.
But, as the procedure under the Act of 1893 is somewhat anoma-
lous, and as there has already been considerable delay in the case,
we think it more in the interests of justice that the question
involved should now be determined, which course is not without
precedent in this state, even if it were clear that the exceptions
were prematurely brought forward. Stevens v. Shaw, 77 Maine,
566.
It is argued that this court had no jurisdiction over the non-resi-
dent defendants, that no service of the bill was ever made upon
them in Maine, and no fact set up in the bill which would subject
them to the jurisdiction of this court, except the alleged fact that
their co-defendant had in his possession certain property or evi-
dences of indebtedness belonging to the non-resident defendants
not open to attachment ; that when the bill was discontinued as to
the resident defendant, the court then had no jurisdiction whatever


















































































































































been issued against the re ident defendant, without a hearing, but 
upon the filing of the statutory bond. Later, he filed a motion to 
di olve thi injunction, upon which motion a hea·ring was had, but 
before a decision had been rendered, on January 24, 1900, the 
plaintiff moved to di continue a to the re ident defendant and 
three days later this motion was granted with costs for him. On 
January 24, 1900, the plaintiff al o filed thi motion: "Now 
com s the plaintiff in the above entitled cause and show unto your 
Honors that the matter in controversy may be adequately and com-
pletely determined in a suit at law, and that the issues presented 
may be more conveniently de cribed according to the cour e of the 
common law, than in equity. Wherefore, she prays leave of the 
court to convert her said action into an action at law upon such 
reasona:ble terms as the court may be pleased to order, etc." The 
docket shows this entry under date of January 27, 1900: "Motion 
to convert cause into an action at law granted." 
T'o this order the defendants took exception and, without any 
thing further being done in the case, entered the same at the next 
law court. It might be questioned as to whether this bill of 
exceptions was not prematurely brought forward, a the exception 
was to an interlocutory order and perhaps should not have been 
entered until the completion of the case, when it might have 
become unnecessary to prosecute the exceptions. R. S., c. 77, §§ 
22 and 25; Maine Benefit Association v. Hamilton, 80 Maine, 99. 
But, a the procedure under the Act of 1893 i omewhat anoma-
lou , and as there ha already been consid rable delay in the case, 
we think it more in the interests of justice tha·t the question 
involved should now be determined, which cour e i not without 
pr cedent in thi tate, even if it were clear that the exception 
were prematurely brought forward. tevens v. Shaw, 77 Maine, 
566. 
It i argued that thi court had no juri diction over the non-resi-
dent def ndant , that no ervice of the bill wa ever made upon 
th m in Maine, an no fact t up in the bill which would ubject 
them to the juri di tion of thi court, xcept th alle d fact that 
th ir co-def ndant had in hi po e sio ertain pr p rty or evi-
dence of ind 1 t dn b loncring to th non-re id nt defendants 
not op n to attachment; tha wh n th bill a di continu d a to 
th r ident d f n ant th ourt th n had no juri diction whait v r 
o r th e d fondant · and that thi di ntinuance a to the oth r 
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defendant, by leave of court and upon the plaintiff's motion, was
equivalent to an admission by the plaintiff and a decision by the
court that the court had no further jurisdiction over these defend-
ants.
The answer to all this is, that the defendants by their duly
authorized counsel entered a general and unconditional appearance,
thereby voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court, although independently of this voluntary action upon their
part the court may have had no jurisdiction over them. It is said
in Daniell's Chancery Pleading and Practice, p. 536: "Appear-
ance is the process by which a person, against whom a suit has
been commenced, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court."
And in the Encyl. of Pleading and Practice, Vol. 2, page 639,
"It is a universal rule, which admits of no exception, that, if the
court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, a general appearance
gives jurisdiction over the person. The principle that a general
appearance confers personal jurisdiction is of great importance
when a non-resident is sued. In a personal action brought against
a citizen of another state, the court does not acquire jurisdiction
over him by virtue of notice served on him in such other state.
WTiile process can not extend beyond the limits of the state, yet a
non-resident becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the court by a
general appearance." In support of these propositions authorities
are cited from nearly every state in the Union ; they are too numer-
ous, and the matter is too well settled to require a citation of these
authorities here.
This principle has been several times recognized by this court in
actions at law. Maine Bank v. Ilervey, 21 Maine, 38; BucJcfield
Branch 7?. R. Co. v. Benson, 43 Maine, 374; Thornton v. Leavitt,
63 AEaine, 384; Mahan v. Sutherland, 73 Maine, 158. That the
principle is equally applicable to causes in equity will be seen by
an examination of the cases above referred to as cited in the
Encyl. of Pleading and Practice.
It is suggested in the argument, by defendant's counsel, that in
accordance with the equity practice in this state, the court will not
assume jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant merely upon the
general appearance of counsel and upon an answer signed by coun-
sel, but will require in addition to the general appearance of coun-
sel an answer personally signed by such non-resident defendant,
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d fendant, by 1 ave of court and upon th plaintiff's motion, wa 
quival nt to an admi ion by th plaintiff and a deci ion by the 
ourt that th urt had no forth r juri di tion over th e defend-
ant . 
Th, an. w r all thi i that the d f ndant by their duly 
authoriz d un 1 nteT d a g n ral and unconditional appearance, 
th r b v luntarily ubmitting th m lv to the juri diction of the 
· urt alth ugh ind p ndently ·of thi voluntary action upon their 
th ourt may ha had no juri diction over them. It i aid 
ani 11 ban ry 1 ading and radic , p. 36 : ' ppear-
an i th by whi h a p r n, again t horn a uit ha 
b n ornm need ubmit him lf to th juri diction of the ourt." 
d in th 1 ncyl. of Pleading and Practice, Vol. 2, page 39, 
' t i a uni e al rule, which admits of no exc ption, that if the 
ourt ha juri .. diction of the ubject matter, a general appearance 
g1v juri di tion oYer the person. The principle that a general 
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when non-re ident i ued. n a per onal action brought again t 
a citizen of another tate, the court doe not acquire juri diction 
o r him by virtue of notic erved on him in uch other tate. 
il proce an not extend b yond the limit of the ta.te } et a 
non-re ident become ubject to the juri di tion of the court by a 
g n ral app arance.' In upport of the e propo ition authoritie 
are cit from nearly every tate in the nion · the are too numer-
ou an the matter i too well ettled to require a citation of the e 
authoriti h ~ . 
Thi principl ha been everal time recognized by this court in 
action at law. Maine Bank . H ervey, 1 Maine 3 ; Buckfield 
Branch . R. o. . Benson, 43 Maine 3 4 · Thornton . L eavitt, 
l\fain 3 -± · Mahan . utherland, 3 Maine, 158. That the 
principl i quall a·pplicabl to cau e in quity will be een b · 
an .·amination of th ca e above ref rred to a cited in the 
1 nc. ·l. of 1 a ding and Practi . 
It i.. uacr t 1 in the ar!lUill nt b defendant' coun el that in 
accorlan with the quity practi e in thi tate the court will not 
a um juri ) tion O\'er a non-r ident dPfendant merely upon the 
<'11 ral app aranc of coun. el an 1 upon an an w r ~irned by un-
, 1. hut will r quir in addition t th u n ral app aran f ou -
. l nn an w r p r nally ignel )' uch non-r .. id nt d f n a t 
unl :--. . r i ha b n mad upon him in h tate. 
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aware of any such practice, and no authority to that effect has
been called to our attention. Upon the other hand, the rule is
that, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption is
that an attorney has full right, power and authority to make such
appearance. In support of this proposition the authorities are
unanimous. Here, there is no suggestion of any want of authority
upon the part of the counsel for these defendants to enter a general
appearance for them. If these non-resident defendants had desired
to object to the jurisdiction of the court, they should have entered a
special or conditional appearance. Such an appearance, made for
the purpose of urging jurisdictional objections, is clearly recognized
by all courts and works upon practice.
It is argued that by Chancery Eule XIV defenses by demurrer
or plea may be inserted in an answer, and that an appearance fol-
lowed by an answer, in which is contained a plea to the jurisdic-
tion, should not have the effect of giving the court jurisdiction
over the person of a non-resident defendant, when jurisdiction is
acquired in no other way. But, in this ease, the defendants' answer
does not contain any plea to the jurisdiction of the court over
these defendants, nor is objection to the jurisdiction of the court
raised in any way; it merely, in one paragraph, denies that the
resident defendant had in his possession, or under his control, any
property belonging to them. But, even if the defendants in their
answer, in which they make answer to the merits of the cause, had
also objected to the jurisdiction of the court as to them, it seems,
in accordance with the authorities, that even this course would
have subjected them to the jurisdiction of the court. The rule is,
that when a defendant appears solely for the purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such motion is not
a voluntary appearance of defendant which is equivalent to service.
Where, however, the motion involves the merits of the case, the
rule is otherwise. Elliott v. Lawliead, 43 Ohio State, 172. See
also St. Louis Car Co. v. Stillwater St. By. Co., 53 Minn. 129;
Carroll Y. Lee, 3 G. & J. (Md.) 504; Fitzgerald, etc. Construction
Company v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98; Tipton v. Wright, 7 Bush,
(Ky.) 448.
These defendants having, as we have seen, voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, must be held to have
done so subject to the method of procedure in this state and to all


















































































































































aware of any such practice, and no authority to that effect has 
been called to our attention. Upon the other hand, the rule is 
that, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption is 
that an attorney has full right, power and authority to make such 
appearance. In support of this proposition the authoritie are 
unanimous. Here, there is no suggestion of any want of authority 
upon the part of the counsel for these defendants to enter a general 
appearance for them. If these non-resident defendants had desired 
to object to the juri diction of the court, they should ha:ve entered a 
special or conditional appearance. Such an appearance, made for 
the purpose of urging jurisdictional objections, is clearly recognized 
by all courts and works upon practice. 
It is argued that by Chancery Rule XIV defenses by demurrer 
or plea may be inserted in an answer, and that an appearance fol-
lowed by an answer, in which is contained a plea to the jurisdic-
tion, should not ha·ve the effect of giving the court jurisdiction 
over the person of a non-resident defendant, when jurisdiction is 
acquired in no other way. But, in this case, the defendants' answer 
does not contain any plea to the jurisdiction of the court over 
these defendants, nor is objection to the jurisdiction of the court 
raised in any way; it merely, in one paragrnph, denies that the 
resident defendant had in his possession, or under his control, any 
property belonging to them. But, even if the defendants in their 
answer, in which they make answer to the merits of the cause, had 
also objected to the jurisdiction of the court as to them, it seems, 
in accordance with the authoritie , that even this course would 
have subjected them to the jurisdiction of the court. The rule is, 
that when a defendant appears solely for the purpose of objecting 
to the jurisdiction of the court over his per on, such motion i not 
a voluntary appearance of defendant which is equivalent to service. 
Where, however, the motion involves the merit of the case, the 
rule is otherwise. Elliott v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio State, 172. See 
al o t. L01.tis Car Co. v. Stillwater St. Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 129; 
Carroll v. Lee, 3 G. & J. (Md.) 504; Fitzgerald, etc. Con truction 
Company v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98; Tipton v. Wright, 7 Bush, 
(Ky.) 448. 
These defendant having, as w have se n, voluntarily ubmitted 
them Ives to the jurisdiction of the court, mu t be h ld to have 
don o ubject to the method of procedure in thi tate and to all 
tatutory provi ion in relation to proc dure including, among 
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other things, the power of the court, under chap. 217 Public Laws
of 1893, in an equit}- proceeding, to strike out the pleadings in
equity and require the parties to plead at law in the same cause,
whenever it appears that the remedy at law is plain, adequate and
complete and that the rights of the parties can be fully determined
and enforced by a judgment and execution at law, and to then hear
and determine the case at law. This provision of the statute
applies to all cases pending in equity, and this order may be made
by the court, under the conditions named, whenever the court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause and over the persons
of the defendants. That this court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the cause is not denied, and that it acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants, we have already decided. The
important thing is that the court has jurisdiction; it matters not
how that jurisdiction was acquired over the person of a defendant.
If a non-resident defendant has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, the procedure must in all respects be the
same as if the defendant was a resident of the state.
We have no question, therefore, of the power of the court in this
cause, under the conditions named in the act, to order that the
pleadings in equity be stricken out and to require the parties to
plead at law in the same cause, which may then be heard and
determined by the court upon the law side of the court. The cause
is the same notwithstanding it has been converted from a cause in
equity to an action at law. The section of the act refers to it as
"the same cause" and provides that the court may hear and deter-
mine "the cause" at law, while by another section of the act it is
provided that no attachment shall be affected by this procedure.
It is further contended, by the counsel for the defendants, that
although the court attempted to proceed under this Act of 1893, it
did not in fact accomplish this intention because of various infor-
malities, and our attention is called to the insufficiency of the plain-
tiff's motion ; the fact that no terms were imposed ; and the further
fact that in making the order the court did not use the language of
the act. It is true that the plaintiff's motion did not cont<iin an
averment, "that the remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete,
and that the rights of the parties can be fully determined and
enforced by a judgment and execution at law." It simply said
"that the matter in controversy may be adequately and completely
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oth r thing , th power of the ourt under chap. 217 Public Laws 
of 1 9 , in an quity proc ding, t trik out the pleading in 
equity and r quir th partie to pl ad at law in the am cause, 
wh n v r it app a•r that l r m dy at law i plain, ad quate and 
ompl t and that h right of the partie can b fully determined 
and nforced by a judgment and x cution at law, and to then hear 
and det rmin the a at law. Thi pro i ion of the taitute 
appli to all a p nding in equity, and thi order may be made 
by the ourt, und r the condition named, whenever the court has 
juri di tion of th ubject matter of the ca.u e and over the per ons 
of th d f ndant . Tl1at thi court has juri diction of the ubject 
matt r of the au i not deni d, and that it acquired juri diction 
o r th person of the defendants, we have already decided. The 
imp rtant thing i that the court ha juri diction; it maUers not 
how that juri di tion was acquired over the per on of a defendant. 
fa non-re ident defendant has voluntarily submitted himself to the 
juri diction of the court, the procedure must in all respects be the 
am as if the defendant wa a resident of the state. 
We have no que tion, therefore, of the power of the court in thi 
cau , under the conditions named in the act, to order that the 
pleading in equity be stricken out and to require the partie to 
pl ad at law in the same cause, which ma·y then be heard and 
det rmined by the court upon the law side of the court. The cau e 
i the ame notwith tan.ding it ha been converted from a cau e in 
equit' to an action at law. The ection of the ad refer to it as 
'th am cau e" and provides that the court may hear and deter-
min 'the cau at law, while by another section of the act it is 
proYid d tha.t no attachment shall be affected by thi procedure. 
It i furth r ont nded, by the oun el for the defendant , that 
although th ourt attempted to proceed under thi Act of 1893, it 
did not in fact a ompli h thi int ntion because of various infor-
ma liti and our att ntion i called to the in ufficiency of the plain-
tiff m tion · th fa t that not rm were impo ed; and the further 
fa t that in makin the order the court did not u e the languaa of 
th act. It i tru that th plaintiff motion d•id not contain an 
av rm nt, 'that th r medy at law i plain ad quat and compl te 
and that th ri ht of th parti Cc n b full determin d and 
11f r d b a jud m nt and e e ution at law. It ~imply aid 
that th matt r in ontrov r ma be ad quat l,i and ompl t l,i 
d t rmin d in a uit at law and that th i~ u pr ent d ma b 
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more conveniently tried according to the course of the conunon
law than in equity." It would have been better practice if the
motion had followed the language of the act, but we do not think
that any written motion was necessary, or even that tliis order of
the court need be made at the instance or request of either party.
It may be made by the court without the motion of either party
during the progress of the hearing, if it appears to the court that
the conditions named in the act exist. See Ridley v. Ridley, 87
Maine, 445. Whatever the form of the motion in any case, or if
there is no motion, these facts must be made to appear to the court
before an order of this kind is made.
Again, the act provides that the order may be made "upon
reasonable terms." Here no terms were imposed, and it is claimed
that upon this account that the order was not properly made.
But we do not think that the statute makes it obligatory upon the
court to impose terms : any terms might be unreasonable in a given
case. The language of the act is similar to the provision of R. S.,
c. 82, § 10, "such errors and defects may be amended on motion
of either party, on such terms as the court orders." Under this
statute it has been held by this court that the matter of imposing
any terms was discretionary upon the court. Bolster v. Inhabi-
tants of China, 67 Maine, 551. Both of these statutes differ from
the one allowing an amendment after demurrer, which can only be
done, by express provision of the statute, upon the payment of
costs.
Lastly, it is argued that the order of the court was not in the
language of the act, that the court did not strike out the pleadings
in equity and require the parties to plead at law in the same cause,
and that it does not appear that the justice who made the order
found that the statutory conditions existed. But this finding by
the sitting justice was a condition precedent to making the order.
We must assume that, before making the order to convert the
cause in equity into an action at law, it was made to appear to him
that, in the language of the act, "the remedy at law is plain, ade-
quate and complete and that the rights of the parties can be fully
determined and enforced by a judgment and execution at law."
The court in the order did not strike out the pleadings in equity
and require the parties to plead at law in the same cause. This,
however, was the precise effect of the order to convert the cause in


















































































































































more conveniently tried according to the course of the common 
law than in equity." It would have been better practice if the 
motion had followed the language of the act, but we do not think 
that any written motion wa necessary, or even that this order of 
the court need be made a.t the in tance or reque t of either party. 
It may be made by the court without the motion of either party 
during the progre of the hearing, if it appears to the court that 
the condition named in the act exist. See Ridley v. Ridley, 87 
Maine, 445. Whatever the form of the motion in any ca e, or if 
there is no motion, these fact mus1t be made to appear to the court 
before an order of this kind is made. 
Again, the act provides that the ord r may be made "upon 
reasonable terms." Here no terms were imposed, and it is claimed 
thait upon this account that the order was not properly made. 
But we do not think that the statute make it obligatory upon the 
court to impo e terms: any terms might be unreasonable in a given 
ca e. The language of the act is similar to the provision of R. S., 
c. 82, § 10, "such errors and defects may be amended on motion 
of either pa:rty, on such term as the court orders." Under this 
statute it has been held by this court that the matter of imposing 
any terms was discretionary upon the court. Bolster v. I nhabi-
tants of China, 67 Maine, 551. Both of these statutes differ from 
the one allowing an amendment after demurrer, which caID only be 
done, by expre provision of the statute, upon the payment o.f 
co ts. 
La"tly, it is argued that the order of the court wa not in the 
language of the act, that the court did not strike out the pleading 
in equity and require the pa>fties to plead at law in the same cause, 
and that it does not appear that the justice who made the order 
found that the tatutory conditions existed. But thi finding by 
th itting ju tice wa a condition precedent to making the order. 
vV mu t a ume that, before making the order to convert the 
ciau in equity into an action at law, it was made to appear to him 
that, in the langua e of th act, "the rem dy at law i plain, ade-
quate and complete and th t the rights of the pa.rti an be fully 
1etcrmined and nforc d by ai judgment an execution at law." 
The court in th order did not trike out th pleading in equity 
and requir the part.ie to pl ad at law in th ame cau e. This, 
how v r wa th pr i e ff t of th ord r to convert th cau e in 
quity into an action at law, and wa in ub tan and ff t what 
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was authorized by the statute. It was a brief and concise form of
order, by which the court exercised the authority given by this
statute.




Isliam V. Miller, U N. J. Eq. 01. (1S88.)
On motion to take a disclaimer from the files.
Van Fleet, V. C. :
The principal object of the suit in this case is to procure a
decree declaring a deed, absolute on its face, to be a mortgage.
The deed was made by the complainant to the defendant. The
bill alleges that the debt, which the deed was intended to secure,
has been paid, and also that the defendant, on its payment, con-
veyed part of the land, which she held as security, to the com-
plainant, and the residue to another person, but that at the time
these conveyances were made the defendant was a married woman,
having a husband living, who did not join with her in the exe-
cution of the deeds, and so, in consequence of the invalidity of
her effort to convey, she still stands seized of the legal title to
the lands. To unravel this tangle, the complainant seeks a
decree declaring that the deed is a mortgage, and that the mort-
gage debt has been paid, and thus procure an establishment of
his own title by a judicial declaration that the defendant's right
in the lands has been discharged.
To meet the case thus made by the complainant, the defendant
says that she did not have, at the time the complainant filed his
bill, any right, title or interest, either legal or equitable, in the
lands in question, nor did she claim to have, and also, that if the
complainant had applied to her before filing his bill she would
have executed any conve3Tance or release necessary to perfect his
title. The complainant moves to strike the defendant's disclaimer
from the files. The ground of liis motion is that the actionable
facts alleged in the bill make a case against which a disclaimer
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wa authoriz d by the tatut . It wa a brief and concise form of 
order, by whi h the court ex rci d th authority given by this 
' tatute. 
·c ption ov rruled. 1a e remand d to nisi prius for further 
proce dings. 
Dr CL IMER. 
Isham v. Miller, 44 N . J. Eq. 61. {1888.) 
n motion to ta.ke a disclaimer from the :file . 
VAN FLEET, v. c.: 
The principal object of the uit in thi ca e i to procure a 
d cree d claring a deed, ab olute on its face, to be a mortgage. 
The d d wa made by the complainant to the defendant. The 
bill alleg that the debt, which the deed was intended to ecure, 
ha been paid, and al o that the defendant, on its payment, con-
vey d part of the land, which she held as ecurity, to the com-
plainant, and the residue to another pernon, but that at the time 
th e conveya·ncee were made the defend.ant wa a married woman, 
having a hu band living, who did not join with her in the exe-
cution of the d d , and o, in consequence of the invalidity of 
her effort to con ey, he sitill tands seized of the legal title to 
the land . To unravel thi tangle, the complainant eek a 
d ree d laring that the deed i a mortgage, and that the mort-
gag debt ha been paid, and thu procure an e tablishment of 
hi own titl by a judicial declaration that the defendant' right 
in the land ha b n di 1charged. 
T m t th a thu made by the complainant, the defendant 
ay that h did not have at th time the complainant filed his 
bill an right titl or intere t, ith r I al or equitaible, in the 
land in qu ti n nor did h la~m to ha , and al o, that if the 
· mplai ant had appli d to h r before :filino- hi bill h would 
hav xe ut an ' onv ~an or r 1 a n ary to perf t hi 
titl . Th omplainan mo to trik the d f ndant di laim r 
fr m th . Th round of hi otion i hat th a i a1 I 
fu ·t < 11 in th bill make a a e again t hich a di laim r 
IL titut n 1 f n e. r, tat th round in anoth r form ,, 
IQ2, Disclaimer
the complainant says, for & defendant standing in the position
which the defendant in this case does, to say, I disclaim all right
and interest in the subject matter of the litigation, neither shows
that the complainant is not entitled, as against the defendant, to
the relief he asks, nor that the defendant is entitled to a dis-
missal. A disclaimer is a mode of defence, and if it prevails
the defendant must be dismissed, and, as a general rule, he will
have a right to be dismissed with costs to be paid by the com-
plainant. If, however, a defendant attempts to disclaim in a
case where his disclaimer does not entitle him to a dismissal, but
he must, notwithstanding his disclaimer, still be retained as a
party defendant, in order that the relief, which the facts alleged
in the bill show the complainant to be entitled to, may be decreed
to him, the pleading, being useless to the defendant and without
effect in the cause, except as an obstruction, will be ordered to
be taken from the files. Judge Story states the rule on this
\ subject as follows: "A defendant cannot, by a disclaimer, de-
prive the plaintiff of the right of requiring a full answer from
I him, unless it is evident that the defendant ought not, after such
disclaimer, to be retained as a party to the suit. For a plaintiff
may have a right to an answer, notwithstanding a disclaimer;
and in such a case the defendant cannot shelter himself from
answering by alleging that he has no interest." Story's Eq. PI.
§ 840. This statement of the rule simply repeats what was de-
claired by Lord Eldon in Glassington v. Tliwaites, 2 Euss. 458,
and by Chancellor Walworth in Ellsworth v. Curtis, 10 Paige
105. And Lord Cottenham, in Graham v. Coape, 3 Myl. & Cr.
638, held that the course to be pursued, where a defendant dis-
claimed when he ought to answer, was to order the disclaimer to
be taken from the files.
Now, it is entirely certain that the defendant is not entitled to
a dismissal, for, giving her disclaimer its utmost effect, it is still,
on the admitted facts of the case, so plain as to be beyond dis-
pute that, notwithstanding her conveyances, she still holds the
legal title to the lands in question, and will, while she and her
husband both live, continue to do so until one of two things
happens, namely, until she and her husband join in making a
conveyance of the lands, or it is judicially declared that she sim-
ply held the legal title to them in pledge as security for the pay-


















































































































































the complainant ay , for a; defendant tanding in the po ition 
which the defendant in thi case does, to say, I disclaim all right 
and int r t in the subject matter of the litigation, neither hows 
that the complainant i not entitled, a aga~n t the defendant, to 
the relief he a k , nor that the defendant is entitled to a dis-
mi al. A di claimer i a mode of defence, and if it prevails 
the d fendant mu t be di mi ed, and, as a general rule, he will 
have a right to be di mi ed with co ts to be paid by the com-
plainant. If, however, a defendant attempts to di claim in a 
case where hi di claimer doe not entitle him to a di missal, but 
he mu t, notwith tanding hi di claimer, till be retained a a 
party defendant, in order that the relief, which the fact alleged 
in the bill how the complainant to be entitled to, may be decreed 
to him the pleading, being u eles to the defendant and without 
effect in the oau e, except as an ob truction, will be ordered to 
be taken from the files. Judge tory tates the rule on this 
ubj ct a follow : "A defendant cannot, by a di claimer, de-
prive the plaintiff of the rig.ht of requiring a full answer from 
him, unle it is evident that the defendant ought not, after such 
disclaimer, to be retained a a party to the uit. For a plaintiff 
may have a right to aill an wer, notwithstanding a di claimer; 
and in such a case the defendant cannot shelter himself from 
answering by alleging that he has no initerest." Story's Eq. Pl. 
840. T'hi tatement of the rule imply repeats what wa de-
claired by Lord Eldon in Gla.ssington v. Thwaites, 2 Ru s. -±58, 
and by Chancellor Walworth in Ellsworth v. Curtis, 10 Paige 
105. And Lord Oottenham, in Graham v. Ooape, 3 Myl. & Or. 
3 , held that the course to be pur ued, wher a d€fendant di~­
claim d when h ought to an wer, wa to order the di claimer to 
be taken from the file . 
ow it i ntir ly erta,in that the def nclant i not entitled to 
-:. a di mi al, for giving her disclaim r it utmo t effect, it i till, 
on th admitt d fa t of the ca e, o plain a to be b yond di -
put that, notwith tanding her con e ance she till hold the 
1 al title to th land in question, and will, while he and her 
hu l and both liv , continue to do o until one of two thing 
happ n , nam ly until h and her hu band join in makinc; a 
·om· ·ance of th land , or it i judicially d lar d that h im-
ply h Id the legal till t them in pl dg a curi f r th pay-
m nt of a d bt an thart the d bt ha b n paid. For the 
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defendant to say that she disclaims all right and title to tlie
lands amounts to absolutely nothing at all, either as a ground
of dismissal, or as a means of transmitting or relinquishing her
right. The thing that the complainant wants is a judicial decla-
ration that the deed which he made to the defendant is not what
on its face it purports to be, but a mortgage. If the facts stated
in his bill are true, the complainant is unquestionably entitled
to such a declaration. In view of the facts alleged in the bill,
such a declaration can be made against nobody but the defend-
ant. Without her before the court as a party defendant, the
suit, for all practical purposes, will be abated, and no decree can
be made, for she is the only person against whom relief, of the
kind sought, can be given. Tliis statement of the issue tendered
by the bill shows, as I think conclusively, that any pleading on
the part of the defendant which docs not in substance either deny
or admit that the deed is a mortgage, does not in any manner
meet the complainant's case. A disclaimer, in view of the case .x^J^
made by the complainant's bill, is obviously without either object '
or effect. The complainant's motion must prevail. _
Demurrer, jjs, ^P^
Rohinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 222. (1832.)
The bill in this cause was filed by certain stockholders of j^\ ^
the New York Coal Company against the directors of that cor-
poration, charging them with improper conduct in the manage-
ment of their trust. The company was incorporated in April,
1824, with a capital of $200,000. By its charter the company
was restricted from canning on any banking business, and was
limited solely to carrying on the business of exploring for, digging, ,
and vending coal. (Laws of 1824, p. 217.) The bill charged that
the commissioners named in tlie act opened books for the subscrip-
tion to the stock, and that the corporation went into operation
in June, 1824, when T. L. Smith, M. Hoffman, J. Minturn, C.
Lawton, W. F. Pell, F. Pell, W. Israel, S. Leggett and S. L.
Govemeur, were chosen directors of the comptinv. Tliat T. L. vX
Smith, was elected president, and R. A])bot was appointed secrettiry.

















































































































































_OBI SON . 
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d fondant to ay that he ili cla1im all right and title to th 
land a unt t ab olutely nothing at all, either a a ground 
of <li mi al r a a m n of tran ·mitting or r linqui hing her 
riaht. h thin that th mpla1inant wan i a judicial decla-
r Lion lha. th d cl whi h h mad th <l f ndant i not what 
on it f · · it I urp rt- to , but a mortga . If the facts tated 
in hi · bill ar ru h ompl inant i unquc tionably ntitl 
t u ·h · d 1 rati n. In i w of the fa t all ged in he bill, 
u ·h a. laration an be made again t nob dy but the d f n<l-
ant. \\ i h ut h r b for the ourt a a party defendant, the 
-nit for all pr ti al purpo , will be aibated, and no deer e can 
be a for h i the only p rson again t whom r eli f, of th 
kind u ht an b i en. Thi tat ment of the i ue tendered 
b ' th bill h w a I think conclu ively, that any pleadin on 
th arrt of th d f noont which do not in 1ib'tance either deny 
or admit thait th deed i a mortgage, do not in any manner 
m t the complainant ca e. A di claimer, in iew of the ca e 
mad by the complainant' bill, i obviou ly without either object 
or effect. Th complainant' motion must pre ail. 
D EM RRER. 
Robinson v. mith, 3 Paige Oh. (N. Y.) ~22. ( 1832.) 
The bill in thi cau e wa fil d by certain tockholder of 
the w ork oal ompany against the dir ctors of that cor-
pora•tion harging them with improper conduct in the manaae-
m nt of th ir tru t. The company wa incorporated in April, 
1 ~-± with a capital of · 00 000. By its charter the company 
\rn r tricted fr m arr ring on any banking bu ine , and wa 
limit d ol 1 to arr ring on the bu ine of exploring for, digITT.na 
and Y ndina coa11. (Law of 1 24 p. 21 . ) Th bill char ed that 
th nm i i n r nam d in the ad opened book for the ub crip-
ti n t h to k an that th orporation went into operation 
in Jun 1 ' T. L. mith 1. o:ffman J. Iin urn, 
La \d n 11 W. I ra 1 . L aaett and 
lOY rn ur w r 0£ th company. That T. 
bbot a aippoint d r 
hnl mpan ' wa~ OfCTaniz , th dire tor ur-
1 64 Demureeb
chased thirty acres of land, supposed to contain a coal bed, for
which they paid $13,000. That they procured from the land about
3000 bushels of coal, which they took to the city of New York,
as a sample. That some time in the course of the same year they
sold the land, and, as the bill alleged, they had never since employed
the funds of the company for the purpose of carrying on the
business of exploring for, diggmg or vending coal. The bill further
stated, that since that time the directors of the company had used
and employed their funds almost exclusively in the purchase and
sale of the stocks of various corporations and institutions. That
they came to a determination to purchase a majority of the stock
of the City Bank, and did by their agent purchase 16,000 shares of
the stock of that bank at a premium of from two to nine and a
half per cent. That they pledged the same to individuals to raise
money thereon, at about 90 per cent, upon the par value of the
stock, and paid the difference out of the funds of the coal com-
pany; and that the individuals to whom the bank stock was
pledged, gave to the agent of the coal company their proxies to vote
for directors of the bank. That the company ordered its agent to
vote for T. L. Smith, C. Lawton, W. F. Pell, and others, as
directors of the bank; that he did so vote, and that they were
accordingly elected such directors on the first Monday of June,
1825. That the stock of the City Bank was afterwards sold at a
loss of from 10 to 20 per cent., by which the coal company lost
$50,000. The bill also charged that this operation of the directors
of the coal company was to subserve their private purposes, and
was in violation of their known duty as directors of the company.
The bill further charged that the directors of the coal company
also purchased 1500 shares of the New York Gas Light Company,
at a premium of from 80 to 100 per cent. ; 1000 shares of the New
York and Schuylkill Coal Company, at an advance or premium
of from 10 to 30 per cent.; 1500 shares of the Bank of America,
at a premium of from 3 to 8 per cent. ; 1000 shares of the Jersey
City Bank, at a premium of from 12 to 25 per cent.; 1500 shares
of the Mercantile Insurance Company, at a premium of from 8
to 12 per cent. ; 1000 shares of the Franklin Fire Insurance Com-
pany, at a premium of from 8 to 20 per cent.; and 1500 shares
of the Brooklyn Gas Light Company, at a premium of 7 per cent.
That a portion of the said stocks had been since sold and on which


















































































































































chased thirty acres of land, supposed to contain a coal bed, for 
which they paid $13,000. That they procured from the land about 
3000 bushels of coal, which they took to the city of New York, 
as a sample. Tha.t some time in the course of the same year they 
sold the land, and, as the bill alleged, they had never since employed 
the funds o.f the company for the purpose of carrying on the 
busines of exploring for, diggmg or vending coaJ.. The bill further 
stated, that since that time the directors of the company had used 
and employed their funds almost exclusively in the purchase and 
sale of the stocks of various corporations and institutions. That 
they came to a determinaition to purchase a majority of the stock 
of the City Bank, and did by their agent purchase 16,000 shares of 
the tock of that bank at a premium of from two to nine and a 
half per cent. That they pledged the same to individua·ls to rai e 
money thereon, at about 90 per cent. upon the par value of the 
stock, and paid the difference out of the funds of the coal CO'Il1-
pany; and that the individuals to whom the bank stock was 
pledged, ga,ve to the agent of the coal company their proxies to vote 
for directors of the bank. That the company ordered its agent to 
vote for T. L. Smith, C. Lawton, W. F. Pell, and others, as 
directors of the bank; that he did so vote, and that they were 
accordingly elected such directors on the first Monday of June, 
1825. That the stock orf the City Bank was 3!fterwards sold at a 
loss of from 10 to 20 per cent., by which the coal company lost 
$50,000. The bill also ·charged that this operation of the directors 
of the coal company was to subserve their private purposes, and 
was in violation of their known duty as directors of the company. 
The bill further charged that the di.redo.rs of the coal company 
also purchased 1500 shares of the New York Gas Light Company, 
at a premium of from 80 to 100 per cent.; 1000 share6 of the New 
York and Schuylkill Coal Company, at an advance or premium 
orf from 10 to 30 per cent.; 1500 ha·res o;f the Bank of Am rica, 
at a premium of from 3 to 8 per cent.; 1000 hare of the J erscy 
City Bank, at a premium of from 12 to 25 p r cent.; 1500 hares 
of the Mercantile n urance Oompany, at a premium of from 8 
to 12 per cent.· 1000 har of th Franklin Fire In uranc Com-
pany, a·t a pr mi um of from 8 to 20 per c nt.; and 1500 hare 
f th Brooklyn Ga Liaht ompany, at a pr mium of 7 per c nt. 
That a poTtion of the aid to k had b en ince ld and on whi h 
th company u tain d a lo of about $6 000, x lu iv of the 
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loss on the City Bank stock. Tliat a considerable portion of the
stocks thus purchased had not been re-sold, and were greatly
diminished in value. Tliat the whole amount of these and other
stocks purchased by the directors, or in which the company was
interested, amounted to nearly two millions of dollars. By which
dealings the directore caused a loss to the coal company of not less
than $150,000, and thereby rendered its stock of very little value.
The bill further charged that the amount of debts owing by the
coal company during a part of the time when these stock specula-
tions were going on, exceeded fifteen times the amount of the
capital paid in. The president and secretary were also made de-
fendants; the bill charging that the books and papers of the com-
pany were in their possession. The complainants prayed a dis-
covery and for general relief.
The defendant F. Pell, put in a general demurrer to the bill
for want of equity. The other defendants put in a general and
special demurrer. And for causes of demurrer, they stated that
it appeared by the bill; that the complainants were owners of
their stock in severalty, and had no joint interest therein; that
the capital stock of the company was 4000 shares, and that the
complainants were owners of only 160 shares. They therefore
insisted that the owners of the other shares should have been made
parties.
The Chancellor:
Before I proceed to examine the merits of this case, it may be
proper to refer to the causes assigned as special grounds of de-
murrer. And first, it is said there are other stockholders who
ought to be made parties. Where it is not apparent from the bill
itself that necessary parties are omitted, it can be taken advantage
of only by plea or answer; showing who are the necessar}- parties,
and making the objection of a want of parties in a plain and
explicit manner. {2 Paige's Pep. 280. 1 Monro's Kent. Rep. 107.
1 A. K. Marsh. Pep. 112. 1 Hogan's Pep. 70.) The defendants
can demur only when it is apparent from the bill itself that there
are other persons who ought to have Ijecn made parties. And the
demurrer should show who are the proper parties. It is true the
capital stock of the corporation is, by the charter, to consist of
4000 shares; and the complainants own but IfiO. But it also
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los on th · ty ank tock. That ai considerable portion o:f the 
tock thu pur ha d had not been re- old, and were greatly 
dimini hed i alu . That th whol amount o:f the e and other 
to k pur h d by the dir tors, or in which the company was 
int r t d am unt to n arly two million of dollars. By which 
d 'a1ing th dir t r au d a 1 to the oal company of not less 
than $1 0 , an th r by r nd red it tock of ery little value. 
1e bill furth r charg d that th amount of debts owing by the 
al o pany uring a part of th time when the e tock p cula-
tion w r goino- on, e ceed d fifteen tim s the amount f the 
·apital paid in. The pr id nit and ecretairy were al o mad de-
f ndant ; th bill charging that th books and papers of the om-
pany ere in th ir p ession. The complainants prayed a dis-
cov ry and for general relief. 
The d fenda·nt F. Pell, put in a general demurrer to the bill 
for want of quity. The other defendants put in a general and 
pecial demurrer. And for causes of demurrer, they stated that 
it appear d by the bill; that the complainants were owneTs of 
their tock in everalty, and had no joint intere t therein; that 
the capital tock of the company was 4000 hares, and that the 
complainants were owners of only 160 share . They therefore 
in i ~d that th owners of the other hares hould have been made 
parti . 
TIIE H NCELLOR : 
efore pr d t examine the merits of this case, it may be 
pro r to r f r to th caus a igned a special grounds of de--
murrer. And first it i said th.er are other tockholders who 
uaht to b made parti . Where it i not apparent from the bill 
it lf that n a-ry parti are omitt d it can be taken advantage 
f only by pl a or an w r; howin who ar th neces aIJ partie 
an 1 making th obj ction of a want of partie in a plain and 
pli it mann r. ( aige' ep. 0. 1 Monro ent. Rep. 10 . 
. \:. a h. . 1 . 1 ogan Rep. 0.) The defendant 
an d mur only wh n it i appar nt from the bill it lf that th re 
nr h r p r n who ou ht to hav be n mad parti . nd the 
10murr r h ull how who ar th proper parti . It i t u th 
apital o k i th rporati n i b.' th hart r, to con it f 
I 0 0 8lrnr · an 1 th mplainant wn but But it al 
·1pp ar. from th a t fin orp ration that th d f dant wh w r 
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directors must also have been stockholders. And from aught that
appears to the contrary, they may now be the owners of all the
residue of the stock subscribed.
The objection for multifariousness cannot be sustained. All
of the complainants are cestui que trusts, having similar interests,
in every respect, and arising out of the same trust. They are
seeking precisely the same redress against their trustees, and for
the same acts; by which they allege they have received a similar
and common injury. There is, therefore, no good reason for
requiring them to file separate and distinct bills. It is a favorite
object of this court to prevent a multiplicity of suits. And where
several persons have a common interest, arising out of the same
transaction, although tlieir interest is not joint, even the defendant
may sometimes insist that they shall all be made parties, that he
may be only subjected to the trouble and expense o'f one litigation.
Upon the principle of the decision of this court, in Brinckerlioff v.
Brown (6 John. Ch. Eep. 139), the complainants were authorized,
if not required, to join in this suit.
The objection that a discovery may subject the company to a
forfeiture of its charter, is not sufficient to support this general
demurrer to the whole bill, both as to the discovery and relief,
even if it would have authorized a demurrer to the discovery of
particular facts. Under the provisions of the revised statutes, the
defendants may be compelled to make a discovery, in certain cases,
although it may subject the corporation to a forfeiture of its
corporate rights. (2 E. S. 465, § 52.)
If the allegations in this bill are true, there is no doubt that
the directors of this company were guilty of a most palpable
violation of their duty, by engaging in this gambling speculation
in stocks, which was wholly unauthorized by their charter; and
which the bill alleges was carried on to subserve their own indi-
vidual interests and purposes. I have no hesitation in declaring
it as the law of this state, that the directors of a monied or other
joint stock corporation, who wilfully abuse their trust, or misapply
the funds of the company, by which a loss is sustained, are per-
sonally liable as trustees to make good that loss. And they are
equally liable, if they suffer the corporate funds or property to be
lost or wasted by gross negligence and inattention to the duties of
their trust. Independent of the provisions of the revised statutes,


















































































































































directors must also have been stockholders. And from aught that 
appears to the contrary, they may now be the owners of aill the 
re idue of the stock subscribed. 
The objection for multifariousne s cannot be susfained. All 
of the complainants are cestui que trusts~ having similar interests, 
in every re pect, and arising out of the same trust. They are 
seeking precisely the same redress against their tru tees, and for 
the same acts; by which they allege they have received a similar 
and common injury. TheTe is, therefore, no goo.d reason for 
requiring them to file separate and distinct bills. It is a favorite 
obj ct of this court to prevent a multiplicity of suits. And where 
several persons have a common interest, arising out of the same 
transaction, although their interest is not joint, even the defendant 
may ometimes insist that they shall all be made parties, that he 
may be only subjected to the trouble and expense of one litigation. 
Upon the principle of the decision of this court, in Brinckerhoff v. 
Brown ( 6 John. Ch. Rep. 139), the complainants were authorized, 
if not required, to join in this suit. 
T'he objection that a dis-covery may subject the company to a 
forfeiture of its charter, is not sufficient to support this general 
demurrer i:o the whole bill, both as ro the discovery and relief, 
even if it would have authorized a demurrer to the discovery of 
particular :facts. Under the provisions of the revised statutes, the 
defendants may be compelled to make a discovery, in certain cases, 
although it may subject the corporaition to a forfeiture of its 
corporate rights. (2 R. S. 4()5, § 52.) 
If the alle~ations in this bill are true, there is no doubt that 
the directors of this company were guilty of a most palpable 
violation o.f their duty, by engaging in this gambling speculation 
in si:ocks, which wa wholly unauthorized by their charter; and 
which the bill alleges was carried on to subserve their own indi-
vidual interests and purposes. I have no hesitation in declaring 
it a the law of this state, that the director of a monied OT other 
joint tock corporation, who wilfully abu e their tru t, or misapply 
the fund of the company, by which a loo is sustained, are per-
sonally liable a tru tee to make good that lo . And they are 
equally liable if they suffer th corporate fund or prop rty i:o be 
loot or wa ted by gro negligence and inattention to the duties of 
th ir trust. Independent of the provi ion of the revi ed statute , 
which were pa d after the filing o.f thi bill, thi court had juris-
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diction, so far as the individual rights of the corporators were
concerned, to call the directors to account; and compel them to
make satisfaction for any loss arising from a fraudulent breach
of trust, or the wilful neglect of a known duty. To this extent
Chancellor Kent, in the case of The Attorney Generdl v. The Utica
Ins. Co. {2 Johns. Oh. Rep. 389), admitted the court had juris-
diction; although he doubted the general powers of this court
over the corporation itself to prevent an abuse of its corporate
privileges. Until very recently, but few incorporated companies,
in which individuals had any direct pecuniary interest, existed in
England, except corporations for charitable purposes. And this
court would very reluctantly interfere with the concerns of mere
municipal corporations, where a sufficient remedy is afforded, by
mandamus or quo warranto, or by an indictment against the
officers of the corporation, for any abuse of their powers by which
the public has sustained an injury. But since the introduction of
joint stock corporations, which are mere partnerships, except in
form, the principles which were formerly applied to charitable
corporations in England, may be very appropriately extended to
such companies here. The directors are the trustees or managing
partners, and the stockholders are the cestui que trusts, and have a
joint interest in all the property and effects of the corporation.
(See Wood's Inst. B. 1 ch. 8, p. 110. 11 Coke's Rep. 98, b.) And
no injury the stockholders may sustain by a fraudulent breach of
trust, can, upon the general principles of equity, be suffered to pass
without a remedy. In the language of Lord Hardwicke, in a
similar case, 'T will never determine that a court of equity cannot
lay hold of every such breach of trust. I will never determine
that frauds of this kind are out of the reach of courts of law or
equity; for an intolerable grievance would follow from such a
determination." (3 Atk. Rep. 406.) The demurrers on the record
are therefore not well taken, and should be overruled.
The defendants have, however, assigned as causes of demurrer,
ore tenus, that is not alleged in the bill that the corporation, by its
officers, refused to sue, or that the defendants are the present
directors, having the control of the corporation, and that there-
fore the suit should have been in the name of the corporation.
That even if a sufficient excuse is shown by the bill, for bringing
the suit in the name of the stockholders, the coqwration should be
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diction, o far a the individual right of the co:rporator were 
on rn ,, cl to all th dir cto to a · aunt; and compel them to 
mak ati .fa ti n for any lo. a·ri ing from a fraudulent breach 
of tru t, r th wilful n o-lcct of a known duty. To this xtent 
han 11 r Y nt in th a of The ttorney General v. The Utica 
In·. Co . ( hn. h. R p. 3 9), aclmit d the court had juri -
cli ·tion · although h cl ubt d th en ral powe of thi ourt 
rporati n it Lf to pr v nt an abu e of its rporate 
ntil very r ently, but fe.w in orporated compani ::, 
j idual had any dir ct pecuniary inter t, exi ted in 
pt orporation for haritabl purpo e . nd thi 
·ot rt woul v ry r lu tantly int rf re with th cone rn of mer 
municipal :rp ration , where a ufficient remedy i afforded, by 
mandamu or qu warranto, or by an indictment again t the 
o · rs of th corporation, for any abu e of their pow 1 by which 
th publi ha u tain d an injury. But ince the introduction of 
joint t k corporation , whicl1 ar mere partn rship , except in 
form th prin i11 s which were :formerly applied to haritable 
·orporation in England may be very appropriately extended to 
u h co pani h re. The directors are the trustee or managing 
I artn r , and the tockholders are the cestui que trustsJ and have a 
joint int r t in all the property and effects of the corporation. 
( e Wood Inst. B. 1 h. 8, p. 110. 11 Cok' Rep. 98, b.) And 
no injury the to khold r ma u tain by a fraudulent breach o,f 
tru t, an, upon th aeneral principle~ of equity, b uffered to pa 
without a r medy. n the language of Lord Hardwicke, in a 
imilar ca I will n er determine that a court of equity cannot 
la r hold of ry u h br ach of tru t. I will never d termine 
that fraud of thi kind are out of the reach of court of law or 
quit ; for an intol rable gri ance would follow from uch a 
d termination. ' ( tk. Rep. 406.) The demurrer on the record 
ar th r for not w 11 tak n, and hould be ov rrul d. 
The d f ndant ha how v r a igned a au e of d murrer, 
ore terw J that i not all g d in the bill that th orporation b r it::' 
offic r fu d to u or that the defendant ar th pr ~ent 
c1ir to havin0 th ontrol of th corporation, and that therc-
f r th uit hould hav b n in the name of th corporation. 
if a uffici nt e~ c i hown b r the bill for brinaino· 
th • uit in th nam f th tockholders the corporation h uld b 
b f r th urt a a par . ' d f ndant. I think at 1 a t on f th e 
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objections is well taken ; and that the corporation should be before
the court, either as complainant or as a defendant.
Generally, where there has been a waste or misapplication of
the corporate funds, by the officers or agents of the company, a
suit to compel them to account for sudi waste or misappHcation
should be in the name of the corporation. But as this court never
permits a wrong to go unredressed merely for the sake of form,
if it appeared that the directors of the corporation refused to
prosecute by collusion with those who had made themselves
answerable by tlieir negligence or fraud, or if the corporation was
still under the control of those who must be made the defendants
in the suit, the stockholders, who are the real parties in interest,
would be permitted to file a bill in their own names, making the
corporation a party defendant. And if the stockholders were so
numerous as to render it impossible, or very inconvenient to bring
them all before the court, a part might file a bill, in behalf of
themselves and all others standing in the same situation. {Hichens
V. Congreve, 4 Russ. E. 563.) Although the revised statutes have
provided for cases of this kind in future, this bill cannot be sus-
tained, unless it is made to conform to the law as it existed at the
time the suit was commenced.
The demurrer ore tenus is therefore allowed, upon payment by
the defendants of the costs of the demurrer on the record. (Attor-
ney General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. Eep. 288. Durdant v. Redmond,
\ '\ \1 Vern. 78.)* But the complainants are to be at liberty to amend,
\ V^ ^ t^^y ^^y ^^ advised.
/^ ^ J^^n'botham V. Burnet, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 18Jf. (1821.)
f^ \r, ' The bill stated, that lot No. 81, in Manlius (part of military
^^' /' bounty lands), was patented to Archibald Elliot. That on the
^j-/ *^' 17th day of January, 1785, before the patent was issued, Elliot,
<^'yr f^ by an agreement contained in the condition of a bond, sold the
(^ J^ lot to Leonard Smith, and ])Ound himself to execute a deed of
.y conveyance. On the 4th of November, 1789, Smith, by an assign-
Vr' *A demurrer ore tenus appears to be in the nature of a new demurrer
to the same part of the bill which was before demurred to. And it was
allowed in this form, upon the argument of the demurrer on record, to
prevent injustice; as the defendant cannot again be allowed to demur



















































































































































objection is well taken; and that the corporation should be before 
the court, either a complainant or as a defendant. 
Generally, where there has been a wa te or mi application of 
the corporate funds, by the of:Iicers or agents of the company, a 
uit to compel them to account for u'Ch waste a:r misapplication 
should be in the name of the corporation. But as this court never 
permits a wrong to go unredre ed merely for the ake of form, 
if it appeared that the directors of the corp-0ration refused to 
pro ecute by collu ion with tho e who had made themselves 
an w rable by their negligence or fraud, or if the corpora.tion was 
till under the control of those who must be made the defendants 
in the suit, the stockholders, who are the real parties in interest, 
would be permitt d to file a bill in their own names, making the 
corporation a party defendant. And if the stockholders were so 
numerous as to render it impoo ible, or very inconvenient to bring 
them all before the court, a part might file a bill, in behalf of 
themselves and all others standing in the same situation. (Hichens 
v. Congreve, 4 Russ. R. 562.) Although the revised statutes have 
provided for cas of this kind in future, this bill oannot be sus-
tained, unless it i ma.de to conform to the law as it existed at the 
time the suit was commenced. 
The demurrer ore tenus is therefore allowed, upon payment by 
the defendants of the costs of the demurrer on the record. (A ttor-
ney General v. Brown, 1 Swanst. Rep. 288. Durdant v. Redmond, 
1 Vern. 78.) * But the complainants are to be at liberty to amend, 
a they may be advised. 
;Higinbotham v. Burnet, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 184. (1821.} 
THE bill tat d, that lot No. 81, in Manliu (part o•f military 
bounty lands), was patented to Archibald Elliot. That on the 
17th day of January, 17 5, b for the pat nt wa i ued, Elliot, 
by an agreement contained in th condition of a bond old the 
lot to L onard mith and bound him f to x cut a d 1 of 
conveyanc . On the 4th of ovember, 1789, mith, by an a ign-
*A demurrer ore tenus app ar to be in th nature of a n w demurrer 
to th m part of th bill whi h was b for d murr d to. And it was 
all w d in thi s f rm , upon th argum nt f th demurr r on r cord, to 
prev nt inju ti ce; a th def ndant ann t again b all w d to demur 
to th am matt r in a ny th r way. (See II V . R p. 70.) 
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ment endorsed on the bond, sold and assigned the lot and the bond
to William I. Vredenbergh. The bond, with the assignment en-
dorsed, was duly deposited in the office of the clerk of Onondaga,
pursuant to the act of IT'J-i. On the 28th of August, 1790, Vre-
denbergh sold and assigned the bond, by an endorsement thereon,
together with all his rights title and interest in and to the land,
to which he was entitled by the said bond, to John Carpenter: and
v., at the same time, delivered to Carpenter the patent for the
lot, and Elliot's discharge from the army. About the year 1792,
Carpenter conveyed the lot in fee to Jeremiah Jackson, who entered
upon it, built a house and mills, and made valuable improvements.
On the 25tli of June, 1799, Jackson reconveyed the lot in fee to
Carpenter, with warranty. C. entered on tlie premises, and con-
tinued in possession until his death, in Fobruarj', 1800. In
February, 1806, a partition of the lands of C. was made among
his heirs, pursuant to the statute, and the premises in question
were allotted to the share of his son, Benjamin C. Ever since the
conveyance of Jackson to John C, he and his heirs have been in
the peaceable occupation of the preonises, to the present time.
Since his death (and since the right, if any, of the heirs of V. had
accrued), several houses, mills, bams, &c. have been erected on
the premises, and other improvements made, to the value of
eighteen thousand dollars. That Vredenbergh, at the time of the
death of John C, lived at Marcellus, within twenty miles of the
premises, and continued to reside there until his death, in 1813;
and he was well acquainted with the improvements making on the
premises. The plaintiffs are severally seised in fee of p'arts of the
lot, under Benjamin C. ; and the defendants are the children and
heirs of Vredenbergh.
The bill furtlier stated, that Vredenbergh, at all times, and
particularly after the death of Jo'hn C, disclaimed all interest
in the lot, declaring that his whole interest had been conveyed
to J. C, and that his heirs were seised thereof in fee. That the
heirs of V. claim the lot, denying that any other than an estate
for life was conveyed by their father, for want of words of inherit-
ance. But the plaantifTs charged, that the conveyance to J. C.
was intended to create, and did create an estate in fee. That in
May, 1820, the defendants brought actions of ejectment against the
plaintiffs, to recover possession of the premises. The plaintiffs
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ment endors d on the bond, oLd and ign d the lot and the bond 
to v illiam . Vred nb gh. The bond, with the a ignm nt en-
do ed, wa duly d p i d in the offi of the clerk of Onondaga, 
pur uant to the ad of 1 -±. On the th of ugust, 1 90, re-
d nb r h old and ,ign d th bond, by an nd r ment ther on, 
to()" th r wjth all his 1·ighl, title and interest in and to the land, 
to whi ·h he ' a ntitl d y he aid bond, to ohn arpent r: and 
., at th am tim , d liver d to arp nter the patent for the 
lot a.nd 1 Uiot di ·harg from the army. About the year 1 92, 
ar nt r onv j ed th lot in fee to J ere iah Jack on, who ent r d 
upon it, built a hou e and mill , and made valuable improvern nt.8. 
On th ' th of June, 1 99, Jack on re onveyed the lot in fe to 
arp nt r, with warranty. . ntered on the premises, and con-
tinu d in p ion until hi death, in F ibruary, 1 00. In 
] bruary, 1 06, a partition of the lands of 0. wa made among 
hi hei1 , pur uant to the tatute, and the premi es in que tion 
w r allotted to the hare of hi on, Benjamin 0. Ever since the 
onveyance of J a on to John 0., he and hi heirs have been in 
the p ac abl oocupation of the prmni es, to the present time. 
inc hi d ath (and ince the right, if any, of the heirs of V. had 
ac ru d) e ral houses, mill , barn , &c. have been erected on 
th pr mi e , an.di other impro ements made, to the value of 
io-hte n thou and dollar . That redenbeJ:gh, at the time of the 
d ath of John 0. lived at Mair ellu , within twenty mile of the 
pr mi and continu d to r ide there until hi death, in 1813; 
and he wa w 11 acquaint d with the improvements making on the 
pr mi . Th plaintiff ar ev rally ei d in fee of part · of the 
lot und r njamin 0.; and the def ndants are the children and 
h i f r d nb rgh. 
Th bill iurth r ta d that Vredenbergh, at all time and 
parti ularl aft r th dea.th oif J o·hn ., di claimed all inter t 
in th 1 t d larinrr that hi whole interest had been conveyed 
to J. . and that hi heir re ei d thereof in f ·e. That the 
h 'ir of . laim h lot d nying that any oth r than an fate 
for life wa on 1 1 b th ir fath r for want f word of inh rit-
an . ut th plari.n iff harg d that h nv ran e to 
m · int nd 1 t r at and did r at a tat in f . That in 
:\ <1)' 1 . th d r n lan brou ht a tion of ejectment arrain t th 
plaintiff:, t r Y r p ~ ion of th pr mi b plaintiff::-
pray d a di o I ' a to th fia tat in th ill aml f r a 
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release from the defendants of any claim to the lot, and that they
may be enjoined, &c., and for other relief, &c. An injunction was,
accordingly, awarded.
The defendants demurred to the bill: 1. Because the plaintiffs
claiming to be seised in fee of the premises, under the conveyance
from v., it was a question of law only. 2. Because the bill con-
tained no matter of equity.
The Chancellor:
This is a demurrer to the whole bill, and there are two causes
of demurrer assigned. (1.) That the plaintiffs claim to be seised
in fee of the premises, and therefore the matter is properly and
exclusively cognizable at law. (2.) That the bill contains no
matter of equity.
Perhaps it would be sufficient to dispose of the demurrer, by
referring to the rule {Laight v. Morgan, 1 Johns. Cases, 429),
that if a demurrer be general to the whole bill, and be bad in part,
it must be overruled. If it be good for discovery, and not for relief,
a general demurrer to the whole bill is bad. The defendants should
in such a case give the discovery, and demur to the relief; and this
rule was so settled, in the case referred to, in the Court of Errors.
I cannot see any doubt, in this case, of the right of the plaintiffs
to a discovery concerning the deeds charged in the bill to have
been lost, and concerning their contents.
But the bill appears to me to state several distinct and sufficient
heads of equity jurisdiction.
It is easy to perceive, that the real ground of the claim of the
defendants, as heirs of Vredenbergh, rests on the defective con-
veyance from him to John Carpenter, under whom the plaintiffs
claim title; and that defect consists in the omission of words of
inheritance, the want of which, I apprehend, would confine the
operation of the assignment, in a Court of law, to an estate for
life. But when the right of the soldier rested originally in
equity, and continued so when he conveyed his right to Smith,
and when Smith transferred that right to Vredenbergh, and when
we consider the charge in the bill that Vredenbergh and Carpenter
negotiated and agreed for the sale and purchase of that entire
right, and the circumstances attending the assignment from V. to
C, and the language and mode of the assignment, and the accom-
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relea e from the d fondant of any claim to the lot, and that they 
ma be enjoined, &c., and for other relief, &c. An injunction wa , 
accordingly awarded. 
The d fendants demurred to the bill: 1. Becau e the plaintiffs 
claiming to be ei ed in fee of the premi e , under the conveyaince 
from V., it wa a question of law only. 2. Because the bill con-
tained no matter of equity. 
THE CHANCELLOR: 
This i a demurrer to the whole bill, and there are two causes 
of demurrer assigned. ( 1.) That the plaintiffs claim to be sei ed 
in fee of the premi es, and therefore the matter is properly and 
exclu ively cognizable at law. (2.) That the bill contains no 
matter of equity. 
Perhap it would be ufficient to di pose of the demurrer by 
referring to the rule (Laight v. Morgan) 1 John . Ca ffi, 429), 
that if a demurrer be general to the whole bill, and be had in part 
it mu t be overruled. If it be good for di covery and not for relief 
a general demurrer to the whole bill i bad. The defendants hould 
in uch a case give th di covery, and demur to the relief; and thi~ 
rule was so settled, in the ciase referred to, in the Court of Errors. 
I ca·nnot ee any doubt, in thi ca e, of the right of the plaintiff 
to a di covery concerning the deed charged in the bill to have 
been lo t, and concerning their content . 
But the bill appears to me to tate several distinct and sufficient 
h ad of equity juri diction. 
It i ea y to perceive, that the real ground of the claim of the 
defendant , as h irs of Vredenbergh, r86ts on the defective con-
veya·nce from him to John Carpenter under whom the plaintiff~ 
claim title; and that defect con i t in the omi sion of word of 
inheritanc , th want of whi h, I appreh nd, woul confine the 
op ration of th a ignment, in a Court of law to an e tat for 
lif . But wh n th right of the oldi r re ted originall} in 
equity, and ontinu d o wh n he conv y d hi right to mith 
and wh n mith tran f rr d thait ri ht to Vred nb rgh and wh n 
we con. ider th ·bar in the bill that\ r denb r h and arpenter 
n gotiat d and agr d for the ale and purcha of that ntire 
riaht, and th circum tan e att nding the i nm nt from . to 
. and the lan ua an mod of th a ianm nt an the accom-
panying , liv n of th patent and oriainal 1i charg of the oldi r 
HiGINBOTHAM V. BURNET 171
there is good cauf^e to infer a mistake in that assignment; and that,
owing to a defect in drawing it, the intention of the parties was
not carried into effect. To remedy this defect, and to prevent an
unconscientious advantage being taken of it, may afford a very fit
case for equitable interposition. Under such special circumstances,
a trust in fee may be considered as created, which this Court would
execute according to the conscience and intention of the parties.
There are many cases at common law in which a fee has been held
to pass without the word heirs (Co. Litt. 9. b.) ; and if a trust
interest in fee was intended to be created by the a>ssignment from
Y. to C, in like manner as a trust interest in fee was conveyed by
the deed from Elliot to Smith, and by the assignment from Smith
to Vredenborgh, then this Court, according to the doc-trine in
Fisher v. Fields (10 Johns. Rep. 495), would decree an adequate
legal conveyance, according to that intention, notwithstanding the
want of words of inheritance.
The allegations in the bill on wliieh so much stress has been
laid by the counsel for the defendants, that the plaintiffs were
seised of the land in question, must be understood to mean an
equitable, and not a legal seisin. The whole scope of the ])ill,
and the very fact of coming into this Court, demonstrate thJs
meaning.
The bill also states facts, from which we are to infer that
Vredenbergh and his heirs, the present defendants, are equitably
estopped from asserting any claim to a reversionan^ interest in the
land. It is charged, that Y., after the death of Carpenter, for 13
years, stood by and saw great and costly improvements made upon
the land, by persons claiming, and believing themselves to be
owners in fee, under Carpenter, and never interposed any preten-
sion of right or title. It appears from the cases referred to in
Wendell v. Van Rensselaer (1 Johns. Ch. Eep. 354), that though
the right of the party, who thus misleads third persons by his
silence, be merely a reversionary interest, and subject to a life
estate, in the very person whom he suffers to deal with the prop-
erty as absolute owner, the rule of equity still applies, that he
never shall be permitted to exercise his legal title against such
person. He is bound, and all persons claiming under him, are
bound, by his silence. This case is much stronger than ordinary
ones of the kind ; for here the silence was maintained for thirteen
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th r i: g cl cau:' t inf ·r a mi tak in that a ianment; and that, 
win a t a c1 'l} t in drawin it th int ntion or th parti wa ~ 
n t ·arri d into ff '.l -t. 'I r •m, 1 thi tl I t and t pr nt an 
un on ·i nti u aclvanta 1 ing tak n f it may aff rd a v ry :fit 
f r quitahl int rpo ·ition. nd r u h p cial ·ircum tance , 
a tru · in fe • may 1 n itl r d a r at d whi ·h thi iourt would 
•. · , ·u t • a · · rtljn t th of th partie . 
at ommon law in whi h a f ha b n held 
to pa · with ut th w rd h ir ( o. Litt. 9. b.); and if a tru t 
in r ·t in f wa int nded to b reat d by the a ignment from 
. in lik mann r a a tru t int r t in fee was con eyed by 
the cl d fr m ~ lliot mi th and by th a ~ignm nt from mith 
then thi ourt, ac ording to th dodrin in 
Fdzer v. Field (10 obn . p. ±9 ) would d ree an adequate 
1 rra·l onv yan accordin to that irutention, notwith tanding the 
,\·ant f wor 1 of inh ritance. 
h all gation in th bill on which o much tre ha been 
laid b th coun 1 for the defendant that the plaintiff were 
. i d of th land in que tion, must be under toad to mean an 
quitable and not a le al ei in. The whole cope of the bill, 
an 1 th ery fact of oming into thi Court, d mon trate thi 
m a ing. 
Th ill al.::o tate fac from which we are to infer that 
Yr 1 nb rah and hi h ir th pr ent d f ndant are equitably 
. t pp d from a , rtin any laim to a rev r ionaIJ intere t in the 
land. It i. hara d that '\. aft r the death of arpenter for 13 
aw r at and o tl improv m ts made upon 
laimina, and b lieving th m elv to be 
arp nt -r and n ver interpo ed an preten-
t app a from the ca referred to in 
en el a er ( 1 John . h. Rep. 5-±) that thou ah 
art who thu mi 1 ad third per on by hi 
r ionar , intere t and subje t to a lif 
r I r n whom h uff r to d al with th prop-
lut own r th rul of uity till appli that he 
rmitt d t x r hi 1 o-al title aO'ain t ~u h 
J r. on. all p rson laiminO' und r him are 
h urn1, by hi i mu 1 tr nger than rdinar. 
< 1 ' "' of lh kin 1; il nc wa maintain or tbirt n 
yt':H~. :1 fl 1•r th· a .. um cl life int r t f arpentcr ha terminate . 
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If Carpenter was bound to know the duration of his title, those
who succeeded to the estate, after his death, were certainly en-
couraged and misled by the studied silence or express admissions
of Vredenbergh ; and the case as stated presents one of the strongest
claims for the assistance of this Court against the assertion of a
title under him by his heirs. It is to be traced up to imposition
and fraud.
The demurrer must, therefore, be overruled with costs, and the



















































































































































If Carpenter was bound to know the duration of his title, those 
who succeeded to the estate, aifter his death, were certainly en-
couraged and misled by the studied silence or express admissions 
of V redenbergh; and the case as stated presents one of the strongest 
claims for the assistance of this Court against the assertion of a 
title under him by his heirs. It is to he traced up to imposition 
and fraud. 
The demurrer must, therefore, be overruled with costs, and the 
defendant ordered to answer. 
Order accordingly. 
CHAPTER VI. #^' A ^
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PEOCEEDINGS ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT [Continued]. h^
Pleas: Defined, Nature and Office. ; ^
Harrison v. Farrington, 38 N. J. Eq. 358. (ISSJ^.jX \y''
Bill for relief. On plea in bar. ^. ^ ^ ^v\
The Chancellor : /V - \*j * v
This matter comes before me on the hearing of the defendant's^ wV
This matter comes before me on the nearmg ot tne defendant's^ w'
plcti in bar. The bill states that John C. Johnson, the com-V V
plainant's intestate, and the defendant were copartners up to'\P A
the death of the former; that the complainant, after having
\P
/.y^r the aeath oi tne lormer; mat me compiainaui, aiuex- navijug
v%.^ jrrepeatedly applied, without success, to the defendant for an
d \-^ account of the partnership affairs, received a statement from him ' Q
\ which showed that there was due Johnson's estate from the part- .yj^ ,
nership the sum of $14,578.85; that the complainant was entirely <-^^ i
ignorant of the affairs of the partnership ; that in the accounts the - y*~'^
defendant fraudulently charged Johnson's estate with the amount X^ .
of a note made by one William C. Miller, which the defendant' I i^'
ought to have required Miller to pay &c. &c., and that the com- Jq/\
plainant, by the false and fraudulent representations of the de- -
fendant, was induced to accept a smaller sum than the amount 'i v-
which appeared to be due by the statement. The defendant de- -^
murred to part of the bill and pleaded to the rest. The demurrer; *• [\
was overruled. 9 Stew. Eq. 107. The plea was also overruled Ij.-^-""
(11 Stew. Eq. 1), with leave to amend. The defendant has i ^ ^
amended the plea, and answered also in support of it. By the plea 0^1^ ^^^
he pleads that an account was stated between him and the com- \ ^"4^
plainant, and negatives, by separate denials, supplemented by a \WJi ^
general one, the charges of fraud made against him in the bill.'
His answer is to the same effect. \
The complainant's counsel insists that the plea should be over-
ruled on various grounds: First, because it is not duly verified;
second, because it does not appear whether it is intended to cover




















































































































































PROCEEDINGS ON BEHAL 1 OF DE 1 ENDA.r T [Continued] .. 
PLE : DEFINED, ATURE AND FFICE. 
Harrison v. Farrington, 38 N. J. Eq. 358. {1884.) 
BILL for reli f. On plea in bar. 
TIIE IIANCELLOR: 
Thi matter m before me on the hearing of the defendant's 
plea in bar. The bill tate that John C. John on, the com-
plainant inte tate, and the defendant were copartners up to 
the d ath of the former; that the complainant, after having .r 
rep atedly applied, without success, to the defendant for an 
aic unt of th partnership affair , received a statement from him fl 
which howed that there was due Johnson's estate from the part-
ner hip the um of $14,578.85; that the complainant was entirely J 
ignorant of th affai1 of the partnership; that in the accounts the 
def ndant fraudul ntly charged Johnson's e tate with the amount 
of a note made by one W.illiam C. Miller, which the defendant 
ught to have required Miller to pay &c. &c., and that the com-
plainant by the fal e and fraudulent represen-00.tions of the de- ' 
f ndant, wa induced to accept a smaller sum tha:n the amount 
which appear d to be due by the statement. The defendant de-
murred to part of the bill and pleaded to the re t. The demurrer 
wa overrul d. tew. Eq. 107. The plea wa al o overruled 
(11 t w. Eq. 1) with leave to amend. The defendant has 
am n led th pl and an wered al o in upport of it. Bj the plea 
h pl ad that an account wa tated between him and the com-
lainant, and n o-ativ b r arate d nial uprplemented b ' a 
0n ml on t11 hara of fraud mad ag:iin t him in th bill. 
Hi~ an w r i .. to th ame ff ct. 
Th rnplainant conn el in i t that th plea hould b O'rer-
ru1 cl on ariou ar und : Fi t, be au it i not duly verified· 
nd b au it a Il t app a.r whf'th r it i i tende to over 
th whol or onl part of th bill· thir becau th an wer i to 
173 
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the same matter as the plea, and so overrules it; fourth, because
the plea is multifarious in separately negativing the various facts
stated in the bill in charging fraud ; fifth, because it does not show
what the balance was that was found due on the alleged account-
ing.
The first objection cannot be entertained. The defendant has
made the oath required by the statute that the plea is not inter-
posed for delay, but in good faith. The old rule on the subject
was that to a plea of matter in pais in bar the defendant must
make oath that it is true. And it has been held that such oath
is requisite, even though the bill pray an answer without oath.
Heartt v. Corning, 3 Paige 566. But where the statute directs
what the verification of the plea shall be, it must be assumed
that no further or other verification is necessary. It may be
added that a plea will not be overruled on the hearing for want
of the requisite oath. The objection must be made on motion,
on notice to take the plea off the files. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr, 688.
The objection that it does not apjjear whether the plea is to
the whole bill or only to part of it, is not tenable. The plea states
that it is to the "whole of said bill or to so much and such part
of it as prays an accounting." The bill is, in fact, only a bill
for an account. It is true there are also prayers for the payment
of any balance that may be found due, for discovery and for relief
generally, but these are only incidental and subordinate to the
great object of the suit, which is the account, or consequent upon
the attainment thereof, provided the result of the accounting shall
be in favor of the complainant. But if it be conceded that the
bill should not be considered as merely a bill for an account, the
plea is evidently intended to go merely to the claim of the bill
to an account. If that is properly to be regarded as the whole
object of the bill, then the plea is to the whole bill ; and if not,
then it is a plea to so much and such part of the bill as seeks an
account. It is very clear that the pleader intended to confine the
plea to the demand for an account.
The next objection is that the answer is to the same matter as
the plea. This objection is based on a misapprehension of the
extent of the rule on the subject. The general rule is, that when
the defendant, at the same time, sets up the same defence both
by answer and plea in bar, the former overrules the latter. The

















































































































































17 4 PLEAS : DEFINED, NATURE AND OFFICE 
th llillle ma titer as the plea, and o overrule it; fourth, because 
the plea i multifariou in separatel} n gativing the various facts 
tat d in the bill in charging fraud; :fifth, becau e it does not how 
what the balance wa that was found due on the alleged account-
rng. 
The :first objection cannot be entertained. The defendant has 
made the oath required by the statute that the plea is not inter-
po ed for delay, but in good faith. The old rule on the subject 
wa that to a plea of matter in pais in bar the defendant mu~t 
make oath that it is true. And it has been held that such oath 
is requisite, even though the bill pray an an wer without oath. 
H eartt v. Corning) 3 Paige 566. But where the tatute directs 
what the veri:fioation of the plea shan be, it mu t be as umed 
that no further nr other verification is nece ary. It may be 
added that a plea will not be overruled on the hearing for want 
of the requi ite oath. The objection mu t be made on motion, 
on notice to take the plea off the :fil . 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 688. 
The objection that it doe not appear whether the plea is to 
the whole bill or only to part of it, is nort tenable. The plea state 
that it is to the "whole of said bill or to so much and uch part 
of it a pray an accounting." T'he bill is, in fact, only a bill 
for an account. It is true there are al o prayers for the payment 
of any balance that may be found due, for discovery and for relief 
generally, but these are only incidental and subordinate to the 
great object of the suit, which i the account, or con equent upon 
the attainment thereof, provided the re ult O'f the accounting shall 
be in favor o·f the complainant. But if it be conceded that the 
bill hould not be con idered a merely a bill fQII' an account, the 
plea i evidently intended to go merely to the claim of the bill 
to an account. If that i properly to be regarded as the whole 
object of the bill, then the plea i ~ to the whole bill; and if not, 
th n it i a pl a to so much and su h part of the bill as eeks an 
account. It i v ry clear that the pleader intend d to confine the 
pl a to th demand for an ac ount. 
The n xt obj tion i that the an wer i to the ame matter as 
th plea. Thi objection i ba on a mi apprehen ion of the 
ext nt of the rul on the ubje t. Th gen ral rul i , that when 
th efendant at the ame time up th am d £ nee both 
by an w r and plea in bar, th form r overrule th latter. The 
rea on i . that by jnt rpo ing th p1 a he claims that he ought not 
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to bo required to answer, and yet at the same time, does answer.
But wiiere, as in the present case, the bill anticipates the bar and
alleges facts to avoid it, an answer is neeessary, in subsidium, to
support the plea. In such case, it is proper not only that the plea
sliould contain all necessary averments to overthrow those allega-
tions, but the defendant must support his plea by an answer, also
denying those allegations. Ferguson v. O'Harra, 1 Pet. C. C. 493.
"A plea should be drawn," says Professor Langdell, " in the same
manner, whether it requires the support of an answer or not, i. e.,
if it is a defence to the whole bill, it should be pleaded to the
whole bill, and then the answer should give such discovery as the
plaintiff is entitled to for the purpose of trying the truth of the
plea." Lang. Eq. PI. § 105. See, also, Mitf. Ch. PI. 244, 298;
Story Eq. PI. § G84. The answer in this case is, according to the
sitatement in the beginning of it, in aid of the plea, and "to give
the complainant the discovery he is entitled to touching and con-
cerning the matters in the bill alleged and charged in avoidance
of the plea." It is urged that the conclusion of the answer, the
general denial of combination and confederacy, and the general
traverse are evidence of the general character of the answer, and
that it is intended to go to the whole bill. The insertion of the
c-onclusion referred to is contrary to the rule of this court which
requires that it be omitted. It has no significance, however, in
favor of the objection under consideration.
It is also urged that the answer is not sufficient, in that it does
not answer all of the bill which is not covered by the plea. I
see no ground for sustaining this objection. Tlie scope of the biU
has already been adverted to, and if the complainant is barred
from an account, his claim to relief wholly fails.
The next objection is that the plea is multifarious, because it
negatives the various facts stated in the bill in charging fraud.
The objection is not well taken. The charges in the bill to sup-
port the allegation of fraud, must be met in the plea. Mitf. Ch.
PI. 240, 271. They may be met by a general denial (no matter
how general), provided it be sufficient to put the charges of fraud
contained in the bill in issue. Mitf. Ch. PI. 244. It is no ground
of objection that the denials are explicit and particular. Bogardus
V. Triniiij Church, 4 Paige 178, 195. They merely put the fraud
in issue.
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to b r iuir d an ·w r, aind yet at the ame time, doe answer. 
ut wher , a in th" pr nt ca ·e, he bill anticipate th bar and 
all g fa ·t to a oid it, an an ~ wer i n ce ary, in subsidium, to 
. upport th plea. n u h as , it i proper not only that the pleai 
:-;hould contain all nece ary a erm n to overthrow tho e all ga-
tion., but the d f ndant mu t upport hi pl a by an an wer, al o 
1lcnying th · all •gation . Ferguson v. O'Harra, 1 Pet. . 493. 
·· ... \ pl ·a h uld be drawn, ay rof or Langdell, ' in the ame 
111ann r, wlPth r it r quir the upport of an an wer or not, i . e., 
if it i ~ a d fen e to the whole bill, it hould be pleaded to the 
wh le bill, and th n the an wer houlcl give uch di cover_)· a the 
plaintiff i entitl cl to for the purpo e of trying the truth of the 
i l 1a.' ang. , q. Pl. § 105. See, al o, Mitf. Ch. 1. 2±4, 298 ; 
f 't r · El· Pl. · ±. The an wer in thi ca e i , according to the 
. tatement in the beginning of it, in aid of the pl a, and 'to give 
th · mplainant the di co ery he is entitled to touching and con-
·erning h matters in the bill alleged and chargecl in avoidance 
f the plea. ' t i urged that the conclusion of the an wer, the 
en ral d nial of combination and confederacy, and the general 
trav r e are evidence of the general character nf the an wer, a•nd 
tha.t it i intended to go to the whole bill. The in ertion of the 
·on lu ion referred to i contrary to the rule of thi court which 
require that it be omitted. It ha no igni:ficance, however, in 
favor of the obj ction under con ideration. 
It i al o urg d that the an wer i not ufficient, in that it does 
not an wer all of the bill which i not covered by the plea. I 
.: no ground for u taining thi objeotion. The cope of the bill 
ha ~ alr c dy been adverted ro and if the complainant i barred 
from an a count bi claim to reli f wholly fails . 
Th next obj ction i that the plea i multifariou , becau e it 
ne atiY the ariou facts tat d in the bill in charging fraud. 
Th bj ction i not well taken. The charge in the bill to up-
por the all gation of fraud, mu t be met in the pl a. lllitf. h. 
1. · 0 1. They may be met by a general denial (no matter 
how o- •n ral) pro i d it be ufficient to put the charge of fraud 
·ontain d in th bill in i ~ u . 1itf. h. Pl. 2±±. t i no crround 
f ol j ction that the d nial ar explicit and particular. Bogardus 
"V. Trinity lzurch -± Paig 1 , 1 . The merely put the frau 
in 1s u . 
I r main t onj r th ohj ction that th plea doe not tate 
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the balance found to be due on the accounting. It is laid down
as a requisite to a plea of account stated in equity, that it set
forth what the balance was. Beam. PL Eq. 230. In the case in
hand, the plea makes no statement on that head. The bar set up
in the plea is, in fact, not the accounting but the executed agree-
ment, for the purchase, by the defendant, of the interest of the
complainants invested in the assets of the firm. Hence, the amount
of that interest, according to the accounting, is not stated, nor
is it stated that it was ascertained thereby. The plea is silent as
to tlie result of the account. Nor does it even state what amount
the defendant agreed to pay the complainant for the interest of
his intestate in the property of the firm. It states that they
accounted and that the complainant urged the defendant to buy
the interest of his intestate, for the sum of $10,000, and as an
inducement, offered to allow him the amount of a note of $262.72,
made by Samuel Thompson and held by the firm, and to waive the
interest on the notes to be given in payment, and that "a memo-
randum of that agreement was then and there drawn in writing,
in words and figures following :
"New York, Aug. 10th, '76.
"It is agreed between the undersigned that the interest of the-
estate of John C. Johnson, deceased, in the late firm of John C.
Johnson & Co., shall be settled for the sum of $10,000, less the




"To be settled by notes as follows : [then follows a statement of
notes], said notes to be without interest."
It is not stated that this instrument was signed by anybody.
The plea adds that the complainant afterwards agreed to allow,
as a "further payment thereon," another claim, which is speci-
fied, thereby reducing the amount to be paid to $9,582.28; that
an attachment was issued out of the supreme court of New York,
at the instance of creditors of the estate of the intestate, against
the complainant, and served on the defendant, and that a notice
was served on the latter, by the public administrator of the city
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the balanc found to be due on the accounting. It i laid down 
a a requi ite to ai plea of aocount sfated in equity, that it set 
forth what the balance w.as. Beam. PL Eq. 230. In the case in 
hand, the plea makes no statement on that head. The bar set up 
in the plea is, in fact, not the accounting but the executed agree-
ment, for the purchase, by the defendant, of the interest of the 
complainants inve ted in the assets of the firm. Hence, the amount 
of that interest, according to the a'Ccounting, is not stated, nor 
is it tated that it was ascertained thereby. The pleai is silent as 
to the re ult o-f the account. Nor does it even state what amount 
the defendant agreed to pay the complainant for the interest of 
his intes.tate in the properly o.f the firm. It states tha1t they 
accounted and that the comp1ainant urged the defendant to buy 
the interest of his intestate, for the sum o.f $10,000, and as an 
inducement, offered to allow him the amount of a note of $262. 72, 
made by Samuel Thomps·on and held by the firm, and to waive the 
interest on the notes to he given in payment, and that "a memo-
randum of that agreement was then and there drawn in writing, 
in words and figures following: 
"NEW YORK, Aug. 10th, '76. 
"It is agreed between the undersigned that the interest of the· 
estate of John C. J o-hnson, deceiased, in the late firm of John C. 
Johnson & Co., shall be settled for the sum of $10,000, less the 




"To be ettled by notes as follows: [then follows a statement of 
notes], said nortes to be without interest." 
It i not tailed tha.t this in trument was igned by anybody. 
The plea add that the comprainant afterward agreed to allow, 
as a "further paym nt ther on," another claim, which is speci-
fied, ther by reducing th amount to be paid to $9 5 2.28; thait 
an attachment wa i ued out of the supreme court of New York, 
at the in tance of creditorn of the ootate of the intestate, against 
th complajnanit, and erved on the def ndant, and that a notice 
wa. rv d on the latter, by the public admini trator of the city 
of N w ork "claiming aid a et and forbidding the payment 
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of said moneys to said complainant"; that on the 10th of July,
1878, the complainant sued the defendant in the circuit court of
Essex county, in this state, for "said balance of $9,582.28," and
obtained judgroent therein against the defendant on the 31st of
August following, which the latter paid on the 6th of December
following, and the complainant gave him a warrant (which is set
out) for the satisfaction of the judgment. The plea does not allege
that the complainant ever agreed to take $10,000, or $9,737.28, or
$9,582.28, for the interest of his intestate in the partnership prop-
erty. It may be gathered from it that the pleader intended to
say tha>t he agreed to take the last-mentioned sum for it, but he
has not done so. He says (to restate it) that the complainant
urged the defendant to give $10,000, and as an inducement agreed
to allow him the Tliompson note; that a memorandum of that
agreement (but it does not say that the defendant agreed to take
tlie interest and pay any sum for it) was drawm (it does not even
state that it was signed) ; that the complainant afterwards agreed
to allow, as a further pajonent thereon, another claim, thereby re-
ducing the amount to be paid to $9,582.28, and that the complain-
ant sued the defendant for that sum and recovered judgment, wliich
the defendant paid. A plea must clearly and distinctly aver all
the facts which are necessary to render it a complete equitable
defence to the case made by the bill. This plea is defective, as has
just been shown; it will therefore be overruled, with costs.
Eeartt v. Coming, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 566. (1832.)
This was a bill filed by Heartt, the surviving partner of the
firm of Heartt & Smith, against the executor of Smith for an
account and settlement of the copartnership concerns. The bill
stated that in September, 1804, Heartt & Smith entered into co-
partnership, in the hardware business, to commence on the first
of January thereafter; that Heartt was expected to furnish the
principal part of the capital, and that Smith was to take the whole
charge of keeping the books and accounts of the firm, and was
to make up and state the copartnership accounts annually on the
first of January in each year; that the partners were to be allowed
interest on the amount of stock furnisliod ])y thorn respectively,
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of aid mon y to aid oomplainant"; that on the 10th of July, 
1 , th mplainant u d the d fendant in the circuit court of 
E x ounty, in thi tatc fo·r " aid balanc of $9,58 . 8," and 
obtain 1 judgm nt ih rein again t th d fend.ant on the 31 t of 
uru t f 11 win0 whi h th latt r paiid on the 6th of ecember 
foll 1wing, and h 01 iplainant gav him a: warrant ( whi h i et 
out) .r r th ati fac ion of th judgmen . Th pl a doe not all ge 
that th omplainant ev r agr d to take $1 , 0 or $9, . , or 
."!J . , f r th int r t of hi inte tat in th part:a hip prop-
rl '· It may b gath r cl from it that the pleader intended to 
,·ay that h agr ed to take the la t-m ntioncd um for it, but he 
ha not don o. ay (to r tate it) that th complainant 
urg the d fondant to give $10,000, and as an inducement agreed 
t allow him th Thompson note; that a memorandum of thait 
agreem nt (but it do not ay that the d fendant agreed to take 
he intere t and pay any um for it) was drawn (it does not even 
tat thait it wa igned); that the complainant afterwards agreed 
t allow, a a further payment thereon, another claim, thereby re-
ducing the amount to be paid to $9,582.28, and that the complain-
ant u d the def ndant for thait sum and recovered judgment, which 
the d f ndant paid. A plea mu t clearly and distinctly aver all 
th .fact whi h are nece ary to render it a complete equitable 
f n to th ca e made by the bill. Thi plea is defective, a has 
ju ' t b en hown; it will therefore be overruled, with costs. 
Heartt orning 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 566. {183fJ.) 
Thi wa a bill fil d by Heartt the urviving partner of the 
firm of H a•rtt & mit.h a ain t the executor of Smith for an 
a cunt and tl ment of th copartner hip concern . Th bill 
tat d that in ptemb r 1 04 H artt & Smith entered into co-
l artner hip in th hardwar bu ine , to mmence on the fir t 
f Tan uar ther after ; that Heartt wa e pect d to furni h th 
1 rin ipal part of th caipital and that mith wa to take th whol 
harcr o k ping th book and a count of th firm, and wa 
t rnak up and tat th partn r hip account~ annually on th 
fir:t f anuary in a h ' ar · that th partn w r t b allow d 
int r , t n th amount f t k furni.::h d 1 y th m r p cfr1 1. 
t h rn1 ut 1 annua11 ' on th firt f anuary, and carri into 
l'.! 
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the accounts; and that Heartt was to receive two thirds of the
profits of the business, and Smith one third. The bill further
stated that the partnership continued until the first of April, 1812,
when it was dissolved by mutual consent, and that Smith died in
March, 1826; that from the commencement of the copartnership.
Smith took the sole charge of the books, notes and accounts of
the firm; that complainant did not, during continuance of the
copartnership, nor until after the death of Smith, inspect the
books of the firm, or know the contents thereof; and that he was
not acquainted with his own and his partner's accounts, kept in
the books, except from the postings in the ledger; that there were
no annual statements made of the demands or accounts of either
of the partners, and no annual inventories were taken of the stock,
demands, or property of the firm; and that there had never been
any statement or settlement of accounts of the copartnership con-
cerns made by or between the partners. It was further alleged in
the complainant's bill, that during the continuance of the copart-
nership, and afterwards. Smith had received large sums of money
belonging to the firm, which he had not entered upon the books
of the company, but had appropriated the same to his own use;
that he had subscribed for and purchased stocks, in the Bank of
Troy and other incoq^orated companies, in the name of the firm,
and in his own name, and had paid for the same with the part-
nership funds; that he had afterwards appropriated the stock to
his own use, without the assent of the complainant, and had re-
ceived the dividends thereon; that during the continuance of the
copartnership. Smith loaned the partnership funds without interest
and against the will of the complainant, by which large sums were
lost ; and that he had also used the name of the firm in endorsing
for the accommodation of various individuals, by which the part-
nership was made liable, and sustained losses. The complainant
also claimed to be credited for the hire of a store, for the keeping
and hire of a horse and carriage for the use of the firm, and for
boarding clerks ; and also for large sums of money belonging to the
complainant, alleged to have been received and appropriated for
the purposes of the company, and not credited on the books of the
copartnership. The complainant waived an answer from the de-
fendant on oath, under the provision of the revised statutes, and
in conformity to the 40th rule of the court.
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th accoun ~ ; and that Heartt was to receive two thirds of the 
profit of the bu in , and Smith one third. The bill further 
tat d that the partner hip continued until the first of April, 1812, 
wh n it wa di olved by mutual consent, and that Smith died in 
~Iarch, 1826; thait from the commencement of the copartnership, 
Smith took the ole charge of the books, notes and accounts of 
th firm; that complainant did not, during continuance of the 
copartner hip, nor until after the death of Smith, inspect the 
book of the firm, or know the contents thereof; and that he was 
not acqua;inted with his own and his partner's accounts, kept in 
the book , except from the postings in the ledger; that there were 
no annual statements made of the demands or accounts of either 
of the partner , and no annual inventories were taken of the stock, 
demand , or property of the firm ; and that there had never been 
any tatement or settlement of accounts of the copartnership con-
cern made by or between the partners. It was further alleged in 
the complainant' bill, that during the continuance of the copart-
nership, and afterwards, Smith had received large sum~ of money 
b longing to the firm, which he had not entered upon the books 
of the company, but had appropriated the same to his own use; 
that he had ub cribed for and purchased stock , in the Bank of 
Troy and other incorporated companies, in the name of the firm, 
and in hi own name, and had paid for the same with the part-
nership funds; that he had afterward appropriated the stock to 
hi own use, without the assent of the complainant, and had re-
c ived the dividend thereon; that during the confanuance of the 
copartner hip, Smith loaned the partnership funds without interest 
and again t the will of the complainant, by which large sums were 
lo t; and that h had al o used the name of the firm in endorsing 
for th accommodation o.f various individua1 , by which the part-
ner hip wa mad liable, and u rtain d lo e . The complainant 
al o claimed to be credited for the hire of a store, for the ke ping 
and hire of a hor e and ·caniage for the u e of th firm, and for 
boelrdin cl rk ; and al o for large um of mon y b longing to the 
mplainant, alleg d to have b n re ived and apprnpriat d for 
th purpos of th ompany, and not er di t d on the book of th 
oparln r hip. Th omplainant waived an an wer from the d -
f n lant on oath, un l r th provi ion of the revi ed tatute and 
in nformity to th Oth rule of the court. 
T all that part of th bill whi h r Jat to error in th book 
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of the company, by supposed improper credits to Smith, or by the
neglect to make proper charges against him, or to the neglect to
give all pro]K!r credits to the complainant, and to that part which
sought to charge Smith with the losses upon moneys loaned or
endorsements made i'or the accommodation of other persons, or
which related to the bank stock subscribed for or purchased by
Smith with the funds of the firm, or which related to any other
errors in the books of the company previous to the first of January,
1812, the defendant pleaded that Smith, on the first day of Janu-
ary, 1811, did cause the partnership accounts of the firm, as
between the company and the complainant, and as between it and
the defendant, from the commencement of the partnership up to
and inckuliug the first day of January, 1811, to be made and stated
in the ledger of the company, and caused the balance to be ascer-
tained and struck in the several accounts of the said partners, under
that date; which balances were then carried to the new accounts
of the partners respectively for the succeeding year, kept in the
ledger, as by reference to the accounts so stated, balanced and
settled on the ledger fully appeared. And also that the complain-
ant and Smith, on the first of Januar}', 1812, caused the partner-
ship accounts as between the partners respectively and the com-
pany, from the first of January, 1811, up to and including the
first of January, 1812, to be made and stated upon the ledger;
that a balance of $5,432.11 was found due from the partnership to
the complainant, and of $3,127.35 to Smith; and that the balances
were struck in the accounts so stated and settled, and were carried
by the parties to the new accounts kept in the same ledger. And
that the scheduler A. and B. annexed to the plea were true copies
of the accounts as stated on the ledger, and that the schedules of
C. D. contained the items and particulars of those accounts, from
the other books of the firm, as referred to in the accounts so
stated, balanced and settled on the ledger. The plea also averred
that the accounts so stated, balanced and settled were just and true
to the best of the defendant's knowledge and belief; that the com-
plainant, from the commencement of the copartnership, had at all
times had free access to the ledger, and all the other books of the
firm, and was well acquainted therewith and with the matters
therein contained ; and that he always acquiesced in the justice and
accuracy of the several accounts from the times of the statement

















































































































































of th compan , by uppo d improp r er dit to mith, or by the 
ucgl ·t l mak prop r ·ha 'g · agt in t him, or to th negl ct t 
giv all I rap r r <lit Lo U1 • mplainant, and to that part whi ·h 
·ought t harg, ~ 'mith with th 1 upon man y loan d or 
·n l r m nt mad .f r th ac · m odation of oth r pe on , or 
whi ·h r •lat cl lh 1 a.nl~ to ·k ub ril cl f r or purcha d by 
'mith wiLh th fund of th firm, r whi h r lated to any oth r 
rr i in th b k of th ompany pr viou to th fir t of January, 
1 'l ·, th cl f n ant pl ad d that mi th, on th fi t day of J anu-
ary 1 '11 c]j au th partn r hip accoun of the firm, a 
1 lw ·n ill om1 any and th omplainant, and a between it and 
th d .f •ndnnl from th ommencement of the partn r hip up to 
and in ·ludi1JO' lh fir t day of January 1 11, lo be made an tated 
in th 1 lcr r of th ompany, and au d th balance to be a cer-
tain d ancl tru k in th ev ral ac aunt of the aicl partner , under 
that <lat ; which balance were then carried to the n w ac oun 
of the par n r r p ctively for th uc e ding year, kept in the 
lc<l ()' r, a by r .f r n to the aiccount o tated, balanc cl and 
· tUctl on th 1 d er full.) app ar 1. nd al o that the omplain-
ant and mith n th first of January, 1 1 · cau cl the partner-
hip ac aunt a b tw n th parin r re 'Pectiv ly and th com-
pany from th fir t of January, 1 11, up to and including the 
fir t of anuar 1 1 , to b mad and tat d upon the 1 dg r · 
that a balan of 5 -13 .11 wa found du from th partnership to 
th omplainant and of 1 .3 to mith; and that the balance 
w r J ·tru k in th ac oun o tat d and ettl d and were carried 
b · th parti to th n w a count k pt in the ame 1 dger. And 
that th h dul . and . ann x d to the pl a wer true copie 
tat d on the 1 cl er, an l that th ch dule of 
. ontain d th it m and particular of tho e a count from 
th' h r l o k of th firm a r ferred to in the account o 
~tat 1, balan cl and ttl l on the 1 dcrer. The plea al ~ o av rred 
that lh a ount o tated balan d and ttl d were ju t and true 
t th' be t f ih d fon ant kn wl cl and b li f · that the com-
plainant, fr m th mm n m nt .f th opartner hip had at all 
im " ha l fr a t th 1 cl r and all th oth r book~ of the 
firm, ·ml wa '" 11 a quaint d th r with and with th matt r 
th r in ntain d · and that h alwa · a qui c d in th ju ti and 
n ·cu rm·.' f th " ral a ount fr m th tim f th ~ta m nt 
, ncl -.. ttl ' 111 •nt th r of until at or about th tim f th d ath f 
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Smith, in 1826. The defendant put in an answer to the rest of the
bill; but as the complainant had waived an answer on oath, the
plea and answer were not sworn to by the defendant. And the
cause was brought to hearing, upon the plea, in the usual form.
The Chancellor:
It is necessary in the first place to dispose of a question of form,
as to the verification of the plea. The complainant having waived
an answer on oath, the defendant's counsel supposed the waiver
extended to the plea, which in this case is connected with the an-
swer, as the plea covers only a part of the bill. A plea for some
purposes may be considered a special answer. And for this reason
it has been held that the defendant might put in a plea to the whole
bill, under the usual order for time to answer, although the defend-
ant in such a case is not permitted to demur. (2 Dicken's K.
554. 1 Grant's Pr. 166. 1 Brown's Ch. Pr. 356.) But it is not
an answer within the meaning and intent of the statute under
which this complainant has waived an answer on oath. A plea
was never considered as evidence in behalf of the defendant, as to
the facts stated therein, so as to require the testimony of more
than one witness to contradict it, even where it negatived a material
averment in the bill. The object of the statute (2 R. S. 175, § 44)
was to prevent the complainant from being concluded by the answer
of the defendant, in a case where he was compelled to come into this
court for relief, but in which he did not need a discovery, and where
he was unwilling to permit the defendant to be a witness in his
own favor, by the forms of pleading. Bills filed under this new
provision in the revised statutes, are strictly bills for relief only,
and not bills for discovery and relief. Hence, in a case which
is proper for a plea, as the complainant is not entitled to a dis-
covery, it cannot be necessary for the defendant to support his
plea by an answer, as he must do in most cases where the answer
on oath is not waived. A plea to a bill of this description can
seldom be necessary, as the answer cannot be excepted to for in-
sufiiciency; and the defendant may set up any matter of defence
in the answer. But where the defendant finds it necessary or ex-
pedient to resort to this mode of defence, to prevent the trouble
and expense of a protracted litigation, he must conform to the
former practice of the court, so far as to verify the allegations
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mith, in 18 6. The defendant put in an answer to the rest of the 
bill; but as the complainarnt had waived an answer on oath, the 
plea and an wer were not sworn to by the defendant. And the 
cau e was brought to hearing, upon the plea·, in the usual form. 
THE CnANCELLOR: 
It i nece ary in the first place to di po e of a que tion of form, 
a to the verification o.f the plea. The complainant having waived 
an an wer on oath, the defendant' counsel upposed the waiver 
extended to the plea, which in thi ca e i connected with the an-
wer, as the plea covers only a part of the bill. A plea for some 
purposes may be con idered a special answer. And for this reason 
it ha been held that the defendant might put in a plea to the whole 
bill, under the u ual order for time to an wer, although the defend-
ant in such a case i not permitted to demur. (2 Dicken's R. 
55-±. 1 Grant's Pr. 166. 1 Brown' Ch. Pr. 356.) But it is not 
an answer within the meaning and intent of the tatute under 
which thi complainant has waived an answer on oath. A plea 
wa never con idered as evidence in behalf of the defendant, as to . 
the facts stated therein, s·o as to require the testimony of more 
than one witness to contradict it, even where it negatived a material 
averment in the bill. The object of the statute (2 R. S. 175, § 44) 
wa to prevent the complainant from being concluded by the answer 
of the defendant, in a case where he was compelled to come into this 
court for relief, but in which he did not need a discovery, and where 
he was unwilling to permit the defendant to be a witne s in his 
own favor, by the forms of pleading. Bills filed und r this new 
provision in the revi ed statutes, are tricily bill for relief only, 
and not bill for di co very and relief. H nee, in a ca e which 
is proper for a plea, a the compfainant i not entitl d to a di -
covery, it annot b nee ·ary for the defend1ant to upport his 
plea by an an w r, a he mu t do in most ca e wh re the an w r 
on oath i not waiv d. A plea to a bill of thi de ription an 
ldom b n ary a the an wer cannot b x epted to for in-
suffici ncy · and th defendant may et up any matt r of d f n e 
in the an wer. ut wher the d f ndant find it n c ary or x-
p di nt to r ort to tbi m d of d f n e, to pr vent th tr uble 
and xp n e of a protr t d litigation h mu t onform to the 
rm r pra •tj of th ourt o far a t v rify th allegations 
and av r nt · in hi pl a by oath in the u ual form. In a ca e 
Heaett v. Corning 1^1
of this kind, however, where the negative averments in a plua of
an executor relate to transactions in the life time of the testator,
or to acts done by others, it is sufficient if the averments are made
upon the dcfeiidant's belief only; and they need not be sworn to
positively. (Drew v. Drew, 2 Vcs. & Beame, 160.) The averments
in this plea were therefore correct in point of form; but the plea
should have been put in upon oatli in the usual manner.
The complainant, however, is wrong in supposing that this is an
objection which he can take advantage of at the hearing as to the
sulllcieney of the plea. As well might he object, at the hearing,
that a plea or demurrer wanted the signature of counsel. The
proper mode of taking advantage of a formal defect of this descrip-
tion, is by an application for an order to set aside the pleading,
or to take it off the files for irregularity. The case of Wall v.
Iluhhs, 2 Yet!. & Bea. 354, referred to by the complainant's counsel
on the argument, shows such to be the practice. The application
there was, to take the plea off the files ; and the only question was,
whether the complainant was not too late in making the motion,
after he had entered an order, in the register's office, setting down
the plea for argument. The application would have been wholly
unnecessary in that case, if the want of a proper verification
would have been a sufficient ground for overruling the plea on the
hearing. If a plea or answer was taken off the files for irregu-
larity, on the ground that it had not been properly sworn to, the
defendant, as a matter of course, would have the right to file a new
one, properly verified. But if a plea is overruled on the hearing,
the defendant cannot have the advantage of his plea without spe-
cial leave from the court to amend. The case of Wall v. Iluhhs,
merely decided that the complainant, by taking a step in the cause
after the irregularity accrued, was not precluded from making
a motion to take the plea off the files of the court. But where,
with full notice of the irregularity, he brings on the argument
of the plea without asking to have it taken of the files, he is not
entitled to have it overruled as an insufficient defence, if in other
respects it is well pleaded. In the case of Beach v. The Fulton
Banl-, 2 Paige's Ch. R. 307, Wendell's Rep. 36, S. C, although
an answer had been put in -wathout oath, as to one of the defend-
ants, and was therefore irregular, it was held that both parties
were precluded from making any abjection to the answer after a
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of thi. kind) h we er, wher th n ga iv a erments in a plea of 
an x utor r lat to tran a tjon in the life time of the te tafor, 
r a t <l. n l y th r,, it i uili i nt if the a rments are made 
upon th f ndan , b li f ly; and th y n not be worn to 
l 'iiv'l 1 • (Drw . rew, .& am,1 .) Theaerments 
in thi · pl a' ·r th r r r corr t jn p int of form; l ut the plea 
'h uld ha b n put in upon ath in he u ua1 manner. 
Th rnpla1nan , lww r, i wrong in uppo ing thait thi is an 
bj ·tion whi l h an tak ad antag of at th hearing as to the 
:ufli i n ·y of th plea. A well might he object, at the heairing, 
hat pl a r d murr -r want d the ignature of coun el. The 
p1 p r mod of takin ad an ag of a formal defect of thi descrip-
tion i by an a ppli ati n for a:n ord r to et a ide the pleading, 
r to tak i off th file for irregularity. 'Dhe ca e of Wall v. 
II ubb , V . a. 54, ref rred to by the complainant's coun el 
n the argument, how uch to be the practice. The application 
th r wa to tak the plea off the fil ; and the only question was, 
wh her h omplainant wa not too late in making the motion, 
after he had nt red an order, in th r gi teT' office, etting down 
h pl a for argument. The application would have b en wholly 
unne ar ' in that a e, if the want of a proper verifi artion 
would hav b en a u.fficient ground for overruling the plea on the 
h aring. f a pl a r an w r wa tak n off th fil for irregu-
larity on the ground that it had not been prop Tly woTn to) the 
d f nda t a a ma·tt r of oure, would have the right to file a n ew 
on r p rl eri.fi d. But if a plea i o errul d on th hearing, 
th d I ndant cannot ha the ad antage of hi plea without pe-
i 1 l a from th court to amend. The ca of Wall v. Hubbs, 
that the complainant b3 akinO' a tep in the cau e 
aft r th irr rularit a crued wa not pr lud d from making 
a. m i n to tak th pl a: off th file f th court. But where, 
with full notic of th irr O'ularit 11 bring on th aro-ument 
f th pl l 1vithout a king to ha it ta.ken of th fil h i n t 
n ilk l l hav i OY rrul d an in ufficient d fence if in oth r 
r p ·ls it i::> w 11 pl a 1 l In the ca of Beach . Th e Fulton 
I ank. · h. . 0 W nd 11 
an nn:-w r hacl l n put in without oath a t n 
t11 t, nnd 1 a th r f r irr ·ular, it wa h ld that th parti 
w ' f pr lu 1 1 fr m mnkino- any hj ti n ~ th an w r aft r 
r J li ntion hnd n :fil d and th pr f had b en tak n in the 
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cause. And Chief Justice Savage there held that the complainants
would have been precluded from objecting to the answer on the
ground of the irregularity, by the filing of a replication thereto
after notice of such irregularity. (See also, Bihy v. Kemmis,
Beatty's Ch. Eep. 322.)
Upon the merits of the plea, if it turns out to be true in point
of fact, my present opinion is, that it will be sufficient to prevent
the parties from going into a general account of the partnership
transactions, as between the copartners, previous to the first of
January, 1812. The late chief baron of the exchequer in England,
in a recent case, Tlie Attorney-General v. BrooJcshanh, 2 Young &
Jerv. E. 42, expressed an opinion that an account stated must be
actually signed by the parties to enable the defendant to plead it
in bar to a suit for an account; although he seemed to suppose an
account not signed might be a good defence if set up in the answer
and proved at the hearing. That opinion is clearly not law ; and it
is directly opposed to that of Lord Hardwicke, in Willis v. Jerne-
gan, 2 Atk. Eep. 252 ; where he says, in express terms, that it is
not necessary that the account should be signed by the parties.
(See also, Jessup v. Cook, 1 Halst. Eep. 436; La Malaine v. Caze,
2 P. A. Brown's Eep. 128.) As there is no statute, or rule of law
Avhich requires the signatures of the parties to an account stated
and settled between themselves, to make it binding and obligatory,
provided the fact of the settlement can be established by other
proof, it cannot, upon any principle of pleading, be necessary to set
out any particular species of evidence, in a plea in bar, to enable
the defendant to avail himself of the stated account as a defence.
In the case under consideration it appears by the statement in
the complainant's bill, that it was one of the stipulations in the
agreement of copartnership that Smith should make up and state
the partnership accounts, annually, on the first of January in each
year. Under that stipulation, oven if Smith made up and stated
the accounts ex parte, in the absence of Heartt, it was the duty of
the latter to look into them within a reasonable time, and to point
out the errors, if any existed therein, or he must be considered
as having acquiesced in the correctness of the accounts as stated
on the books of the firm; to which books both parties had access
during the existence of the copartnership. In stating the accounts
of partners, as between themselves, the entries on the partnership
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cau e. And Chief Ju tice Savage there held that the complainants 
would have been precluded from objecting to the an wer on the 
ground of the irregularity, by the filing 01f a replication thereto 
after notice of uch irregularity. (See also, Riky v. Kem mis, 
Beatty n Ch. Rep. 322.) 
Upon the merits of the plea, if it turns out to be true in point 
of faot, my pre nt opinion i , that it will be sufficient to prevent 
the partie from going into a general ac ount of the partner hip 
tran action , a between the copartner , previous to the :first of 
January, 1812. The late chief baron of the exchequer in England, 
in a recent ca e, The Attorney-General v. Brooksbank, 2 Young & 
J erv. R. 42, expre ed an opinion that an account stafod must be 
actually signed by the parties to enable the defenclant to plead it 
in bar to a uit for an account; although he eemed to suppose an 
account not ·igned might be a good d fence if set up in the an wer 
and proved at the hearing. That opinion is cl arly not law; and it 
i , directly oppo ed to that of Lord Hard wicke, in Willis v. J erne-
gan, 2 Atk. Rep. 252; where he say in expre term , that it is 
not nee s ary that the account hould be . igned by th parties. 
(See al o, Jessup v. Cook, 1 Halst. Rep. 436; La Malaine v. Gaze, 
· P. A. Brown's Rep. 128.) As th re i no statute, or rule of law 
·which requires the ignatures o·f the partie to an account stated 
and ettled between them elve , to make it binding and obligatory, 
provided the fact of the ettlement can be stablished by other 
proof, it cannot, upon any principle of pleading, be necessary to set 
out any particular ·species of evidence, in a plea in bar, to enable 
the defendant to avail himself of the stated account as a defence. 
In the ca e under consideration it app ars by the statement in 
the complainant' bill, that it was one of the tipulation in the 
agre ment of oparlner hip that mith hould make up and tate 
the partner hip ac aunt , annually, on the :first of January in ach 
year. nder that tipulation, v n if mith made up and tated 
the account e parte, in th ab n of Heartt, it was the duty of 
the latter to 1 ok into th m within a r a onabl time, and to point 
out the errors, if any exi t d th r in, or h mu t be con id red 
a having a quj cl in th corr tn o·f th account a tated 
on th book of the firm ; t w hi h book both parti had a c 
during th exi tenc of the opartner hip. In tatinc; the a count 
of partne a bctw en them Iv , th ntri n th partn rship 
b ok to whic11 th partn r hav had a c at h time wh n those 
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entries wore made, or immediately afterwards, are to be taken as
prima facie evidence of the correctness of those entries; subject,
however, to the riglit of either part}' to show a mistake or error in
the charge or credit. And vouchers for the specific items can never
be required except under very peculiar circumstances. Here the
copartnersliip continued but a few montlis after the statement of
the accounts on the first of January, 1812; and it is possible that
some fact nuiy be disclosed in the evidence which may render it
proper to permit the complainant to surcharge or falsify the ac-
count, as stated on that day for the preceding year, at least. But
this cannot be done if the plea is now allowed as a conclusive bar
against opening the account. I therefore think this is a proper
case for saving the benefit of the plea to the defendant until the
hearing.
An order must be entered accordingly, directing the plea to
stand over until the hearing of the cause; and saving to the defend-
ant the benefit thereof at that time. In such a case neither party
recovers costs against the other on the argiiment of the plea, unless
the contrary is specially directed by the court. (1 Brown's Ch.
Prac. 359.)
'IJ^
Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303. (1SS7.)
Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the court.
A brief abstract of the pleadings will help to make clear what
is presented for decision upon this record.
Tlie suit was brought by Farley to enforce an agreement by which
he and the defendants Kittson and Hill agreed to purchase, for
their joint and equal benefit, the bonds, secured by mortgages, of
two railroads, of one of which he was receiver, by appointment of
the court, and of the other of which he was the general manager,
by appointment of the trustees named in the mortgages.
The bill alleged the making of the agreement; that its object
was, by means of the Ijonds so purchased, to purchase the railroads
at sales under decrees of foreclosure in suits then pending ; that it
was agreed that Kittson and TTill should conduct the negotiations
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ntri . w 1· mad or irnrn dfat 1' aft n rd are to be tak n a 
JJri11ict f acie id<m ·, f th • rr ·tn f tl ntri ; ubj ·t, 
ho"' v · L th right f iih .r party to . h w a mi tak or rror in 
the ·har ,. or e;r •<lit. \nd v u ·h r f r th . p ifi · it m ·an ncv r 
b n·q ui rt•t1 x · pl um1 r v r p uliar ·ir ·um tan r th 
opartn 'l" hip ·on ti nu <l. bu a f w m nth ft r the tat m nt of 
th a·· un · n th £ir ' t t J nuar , 1 1· ; and it i:" p ibl that 
<li - ·l •cl in h - id n whi·h ma r r nd r it 
prop r t p ·rmit th mr lainant to ur ·harg or fal ify the ac-
·ou11 a· :tat d on that day for th pr · ding , ar, at 1 a t . ut 
thi: ann l 1 n if th pl a i now allowed a a onclu iv l ar 
:wain t p nin0 th a ount. I th r for think thi i a pr p r 
·a: • f r a ing th b n :fit of th plea to the defendant until th 
h arin0 . 
An rd r m t b ent r d accordingly, directing the plea to 
ian 1 ov r until th h aring of the cau ; and aving to the defend-
ant th b n fit ther f at that time. n u h a ca e n ither party 
r · ' t again t h oth r on the argument of th pl a, unle 
th · ntrary i ' ially dir cted b3 the court. ( 1 Brown h . 
Pra. .) 
Farley v. Kitt on, 1,.,0 U. . 30 . {1887.) 
fa. J TI E RA aft r fating the ca e, deli ered the opinion 
of th court. 
l\ ri f ab tract of th pl ading will help to make clear what 
l pr nt d f r d i i n upon thi record. 
Th uit a brouaht b 1 arl ' to nfor an aar em nt b which 
h and th d f ndant itt on and Hill agr d to pur ha e for 
11 fi th bond ur d b mort age , of 
f hi h h wa receiv r by appointm nt f 
thl ourt, an f th o h r f ' hi h h wa~ th o· neral manag r 
h.1· npp intrn nt of th tru t nam d in the mortaao- . 
Th hill a 11 o- cl th m nt · tha·t it obje t 
wn . . by m an £ th pur ha th railroad 
at. al '- un 1 r d r th 11 p ndin · t1rnt it 
wa ncrr 1 hat itt houl n lu t th n g tin i n: 
f r procnrincr th n ar. ' fund and pur ha ing th b nd::;, an 
18-i Pleas: Defined, Nature and Office
the plaintiff should furnish such facts, information and advice, and
render such assistance, from time to time, as should be required
of him; that the plaintiff had knowledge, not possessed b}' the
other parties, as to who held the bonds and at what rate, and how
they could be procured, and as to the nature and value of the rail-
roads, and as to the pending suits for foreclosure, and his services
and cooperation were indispensable to the success of the enterprise ;
that he performed the agreement on his part; that Kittson and
Hill obtained the requisite funds from other persons, and pur-
chased the bonds from the bondholders through one Kennedy, the
authorized agent of the latter, and afterwards purchased the rail-
roads at sales under decrees of foreclosure; that pending the
negotiations for the purchase of the bonds, the plaintiff infonned
Kennedy of his interest, and his connection with Kittson and Hill,
in the project to purchase them; that the plaintiff at all times,
to the best of his knowledge and ability, gave full and true answers
and information to all inquiries made by Kennedy, or by any of
the trustees or bondholders, or by any person interested in the
property under his charge as receiver and as manager, and kept
Kennedy fully informed of all matters coming to his knowledge
affecting the property, and in all things acted honestly and in good
faith towards all persons interested in it; that Kittson and Hill
had organized a new corporation, which was joined as a defendant;
and that the defendants had thereby obtained a great amount of
property and of profits, and had refused to account to the plaintiff
for his share. The bill prayed for a discovery, an account, and
other relief.
The individual defendants filed a plea, which, on the motion
of the defendant corporation, was ordered to stand as its plea also,
consisting of three parts :
First. A restatement in detail of some of the facts alleged
generally in the bill.
Second. Averments that the plaintiff never informed Kennedy
or any of the bondholders of his interest in the project for pur-
chasing the bonds and thereby acquiring the mortgaged property,
as alleged in the bill; and that neither Kennedy nor the bond-
holders knew, suspected, or had any information or belief, that the
plaintiff had or claimed to have any interest in the project, until
after the foreclosure sales.
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the plaintiff hould furni h uch facts, information and advice, and 
render uch a i tanc , from time to time, a should be required 
f him; that th plaintiff had knowledge, not po e ed by the 
other parli , a to who held the bonds and at what rate, and how 
th could b procured and a to the natur and value of the rnil-
road and as to the pending suit for foreclo ure, and his ervices 
and cooperation were indi pen aobl to th success of the enterprise; 
that he performed th agre ment on hi part; that Kittson and 
Hill obta·ined the requi ite fund from other per,:;on , and pur-
has d the bond from the bondholders through one Kennedy the 
authorized agent of the latter, and af.terward purcha ed the rail-
road at al s under decrees of foreclosur ; that pending the 
n gotiation for the purcha e of the bond , the pla·intiff informed 
Kennedy of hi intere t, and his connection with Kittson and Hill, 
in the project to purcha e them; that the plaintiff at all times, 
to the b t of hi knowledge and ability, gave full and true an wers 
and information to all inquirie made by Kennedy or by any of 
the tru te or bondholders, or by any person int re,ted in the 
properly under hi charge a receiver and a manager, and kept 
Kennedy fully informed of all matters coming to his knowledge 
affecting the property, and in all thing acted hone tly and in good 
faith towards all persons inter ted in it; that Kittson and Hill 
had organized a new corporation, which wa joined as a defendant; 
and that the defendant had thereby obtained a great amount of 
property and of profit , and had r fu ed to account to the plaintiff 
for hi hare. The bill prayed for a discovery, an account, and 
other relief. 
The individual def ndants filed a plea, which, on the motion 
of the d fendant orporation wa order d to tand as its plea al o, 
con i ting of thr e part : 
Fi t. r tat m nt in detail of ome o·f the facts alleged 
gen rally in th bill. 
nd. v rm nt that th plaintiff never inform d K nnedy 
or any f the bondholde of hi int r t in th proj t f r pur-
ha ing th bond and ther by a quirin th morto-ag d pro1 rty, 
a all in th l ill · and that n ith r \: nn d ' n r th bond-
hold u p t 1 or ha 1 an inf rmati nor b li f that th" 
plaintiff had r ·lai rn 1 ha v any int r t in th proj ct until 
aft r th f r 1 ur a·l . 
Thir . 1 .\ th plaintiif of the agree-
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liient sued on, and his engag-ing in the enterprise of purchasing
the bonds and thereby acquiring the railroads, were, as to that rail-
road of which he was receiver, unhiwful, a breach of his trust as
such receiver, and a fraud upon the bondiiolders and the court;
and, as to the railroad of which he was general manager for the
trustees under the niorl^^ages, a ijreach of trust towards the trustees
and the bondholders, and a fraud upon them; and that by reason
of the fiduciary positions so occupied by him the plaintiff was not
entitled to the aid of a court of equity to enforce the agreement or
any rigiits growing out of it.
To this plea the plaintiff filed a general replication, and the
hearing in the Circuit Court was upon the issue thus joined.
The pleader and the court below appear to have proceeded upon
the theory that by a plea in equity a defendant may aver certain
facts in addition to or contradiction of those alleged in the bill;
and also not only, if he" proves his averments, avail himself of
objections in matter of law to the case stated in the bill, as modified
by the facts proved ; but even, if he fails to prove those facts, take
any objection to the case stated in the bill, which would have been
open to him if he had demurred generally for want of equity.
But the proper office of a plea is not, like an answer, to meet
all the allegations of the bill; nor like a demurrer, admitting those
allegations, to deny the equity of the bill ; but it is to present some
distinct fact, which of itself creates a bar to the suit, or to the part
to which the plea applies, and thus to avoid the necessity of making
the discovery asked for, and the expense of going into the evi-
dence at large. Mitford PL (4th ed.) 14, 219, 295; Story Eq. PI.
§§ 649, 652.
The plaintiff may either set down the plea for argument, or file
a replication to it. If he sets down the plea for argument, he there-
by admits the truth of all the facts stated in the plea, and merely
denies their sufficiency in point of law to prevent his recovery.
Tf, on the other hand, he replies to the plea, joining issue upon
the facts averred in it, and so puts the defendant to the trouble
and expense of proving his plea, he thereby, according to the Eng-
lish chancery practice, admits that if the particular facts stated in
the plea are true, they are sufficient in law to bar his recovery;
and if t1i(>y are proved to be true, the bill must be dismissed, with-
out reference to the e(piity arising from any other facts stated in
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ment u d n and hi ngaging in th ntcrpri e of pur ha ing 
the boll(} an l th r by a quiring th railr a w r l) a to that rail-
roacl of whi ·h h ' a r · iv r unla·wfol) a l r a ·h of hi tru t a 
u ·h r' ·'iv r aml a fr· ud upon Lb b ndh ld and th ourt; 
aml a· t th railr ad [ whi ·h h wa · g n ral mana r for th 
tru t 1 ' • und r th m rl ag a br a h of tru t t war 1 th tru tee · 
an l Lh • b mlh ld r anu a fraud upon th · and that by r a on 
of th fiuu i ry I ' i lion o o upi by him th plaintiff wa not 
ntitl 1 1 t th ail f a ourt of equity to nfor e the agre m nt or 
an! ri<rht: <rr wing ut of it. 
T Lhi pl a th pla.intiff fil d a g neral r plication) and the 
hearing in th ir ui.t ourt wa upon the i ue thu join d. 
Th pl ad r an l th urt below app ar to have pro eed d upon 
th th ry ·hat by a plea in quity a defendant may av r certain 
fa t in addition to or ontradi tion of tho e alleged in th bill; 
and al not onl if he prov hi averment ) avail him lf of 
obj tion in matt r of law to th a.s tated· in th bill, a modifi d 
by th' fa t prov d · but ven, if he fail to prov those facts, take 
an· bj tion to th a e tated in th bill, which would ha e been 
I 11 to him if h had d murr d generally for want of equity. 
ut th prop r office of a plea i not, lik an answer, to meet 
all th all era ti on of the bill; nor like a demurrer, admitting tho 
all era ti n, t d ny th quity of the bill; but it i to pre ent om 
di tin t fa ·t whi h of it If r ate a bar to th uit, or to the part 
to whi h th pl a appli and thu to avoid the n ce ity of making 
th di OY ry a k d for and th xpen of going into th vi-
d n at larcr . itford 1. ( Mh d.) 1-±, 219, 295; Story Eq. Pl. 
. '6-L 
Th plaintiff ma· ither et down th pl a for argumP.nt or fil 
a repli ati n t it. f h t lawn th pl a for ar um nt, he ther -
hy a lmit th truth f all th fa t tat d in th pl a and mer ly 
1 ni , th ir su i 11 ) in I oint f law to pr v nt hi r cov r '· 
If, on th ot1Pr han 1, h pli t th pl a joining i u upon 
th fa t av rr 1 t1 in it, an 1 o pu th d f ndant to the troubl 
am1 ';\.p n c of rm·in hi pl a, h th r by ac ordincr to th Encr-
kh chnn · ry Ira tic , adn it that if th I arti ular fa t tated in 
th· pl 'n nr true, th .' ar uffi icnt in law to bar hi r ' ry · 
;rntl if th y ar I r \' tl t b tru , th lill mu t b di mi" 1, with-
out l'l'I\ n ne to ih quity ari incr fr m any th r fa ·t ~tat 
th l hill. • fitf r 1. • o~ q. i. 
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in this particular has been twice recognized by this court. Hughes
V. Blake, 6 Wheat. 453, 472; Rhode ISland v. Massachusetts, 14
Pet. 210, 257. But the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts
arose within its original jurisdiction in equity, for outlines of the
practice in which the court has always looked to the practice of the
Court of Chancery in England. Eule 7 of 1791, 1 Cranch, xvii,
and 1 How. xxiv; Eule 3 of 1858 and 1884, 21 How. v, and 108
U. S. 574. And the case of Hughes v. Blake, which began in the
Circuit Court, was decided here in 1821, before this court, under
the authority conferred upon it by Congress, had established the
Eules of Practice in Equity in the Courts of the United States, one
of which provides that "if upon an issue the facts stated in the
plea be determined for the defendant, they shall avail him as far
as in law and equity they ought to avail him." Eule 19 in Equity
of 1822, 7 Wheat, xix; Eule 32 in Equity of 1842, 1 How. li. The
effect of this rule of court when the issue of fact joined on a plea
is determined in the defendant's favor need not, however, be con-
sidered in this case, because it is quite clear that at a hearing upon
plea, replication and proofs, no fact is in the issue between the par-
ties but the truth of the matter pleaded.
In a case so heard, decided by this court in 1808, Chief Justice
Marshall said: "In this case the merits of the claim cannot be
examined. The only questions before this court are upon the suffi-
ciency of the plea to bar the action, and the sufficiency of the
testimony to support the plea as pleaded." Stead v. Course, 4
Cranch, 403, 413. In a case before the House of Lords a year
afterwards. Lord Eedesdale "observed, that a plea was a special
answer to a bill, differing in this from an answer in the common
form, as it demanded the judgment of the court, in the first in-
stance, whether the special matter urged by it did not debar the
plaintiff from his title to that answer which the bill required. If
a plea were allowed, nothing remained in issue between the parties,
so far as the plea extended, but the truth of the matter pleaded."
"Upon a plea allowed, nothing is in issue between the parties but
the matter pleaded, and the averments added to support the plea."
"Upon argument of a plea, every fact stated in the bill, and not
denied by answer in support of the plea, must be taken for true."
Roche V. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721, 725-727.
Tlie distinction between a demurrer and a plea dates as far back
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in thi particular ha been twice recognized by thi court. Hughes 
v. Blake, 6 Whea·t. 453, 472; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 
P t. 210, 257. But the case of Rhod(') Island v. Massachusetts 
aro e within it original juri diction in quity, for outlines of the 
practice in which the court has alwa} looked to the practice of the 
Court of Chancery in England. Rule 7 of 1791, 1 Crnnch, xvii, 
anc.1 1 How. xxiv; Rule 3 of 1858 and 1884, 21 How. v, and 108 
U. S. 574. And the case of Hughes v. Blake, which began in the 
ircuit Court, was dec.ided here in 1821, before this court, under 
the authority conferred upon it by Congress, had established the 
Rules of Practice in Equity in the Courts of the United States, one 
of which provides that "if upon an issue the facts stated in the 
plea be determined for the defendant, they sihall avail him as far 
as in law and equity they ought to avail him." Rule 19 in Equity 
of 1822, 7 Wheat. xix; Rule 32 in Equity of 184:2, 1 How. li. The 
effect of this rule of court when the is ue of fact joined on a plea 
i determined in the defend'ant's favor need not, however, be con-
sidered in this case, because it is quite clear that at a hearing upon 
plea, replication and proofs, no fact is in the is ue between the par-
tie but the truth of the matter pleaded. 
In a case o heard, decided by this court in 1808, Chief Justice 
Marshall said : "In this ca e the merits of the claim cannot be 
examined. The only questions before this court are upon the suffi-
ciency of the plea to bar the action, and the sufficiency of the 
te timony to support the plea as pleaded." Stead v. Course, 4 
Cranch, 403, 413. In a case before the House of Lords a year 
afterward , Lord Redesdale "observed, that a plea was a special 
an wer to a bill, di:ff ering in this from an answer in the common 
form, as it demanded the judgment of the court, in the first in-
tance, wheth r the pecial matter urged by it did not debar the 
plaintiff from hi title to that an wer which the bill required. H 
a plea wer allowed, nothing r mained in is ue between the partie , 
. o far a th pl a extend d, but the truth of the mll!tter pleaded." 
' pon a pl a allow d, nothing i in i ue between the parties but 
the matter pleaded, and th averments added to upport the plea." 
pon aro-um nt of a plea, very fact tat d in the bill, and not 
cl ni d by an w r in u p rt of th plea, mu t be taken for true." 
Roche v. //. orgell, h. & L f. 721, 7 5- 27. 
The di tin ·ti n l tw n a d murr r and a pl a dat a far back 
a~ the tim or rel Ba on, by th 5 th of whose Ordinances for 
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the Administratio'n of Justice in Cliancery, "a demurrer is properly
upon matter defective contained in the bill itself, and no foreign
matter; but a plea is of foreign matter to discharge or stay the
suit, as that the cause hath been formerly dismissed, or that the
plaintiff is outlawed or excommunicated, or there is another bill
depending for the same cause, or the like." Orders in Chancery
(Beames's ed.) 2G. Lord Redesdale, in his Treatise on Pleadings,
says: "A plea must aver facts to which the plaintiff may reply,
and not, in the nature of a demurrer, rest on facts in the bill."
Mitford PI. 297. And Mr. Jeremy, in a note to this passage, com-
menting on the ordinance of Lord Bacon, observes, "The prominent
distinction between a plea and a demurrer, here noticed, is strictly
true, even of that description of plea which is termed negative, for
it is the affirmative of the proposition which is stated in the bill";
in other words, a plea, which avers that a certain fact is not as the
bill affirms it to be, sets up matter not contained in the bill. That
an objection to the equity of the plaintiff's claim, as stated in the
bill, must be taken by demurrer and not by plea is so well estab-
lished, that it has been constantly assumed and therefore seldom
stated in judicial opinions; yet there are instances in which it has
been explicitly recognized by other courts of chancery, as well as
by this court. Billing v. Flight, 1 Madd. 230; Steff v. Andrews,
2 Madd. G ; Varich v. Dodge, 9 Paige, 1-19 ; Phelps v. Garrow, 3
Edw. Ch. 139; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210, 258,
262; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 76.
It only remains to apply these elementary principles of equity
pleading to the case before us.
The averments in the first part of the plea, restating in detail
some of the facts alleged in the bill, were admitted by stipulation
of counsel in writing to be true, and no controversy arose upon
them.
The substance of the averments in the second part of the plea
was that neither Kennedy, nor the bondholders whose agent and
representative he was, had any notice or knowledge that the
plaintiir had or claimed to have any interest in the project set forth
in the bill, until after the sales of the railroads under decrees of
foreclosure. The matter of fact thus averred was put in issue by
the replication. The testimony of the plaintiff (in connection with
Kennedy's letter to him), which was uncontradicted, and was the
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th ' lmin.i tra ion .f J t tice in han ry ' a d murrer is properly 
11pon rnaU 'r d I· ti ntain d in th Lill it 1£, and no foreign 
muLL •r; but a I I ' i of for ign matt r to i charge or tay the 
uit, a that h au hath b n form rly di mi cd, or that the 
JJluinLiff i uU aiwcd or x ommuni ·at d or th r i another bill 
d ·pernlin<r f r th ·au , or th lik . rl r in Chancery 
( n um , , · d.) · . d d1ale in hi Tr ·a ti e on Pleading , 
~ays : ' pl a mu t a r fa t to whi h the plaintiff may reply, 
a1 d nol in th natur o·f a demurr r, re t on facts in the bill." 
: lilf r l I 1. . And fr . J er my, in a not to thi pa age, com-
1ll ntiug on th orlinan of Lord Ba on, ob rve , "The promin nt 
di~Un ti n b tw n a pl a and a demurrer, her noticed, i trictly 
trnc, v n f that d cription of plea which i termed negative, for 
ii j ~ th ailirma iv of the proposition which i tated in the bill'; 
in oth r word a plea, which aver that a certain fact is not a the 
bill a.fftrm it to b , e up matter not contained in the bill. That 
an ob j tion to the quity of the plaintiff's claim, a stated in the 
bill, mu t be taken by demurrer and not by plea i o well e tab-
li h cl that it ha be n constantly as urned and therefore ~eldom 
, tat d in judicial opinions; yet there are instances in which it ha 
b en xpli itly r oanized by other courts of chancery, as well a 
b ' thi ourt. Billing v. Flight) 1 Madd. 230; teff v. Andrews) 
~ a 1 . ; Varick v. Dodge) 9 Paige, 1-1:9 ; Phelps v. Garrow) 3 
Edw. h. 13 ; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts) 14 Pet. 210, 258, 
G~ · ~~atio 11al Bank . I nsurance o.) 104 U . S. 5±, 76. 
t onl r main to apply th e elementary principles of equity 
pl a ling to th b fore us. 
Th a rm nt in the :fir t part of the pl a, re ta.ting in detail 
, m :f th fac alleg d in the bill, were admitted by tipulation 
f eoun 1 in writing to be true, and no controver y aro e upon 
th m. 
'lh ub tanc of he averment in the econd part of the plea 
wn that n ith r nn d ' nor th handhold r who e agent and 
T 'l r s ntati\' h \rn had an notic or kn wl d e that th 
pln intiff ha 1 or laim d to ha e an int re t in th project et forth 
in th bill until aft r th al of he railroad under deer ~ f 
f r lo ur . Th matt r of fa t thu a1 rr d -wa put in i ~ u b 
th r 1 li ati n . Th t tim ny of th plainti in onn ction with 
r nn dy' 1 tt r t him) -whi h -wa ~ un ontra li ted and w th 
only vid n n1 n th matt r pl adcd, h -w~ that :K nnedy. 
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fore the completion of the sale and purchase of the bonds, knew
that the plaintiff was to have an interest in the project, although
he may not have known the extent of that interest, or that it had
been already acquired. The want of any notice to Kennedy and
the bondholders, averred in the plea, was thus disproved.
The plea, indeed, is supported by the affidavit of one of the
defendants that it is true in point of fact. But the oath of the
party to its truth in point of fact is added only for the same pur-
pose as the certificate of counsel that in their opinion it is well
founded in matter of law, in order to comply with the 31st Rule
in Equity, the object of which is to prevent a defendant from de-
laying or evading the discovery sought, without showing that the
plea is worthy of the consideration of the court. Ewing v. Bright,
3 Wall. Jr. 134; Wall v. Stuhhs, 2 Ves. & B. 351. An answer
under oath is evidence in favor of the defendant, because made in
obedience to the demand of the bill for a discovery, and therefore
only so far as it is responsive to the bill. Seitz v. Mitchell, 91
U. S. 580. But a plea, which avoids the discovery prayed for, is
no evidence in the defendant's favor, even when it is under oath
and negatives a material averment in the bill. Heartt v. Corning,
3 Paige, 566.
The allegations of the bill, that the plaintiff at all times, to the
best of his knowledge and ability, gave full and true answers to all
inquiries made by Kennedy or any of the trustees or bondholders,
or any person interested in the property under his charge as re-
ceiver and as manager, and in all things acted honestly and in
good faith towards all persons interested in it, were not denied by
the plea, and therefore, for the purposes of the hearing thereon,
were conclusively admitted to be true. So much of the plaintiff's
testimony, as tended to show that he intentionally concealed his
interest from the stockholders and from the court, was outside of
the averments of the plea, and therefore irrelevant to the issue to
be tried.
The plaintiff having neither moved to set aside the plea as irreg-
ular for want of an answer supporting it, nor set down the case
for hearing upon the bill and plea only, but having replied to the
plea, and the only issue of fact thus joined having been determined
by the evidence in his favor, it is unnecessary to consider whether
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fore the completion of the sale and purchase of the bonds, knew 
that the plaintiff was to have an interest in the project, although 
he may not have known the ertent of that intere t, or that it had 
been already acquired. The want of any notice to Kennedy and 
the bondholders, averred in the pl a, was thus di proved. 
The plea, ind ed, i upported by the affidavit of one of the 
defendants that it i true in point of fact. But the oath of the 
party to its truth in point of fact i add d only for the ame pur-
po e as the certificate of counsel that in their opinion it is w ll 
founded in matter of law, in order to comply with the 31 t Rule 
in Equity, th object of which i to prevent a defendant from de-
laying or evading the discovery ought, without showing that the 
plea is worthy of the consideration of the court. Ewing v. Bright, 
3 Wall. Jr. 13-±; Wall v. Stubbs, 2 Ve . & B. 354. An an wer 
under oath is evidence in favor of the defendant, becau e made in 
obedience to the demand of the bill for a discovery, and therefore 
only so far a it i responsive to the bill. Seitz v. Mitchell, 9-± 
U. S. 580. But a plea, which avoids the discovery prayed for, is 
no evidence in the defendant's favor, even when it is under oath 
and negatives a material averment in the bill. Heartt v. Corning, 
3 Paige, 566. 
The allegation of the bill, that the plaintiff at all times, to the 
be t of hi knowledge and ability, gave full and true answers to all 
inquirie made by Kennedy or any of the trustees or bondholder., 
or any person intere ted in the property under hi charge as re-
c iver and a manager, and in all things acted hone tly and in 
good :faith toward all persons interested in it, were not denied by 
the plea, and therefore, for the purposes of the hearing thereon, 
were conclu ively admitted to be true. So much of the plaintiff's 
te timony, as tended to how tha·t he intentionally concealed hi 
intere t from th tockholder and from the court, wa outside of 
th a erm nt of the plea, and therefore irrelevant to the i u to 
b tried. 
The plaintiff having neither mov d to et a ide th plea a irreg-
ular for want of an an wer upporting it nor t down the ca e 
for hearing upon th bill and pl a only but havino- r plied to the 
1 a, and th only i u of fact thu join d ha in0 b n d t rminecl 
by th vidence in hi favor it i unn ary to on id r wheth r 
th averment of fa t in the econd paTt of th plea ought to have 
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been supported by an answer, or whether, if proved, they would
liave made out a defence to the bill.
The averments in the third part of the plea, that, by reason of
the plaint ill's position as receiver and general manager of the rail-
roads, his entering into the agreement sued on, and engaging in
the enterprise of purchasing the bonds and thereby acquiring the
railroads, were unlawful, and did not entitle him to the aid of a
court of equity to enforce the agreement or any rights growing out
of it, were averments of pure matter of law, arising upon the
plaiutilfs case as stated in the bill, and affecting the equity of the
bill, and therefore a proper subject of demurrer, and not to be
availed of by plea.
The result is, that the principal question considered by the court
below and argued at the bar is not presented in a form to be decided
upon the record before us; and that, for the reasons above stated,
and as suggested in behalf of the plaintiff at the reargument, the
plea was erroneously sustained, and must be overruled, and the
defendants ordered, in accordance ^vith the 34th Eule in Equity,
to answer the bill.
Decree reversed, and case remanded, with directions to overrule
the plea, and to order the defendants to answer the hill.
Spangler v. Spangler, 19 III. App. 28. (1886.)
Error to the Circuit Court of Jefferson county ; the Hon. C. 0.
BoGGS, Judge, presiding. Opinion tiled April 15, 1886.
Wilkin, J. :
At the DcM?ember term, 1885, of the Circuit Court of Jefferson
county, defendant in error filed his bill for divorce against plaint-
iff in error. This bill alleges that both parties reside in said
Jefferson county. To this bill plaintiff in error filed a plea den3'ing
that defendant in error was at the time of filing his bill or since,
a resident of Jefferson county, and averring that he was at that
time and still is a resident of Washington county in this State.
The plea concludes by demanding the judgment of the court
whether she ought to l)e compelled to make any answer to the
bill, dc. To this i)lea the defendant in error filed a general de-
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I en upp r d by an an w r or wh th r, if proved, they would 
hav ma 1 out a a 'f n c t th bill. 
Th av rm nt in th thirl part of th pl a that, by rea on f 
th• plaintiff I iLi n a r iv r and 11 ral man.a r of the rail-
ro~ l1 , hi · nt rin · into the agr m nt u cl n and engaging jn 
U1e nl 'l'} ri .£ l ur ha ino- h bond an tl r l y acquirin the 
railr ·1cl w r unlawful and did not ntitl him to th aid of a 
·ourL r quity t nfor th a r ID nt r any ri ht growing ut 
of it w r av rm nt of pur maN: r of law ari ing upon the 
plaintiff' · ·a ta d in th bill, and a:ff ting the equity of th 
bill an L th r f r a proper ubj ct o·f demurrer, and not to b 
a ail d .£ b pl a. 
r1 l r ult i that th principal que tion on ider d by th . court 
b 1 w and ar u d at th bar i no pr ented in a form to be decided 
upon th r ·or b fore u ; and that, for the rea on aibo e tatecl, 
an 1 a ugcr t 1 in behalf of the plaintiff at the reargument, the 
pl a wa crron ou ly u tained, and mu t be o erruled, and the 
d f ndant ord r d in accordance with the 34th Rule in Equity, 
to an w r th bill. 
Decree rever ed, and ca,se remanded, with directions to overrule 
the peea, and to order the defendants to answer the bill. 
pangler . pangler, 19 Ill. App. BB. {1886.) 
RROR to th ir uit ourt of Jefferson county; the Hon. C. 0. 
ud pr iding. Opinion :filed April 15, 1886. 
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answer further she was defaulted and on a hearing a decree was
rendered in favor of the defendant in error. The onl}' question
presented for our decision is as to whether or not the court erred
in sustaining the demurrer to the plea.
It was not proper practice to dispose of a plea in chancery on
demurrer. Story's Equity Pleading, Sec. 697; Daniells' Chan-
cery Pleading and Practice, Vol. 1, Sec. 4, p. 713 ; Cochran et al.
V. McDowell, 15 111. 10; Dixon v. Dixon, 61 111. 324. The de-
murrer may, however, be treated as equivalent to setting the plea
for hearing, and we shall so consider it. By Sec. 5, Chap. 40, E. S.,
it is expressly provided that divorce proceedings shall be had in
the county where the complainant resides. The latter clause of
Sec. 2, Chap. 40, of the statute of 1845, was the same. In ^Vaij v.
Way, 64 111. 410, the Supreme Court say : "The language is im-
perative, and excludes the right to commence proceeding in any
other county than the one in which the residence of the complainant
is fixed." if the statute could, by possibility, be construed into a
different meaning, this case effectually disposes of all that is said
by counsel for defendant in error as to the right of a complainant
to bring a bill for divorce in any other county than that in which
he resides. The allegation in the bill that the complainant resided
in Jefferson county was a material and necessary one, and the
plaintiff in error unquestionably had the rigM to put it in issue.
Counsel for defendant in error seem to maintain that this can
not be done by plea, and in the argument confound this plea with
a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction as at common law, objecting
to the manner in which it concludes, and citing authorities as to
the requisites of a plea at law. It scarcely need be suggested that
pleas in equity are not to be determined by the rules of pleading at
law and hence the authorities cited both as to the office and form
of this plea have no application whatever. The plea in this case is
not a plea to the jurisdiction, but a plea in bar. The same defense
set up in the plea might have been interposed by answer, as was
done in Way v. Way, supra. It may with equal propriety be done
by plea. A plea to a bill in chancery is proper whenever the de-
fendant wishes to reduce the cause, or some part of it, to a single
point, and from thence to create a bar to the suit. Smith's Chan-
cery Practice, Vol. 1, page 216; Story's Equity Pleading, Sec. 652.
Pleas in chancery are pure pleas and pleas not pure. Pleas not
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an w r further he wa defauHed and on a hearing a decree was 
rend red in fa or of the defendant in error. The only que tion 
pr ented for our deci ion i a to whether or not the court erred 
in u taining the demurr r to the pl a. 
It wa not proper practice to di po of a plea in chancery on 
d murrer. tory Equity Pleading ec. 69 ; Daniell ' Chan-
cery Pleading and Praclice Vol. 1, ec. 4, p. 13; Cochran et al . 
. ]lcDowell, 15 Ill. 10; Dixon . Dixon, 61 Ill. 394. The de-
murrer may, however, be treated a equivalent to etting the plea 
for hearing and we shall o con ider it. By Sec. 5, hap. -±0, R. S., 
it i expre ly provided that divorce proceeding hall be had in 
the county where the complainant re id . The latter clause of 
Sec. 2, Chap. 40, of the fatute of 18-±5, was the same. In TVay v. 
TVay, 6-± Ill. -±10, the Supreme Court ay : "The language i im-
perative, and exclude the right to commence proceeding in any 
other county than the one in which the re idence of the complainant 
i fued." If the tatute could, by po ibility, be con trued into a 
different meaning, this ca e effectually di po e of all that is said 
by coun el for defendant in error a to the right of a complainant 
to bring a bill for divorce in any other county than that in which 
he re ide . The allegation in the bill that the complainant re ided 
in J effer on county was a material and nee ary one, and the 
plaintiff in error unque tionably had the right to put it in issue. 
Coun el for clef ndant in error seem to maintain that this can 
not be clone by plea, and in the argument confound thi plea with 
a pl a in abatement to the juri diction a at common law objecting 
to the manner in which it conclude , an l citing authoritie a to 
the requi it of a plea at law. It carcely need be ugg ted that 
pl a in quit are not to be determined by the rule of pleading at 
law and henc the authoritie cited both a to the offi. e and form 
of thi pl a hav no appli ation whateYer. The pl a in this ca e i 
not a plea to th juri liction but a pl a in bar. The ame defen"e 
t up in th plea might ha·v been int rpo ed by an w r, a wa 
don in Way v . TVay upra. t may with qual propri ty be done 
l pl a. pl a to a bill in chancery i proper when ver the d -
f ndant wi he to r duce the cau or ome part of it, to a ingle 
point, and from th nee to er at a bar to the uit. mith' Chan-
r r Practic \ 1. 1, page 16 · tor quit leading Sec. 652. 
1 a in chan ry ar pur pl a and pl a not pure. Plea not 
pur are m tim 11 d n O'ativ pl a -Ibid. . 651. It wa 
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formerly doubted whether a purely negative plea was a legitimate
mode of defense in equity; but that doubt has been dissipated,
and it is now firmly established that such a plea is good— Ibid. 668.
In Sec. 652, supra, the author says : "The true end of a plea is
to save to the parties the expense of an examination of witnesses
at large." It would, therefore, seem to be eminently proper in
this kind of proceeding, if the complainant did not reside in the
county in which the bill was brought, such residence being a "pre-
requisite to the existence of the right to file the bill," as was said
in Wai/ V. Way, supra, to raise the question, by plea, and thus save
the expense of a general hearing. We see no objection to this
plea, either in form or substance, as a plea in bar to a bill in chan-
cery. The court below erred in holding it bad, and the decree is
reversed and cause remanded for that reason.
Pendency of Another Suit.
Radford v. Folsom, U Fed. Rep. 97. (1S82.)
This cause is now before the court upon a plea to the bill inter-
posed by the respondents, which is termed a plea in bar, but which,
in effect, is a plea in abatement. The present bill is filed by George
W. Eadford, assignee in bankruptcy of Frank Folsom, against Jere-
miah Folsom in his own right, Jeremiah Folsom, administrator of
the estate of Sarah M. Folsom, deceased, and Adele, Florence, and
George B. Folsom, minor heirs of said Sarah M. Folsom, who ap-
pear by J. B. Blake, their guardian; and in substance the bill
avers that complainant is the owner of certain realty in the bill
described, and prays that his title thereto may be confirmed and
quieted as against the respondents, and that he may have a writ
of possession. The plea sets forth that prior to the commencement
of this proceeding, to-wit, in the year 1873, Frank Folsom, to whose
rights his assignee, George W. Radford, was afterwards substituted,
brought an action against Jeremiah Folsom and Sarah M. Folsom,
in the circuit court of Pottawattamie countv, Iowa, "for the same
matters and to the same effect, and for the like relief and purpose
as the now complainant doth by his present bill set forth ; in which
said action issue was joined, and the same is still depending in
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. 
form rly c.l ubt c.l wheth r a pur ly ativ pl a was a legitimate 
mo<l i d fe in quity; but that doubt ha been di ipatcd, 
and it i now firmly tabli heel ihat u h a pl a i ood- l id. 66 . 
In 1 • 5', upra th auth r ay · : h' ru end of a pl a i 
to a to th partie · the xpen e of an examination of wi -ne e 
at laro-e. It would therefore, . e m to l minently proper in 
1hi · kind of pro cding if th ·omplainant did not re ' icl in the 
c.: unty in which ih bill wa brought uch r idence being a pre-
reyui it to the xi tence of th right to :file the bill, a wa ~aiJ 
in Way . Way supra; to rai e the qu tion, by plea, and thu ave 
th xp n of a g neral h aring. V\ e no ol jection to thi 
pl , , ith r in f rm or ub tanc , a a plea in bar to a bill in cban-
c ry. Th court below erred in holding it bad, and the decree i 
rev r eel and au e remanded for that rea ·on. 
PE IDEN CY OF N OTHER IT. 
Radford . Folsom; 14 Fed. Rep. 97. {1882.) 
Thi cau e i now b fore the court upon a plea to the bill inter-
po ed by th r ponden , which i termed a pl a in bar, but which, 
in ff ct i a plea in abatement. The pre ent bill i filed by eorge 
adford a ignee in bankruptcy of Frank Fol om, again t Jere-
miah Fol om in hi own right, J eremiah Fol om admini trator of 
th tate of arah I. ol om decea ed and Adele Florence and 
eorg . Fol om minor h ir of aid arah U. Fol om, who ap-
pear ) J. B. Blake, their guardian· and in ub tance the bill 
aY r that complainant i the own r of certain realty in the bill 
1 ·s rib , ancl pray that hi title ther to may be confirmed and 
ui t cl a again t the r pondent and that he may hal'e a writ 
of p , ion. The plea et forth that prior to the commencement 
of thi F e 1in to-wit in th y ar 1 3 Frank 1 ol om to who'e 
rirrht' hi a iO'n e eorg W. Radford wa afterward' ub titute 
brourrht an action a ain t J r miah Fol om and arah :JI. FoLom, 
in th ·ir uit urt f ottawattami aunty Iowa afor th same 
matt l ' an l t th am ' t and for th like r lief and purpo._ 
a lh 11 w omplainant oth by hi pr ~ nt bill t forth· in which 
aitl • tion i~ u wa join d and th am i ' ~till depen i g in 
id h 11 rabl ourt and i ' undi.. d of.' o thi" pl th 111-
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plainant interposes a demurrer, thus presenting the question
whether an action pending in the state court of Iowa can be
pleaded in abatement of a subsequent action commenced between
the same parties in the United States court for the district of Iowa,
for the same subject-matter and the same relief.
Shiras, D. J.:
The doctrine is now well settled that an action pending in a
foreign jurisdiction cannot be pleaded in abatement of an action
commenced in a domestic forum, even if there be identity of parties,
of subject-matter, and of relief sought. Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa.
St. 326; Bowne v. Joy, 9 Johns. 221; Allen v. Watt, 69 111. 655;
Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 588; Stanton v. Em-
Irey, 93 U. S. 548. It is equally well settled that at law the pen-
dency of a former action between the same parties, for the same
cause and relief, in a court of the state in which the second action
has been brought, will be cause of abatement if pleaded in the
second action. Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 588.
In equity, the general rule is the same. Story Eq. PI. §§ 736-741.
In Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 588, it is held
that "the rule in equity is analogous to the rule at law," and the
statements of Lord Hardwicke in Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 587, is
quoted approvingly, to-wit, that "the general rule of courts of
equity with regard to pleas is the same as in courts of law, but
exercised with a more liberal discretion."
The case of Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee further states the
rule to be that "a bill in equity pending in a foreign jurisdiction
has no effect upon an action at law for the same cause in a domestic
forum, even when pleaded in abatement"; and further, "it has no
effect when pleaded to another bill in equity" ; that is to say, a bill
pending in a foreign forum will not, if pleaded, abate a bill pending
in a domestic forum.
The reasons usually assigned in support of this doctrine are that
the court of the one state or county cannot judicially know whether
the rights of the plaintiff arc fully recognized or protected in such
foreign state or count}^, nor whether the plaintiff can enforce to full
satisfaction any judgment he may obtain in the foreign tribunal;
and further, that a court will not compel a plaintiff to seek his
remedy in a foreign forum; or, as it is said by the supreme court
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~ 
plainant interipo a demurrer, thu pre nting the question 
whether an action pending in the state court of Iowa can be 
pleaded in abatement of a; ub equent action commenc d between 
the ame parties in the United States court for the di trict of Iowa, 
for the ame ubject-matter and the aime relief. 
HIR.A. ) D. J .: 
The doctrine i now well ettled that an action pending in a 
foreign juri diction cannot b pleaded in abatement of an action 
commenc din a dam ~ tic forum ven if there be identity of parties, 
of ubject-matter, and of relief ought. mith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa. 
Si:. 3'>6; Bowne v. Joy, 9 John . 221; Allen v. Watt, 69 Ill. 655 ; 
Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 5 8; Stanton v. Em-
brey, 93 U. . 5-±8. It i equally well settled that at law the pen-
dency of a former action between the a:me partie for the same 
cau e and relief, in a court of the bate in which th econd action 
ha been brought, will be cause of abatement if pleaded in the 
second action. Insurance Co. v. Brune s Assignee, 96 U. S. 588. 
In equity, the general rule i the ame. tory Eq. Pl. §§ 736-741. 
In Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee, 96 U. S. 5 8, it is held 
that "the rule in equity is analogou to the rule at law," and the 
tatements of LOl'd Hardwicke in Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 587, is 
quoted approvingly, to-wit, that "the general rule of courts of 
equity with regard to pleas i the sam a in courts of law, but 
ex rci ed with a more liberal di cretion." 
The case of Insurance Co. v. Brune's Assignee further states the 
rule to be that "a bill in equity pending in a foreign jurisdiction 
ha no effect upon an action at law for the same cause in a domestic 
forum even when pleaded in abatement'; and further "it has no 
ffcct when pl aded to another bill in equity' ; that i to say, a bill 
p nding in a foreign forum will not, if plead d, abate a bill pending 
in a dam ti forum. 
Th rea on u ually a igned in support of thi do trine ar that 
th court of th on tate or county cannot judicially know wh ther 
th righ of th plaintiff ar fully recogniz d or prot t d in uch 
for ign tat or aunty nor wh ther th plaintiff can nforc to full 
ati. faction any judgm nt h may obtain in the for io·n tribunal; 
ancl furth r that a court will not comp 1 a plaintiff to eek hi 
r m cly in a for ign forum; or a it i aid by th upr me ourt 
of 1onn i.icut in Ilatch . pofford, onn. 4 That ountry 
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is undutiful and imtaitliful to its citizens which pends them out of
its jurisdiction to seek justice elsewhere." None of these cases,
however, meet the exact point presented by the plea interposed
in the case now under consideration; for in all of them it will
be found that the proceedings were pending in the courts of differ-
ent states or circuits, whereas in this case the two proceedings are
pending within the same state, but the one in the state and the
other in the federal court. We do not find that this question has
ever been finally settled by the supreme court of the United States,
nor by the circuit court for this circuit.
In the case of Brools v. Mills Co., 4 Dill. 524, is found a full and
able discussion of the question in the opinion of Judge Love, both
upon principle and authority, with a review of the decision of Mr.
Justice Clifford in Loring v. Marsh, 2 Cliff. 322; and the evils
resulting from permitting parties to litigate the same subject-
matter in two courts exercising judicial power within the same
territorial limits, are very clearly and forcibly shown; and the
conclusion is reached that "it would seem most rational and just
that a plea in abatement should be allowed in order to avert con-
sequences so mischievous." The judgment of the court, however,
in that cause was placed upon another ground; the plea in abate-
ment being overruled for the reason that it appeared upon the face
of the plea that the parties to the suit in the state court were not
the same as the parties to the bill in the United States court, and
the question now before the court, though discussed, was not
authoritatively determined. To the report of this cause in 4 Dill,
is attached a full note by the learned reporter, citing the leading
cases on the general question; and it is therein stated that "it is
clear that the foregoing cases do not go to the length of holding
that the pendency of a prior suit in a state court is not a valid
plea in abatement to a suit for the same cause, and between the
same parties to an action, in a United States court sitting in the
same state"; and the reporter further states that Mr. Justice
Miller, in a case in the Minnesota circuit, "intimated his inclina-
tion to the opinion that where the parties are identical, and the
scope of the subject-matter equally so, the pendency of a prior suit
in the state court, within the territorial limits of the district where
the second suit is brought in the federal court, may be properly
pleaded in abatement, or, at all events, will operate to suspend
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i · untlutiful and unfaithful to it itizen which , ncl them out of 
i · juri 'di ti n to k ju ti e el wh r . ' one of the e ca e , 
h w 'V r m t th xact point pr' nt d by th plea interpo ed 
in he a ~ now under con icl ration; for in all f them it will 
b foun that th I ro · din w r p ncling in th courts of difr r-
nt at or ir uit wherea. in thi a th tw proc eding are 
l entlin0 w-ithin th am tat , but the on in th tate and th 
oth r in th I <l ral ·ourt. W do not find that thi que tion ha 
·r r b en :finally ttl d by the upr me ·ourt of the Tni d tate .. , 
nor b th fr ·uit urt for thi ircuit. 
In th .r Brook . Mill 10., 4 ill. -±, i found a full and 
of the que tion in the opinion of Judge Love, both 
u1 on prin ipl and authority, with a re iew of the deci ion of ~fr. 
u ·tic liffor in Loring . Marsh, liff. 3 '>; and the vil 
r ultin fr m permitting parti to litigate the ame ubject-
matt r in two court e rci ing judicial power within the same 
territorial limit ar very cl arly and forcibly hown ; and the 
n ·lu ion i r ach d that 'it would eem mo t rational and ju~t 
that a pl a in abat ment hould be allowed in order to avert con-
equ n e o mi hi vous." The judgment of the court, however, 
in that au e wa placed upon another ground; the plea in abate-
ment b in o rrul d for the r a on that it app ar d upon the face 
f th pl a that th parti to the nit in the tate court were not 
th am a th parti to bhe bill in the United tate court, and 
th ' qu tion now b for the court though di cu ed wa not 
authoritativ l cletermined. To th report of thi cau e in 4 Dill. 
i atta h d a full not b th learn d reporter, citing the leadin 
·a on th er n ral qu tion · and it i therein tated tha·t 'it i 
·lcar th t h forecroin ca do not go to the length of holding 
tha th p n n y of a prior uit in a tate court i not a alid 
i I a in abatem nt to a· uit for th am cau e, and between the 
am parti to an a tion in a nit d tat court itting in th 
:"am ' · tat · · and th r port r further tat that 1\Ir. J u~ tic 
. I ill r, in a ·a in th :Jiinn "ota ircuit intimat d hi inclina-
ti n t th pinion that wh r th parti are id ntical and th 
. OJ f th ~ubj t-matt r quall) o th pendency of a prior ui 
in the. tal urt 1rilhin th t rritorial limit of the di ri t wh r 
t hP · nc1 . uit i~ 1 roucrht in th ro1 rly 
pl ndeJ in ah;1 m nt, or. at all Y n t , '\r ill operate t .::u~1 n 
th · a ion in tb latt r" · 1 u , a w und rstan l th tat 111 n of 
13 
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the reporter, this was not decided or ruled in the cause, so that,
as already stated, the question remains an open one. As authorities
bearing upon the question more or less directly, see Earl v. Ray-
mond, 4: McLean, 233; U. S. v. Dewey, 6 Biss. 502; Lawrence v.
Remington, Id. 44:; Smith V. Atlantic F. Ins. Co., 23 N. H. 21.
In this condition of the authorities, what is the conclusion that
should be reached from a consideration of the reasons .upon which
is based the doctrine that under certain circumstances the pendency
of a prior action may be pleaded in abatement of an action com-
menced in the courts of the same state? The reason for the rule
that the pendency of a former action may be pleaded in abatement
of a second action, is, that if the complaining party has already
an action pending in which he can obtain full relief, there is no
justification for harassing the defendant by a second action for the
same subject-matter. If it should appear, however, that in the
second action the plaintiff can avail himself of some legal or equit-
aible advantage, not open to him in the first action, then a legal
reason is shown for the bringing of the second action, and the
pendency of the one would not ordinarily abate the other. This is
the reason why, as a rule, the pendency of an action at law cannot
be successfully pleaded in abatement of a suit in equity.
As is said in Story, Eq. PL § 742 : "It can scarcely ever occur
that the remedial justice and the grounds of relief are precisely
the same in each court, for if the remedy be complete at law, that
is an objection to the jurisdiction of a court of equity."
In the well-considered opinion of the supreme court of Connecti-
cut in Hatch v. Spofford, supra, it is stated in substance, that while
the pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the
same parties, brought to obtain the same end, is at the common
law good cause of abatement, yet the rule is not one of unbending
rigor nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law,
but rather a rule of justice and equity, and that a second suit is
not, as a matter of course, to be abated as vexatious, but all the
attending circumstances are to be carefully considered, and the true
inquiry is, what is the aim and purpose of the plaintifl^ in the insti-
tution of the second action, — is it fair and just, or is it oppressive ?
If it appears that the former proceeding, whether at law or in
equity, is pending in a foreign state or country, and in this respect
the states of the Union are foreign to each other, this fact in itself

















































































































































194 PENDENCY OF ANOTHER SUIT 
the reporter, thi wa not decided or ruled in the cau e, so thait, 
a already stated, the que tion remains an open one. As a:Uthorities 
bearing upon the que tion more or le s directly, see Earl v. Ray-
mond, 4 McLean, 233; U. S. v. Dewey, 6 Biss. 502; Lawrence v. 
Remington, Id. 44; Sniith v. Atlantic F. Ins. Co., 22 N. H. 21. 
In this condition of the authorities, what is the conclusion that 
bould be reached from a consideration of the reason .upon which 
i ba ed the doctrine that under certain circumstances the pendency 
of a prior action may be pleaded in abatement of an action com-
menced in the courts of the same state? The rea on for the rule 
that the pendency of a former action may be pleaded in abatement 
of a second action, is, that if the ,complaining party bas alrea;dy 
an action pending in which he can obtain full relief, there is no 
justification for harassing the defendant by a second action for the 
same subject-matter. If it should appear, however, that in the 
second action the plaintiff can avail him elf of some legal or equit-
aible advantage, not open to him in the first action, then a legal 
reason is shown for the bringing of the second action, and the 
pendency of the one would not ordinarily abate the other. This is 
the rea on why, as a rule, the pendency of an action at law cannot 
be uccessfully pleaded in abatement of a uit in equity. 
A i said in Story, Eq. Pl. § 742: "It can scarcely ever occur 
that the remedial ju tice and the ground of relief are precisely 
the same in each court, for if the remedy be complete at law, that 
i an objection to the jurisdiction of a court of equity." 
In the well-considered opinion o-f the supreme court of Connecti-
cut in Hatch v. Spofford, supra, it is stated in substance, that while 
the pendency of a prior suit of the same character, between the 
ame partie , brought to obtain the same end, i at the common 
law good cau e of abatement, yet the rule i not one of unbending 
rigor nor of universal application, nor a principle of ab olute law, 
but rather a rule of justice and equity, and that a econd uit i 
not, a a matter of cour e, to be abated a vexatiou but all the 
attending circum tances are to be carefully con ider d, and the true 
inquiry i , what i the aim and purpo e of the pl1ainti:ff in the in ti-
tution of the econd adion,-i it fair and ju t or i it oppre iv ? 
If it appears that the former proceeding, whether at law or in 
equity i pending in a foreign tate or country and in thi r pect 
th tate of the Union are foreign to each other thi fact in itself 
a t rmines the question adversely to th plea in abatement. 
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If it appears that the two actions are pending within the same
state, and are both at law or both in equity, and are identical in par-
ties, subject-matter and relief sought, then no necessity appears for
the institution of the second proceeding, in which event it would
clearly be oppressive upon the defendant, subjecting him to unnec-
essary costs, and in such case the pendency of the first should abate
the second proceeding.
On the other hand, if the two proceedings are pending in the same
state, between the same parties, and concerning the same subject-
matter, yet the relief sought is different, as in cases of an action at
law and suit in equity, when the pendency of the one should not
ordinarily operate to abate the other; for the difference in the relief
obtainable in the two jurisdictions constitutes a sufficient legal
reason for the maintenance of both proceedings.
But it is urged that while the second of the rules as above given
may be applicable to cases pending in courts of the same state, yet
it is inapplicable when one case is pending in the state and the
other in the federal courts for the same state, the argument being
that the two jurisdictions are foreign to each other, and hence that
the pendency of a suit in the one court cannot be pleaded in abate-
ment of a suit in the other. It is true that the state and federal
tribunals owe their origin to different sources, but when created
and brought into action within the same territorial limits, can it
be fairly said that there are two states or jurisdictions co-existing
within the same limits, and yet foreign to each other, in the sense
that Iowa is foreign to New York? The same statutory and com-
mon law is enforced by both tribunals, and it cannot be said that
if a party is relegated to the state court for the enforcement of his
rights, that he is thereby sent into a foreign state or country,
whose laws and modes of proceeding are unknown or unfamiliar.
As we have already shown, the main purpose of the rule allowing
the pendency of one action to be pleaded, under given circum-
stances, in abatement of a second, is to prevent a defendant from
being unnecessarily harassed, and subjected to additional costs by
two proceedings when one will fully protect all the rights of the
plaintiff. Xow, it is apparent that the cost and vexation caused
to the defendant by the institution of the second suit is, to say
the least, not lessened by the fact that it is brought in the federal
while the first is pending in the state tribunal. Tlie evil to be

















































































































































RADFORD V. OLSOM 195 
I.f it app a-r that the two a tion are p nding within the same 
stat , ancl arc both at law orb th in quity, and ar identical in par-
tie , ·ubj ct- att r and relid ought, th n no nece ity appear for 
th in titution of th econd proc eding, in which e ent it would 
cl arly b oppr iv upon the defendant, ubjecting him to unnec-
o t , and in uch ca e th pendency of th :fir t hould abate 
ncl pr cling. 
n th oth r hand, if the two proc cling · are pencl1ng in th aille 
... tat b w en the ame parties, and concerning the ame ubject-
matter yet the r li f ought i different, a in ca of an action at 
law and uit in quit.', when the pendency of the one should not 
or inarily op rat to abate the oth r; for the difference in the reli f 
obtainable in th two jurisdiction constitut a sufficient legal 
rea on for the maintenance of borth proce ding . 
ut it i urged that while the cond of the rules a above given 
may b applicable to cases pend~ng in courts 01f the same tate, yet 
it i inapplicabl when one ca e is pending in the state and the 
oth r in th f cleral courts for the ame tate, the argument being 
that th two juri dictions are foreign to each other, and hence that 
the p ndency of a uit in the one court cannot be pleaded in abate-
m nt of a uit in the other. It is true that the state and federal 
tribunal owe th ir origin to different source , but when created 
and l>r ught into action wJ.thin the ame territorial limits, can it 
b fairl · aid that there a:re two tate or juri dictions co-exi ting 
within the am limit, and yet foreign to each other, in the ense 
that Iowa i for ign to ew York? The ame tatutory and com-
mon law i nforc d by both tribunals, and it cannot be said that 
if a I art i rel gated to the ta,te ourt for the enforcement of his 
ri ht that h i th r by nt into a foreign tate or country, 
law and mode of proce ding are unknown or unfamiliar. 
hav alr ady hown the main purpo e of the rule allowing 
the p nc.l n ' of on action to be pleaded, under given circum-
tanc s, in abat nt of a cond, i to prevent a defenda·nt from 
c aril' ham ed and ubjected to additional co bY 
ding wh n on will full prot ct all the riaht of the 
I lajr tiff. Now it i appar nt that the o t and -ve ation au d 
t th cl f n ant b. · th in titution f th econd uit i to a3 
tlh least, n t l nccl by th fa t that it i br uo·ht in the f d ral 
whil th :fir t i p nding in th tat tribunal. The vil to be 
rem Ji i n t obviat cl by th fa t that th mo pr c ding are 
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pending in tribunals owing their origin, the one to the state, the
other to the federal government, yet acting within the same tevri-
torial limits.
If it appears that the two proceedings, being between the same
parties, and for the enforcement or protection of the same rights,
will result in the granting of the same remedy, operative within the
same territorial limits, then it would seem clear that the second is
not needed to protect or enforce the plaintiff's rights, and as the
defendant must of necessity be put to additional trouble and ex-
pense in defending the second action, it follows that he is thereby
vexatiously harassed, and in such case he should be enabled to pro-
tect himself by causing the abatement of the second action. It is
the duty alike of the state and the United States court to protect
a defendant from unnecessary and vexatious litigation. If the first
action is brought in the state and the second in the federal tribunal,
or vice versa, it is the bringing of the second action that constitutes
the oppressive and unnecessary act on part of plaintiff, and the
corrective should be applied in the court whose jurisdiction is in-
voked oppressively and wrongfully. Again, the fact that the one
action is pending in the state and the second in the federal court,
instead of being a reason why the second should not be abated,
is, on the contrary, a weighty argument for just the opposite con-
clusion; for if the two proceedings are allowed to proceed at the
same time, there may arise all the difficulties from a conflict be-
tween the two jurisdictions, acting within the same state, which
are so fully presented in the opinion in the case of Brooks v.
Mills Co., already cited.
Applying these principles to the case before the court, it follows
that the demurrer to the plea must be overruled, for the demurrer
admits the allegation of the plea that the former suit pending in
the state court is for the same subject-matter, and to the same
effect, and for the like relief and purpose, that is contemplated in
the second proceeding; and if that be true, then in the absence
of any showing justifying tbc institution of the second suit, as being
needed for the full protection of complainant's rights, it would
necessarily follow that the second suit was uncalled for, and there-
fore vexatious.
In the argument of the demurrer, it was urged that the second
suit was necessary for the enforcement of plaintiff's rights, for the
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p nding in tribunal owing their Drigin, the one to the state, the 
other to the federal government, yet acling within the ame teni-
torial limits. 
If it appear that the two proceeding, being betw en the same 
parti s, and for the enforcement or protection of the same rights, 
will result in th granting of the same remedy, operative within the 
ame territorial limit , then it would seem clear that the second i 
not needed to protect or nforce the plaintiffs right and a the 
c1efendap.t mu t of necessity be put to additional trouble and ex-
pen e in defending the econd action, it follow that he i thereby 
vexatiou ly hara ed, and in uch case he hould be enabled to pro-
t ct himself by causing the abatement of the second action. It i 
the duty alike of the tate and the Unit d States court to protect 
a d fendant from unneces ary and vexatiou litigation. If the fir t 
action is brought in the tate and the econd in the federal tribunal, 
or vice versaJ it i the bringing of the econd action that constitutes 
the oppre ive and unnece ary act on part of plaintiff, and the 
corrective ·hould be applied in the court whose jurisdiction is in-
voked nppres ively and wrongfully. Again, the fact that the one 
action is pending in the tate and the econd in the federal court, 
in tead of being a rea on why the econd hould not be abated, 
i , on the contrary, a weighty argument for just the oppo ite con-
clu ion; for if the two proceedings are allow d to proceed at the 
ame time, there may arise all the difficultie from a conflict be-
tween the two juri diction , acting within the ame tate, which 
are o fully pre ented in the opinion in the case of Brooks v. 
Mill Oo.J already cited. 
pplying the principles to the case before the court, it follow 
that the demurr r to the plea mu t be ov rruled, for the demurr r 
admit the all gation of th plea that the former suit pending in 
th tate court i for th ame ubject-matter, and to the am 
effect, and for th like reli f and purpo e that i contemplated in 
th . cond pro ding; and if that be true, then in the ab nc 
of an) howin ju tif 'ing th jn titution f th ond uit a b ing 
n d d for th full protection of complainant' right it woul l 
nee arny f llow that th c ond uit wia uncalled for, and ther -
for vexatiou . 
In th ar iment of th 
. ujt wa. n c ary for th 
r a on that th upr m 
d murrer it wa urge that the econd 
nfor em nt f plainti riaht for the 
ourt of th tat had decid d in the firt 
Bolton v. Gardner 1'J7
proceeding tlmt the suit was prematurely brought, and hence should
be dismissed. The effect of such fact cannot be considered on the
demurrer, as it is not presented by the record, and the complain-
ant, if he desires to urge the same as a reason justifying the bring-
ing of the second suit, must bring the same to the knowledge of
the court in the further progress of the cause.
McCiuuY, C. J., and Love, U. J., concur.
Answer to Support Plea.
Bdton V. Gardner, 3 Faige Ch. (N. Y.) 273. (1832.)
The bill in this cause was filed by the administratrix of J. Bolton,
deceased, to obtain the distributive share of the decedent in the
estate of A. McLachlan, his half-brother. The bill charged that
McLachlan died in January, 1819, leaving a large personal estate,
and that the defendant D. Gardner, who married his sister, admin-
istered thereon: that in February, 1821, Bolton received a letter
from the defendant S. S. Gardner, a brother of D. Gardner, re-
questing him to call and see him relative to the estate of McLachlan ;
that Bolton called accordingly, and S. S. Gardner told him he was
entitled to some portion of the estate, and that as the agent of his
brother, the administrator, he wished to settle it with him, and he
referred him to S. ^liller, the surrogate, for further information;
that Bolton called on Miller, who advised him that he was entitled
to about seven or eight hundred dollars out of the estate of Mc-
Lachlan, but that, as the administrator was a liberal man, he
thought it probable he would give him a thousand dollars: that
Miller offered to undertake the business and obtain the money for
him for a fee of $50, to which Bolton agreed : that a few days
afterwards Bolton met Miller and S. S, Gardner, by appointment,
at the otlice of the latter, where Bolton agreed to accept $1,000 for
his share of the estate of McLachlan; and that he then executed
a release or assignment of his interest therein to D. Gardner, on
receiving $050, the remaining $50 being paid to ^filler as his fee.
The bill further charged that Bolton, at the time of executing
the release and assignment, was wholly ignorant of his rights as
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pro •djng that Lb uit wa pr maturely brought, and hence hould 
be di mj d. Th ff ct of u h fact annot be considered on the 
demurr r, a it i n t pr nt d l y th r ord, and the complain-
ant, if h 1 ir to urg he a a a r a on j tifying the bring-
ing of th · n uit mu t bring t11 am to the knowl dg of 
the court in th l'urth r progr of the cau e. 
M RAR , C. J., and Lo E, J., concur. 
ANSWER TO UPPORT PLEA. 
Bdlton . Gardner, 3 Paige h. (N. Y.) 273. (1832.) 
The bill in th:i cau e wa fil d by the administratrix of J. Bolton, 
dee a d to abtain th di tributive hare of the decedent in the 
tate of . M La hlan hi half-brother. The bill charged that 
M a hlan di d in January, 1 19 leaving a large per anal tate, 
and that t1 f ndant D. Gardner, who married hi i ter admin-
i t r d th r on: that in February, 1 1, olton receiv d a letter 
fro th d f ndant . Gardn r, a brother of D. Gardner, r e-
qu tin a him to all and e him relativ to the e tate of 1cLachlan _; 
that olton call d a cordingl , and . . Gardner told him he wa 
•ntitl to om portion of th tate, and that a the agent of hi 
br ih r th admini trator he wi h d to ttl it with him and he 
r f rr him to . Miller the mTo ate for further information; 
that olton all d on :Jiiller, who advi d him that he wa entitled 
to ab ut v n or ight hundr d dollar out of the tat of c-
La hlan but that, a the admini trator wa a liberal man he 
thou ht it pr babl h would 0 i him a thou and dollars : that 
ill 'r ff r d und rtak h bu ine and obtain th mane r for 
f t which olton a r c1: that a f w dar 
lt n m t :Jiill r and ardner b appointm nt, 
of th lati r wher lton a r d to ace pt 1 0 for 
hi, shar of ih f I L hlan; and that h then ut d 
r a ianm nt of hi int r t th r in to ardn r n 
T b in0 pai 1 to :Jiiller a hi f . 
Th olton at h tim f cutin 
th 
Oll 
wa wholly icrnora t of hi ~ ricrht .... H 
·1 ·blan, anc.1 that he wa ... al i n nut 
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that Miller was the counsel of D. Gardner, which he subsequently
ascertained to be the case; that during the negotiation Bolton did
not see any statement of the personal estate of McLachlan, nor
was he informed of its value, or of his rights therein, either by
Gardner or by Miller, but that he was induced to sign the release
and assignment by the representations made to him by S. S. Gard-
ner, the solicitor, and Miller, the counsel of D, Gardner : that if
Bolton had known the amount of the personal estate of McLachlan,
and of his interest therein, he would not have released such interest
for $1,000, which the complainant averred was less than one-fifth
of his just distributive share of the estate, and to which he was
entitled as one of the next of kin. The complainant, therefore,
insisted that the release and assignment were void, by reason of this
fraud and imposition ; and that she, as the personal representative
of Bolton, was entitled to one-fourth of the personal estate of
McLachlan, deducting therefrom the $950 received from Gardner.
The bill further stated, that D. Gardner had not filed an inventorv,
and that he had refused to es:hibit to Bolton in his lifetime, or to
the administratrix since his death, an account of the estate: that
at the time of executing the release and assignment, D. and S. S.
Gardner and Miller well knew that $950 was not one-fifth of the
distributive share of Bolton in the estate of McLachlan ; that they
then also knew that Bolton -ftTas ignorant of his rights, and of the
proportion of the estate to which he was entitled ; and they did not
produce or show to him any statement or inventory of the estate.
The bill prayed that the defendant D. Gardner might set forth
an accoimt of the personal estate of McLachlan which had come to
his hands as administrator, &c., and of the administration thereof;
and that he might be decreed to pay to the complainant the dis-
tributive share of such estate to which she was entitled, as the
personal representative of Bolton; and for general relief.
The defendant D. Gardner, as to so much of the bill as sought
for a discovery or account of the estate of McLachlan, and of the
administration thereof, and as to all the relief sought by the bill,
pleaded in bar the release and assignment executed by Bolton, in
February, 1821. He averred in his plea that it was not true, to his
knowledge or belief, that Bolton, at the time of executing the re-
lease, was wholly ignorant of his rights as one of the next of kin of
McLachlan : that Miller was not at that time his counsel : that
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that Miller was the coun el of D. Gardner, which he subsequently 
ascertained to be the case; that during the negotiation Bolton did 
not see anJ statement of the per onial tate of lVIcLachlan, nor 
wa he informed of its value, or of hi rights therein, either by 
Gardner or by Miller, but that he wa induced to sign the release 
and a ignment ·by the representation made to him by S. S. Gard-
ner, the solicitor, and Miller, the counsel of D. Gardner : that if 
Bolton had known the amount of the per onal estate of McLachlan, 
and of his intere t therein, he would not have released such interest 
for $1,000, which the complaina·nt averred was less than one-fifth 
of hi just di tributive share of the estate, and to which he was 
entitled a one of the next of kin. The complainant, therefore, 
in isted that the release and a ignment were void, by reason of this 
fraud and imposition; and that she, as the personal representati e 
of Bolton, was entitled to one-fourth of the personal e tate of 
l\lcLachlan, deducting therefrom the $950 recei' ed from Gardner. 
The bill further stated, that D. Gardner had not filed an inventor , 
and that he had refu ed to exhibit to Bolton in his lifetime, or to 
the administraJtrix since his death, an account of the estate : that 
at the time of executing the release and assignment, D. and S. S. 
Gardner and Miller well knew that $950 was not one-fifth of the 
di tributive share of Bolton in the estate of McLachlan; that th y 
then also knew that Bolton was ignorant of his rights, and of the 
proportion of the estate to which he was entitled; and they did not 
produce or show to him a:ny statement or inventory of the e tate. 
The bill prayed that the defendant D. Gardner might set forth 
an account of the personal e tate of McLachlan which had come to 
hi hands as administrator, &c., and of the administration thereof; 
and that he might be decreed to pay to the complainant the dis-
tributive hare of such e tate to which he wa entitl d, as the 
per onal repre entative of Bolton; and for general relief. 
The defendant D. Gardner, a to so much of the bill as ought 
for a di covery or account of the tate of McLachlan, and of the 
admini tration thereof, and a to an the relief ought by the bill, 
pleaded in bar the relea e and a ·gnment e 'ecuted by Bolton, in 
F bruar , 1821. averred in hi plea that it wa not tru , to hi 
knowledae or b lief, that olton, at the time of xe uting the re-
lea e wa wholly ignora-nt of hi right a one of the next of kin of 
foLachlan: that fill r wa not at that time hi coun el: that 
Bolton wa a cor lin to hi b li f inf rm d f th al u f the 
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estate, and af his rights and interest therein : that the sum of $1,000
was not less than one-fifth of his distributive share of the estate to
which lie was entitled as one of the next of kin: that the release
was not procured by the contrivance and management of S. S.
Gardner and ]\Iillcr, and by false and untrue representations : that
it was not true that either the defendant S. S. Gardner, or Miller,
knew, at the time of making the release, that $950 was not one-
fifth of Bolton's share of the estate, or that it was far less than his
distributive proportion thereof; or that they knew he was ignorant
of his rights and of the proportion of the estate to which he was
entitled. The defendant further averred in his plea, that he could
not state whether S. S. Gardner and Miller produced and exhib-
ited to Bolton any inventory or statement of the property at the
time of the execution of the release; but that the defendant was
informed and believed that S. S. Gardner did, at that time, state
to Bolton and Miller the amount of the estate of McLachlan.
There were also some other informal averments in the plea as to
other matters stated in the bill.
The plea was accompanied by an answer, admitting most of
the allegations in the bill relative to the original right of Bolton
to a distributive share of the estate of McLachlan; and containing
a general denial, according to the defendant's knowledge, informa-
tion and belief, as to most of the circumstances stated in the bill,
as evidences of fraud or imposition, to avoid the release. The de-
fendant also denied, in his answer, that the sum of $1,000 paid to
Bolton on the execution of the release, was less than one-fifth of
his distributive share of the estate ; and he alleged that, according
to his belief, it was fully equal to what he was rightfully entitled
to. He also alleged that he filed in the office of the surrogate an
inventory of the estate of McLachlan, in February, 1819; which
inventory he averred to be in all respects just and true, except
that after the filing of the inventory, he received eleven volumes
of books and $132,81, belonging to the estate, which came to his
knowledge after the filing of the inventory. He also denied that
Miller was his counsel at the time of the execution of the release;
but admitted he had since been informed, and that he believed
Miller, previous to that time, had, as his counsel, signed a plea put
in by him, the defendant, to a bill filed by Jane Garness relative
to the estate; but that the name of Miller was affixed to the plea
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c·tafo1 and of hi right and inte1ent h rein : that the um of $11000 
wa not 1 than on -fifth of hi ili tributi e hare of the e tate to 
which he wa ntitl d a on 0£ the next of kin : that th rclea e 
wa not pro ur d by th• ·ontrivance and management of 
ardn r and iller1 and by fal and uniru r pr ntati n : that 
it wa not tru that either th d f ndant 1 • , • ardner1 r '.Liller, 
knew1 at th time of making the relea that 9 0 wa n t one-
.fifth of olton har of the e tate1 or hat it a far les than hi 
1i ·tributi proportion thereof; or that they kn w he wa ignorant 
of hi right and of the proportion of the tate to which he wa 
ntitled. Th defendant further averred in hi plea, that he could 
n t tate wh ther ardn r a·nd 1iller produced and exhib-
it d to olton any in entory or tatement of the propert; at the 
tim of th ecution of the r lea e · but that the d f ndant wa~ 
inform d and believed that ardner did, at that time, tate 
to Bolt n and Miller th amount of the e tate of McLachlan. 
Th re w r al o ome other informal avennent in the plea a to 
other matt r tated in the bill. 
The pl a wa accompanied by an an wer admitting mo t of 
the all ga ion in the bill relative to the ori inal right of Bolton 
t a di ~tributi hare of the e tate of McLachlan; and containing 
a creneral d nial according to the defendant knowledcre, informa-
tion and b li f a to m t of the circum tance fated in the bill, 
a evidence of fraud or impo ition, to avoid the relea e. The de-
f mlant al o denied in hi an wer, that the um of $11000 paid to 
ol ton on th .xecution of the rel ea e wa le than one-fifth of 
hi · 1i tributiv har of the e fate; and he alleged that, according 
to hi b li f, it wa fully qual to what he wa rightfully entitled 
t . H al~o all cred that h filed in th office of the urrogate an 
in entor of th e tat of ~ Lachlan, in February 1 19; which 
inv n ory h a1 rred t be in all re pect ju t and true except 
that aft r th filing of the inventory he received eleven olume, 
f book and 13 1 belon in to th e tate which cam to hi 
kn wl dg aft r the filing of th in entory. He al o denied that 
.. Iill r wa hi coun el at th time of th execution of the r lea e · 
hu admitte 1 h had ince b n inform d and that h b lie ed 
.. I ill r. I re iou to that time had, a .. hi coun el iD"ned a pl put 
in 1 Y him h d fondant to a bill fil d l y Jan :dune.. r la tile . . 
the i'tat · but that th name of :Jiill r m ~ affix d to the pl 
wi h ul lh' kn wl drr or a1 I robati n f th d f ndant. 
200 Answek to Support Plea
Upon argument before the late vice-chancellor of the first cir-
cuit, the plea was allowed; with liberty to the complainant to
reply to the same within ten days, or in default thereof, that her
bill be dismissed. From this decision the complainant appealed to
the chancellor.
The Chancellor:
Several objections are made to this plea which are merely formal ;
but the principal objection is that it is pleaded in bar to the dis-
covery of what the complainant's counsel considers a material fact
to destroy the defence arising out of the release and assignment of
Bolton. I believe the answer is sufficiently full as to all the mat-
ters of the bill not professedly covered by the plea. Whether the
plea does not cover the discovery of some facts as to which the
complainant was entitled to an answer, I shall presently consider.
The rule which requires an answer in support of a plea, in certain
cases, does not render it necessary that the defendant should deny
positively, in the answer, matters of which it cannot be presumed
he has any personal knowledge. Where fraud or other circum-
stances are charged for the purpose of avoiding a release, the
defendant pleading the release, must by proper negative averments
in his plea, deny the allegation of fraud, &c., and must support
his plea by a full answer and discovery as to every equitable cir-
cumstance charged in the bill to avoid the bar. (Mad. & Geld.
Eep. 64; 2 Ves. & Beam. Rep. 364.) But in the case of negative
averments as to matters not alleged to be the act of the defendant,
or where, from the nature of the case, he cannot be supposed to
have any personal knowledge of the subject, it is sufficient for him
to deny the facts charged upon his belief only. {Drew v. Drew, 2
Ves. & Beam. 159.) The defendant, however, must be careful so
to frame his averments that the complainant may put the facts in
issue by a replication. And where the negative averments in the
plea are permitted to be made upon the belief of the defendant,
it will be sufficient for him, in the answer in support of such plea,
to deny the equitable circumstances stated in the bill, according
to his knowledge, information and belief only.
One objection which is urged by the complainants' counsel,
to the form of the plea in this case, is that some of the averments
therein professing to negative the charges in the bill, are not direct

















































































































































200 A SWER TO SUPPORT PLEA. 
Upon argument before the late vice-chancellor of the first cir-
cuit, the plea wa allowed; with liberty to the complainant to 
reply to the ame within ten day , or in default thereof, that her 
bill be di mi ed. From this deci ion the complainant appealed to 
the hancellor. 
T '.HE HANCELLOR: 
everal objection are made to this plea which are merely formal; 
but the principal objection is that it i pleaded in bar to the dis-
co ery of what the complainant's coun el con iders a material fact 
to destroy the defence a-ri ing out of the relea e and as ignment of 
Bolton. I believe the answer i suffi iently full as to all the mat-
ters of the bill not profe edly covered by the plea. Whether the 
plea doe not cover the discovery of some facts as to which the 
complainant wa entitled to an answer, I shall presently consider. 
The rule which requires an an wer in support of a plea, in certain 
case , does not render it nece ary that the defendant hould deny 
positively, in the an wer, matters of which it cannot be presumed 
he has any personal knowledge. Where fraud or other circum-
tances are charged for the purpose of a-voiding a release, the 
defendant pleading the release, mu t by proper negative averments 
in bis plea, deny the allegation of fraud, &c., and must support 
bi plea by a full an wer and discovery as to every equitable cir-
cumstance charged in the bill to avoid the bar. (Mad. & Geld. 
Rep. 64; 2 Ve. & Beam. Rep. 364.) But in the case of negative 
averment.s a to matter not alleg d to be the act of the defendant, 
or where, from the na·ture of the case, he cannot be upposed to 
have any per anal knowledg of the ubject, it i ufficient for him 
to leny the fact barged upon hi b lief only. (Drew v. Drew, 2 
Ve. & Beam. 159.) The defendant, however, mu t b careful . o 
to frame bi av rmen that the complainant may put the fact in 
i ue by a repli ation. And where the negative averment in the 
pl a are permitt d to be made upon the belief of th d fendant 
it will uffici nt for him, in th an wer in upport of uch 1 l a, 
to d ny the quitabl ircum tanc tat d in the bill, ac ordin~ 
to bi kncwl ge, information a d b li f only. 
One objection wbi h i urg 1 b 1 th omplainant oun el, 
to the form of th pl a in thi a , i that ome f th av rm nt 
th r in prof ing to n o-ativ th haro- in th bill ar not dir ct 
and i uahlc l ut ar inv lv 1 an l ar um ntativ . I am inclined 
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to think this objection is well taken. One of those averments com-
mences thus: "And this defendant further avers, that for the
reasons in his answer particularly set forth, he cannot say whether
or not," &c., concluding with two or three involved exceptions,
and embracing in a parenthesis another distinct averment of ig-
norance. This mode of denying an allegation in the bill might
not perhaps be deemed objectionable in an answer, where every
allegation, not admitted by the defendant, is put in issue by the
formal traverse at the close of the answer. But it is bad in a plea
where the negative averments must tender an issue directly.
Another objection to the plea is that it is overruled by a part
of the answer. The defendant, by his plea, objects to answering
any allegations in the bill which call for a discovery as to the
situation or amount of the estate of MicLachlan, which has come
to his hands as administrator; yet he does answer in part as to
those matters. He alleges, in substance, that the inventory filed
by him in the office of the surrogate contains a just and true ac-
count of the estate which had come to his hands, except eleven
volumes of books and $132, which came to his hands afterwards.
He also states that the $1,000 paid Bolton at the time of making
the release, was fully equal to what he was rightfully entitled to,
and was not, as alleged in the bill, less than one-fifth of his just
distributive share of the estate. If it was necessary or proper to
put these allegations in an answer in support of this plea, then it
was improper to plead the release in bar of the discovery as to the
amount of the estate. The defendant should have pleaded in bar
of the relief merely, and have given a full discovery as to the actual
amount of the estate. If the allegation in the answer, that the
amount paid to Bolton at the time of the execution of the release
was not less than one-fifth of his distributive share of the estate
and that it was fully equal to what he was rightfully entitled to,
was not necessary to support the plea, it overrules the whole plea
and constitutes a double bar. (3 Sim. & Stu. R. 281.) Taking
this answer to be true, Bolton received from the defendant his full
distributive share of the estate, and all he had any right to claim.
This of ii^elf is a full defence to the suit, and to the whole relief
asked for by the bill.
Independent of these objections to the plea, in point of form
I think the complainant was entitled to a full discovery as to the

















































































































































BOLTON . GARDNER 201 
to think tbi obj ction i w ll tak n. One of those averments com-
m nee thu " nd thi def ndant further aver , that for the 
r a on in hi an w r particularly et forth he cannot ay whether 
or not, &c., on ludino- with two or three involved exception, 
nd mbracing in a par nth i another di tin t av rment of ig-
noran . Thi mod of nying an allegiation in the bill might 
n t p rhap be d m d obj tionable in an an wer, where very 
all gation not admitted by the defendant, i put in i ue by the 
formal trav r e at the lo e -0£ the an w r. But it i bad in a plea 
wher then gativ av nnent mu t tender an i ue directly. 
noth r obj ction to th pl a i that it i overruled by a part 
of th a·n wer. Th defendant, by his plea, obj ct to an wering 
an allegation in the bill w hi h call for a di co very a to the 
ituation or amount of the e tate of MicLachlan, which ha come 
to hi hand a admini trator; yet he doe an wer in part a to 
tho e matters. allege , in ubstance, that the inventory :filed 
by him in the offi of the surrogate contains a ju t and true ac-
count of the e tate which had come to hi hand , except eleven 
Yolum of book a·nd $13 , which came to hi hand afterward . 
e al o tates that the $1 000 paid Bolton at the time of making 
the r 1 a e, wa fully qual to what he wa rightfully entitled to, 
and wa not a all O'ed in the bill, le than one-fifth of hi ju~t 
di tributi e ha·re of the estate. If it wa nece ary or proper to 
put the e allegation in an an wer in upport of thi plea, then it 
wa ~ improper to pl ad the r lea e in bar of the di covery a to the 
amount f the e tat . Th defendant hould have pleaded in bar 
of the r lief m r l; and hav gi en a full di covery a to the actual 
amount of the tat . If the allegation in the an wer, that the 
amount paid to Bolton at the tim of the execution of the relea e 
wa not 1 than on -:fifth of hi di tributive hare of the tate, 
and that it a full equal to what h wa rightfully entitled to, 
no n ce ar t upport th pl a it overrule the whole plea 
an ntitute ad ubl bar. (· im. & tu. 1.) Taking 
thi a-n w r to b tru Bolton r ceiv d from th d fendant hi full 
di. tributiv har of th tat and all he had an; rio·ht to laim. 
'I11i £ i If i a full def nee to the uit and to th whol r lief 
a ]· cl for by th bill. 
ln l 'P ncl )n of th "e o jection to the pl a, in point of form 
I thinl~ th omplainant wa ntitl d to a full di oy ry a to the 
w tu. 1 amo t f th pe anal tate of 1\IcLachlan. have 
202 Answer to Support Plea
before seen that the party pleading a release which the complain-
ant seeks to impeach upon equitable circumstances, must, in his
answer supporting the plea, make a full discovery as to every ma-
terial circumstance relied on to avoid the bar. One equitable cir-
cumstance relied upon here is, that Bolton understood from Miller
that his share of the estate was less than $1,000, whereas the com-
plainant alleges it was more than five times that amount, and that
this fact was then known to the defendant and his solicitor. If this
was so, although Miller himself was probably misinformed as to
the amount, I am not prepared to say that a trustee can be per-
mitted to support a release from his cestui que trust, founded on
such a gross inadequacy of consideration; although there was no
actual fraud intended. I think,, in such a case, the defendant
should be required to show that the parties were treating for a
settlement at arms' length, or that he gave the cestui que trust
a fair statement of the amount of tlie property, so far as was
necessar}^ to enable him to act understandingly in relation to his
rights. Although the defendant denies knowledge of the amount
of property charged in the bill, the complainant has a right to
know what the property was, and when it came to the defendant's
hands, to enahle the court to see whether the allegation is true.
I think the vice-chancellor erred in allowing this plea; and
his decision must be reversed, with the costs of this appeal. The
plea is to be overruled, but without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to insist upon the release and assignment, in his answer,
as a bar to the relief sought by the complainant's bill.
As the complainant is prosecuting her cause before the vice-
chancellor in forma pauperis, the question whether she is to receive
costs upon the argument of the plea before the vice-chancellor,
must be reserved until the hearing; but they are not to be allowed
if the defendant succeeds in his defence. This court will not
encourage the prosecution of suits in forma pauperis, merely for
the purpose of obtaining the costs of interlocutory proceedings,
if there is no reasonable hope of succeeding on the merits. As
the complainant cannot prosecute an appeal as a poor person, and
is also obliged to give security for the costs of the adverse party
in such a case, it is reasonable that she should recover dives costs

















































































































































202 ANSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA 
before een that the party pleading a release which the complain-
ant eek to impeach upon equitable circumstances, must, in his 
an wer upporting the plea, make a full discovery a to every ma-
terial circum tance relied on to avoid the bar. One equitable cir-
cum tance relied upon here i , that Bolton understood from Miller 
that hi hare of the e tate wa le 'S than $1,000, whereas the com-
plainant alleg it was more than five times that amount, and that 
thi faot was then known to the defendant and his solicitor. If this 
wa o, although Miller himself was probably misinformed as to 
the amount, I am not prepared to ay that a trustee can be per-
mitted to support a release from hi cestui que trust, founded on 
such a gros inadequacy of consideration ; although there wa no 
actual fraud intended. I think,. in such a case, the defendant 
should be required to how that the partie were treating for a 
ettlement at arms' length, m that he gave the cestui que trust 
a fair tatement of the amount of the property, o far as was 
neces ary to enable him to ad under tandingly in relation to his 
right . Although the defendant denies knowledge of the amount 
of property charged in the bill, the complainant has a right to 
know what the property was, and when it came to the defendant's 
hands, to enaible the court to ee whether the allegation is true. 
I think the vice-chanc llor erred in allo.wing this plea; and 
his decision must be reversed, with the costs of this appeal. The 
plea is to be overruled, but without prejudice to the right of the 
defendant to insist upon the release and as ignment, in his answer, 
as a bar to the relief sought by the compla·inant' bill. 
As the complainant i prosecuting her cau e before the vice-
chancellor in forma pauperis, the question whether she is to receive 
co ts upon the argument of the plea before the vice-chancellor, 
mu t be re erved until the hearing; but they are not to be allowed 
if the d f ndant ucc ed in hi defenc . Thi court will not 
encourag the pro ution of uit in forma pauperis, merely for 
th purpo e of obtaining the co t of interlocutory proceeding , 
if ther i no rea onable hop of ucce ding on the merit . A, 
the complainant annot pro ecut an appeal a a poor p rson, and 
i al o oblicred to giv ecurity for the co t of th adv rse party 
in uch a ca e, it i r a onabl that he hould recover dives costs 
for the proceeding on the appeal. 
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Goodnch v. Pendleton, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 3S4. (1818.)
Phineas Miller, of Georgia, made his will, the 11th of December,
1797, appointing Decius Wadsworth, Samuel Kelloek, and liis wife,
Catharine Miller, his executors, and died the 7th of December,
1803. Tlie two executors first named declined to act, and the
executrix administered, but did not take out any letters testa-
mentary in this state, x\.t the time of his death, the testator was
a creditor of the United St-ates to forty thousand dollars, and
upwards, on a contract made for supplying the United States
with ship timber. Some controversy having arisen between the
executrix and the United States, relative to this debt, the de-
fendant, professing great friendship for the executrix, who resided
in Georgia, wrote her a letter, dated December 4, 1806, in which
he takes notice of that debt, and expressed a belief, that if he were
duly authorized, he could obtain the money from the United States,
and he, at the same time, enclosed a power of attorney for her
to execute. The executrix received the letter, executed the power
of attorney, and returned it to the defendant. The power of
attorney was dated January 30th, 1807, by which the executrix
authorized the defendant to demand and receive of and from the
United States, the debt above mentioned, being the balance of
account as awarded by arbitrators, to give acquittances for the
same, and to compound, if necessary, any controversy respecting
it, so far as she, as executrix, might lawfully do. The executrix,
afterwards, by a letter written by her agent, Eay Sands, from
Georgia, to the defendant, requested him not to act under the
power, which letter the defendant received prior to the 26th of
March, 1807. The defendant, afterwards, in pursuance or under
color of the power of attorney, on the 13th of January, 1808,
received from the United States 18,328 dollars, 50 cents, for the
balance due to the estate of the testator, and as attorney of the
executrix, gave a discharge to the United States. Tlie defendant
paid over to the executrix 7,960 dollars, 11 cents, but retained the
residue of the money so received by him, being 10,368 dollars,
39 cents, against her consent. The bill further stated that the
sum so received by the defendant was less than the sum due from

















































































































































Uoovr ICU . ENDLETO 203 
'oodrich . Pendleton, 3 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 384. (1818.) 
l hin ~a Miller, of eorgi , mad hi will, th 11th of c mber, 
l / , appointing iu vV· d w rth, iamu 1 ell k, and hi wife, 
iatharin Mill r, hi x cutor , and died the th of e mb r, 
1 h two uto fir nam d declined to act, and th 
·. c utrix admini ter d, but did nort take out an; lette te ta-
m ntary in thi tate. t the time of hi death, the te tator wa 
a r ditor of th nitc l tate to forty thou and dollar , and 
upward on a contra t mad for upplying th Unit d tat 
with hip timber. iome controver y having ari en between the 
·.- u rix and th nited tate , r lative to hi debt, the d -
.f ndant, prof , ·ing areat friend hip for the x cutrix, who re id d 
in corgia, wrot h r a letter, dated December 4, 1806, in which 
h take notice of hat debt, and xpres ed a belief, that if he were 
luly a·uthorized, he ould obtain the money from the United tate , 
and he, at the ame time, enclo ed a power of attorney for her 
t e_ cut . The ex cuhix r ceived i:he lett r, xecuted the power 
f attorney, and r urned it to ihe defendant. The power of 
attorn r wa dat d January 30th, 180 , by which the executrix 
authoriz d the dei ndant to demand and receive of and from the 
nit d tate, the d ht above mentioned, being the balance of 
ac unt a awarded by arbitrator , to give acquittance for the 
am and to compound, if nee ary, any ontrover y re pecting 
it ,o far a he, a xecutrix might lawfully do. The executrix, 
·fl rward by a letter written by her agent, Ray Sand , from 
koraia to the d fendant, requ ted him not to act under the 
J ow r which letter th defendant recei ed prior to the 26th d 
:Jfarch 1 0 . Th d f ndant afterward in pu ~uance or under 
· lor f the pow r f attorne' on th 13th of J a·nuary 1 O 
r .. i\' a from th nit d tat 1 32 dollar 0 nt for the 
l aLm · lue to th tat f th t tator and a attorney of th 
to th nit d tat . The d f ndant 
dollar , 11 
i d b r him b ing d llar ... 
Th bill further ta d that th ~ 
1 than th um du from 
t tator. an 1 1 ... c than oul 
204: Answer to Support Plea
have been obtained before giving the power to the defendant ; that
the sum actually received was by way of compromise, and which
compromise the defendant was induced to make, not because he
considered that sum as the full amount due, but with a view to
obtain possession of it, and apply it to his own use. That the
executrix, residing in Georgia, and the defendant in New-York,
was unable to obtain the sum so withheld from her, by the de-
fendant; though the sum so received by him was as a trustee for
the estate of the testator, and he was liable to account for the same
as such trustee. That the executrix died in Georgia on the 3d of
September, 1814. That on the 9th of October, 1817, the plaintiff
took out letters of administration, with the will annexed, in New-
York. That the defendant refuses to account with the plaintiff,
for the money so received, or to pay it; pretending that when he
received the power of attorney as aforesaid, there was a debt due
to him from the estate of the testator, and that it was agreed
between him and the executrix, when he received the power, that
he might retain the amount of his debt out of the moneys to be
received by liim. The plaintiff denied any such agreement; or, if
it was ever made by the executrix, it was through ignorance of
her duties, and from an undue confidence reposed in the defendant,
who professed his desire, in soliciting the power, to promote her
interest. That if any debt was due to the defendant, it was a
simple contract debt unsettled, and that the estate of the testator
was then indebted, by judgments and specialties, to more than the
amount of all the assets, which the defendant knew; and the
agreement, if made, would have been a devastavit in the executrix,
&<3. The bill prayed that the defendant might be decreed to
account with the plaintiff, as administrator, with the will annexed,
for the moneys so received by him from the United States, and to
pay the same, &c.
The defendant, on the 13th January last, put in a plea and
answer. For plea, he said, that every cause of action in the bill
contained, accrued above six years before filing the bill. That
after the cause of action (if any) arose, to wit, in June, 1808, the
said C. M., the executrix, was in this state, and that she, by her
will, appointed her daughter, Louisa Shaw, executrix, who proved
the will in Georgia. That the sum of money (if any), received
l)v the defendant, was not received as trustee for the estate of

















































































































































204 ANSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA 
have been obtained before giving the power to the defenda·nt; that 
the um actually received was by way of compromise, and which 
compromi e the defendant wa induced to make, not because he 
con idered that sum a the full amount due, but with a view to 
obtain pos e ion of it, and apply it to his own u e. That the 
executrix, re iding in Georgia, and the defendant in New-York, 
wa unable to obtain the sum so withheld from her, by the de-
fendant; though th um o received by him was as a trustee for 
the e tate of the testator, and he was liable to account for the same 
a uch trustee. That the executrix died in Georgia on the 3d of 
September, 1814. That on the 9th of October, 1817, the plaintiff 
took out letters of admini tration, with the will annexed, in New-
York. That the defendant refu e to account with the plaintiff, 
for the money o received; or to pay it; pretending that when he 
received the power of attorney a aforesaid, there was a debt due 
to him from the estate of the testator, and that it was agreed 
between him and the executrix, when he received the power, that 
he might retain the amount of his debt out of the moneys to be 
received by him. The plaintiff denied any such agreement; or, if 
it was ever made by the executrix, it was through ignorance of 
her duties, and from an undue confidence reposed in the defendant, 
who professed his desire, in soliciting the power, to promote her 
interest. That if any debt was due to the defendant, it was a 
imple contract debt unsettled, and that the estate of the testator 
wa then indebted, by judgments and specialtie , to more than the 
amount of all the assets, which the defendant knew; and the 
agreement, if made, would have been a devastavit in the executrix, 
&c. The bill prayed that the defendant might be decreed to 
account with the plaintiff, a administrator, with the will annexed, 
for the money o received by him from the United States, and to 
pay the ame, &c. 
The d f ndant, on the 13th January }a t, put in a plea and 
answer. For plea, h aid that ev ry cau e of action in the bill 
·ontain d accn1 d al ove ix year b fore filing the bill. That 
aft r th cau of action (if any) aro e to wit, in Jun 1 0 , the 
. aid C. ~1., the x cutrix wa in thi tate, and that h , by her 
\\·ill, app int l h r dau hter L ui a ha·w x cutrix who· proved 
the will in orgia. That th um of mon y (if any) r eiv d 
hY the d f n 1ant ' .._ n t r iv d tru tee for th estate of 
. M. th d or for C. M. a x cu rix, and, there-
(jiooDiucH V. Pendleton ^05
fore, the defendant pleads the statute of limitations, in bar of the
plaintiff's bill. That in support of the plea, and as to so much
of the bill as charges that the money received by the defendant
was received as trustee, for the estate of P. M., deceased, and that
the defendant was, and is, accountable as trustee, he answers, and
says, that he denies that the said money was received by him as
trustee, but that the same was received by him on his own account,
and retained by him, at the time of the receipt, for his own use
(being applied by him for the payment of a debt justly due to
liim from 1*. M., in virtue of a special agreement between the
executrix and him), and not as trustee.
The cause came on to be heard on the plea in bar and the
answer in support of it.
The Chancellor:
This plea, with its attendant answer, is insufficient.
1. In the first place, it is multifarious, and contains distinct
Joints. It states that the cause of action did not arise within
six years, and that the plaintiff was barred by the statute of
limitations ; it also states, that the sole acting executrix of Phineas
Miller, deceased, made her will, and appointed her daughter, Louisa
Shaw, executor, and that the daughter had proved the will. This
last point seems to be wholly unconnected with any fact forming
the plea of the statute: if it meant any thing, it meant that the
plaintiff was not entitled to the character he assumed, and that
the suit ought to have been brought in the name of Louisa Shaw.
Xo doubt, it may, in certain cases, be a good plea, that a plaintiff,
who assumes to be administrator, was not entitled to that trust;
and of this we have an example in Ord v. Huddleston, cited in
:\[itford's PI. p. 189. But I do not mean to say, that the fact thus
stated would, if it had stood by itself, have been a good plea. It
is sufficient, however, for the present, to observe, that it is put
forward in the plea, as a matter of defence, or it would not have
appeared there, and the rule applies, that a plea containing two
distinct points is bad. Such a defective plea was overruled by
Lord Thurlow, in Wiifbrcad v. Brockhurst (1 Bro. 404); and
Lord Posslyn afterwards observed (6 Vesey, 17), that he would
not allow a plea of the statute of frauds, when it was coupled with
another defence. Every plea must rest the defence upon a single

















































































































































1 OODIUCII V. IE DLETO.i.: 205 
J: r , the d fendant pl ad th ta-tut of limitation , in bar of the 
pl inti:ff bill. Tbat in upp rt of th plea, and a to o much 
of th bill a char that the m n y r c i ved by the def ndant 
,ra recei d a ru tee for h e tate of P . M., decea ed, and that 
th def ndant wa , n 1 i , accountabl a tru t , he answers~ and 
savs that h d ni that th a·icl money wa r c iv d by him as 
tru te , but th t th am wa r i d by him on hi own account, 
au r tain cl by him, at th tim of the receipt, for hi own u 
b ino- appli l by him for th paym nt of a d bt ju tly due to 
him from . M., in irtue of a p cial agreement between the 
•xccutri, and him), and not a tru t e. 
Th au ame on to be heard on the plea in bar and the 
an w r in upport of it. 
THE II T CELLOR : 
Thi pl a with it attendant answer, is in ufficient. 
1. In the first place, it i multifariou , and contain di tinct 
int . It tat tha·t the cau e of action did not ari e within 
~ix } ear and that the plaintiff wa barred by the taitute of 
limitation ; it al o tate , that the ol acting executrix of Phinea. 
:Jlillcr de a d mad h r will, and appointed her daughter, Loui a 
1haw executor and thart the daughter had proved the will. Thi 
la t point e m to be wholl unconnected with any fact forming 
th pl a of th tatute: if it meant any thing, it meant that the 
plaintiff wa not ntitl d to th character he a sumed, and that 
th uit ouo-ht to ha b en brought in the name of Loui a Shaw . 
.._ T doubt, it may in certain ca be a good pl a, that a plaintiff, 
who a um to be admini trator w not entitled to that tru t; 
<md of thi w hav an e ample in Ord v. Huddleston~ cited in 
:Jiitford 1. p. 1 ut I do not mean to ay that the fact thu 
, · t cl would if it had toad b it elf have b n a o·ood plea·. It 
i~ uffi i nt, how 1 r for th pr ent to ob erv that it i put 
i n ard in h pl a a a matt r of d f nee, or it would not ha1 
np1 nr l th r and th rul appli that a pl a containing two 
c1i ·tin t p int~ i bad. u h a f tiv plea wa 01 rruled b. 
Lnrd hurl w in TI'hitbrca d \. Brocklwr t (1 ro. -±0-±) · and 
1 orcl ~dyn aft rward ob r d ( \ e ' , 1 ) that h oul 
not all w n pl a f th ta tut f fraud , , wh n it 11a upl d 11i h 
nn th r 1,f n n a "ingl 
point. and 111 n uh i::s h 
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policy and convenience of pleading, and the party must resort to
his answer, if he wishes to avail himself of distinct matters. It
is fit and, salutary that a plea, which mixes together different and
discordant matter, should be condemned ; for it uselessly encumbers
the record, and serves no other purpose than to produce confusion.
2. But I perceive a more important and stronger objection to
the plea.
The defendant is charged as a trustee, and with a breach of
his trust, and with fraud in the execution of it. These charges
formed an equitable bar to the plea of the statute, and they ought
to have been fully, particularly, and precisely, denied in the answer,
put in as an auxiliary to the plea.
The bill contains the following charges, viz. that the testator,
Phineas Miller, had a large demand against the United States;
that the defendant, professing a friendship for Catharine Miller,
the widow and sole acting executrix, and who resided in the state
of Georgia, wrote her a letter, in which he takes notice of her
demand, and expresses a belief that, if duly authorized, he could
obtain the money for her, and, at the same time, enclosed to her a
power of attorney to be executed and given to him; that under
that solicitation she executed and sent him the power; that she
afterwards wrote him a letter by her agent, requesting him not to
act under that power, and which letter he received in March, 1807 ;
that the defendant, acting under color of the power, in January,
1808, received from the United States 18,328 dollars and 50 cents,
as for the balance due to the testator, which he received as such
attorney and trustee, and in that character gave a discharge to the
United States; that he, contrary to her consent and his duty,
appropriated, of that sum, 10,368 dollars and 39 cents, to his own
use; that he received the money upon a composition, made by
him with the United States, and which he was induced to make,
not because he considered the sum received to be the full amount
due, but with a view to obtain possession of it, and to apply it
to his own use, in discharge of some pretended unsettled debt by
simple contract, alleged to be due to him from the testator; that
the estate of the testator was indebted, by judgment and specialties,
to more than all the assets, and which fact was well known to the
defendant, and if the executrix had assented to any such appropria-
tion, she would have committed a devastavit, which the defendant,
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policy and convenience of pleading, and the party must re ort to 
his answer, if he wi hes to avail him elf of distinct matters. It 
is fit and, alutary that a plea, which mixes together different and 
di cordant matter, should be condemned; for it uselessly encumbers 
the record, and serves no other purpo e than to produce confusion. 
2. But I perceive a more important and stronger objection to 
the plea·. 
The defendant is charged as a trustee, and with a breach of 
hi trust, and with fraud in the execution of it. These charges 
formed an equitable bar to the plea of the statute, and they ought 
to have been fully, particularly, and precisely, denied in the answer, 
put in as an auxiliary to the plea. 
The bill contains the following charges, viz. that the t tator, 
Phineas Miller, had a large demand against the United States; 
that the defendant, professing a friendship for Catharine Miller, 
the widow and sole acting executrix, and who re ided in the state 
of Georgia, wrote her a letter, in which he takes notice of her 
demand, and expresses a belief that, if duly authorized, he could 
obtain the money for her, and, at the same time, enclosed fo her a 
power of attorney to be executed and given to him; that under 
that solicitation she executed and sent him the power; that she 
afterwards wrote him a letter by her agent, requesting him not to 
act under that power, and which letter he received in March, 1807; 
that the defendant, acting under color of the power, in January, 
1808, received from the United States 18,328 dollars and 50 cents, 
as for the balance due fo the testator, which he rec€ived as such 
attorney and trustee, and in that character gave a discharge to the 
United Srtates; that he, contrary to her con ent and his duty, 
appropriated, of that sum, 10,368 dollars and 39 cent , to hi own 
u e; that he received the money upon a composi·tion, made by 
him with the United States, and which he wa induced to make, 
not becau e he con idered the um received to be the full amount 
du , but with a view to obtain po ion of it, and to apply it 
to his own u e, in di · harg of some pret nded un ttl d debt by 
simple contra· t, all ged to be du t·o him from the t tator; that 
the e tate of th t tator wa indebt d, by judD"ment and pecialties 
to more than all th a "'et , and which fact w.a well known to the 
d fendant, and if the ex cutrix had a nt to any u h a·ppropria-
tion, he would hav committ d a. devastavit; which the d f ndant, 
from hi prof ional knowl dO"e, al o kn w. 
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Upon such a case, as stated by Hie bill, and not denied by the
answer, I might well say, with Lord Ilardwicke, in Brereton v.
Gamul (2 Atk. 240), when he overruled a plea of the statute, as
not being particular enough, that "the case was of such a nature as
entitled the plaintiff to all the favor the Court could show her."
I need not stay to show that the defendant, being charged with
a fraudulent breach of trust, as an agent or trustee for the
executrix, cannot set up the statute of limitations, so long as the
trust is admitted. A trustee cannot protect himself by the statute
of limitations in a suit brought by the cestiiy que trust; it would
be a waste of time to look for authorities in support of a principle
so well known and established. The only question that can now be
made is, whether the defendant has sufficiently met and denied
the charges in respect to the creation and breach of this trust.
He contents himself with denying, in the plea, that the money
received by him was received as trustee for the estate of Phineas
Miller, deceased, and with denying, in the answer, that the money
was received by him as trustee, and with averring that it was
received on his own account, and retained for his own use, under
some agreement not detailed. We have no denial of the letter
professing friendship, and soliciting the appointment, nor any
denial of the receipt of the letter from the executrix, suspending
the power, nor of the subsequent receipt of the money from the
United States, under a composition made in the injurious manner
and for the unjust purposes stated; nor have we any denial that
he gave the United States an acquittance or discharge, as attorney
for the executrix. The defendant cannot be permitted to shelter
himself under the statute, from the resjDonsibility of such grave
accusations, by a mere simple denial of the receipt of the money
as trustee, while he leaves all those facts or charges uncontradicted
which establish the existence of the trust, and show that he cer-
tainly did receive the money, as such agent or trustee. If such a
general denial, without meeting specific charges, was sufficient,
every trustee might escape from responsibility, by means of the
statute, and be left to his own construction of what was intended
by such a denial. But the rules of pleading are founded in better
sense, and in stricter and closer logic; they require the defendant
to answer, particularly and precisel}'', the charges in the bill, which
go to destroy the bar created by the statute.


















































































































































pon uch a ca , a tat d by the bill, and not u ni d by the 
an wer, I might w 11 ay, with rd ardwicke, in Brereton v. 
Gamul ( tk. ) , wh n he OY rrul d a plea of the tatute, a 
not b ing particular nough, that th ca c wa 1 u h a nature a 
ntitl d th plaintifr to all th fa or th ourt ould how h r.' 
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c - utrix, cannot t up th tatute of limitati n , o long a the 
tru t i admitt d. A tru t c cannot protect him elf by the tatute 
of limitation in a uit brought by the ce tuy que trustJ· it would 
b ·1 wa t of time to look for authoritie in support of a principle 
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r iv d by him wa received a trustee for the e tate of Phineas 
:Mill r d cea ed, and with denying, in the answer, that the money 
wa r ived by him a tru tee, and with averring that it was 
r cei d on hi own account and retained for hi own une, under 
om agr ment not detail d. \\ have no denial of the letter 
prof ing friend hip, and olici1ting the appointment, nor any 
d nial of the r ceipt of the letter from the xecutrix, uspending 
th pow r, nor of the ub equent receipt of the money from the 
nit d tate , und r a compo ition made in the injurious manner 
and for the unju t purpo e .tat d; nor have we any denial that 
he o-a the Unit d tate an acquittanc or di charge, a attorney 
for th e ecutrix. The def ndant cannot b p rmitted to helter 
him lf under the tart:urf:e, from the respon ibility of uch grave 
a u ation by a m re impl d nial of the re eipt of the money 
a tru te while h leave all tho fact or charge uncontradicted 
"hi h tabli h th xi ten e of the tru t and how that he er-
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bill, and wliich will avoid the statute, must be denied by the
answer, as well as by the general averment in the plea; and the
answer in support of the plea (and which is indispensable to its
support) must be full and clear, and contain a particular and
precise denial of the charges, or it will not be effectual to support
the plea. The Court will intend that the matters so charged against
the pleader, are true, unless they be fully and clearly denied.
The facts requisite to render the plea a defence, must be clearly
and distinctly averred, so that the plaintiff may take issue upon
them; and the answer in support of the plea must contain par-
ticular and precise averments, to enable the plaintiff to meet them,
as the object of the answer is to give the plaintiff an opportunity
of taking exceptions to the traverse of the facts and circumstances
charged in the bill, which, if true, would destroy the bar set up.
These general principles of pleading are laid down in Lord
Eedesdale's Treatise of Pleading (p. 212. 214. 236, 237), a work
of great authority on the subject: they are also to be met with in
other treatises of established character. (Cooper's Eq. PI. 227,
228. Gilbert's For. Eem. 58. Van Heythuysen's Equity Drafts-
man, p. 443.) They are, indeed, plain, elementary rules, which I
should have apprehended could not well be mistaken by the equity
pleader; but we will, for a moment, look into the cases in which
they have been declared and applied.
In Price v. Price (1 Vern. 185), the defendant pleaded that
he was a doiia fide purchaser for a valuable consideration; but
there being several badges of fraud stated in the bill, though the
defendant in his plea had denied them, yet, because lie had not
denied them, hy way of answer, so that the plaintiff might he at
liberty to except, the plea was overruled. In The South Sea Com-
pany V. Wymondsell (3 P. Wms. 143), the bill charged fraud,
and the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations, and denied
the matters of fraud; hut as there were some circumstances not
fully denied, the defendant was ordered to answer the bill, with
liberty to the plaintiff to except, and the benefit of the statute was
to be saved to the defendant. In Walter v. Glanville (3 Bro. P. C.
266), sometimes referred to, to show, that if the matters charged
are answered substantially, it will do, the only question was,
whether the answer in support of the plea did not fully and par-
ticularly (as it did in that case) answer the material charges in the
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bill, and which will avoid the statute, must be denied by the 
an wer, a well a by the general averment in the plea·; and the 
an wer in upport of the plea (and which is indi pen able to its 
upport) must be full and clear, and contain a particular &nd 
preci e denial of the charge , or it will not be effectual to support 
the plea. The Court will intend that the matter o charged again t 
the pleader, are true, unle s they be fully and clearly denied. 
The fact requi ite to render the plea a defence, mu t be clearly 
and di tinctly averred, so that the plaintiff may take i sue upon 
them; and the answer in upport of the plea mu t contain par-
ticular and preci e averment , to enable the plaintiff to meet them, 
a the obj ct of the an wer i to give the plaintiff an opportunity 
of taking exceptions to the traverse of the fact and circum tance 
charged in the bill, which, if true, would destroy the bar set up. 
Th e general principle of pleading are laid down in Lord 
Rede dale' Treati e of Pleading (p. 212. 214. 236, 237), a work 
of great authority on the ubject : they are al o to be met with in 
other treati es of establi hed character. (Cooper' Eq. PL 227, 
228. Gilbert' For. Rem. 58. Van Heythuy en' Equity Drafts-
man, p. 443.) They are, indeed, plain, elementary rule , which I 
hould have apprehended could not well be mi ta·ken by the equity 
pleader; but we will, for a moment, look into the cases in which 
they have been declared and applied. 
In Price v. Price (1 Vern. 185), the defendant pleaded that 
he wa a bona fide purchaser for a valuable con ideration; but 
there being everal badge of fraud tated in the bill, though the 
defendant in hi plea had denied them, yet, because he had not 
denied them, by way of answer, so that the plaintiff might be at 
liberty to except, the plea was overruled. In The oitih Sea Com-
pany v. Wymondsell (3 P. Wms. 143), the bill charged fraud, 
and the defendant pleaded the tatute of limitation , and deni d 
th matter of fraud; but as there were some circumstances not 
fully denied, the defendant wa order d to an wer th bill with 
lib rty to the plaintiff to except, and the benefit of the tatute wa 
to b aved to th cl f ndant. In Walter v. Glanville (3 Bro. P. C. 
G) ometime r f rr d to to how, that if the matt r harged 
ar an w red ub tantially it will do the onl qu tion wa , 
wh th r the an wer in upport of th plea did not fully and par-
ti ularly (a it dil in that ) an w r the mat rial har in th 
1 ill. Th n c it. f u h an an w r 'rn evid ntly admitt by 
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the counsel, and by the Court; and so it must have been under-
stood by Lord Ch, King, who made the decree appealed from, and
who, subsequentl}', in the case cited from P. Williams, required
such a full and particular answer.
Lord Hardwicke frequently noticed and supported these rules
of pleading. Thus, in Brereton v. Gamul, already cited, the plea
of a fine levied and of five years with non-claim was overruled,
as not being particular enough. So, in 3 Atk. 70, Anon., the bill
charged, that since the death of the intestate, the administratrix
had promised to pay the note as soon as she had effects, and the
administratrix pleaded the statute of limitations, and that she made
no ])romise. But the chancellor held the plea to be too general,
as there was a special promise charged; and he ordered the plea
to stand for an answer, with liberty to accept. Again; in Hild-
yard v. Cressy (3 Atk. 303), the defendant pleaded a fine and
non-claim to a bill for a discovery whether the defendant were a
bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration ; and it appearing
that the defendant had not made a complete answer, and therefore
not properly supported his plea, the plea was ordered to stand
for an answer, with liberty to except. In Radford v. Wilson (3
Atk. 815), the defendant put in a plea of a purchase for a valuable
consideration, without notice; but as the instances of notice
charged in the bill were particular and special, it was held that a
general denial of notice was not sufficient, and that it must be
denied as specially and particularly as it was charged, and the plea
was overruled.
The modern cases before Lord Eldon contain the same rules.
Thus, in Jones v. Pengree (6 Vesey, 580), there was a plea of
the statute of limitations, and an answer. The former was ob-
jected to as multifarious, and as not covering enough; and the
answer was objected to as overruling the plea by answering to the
very parts to which the plea went, and as not answering the ma-
terial charge, which, if admitted, would have taken the ease out
of the statute. It was observed, ujwn the argument, that the plea
ought to go to every thing, except the charges introduced into the
bill to take the case out of the statute, and which it was necessary
to answer. The plea was overruled as covering too much, and
ordered to stand for an answer, with liberty to except ; and though
that ease (as well as the one which followed") does not strike me
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the coun 1 and by th ourt; and so it must have been under-
toocl by Lord h. ·ng, who made the deer e app aled from, and 
who ub equently in the a ciited from P. William , r quired 
·uch a full ancl parti ular an wer. 
orcl arclwicke fr u ntly noti ed and ur ported the rule 
of pleading. Thu , in rereton v. Gamul, alr ady cited, the plea 
of a fin 1 vi cl and of five y ar with non-claim wa overrul d, 
a· not being particu~ar enough. o, in 3 Atk. 0, Anon., the bill 
·b· rg cl, hat inc the death of the inte tate, the admini tratrix 
h11] promi ed to pay th note a oon a he had effect , and the 
aclmi i tratrix plead d the tatute of limitation , and that she made 
no promi e. Burt th chancellor held the plea to be too general, 
a there wa a pecial promi e charg d; and he ordered the plea 
to tand for an an wer, with liberty to accept. Again; in Hild-
yard . ressy ( 3 tk. 303), the defendant pleaded a fine and 
non-claim to a bill for a discovery whether the defendant were a 
bona fide pur ha er, for a valuable con ideration; and it appearing 
that the defendant had not made a complete answer, and therefore 
not properly upported hi plea, the plea wa ordered to stand 
for an an wer, with liberty to except. In Radford v. Wilson (3 
tk. 1 ~) the defendant put in a plea of a purchase for a valuable 
on idera ion, without notice ; but as the in tances of notice 
harg d in the bill were particular and pecial, it wa held that a 
g n ral denial of notice wa not ufficient, and that it mu t be 
d ni d a specially and particularly as it was charged, and the plea 
a overruled. 
Th mod rn ca e b fore Lord Eldon contain the ame rul . 
Thu, in Jones . Pengree (6 Ve ey, 5 0), there wa a plea of 
th tatute of limitation and an an wer. The former wa ob-. 
j ted to a multifariou and a not covering enough; and the 
an w r wa obj ted to a overrulin the pl a by an wering to the 
\r ry par to which th plea went, and a not an wering th ma-
t rial haro- which if admitted would have taken the ca e out 
of th tatute. t wa ob erved upon the argument that the plea 
ucrht to go to v r thin cept the charge introduc d into the 
l ill t tak th a out of the tatute and which it wa ne · ~ar 
l an wer. h pl a wia o errul d a co rin too much an 
rd r d t tand for an an r with lib rty to exc pt· and thou h 
thn t n (as; w 11 a th on which follo d) d e not ~trik m 
n 1i tingui. h d ith r r r pr i ion or clear di ~tinction . t it i 
14 
210 Answee to Support Plea
important in this respect, tliat Lord Eldon adopts and approves
of the rule, in the very words of Mitford, "that if any matter is
charged by the bill, which may avoid the bar created by the statute,
that matter mnst be denied generally, by way of averment in the
plea ; and it must be denied particularly and expressly, by way of
answer to support the plea." The reason of the rule his lordship
stated to be, that the plaintiff was entitled, by exceptions, to com-
pel the defendant to answer precisely to all the cases put in the bill
as exceptions to the statute. In the next case, of Bayhy v. Adams
(6 Vesey, 586), there was a plea of the statute of limitations,
supported by an answer, and the decision was, that the plea was not
sufficiently supported by the answer, because the charges in the
bill were not sufficiently answered. There was a good deal of dis-
cussion in that case, on the point, whether the averments meeting
the charges in the bill ought to be repeated in both plea and
answer; and two decisions in the Exchequer {Pope v. Bush, and
Edmundson v. Hartley, 1 Anst. 59. 97), which held, that if both
plea and answer met and denied the same charges by the aver-
ments, the answer would overrule the plea, were much questioned.
I need not now enter into that discussion; and even the Ex-
chequer cases were declared to be confined to awards. It seemed
to be admitted, throughout the case, that the answer, at least,
must contain a full and particular denial of the charges; and
perhaps the better opinion is, that a general denial will be suf-
ficient in the plea.
The result is, that a plea of the statute is bad, unless accompanied
with an answer aiding and supporting it, by a particular denial
of all the facts and circumstances charged in the bill, and which
form an equitable bar to the plea of the statute. The plea in this
case has no such accompanying answer, and it must be overruled.
The usual order in such cases is, that the plea stand for an answer,
with liberty -to the plaintiff to except; but in some of the cases
the plea was declared to lie overruled, and the defendant ordered
to answer, saving to himself the liberty to insist on the statute
in the answer. That is the better course in this case ; for to order
the plea to stand for an answer, with liberty to the plaintiff to
except, would be prolonging the litigation, as we may take it for
granted, from the palpable insufficiency of the plea as an answer,
that the plaintiff would except, and the defendant be finally com-
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important in thi re pect, that Lord EMon a fopt and approves 
o.E the rule, in the ver; word of Mitford, "that if any matter is 
charged by the bill, which may avoid the bar created by the statute, 
that matter mu t be denied generally, by way of averment in the 
plea; and it mu t be denied particularly and expres ly, by way of 
an wer to upport the plea." The rea on of the rule his lordship 
tated to be, that the plaintiff was entitled, by e:xrnptions, to com-
p 1 the defendant to an wer preci ely to all the cases put in the bill 
a exception to the tatute. In the next ca e, of Bayley v. Adams 
( 6 Ve ey, 5 6), there wa a plea of the natute of limitations, 
supported by an an wer, and the decision wa , that the plea was not 
sufficiently upporled by the answer, becau e the charges in the 
bill were not ufficiently an wered. There was a good deal of di -
cu ion in that case, on the point, whether the av rment.s meeting 
the charge in the bill ought to be repeated in both plea and 
an w r; and two deci ion in the Exchequer (Pope v. Bush, and 
Edniundson v. Hartley, 1 An t. 59. 9 ) , which held, that if both 
plea and an wer met and denied the same charges by the aver-
ment.s, the an wer would overrule the plea, were much que tioned. 
I need not now enter into that discu ion; and even the Ex-
chequer ca e were declared to be confined to awards. It eemed 
to be admibted, throughout the ca e, that the answer, at least, 
mu t contain a full and pa-rticular denial of the charges; and 
perhap the better opinion is, that a general denial will be suf-
ficient in the plea. 
The result i , that a plea of the statute is bad, unless accompanied 
with an an wer aiding and upporting it, by a particular denial 
of all the fact and circum tanc charged in the bill and which 
form an equitable bar to the plea of the tatute. The plea in thi~ 
ca e ha no uch accompanying an wer, and it mu t be overruled. 
The u ual order in uch ca i , that the pl a tand for an an wer, 
with liberty to th plaintiff to exc pt; but in ome of the ca e 
th pl a wa d clared to b overruled and th d fendant ordered 
to an wer avin to him lf th lib rty to in i t on the tatute 
in th an wer. That i the b tit r com e in thi ca c · for to order 
th ple to tand for an an wer, with lib rty to th plaintiff to 
except would b prolonging th liti ation a w may tak it for 
O'rant d, from th palpabl in ufficiency of th pl a a an an w r, 
that th plaintiff would ex· pt, and the defendant be finally com-
p 11 a to a full r an wer. 
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I shall, therefore, overrule the 2)lea, with costs, and order the
defendant to answer in six weeks, when he will still have the
liberty of insisting on the benefit of the statute in his answer.
Order accordingly.
Souzer v. De Meyer, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 57^. (1831
-,-Kr^y
^
This was an appeal from a decretal order of the late vice chan-
cellor of the second circuit. The defendants plead the statute of
limitations to the whole bill, and at the same time put in an answer
denying the whole equity thereof. The vice chancellor made an
order, declaring, among other things, that the statute did not
apply, and was no defence to the matters and charges contained
in the bill; and for that reason he overruled the plea, with liberty,
however, to the defendants to insist on the statute in their answer
as a defence.
The Chancellor:
It is a well settled principle of equity pleading, that the de-
fendant cannot plead and answer, or plead and demur, as to the
same matter. If he pleads to any part of the bill, he asks the
judgment of the court whether the matters of the plea are not
sufficient to excuse him from answering so much of the bill as is
covered by the plea. Therefore, if he answers as to those matters
which by his plea he has declined to answer, he overrules the plea ;
and if he demurs to any part of the bill, and also puts in a plea,
which is a special answer to the same part, the demurrer is over-
ruled. If he is willing to give the discovery sought by the bill,
and has any defence which might be pleaded in bar of the relief
sought, he will have the full benefit of such defence, if he sets it
up and insists upon it in his answer. This is always the better
course, where the expense of a full answer will not be great;
especially if there is any doubt as to his right to set up the par-
ticular defence by way of plea.
In some cases, where the complainant anticipate? the plea, and
sets up equitable circumstances in his bill to defeat the same, the
defendant is not only permitted, but actually required, to support
bis plea by an answer as to those equital)le circumstances. This,
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I ,. hall, ther fore, ov rrul th pl a, with o t , and order the 
tl f •nc} nt t an w r in i v1 'k when he will till have the 
f in i ting on the b 11 fit f the tatut in hi an w r. 
Ord r accordingly. 
ouzer v. De Meyer, Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 574. {1831 .) 
Tur wa an appeal from a decretal order of th late vice chan-
11 r f h econd ircuit. Th defendan pl ad the tatute of 
limitation, o the whol bill, and at the am tim put in an an w r 
u nving the whole equity ther of. The vie chancellor made an 
orcl r d claring, among oth r thing , that the tatute did not 
appl · and wa no d f nee to th matter and charg N contained 
in the bill; and for that reason he overruled the plea, with liberty, 
h v r to the def ndants to insist on the statute in their an wer 
a a d fenc . 
Trrn CrrA :rcELLOR: 
It i a well ettl d principle of equity plea-ding, thiait the de-
f ndant annot plead and an w r, or plead and demur, a to the 
am matt r. f h plead to any part of the bill, he a k the 
ju 1Q1.n nt of the court whether the ma.tt r of the plea are not 
uffi i nt to :x:cu e him from an wering o much of th bill as i 
or r 1 b ' h plea. Therefor if he an wer a to tho e matter 
whi h b r hi plea he ha d clined to an wer, he overrules the plea; 
an 1 if h demur to any part of th bill, and al o puts in a pl a, 
whi h i a p cial an w r to the am part, the demurrer i o er-
rul d. f h i willincr to criv th di covery oucrht b the bill, 
anu ha an: def n whi h micrht be pleaded in bar of the reli f 
~ou h 11 will h th full b n :fit of u h def nee if he et it 
up an 1 i1ri ~ tn up n it in hi an w r . Thi i alwa th b tt r 
urs wh r th xp of a full an wer will not be gr at ; 
l ially if ther i an' doubt a to hi right to et up the par-
ti ular c1 fen b wa, ' of pl a. 
In m a.. , wher th omplaimmt anti ipate the plea an 
: L ll} quitahl ir um tan N in hi ill to d f at th am , the 
cl fl'rnlnnt is n t onl~· I rmitt 1 but a tually r quir t upp rt 
hi. J l < hy al an. ' r a t tho quitahl ir um tanc . Thi 
how r r. i. only an · 1 ti on to the er nc1 ~ l rule; and th answ r 
212 Answer to Support Plea
is not put in as a defence, but to give the complainant the benefit
of a discovery to defeat the plea, which only contains a general
denial of the equitable circumstances. Even in that case the plea
does not profess to cover the discovery as to those particular allega-
tions in the bill. If they are admitted, or not fully denied by the
answer, it may be used, on the argument of the plea to counter-
prove the same. If they are denied, the complainant still has
an opportunity to contradict the general denial in the plea, and
the particular denial in the answer, by taking issue on the plea.
And if the plea is falsified by the proofs, the complainant will not
lose the benefit of his discovery as to the other matters in the bill,
but may still examine the defendant on interrogatories, if a dis-
covery is necessary. (Lube's Eq. PL 237, 335, 342. Mitf. 277,
302 ;-i Lond. ed.) In the case now under consideration, the de-
fendants have answered, as well as pleaded, to the whole of the
charges in the bill, although no equitable circumstances were set
up in anticipation of the plea. It is very evident, therefore, that
this plea is overruled by the answer.
If the plea was bad in form only, but good in substance, as to
the whole, or any part of the relief sought by the bill, and was
not put in by the defendants in bad faith, the same should have
been permitted to stand as a part of their answer, or they should
have been allowed the full benefit of insisting upon the statute in
their answer. But as the order has been drawn up in this case,
although the defendants are to be permitted to insist upon the
statute in their answer as a defence, it is somewhat doubtful, at
least, whether they would not be precluded, on the final hearing,
by the preceding part of the order, which declares that the statute
is no defence to the matters and charges in the bill.
As to so much of the bill as seeks for a discovery and satisfac-
tion of that part of the legacies which was not charged upon the
land, I apprehend the statute would be a valid bar. The statute
of this state having given a concurrent remedy in this court and
in a court of law, to recover such legacies, it seems to follow that
if the statute would be a good bar in an action at law for the
legacy, it should be equally so on a bill filed in this court, for the
same kind of relief. W^iether the same principle would apply to
the legacies chargeable on the land, after the defendants had sub-
jected themselves to the payment thereof personally, or whether

















































































































































212 ANSWER TO SUPPORT PLEA 
is not put in a a defence, but to give the complainant the benefit 
of a di covery to defeat the plea, which only contains a general 
denial of the equitable circumstances. Even in that case the plea 
doe not profe to cover the discovery a to tho e particular allega-
tion in the bill. If they are admitted, or not fully denied by the 
an wer, it may be u ed, on the argument of the plea to counter-
prove the am . If they are denied, the complainant still has 
an opportunity to contradict the general denial in the plea, and 
the particular denial in the an w r, by taking i ue on the plea. 
And if the plea is fal ified by the proofs, the complainant will not 
lo e the benefit of hi di covery as to the other matters in the bill, 
but may till examine the defendant on interrogatorie , if a dis-
covery i nece ary. (Lube' Eq. Pl. 237, 335, 3±2. Mitf. 277, 
302; -± Land. ed.) In the ca e now under con ideration, the de-
fendants have answered, a well as pleaded, to the whole of the 
charge in the bill, although no equitable circumstances were set 
up in anticipation of the plea. It is very evident, therefore, that 
thi plea i overruled by the answer. 
If the plea was bad in form only, but good in uibstance, as to 
the whole, or any part of the relief ought by the bill, and was 
not put in by the defendants in bad faith, the ame should have 
been permitted to stand as a part of their answer, or they hould 
have been allowed the full benefit of in i ting upon the statute in 
their an wer. But as the order has been drawn up in thi ca e, 
although the defendants are to be permitted .to insi t upon the 
statute in their an wer a a defence, it is somewhat doubtful, at 
lea t, whether they would not be precluded, on the final hearing, 
by the preceding part of the order, which decla·re that the tatute 
i no defence to the matters and charge in the bill. 
A to o much of the bill a eek for a di covery and sati fac-
tion of that part of the legacie which was not charged upon the 
land I appr hend the tatute would be a valid bar. The tatute 
of thi tate having given a concurrent remedy in thi court and 
in a court of law, to reco er uch le acie , it eem to follow that 
if th ~tatut would be a good bar in an action at law for the 
l gacy, it hould be equall o on a bill filed in thi court for the 
am kind of r lief. "711 th r th ame principle would apply to 
th lega ·i hargeable on th land a·fter the defendant had ub-
j ct d them l to th pa ment th r f per anally or whether 
th om lainant an call for an a count for the riod of tw nty 
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years in analogy to the limitation of actions at law to recover the
possession of real estate, are questions not necessary to be decided
on this informal plea. Those questions can be discussed more
profitable at the hearing, when all the facts are before the court.
I think the order of the vice chancellor should be so modified
as to strike out that part thereof which declares that the statute
does not apply, and is no defence to the matters and charges in the
bill. So as to leave the whole question, as to the merits of that
defence, open for discussion at the hearing, if the defendants think
proper to amend their answer, and insist upon the statute as a bar
to all or any part of the complainant's claim. The costs on this
appeal must abide the event of the suit. And as the present vice
chancellor of the second circuit was formerly counsel in the cause,
the further proceedings in the case must be had before the chan-
cellor; the defendants to have thirty days, after notice of this
decision, to file a supplemental answer by way of amendment for
the purpose of insisting upon the statute.
Dwight V. By. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 785. {1881.)
Wheeler, D. J.:
Tlie orators, who are stockholders to a large amount in the
Vermont & Canada Railroad Company, and citizens of Xew York,
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, bring this bill in behalf of
themselves and all other stockholders having like interests with
them, not citizens of Vermont, Massachusetts, or Maine, against
the directors of that corporation, citizens of Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania, alleging that they refuse to take legal measures to
protect the rights of the orators, and against the Central Vermont
Railroad Company, in possession, and the Vermont Central Railroad
Company, lessee of, and the other defendants, security-holders,
claiming liens upon the Vermont & Canada Railroad, all citizens of
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine, to recover the possession of
that road for the Vermont & Canada Railroad Company.
The Central Vermont Railroad Company pleads that it is in
possession as a receiver of the court of chancer}- of Franklin county,
and of the state of Vermont, and the proceedings upon which its
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years in analogy to the li ita ion of action at law to recover the 
po e ion of real tate, are qu tion not n c ary t-0 be decided 
on thi informal plea. 'Iho qu tion can be di cus ed more 
I rofitable at the hearing, wh n all the fa t a·re before he court. 
I think the ord r of th vie chan ellor hould be o modified 
a to trike out that part thereof which d clare .. hat the tatute 
Lloe no · pply, and i no d f nee to th matter and cha-rge in the 
Lill. o a to 1 ave the whole que tion, a to the merit of that 
def nee, open for di u ion ait the hearing, if the defendants think 
prop r to amend their an wer, and in i t upon th statute a ai bar 
t all or any part of the complainant' claim. The co ts on this 
app al mu t abide th event of the uit. And a the pre ent vice 
hancellor of the econd circuit wa formerly coun el in the cau e, 
the furth r proceed.in in the case mu t be had before the chan-
ellor; the defendant to have thirty day , after notice of thi · 
deci ion to file a uppl mental an wer by way of amendment for 
th purpo e of in i ting upon the taJtute. 
Dwight v. Ry. Co.~ 9 Fed. Rep. '785. (1881.) 
llEELER, D. J.: 
Th orato who are tockholders t-0 a large amount in the 
\ ermont & anada Railroad Company, and citizen of ew York, 
.. ew Hamp"hire, and hode I land, bring thi bill in behalf of 
th=>m_ lv and all oth r tockholder having like interests with 
th m not itizen of Vermont, :Ma achu ett , or Maine, again t 
the direct of that corporation, citizen of Ma: achusetts and 
nn. ylYania alleo-ing tha·t the refu to take legal mea ure to 
pr t t th righ of the orator , and again t the entral ermont 
,ailroad ompany in po ~ ion and the\ ermont entral Railroad 
ompan · 1 ~ ee of and th other def ndant , e urit ·-holders 
·laimin0 Ii n upon th rmont T anada Railroad all citizen of 
... ' rm nt ~Ia a hu ett and :Main , to reco r the po e ion f 
that r ad f th rmont ,. anada Railroad ompany. 
ntral Y rmont ailroad ompany plead that it i in 
po· ~ ,., ~ion a a r cei r f th ourt of chanc ry of ranklin coun y 
and of th ~t t of ... rmont an 1 the proce din ~ upon which it 
po . . i n t k I lace ar t f rth. 
214 Answer to Support Plea
John Gregory Smith pleads that security-holders, of the same
class as those made defendants, have brought proceedings in behalf
of themselves, and all others like security-holders, against the
Vermont & Canada Railroad Company, in the same court of chan-
cery, to establish and enforce their security upon this road, in which
a decision favorable to the validity of their lien has been made by
the supreme court of the state, and which are now pending in the
court of chancery to ascertain the amounts of, and facts concerning,
the different classes of securities; and these proceedings are set
forth.
Worthington C. Smith pleads that the Vermont & Canada Eail-
road Company brought a suit like this, and for the same relief, in
the same court of chancery, and through its directors, by precon-
cert with the orators, discontinued the same that this suit might be
lirought to evade the proper jurisdiction of the state court, and
confer a seeming, but unreal, jurisdiction upon this court, in
pursuance of which this suit was brought; and denying that the
directors have violated their duty, committed any breach of trust,
or done otherwise than as requested by the orators.
Jed P. Clark pleads that the orators did not, before bringing this
bill, in good faith request the directors to take legal measures to
protect their rights, but that by the planning, suggestion, and re-
quest of the directors, and concert and arrangement made between
them and the orators for the sake of escaping from the jurisdiction
of the state court, to which the jurisdiction of right belonged,
and to confer upon this court a seeming jurisdiction not real or of
right, a simulated and unreal pretence of request and refusal were
made, and that this suit is prosecuted by the Vermont & Canada
Railroad Company, in the name of the orators, for the common
benefit of them all, and denying that there has been any such
refusal by the directors as amounts in legal effect to a breach of
trust.
The Vermont Central Railroad Company sets out by plea that
there were when this bill was brought, and are now, divers and
sundry stockholders of the Vermont & Canada Railroad Company,
citizens of Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine, whose names are
known to and ascertainable by the oratoi-s, and not by the defend-
ant, and demurs to the bill for want of the necessary parties.
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John Gregory Smith plead that ecurity-holders, of the same 
cla s a tho e mad defendant , have brought proceedings in behalf 
of them lve , and all other like security-holders, against the 
rmont & Canada Railroad Company, in the same court of chan-
c ry, to e tabli h and enforce their security upon this road, in which 
a deci ion favorable to the validity of their lien has been made by 
the supr me court of the state, and which are now pending in the 
court of chancery to ascertain the amounts of, and fact concerning, 
the different cla es of securitie ; and these proceedings are set 
forth. 
\Yorthington C. Smith pleads that the Vermont & Canada Rail-
road Company brought a suit like this, and for the same relief, in 
the same court of chancery, and through its directors, by precon-
cert with the orators, discontinued the same that this suit might be 
hrought to evade the proper jurisdiction of the state court, and 
ronfer a seeming, but unreal, juri diction upon this court, in 
pursuance of which this suit was brought; and denying that the 
directors have violated their duty, committed any breach of trust, 
or done otherwise than as reque ted by the orators. 
J d P. Clark pleads that the orators did not, before bringing this 
bill, in good faith request the directors to take legal measures to 
protect their rights, but that by the planning, suggestion, and re-
q ie t of the directors, and concert and arrangement made between 
them and the orators for the sake of escaping from the jurisdiction 
of the state court, to which the jurisdiction of right belonged, 
and to confer upon this court a seeming jurisdiction not real or of 
right, a simulated and unreal pretence of request and refusal were 
mad , and that thi suit is prosecuted by the Vermont & Canada 
Railroad Company, in the name of the orators, for the common 
benefit of them all, and denying that there has been any such 
refu al by the director as amount in legal effect to a breach of 
trust. 
The Vermont Central Railroad Company et out by plea that 
ther w r wh n thi bill wa brought, and are now, diver and 
·undry tockholder of the V rrnont & anada Railroad ompany, 
itiz n of V rmont, Ma achu tt , and Maine, who narn are 
known to an l a crtainabl by th orato1 , and not by th d fond-
ant, and d mur to th bill for want of th n ce ary parti . 
None of th e pl a i upported by an w r. All of them, and the 
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demurrer, have been argued. They may properly be considered in
the inverse order of their statement.
The last one, that of the Vermont Central Eailroad Company, is
not in the proper form and sufficient, even if the fact that there
were stockholders, citizens of Vermont, Massachusetts, or Maine,
not invited to take part in the prosecution of the suit, would defeat
it. In such cases the defendant should, at law, give the plaintiif a
better writ, by setting out the name and identifying the party
whose existence is alleged to create a fatal non-joinder, so that the
plaintiff may traverse the allegation and form a definite issue to
be tried, or discontinue and bring a new suit, joining the proper
parties, upon the information given. The rules of pleading are the
same in equity as at law, unless the reasons of them are varied
by the different methods of procedure. There is no reason growing
out of the proceedings in equity for varying this rule. The orators
have the right to have the names of the stockholders, if there are
any in tliose states whose existence would defeat the suit, set forth,
so that they could traverse the existence of the persons or the fact
of their being stockholders. They could not do that upon these
allegations. There is no person named whom they may say is not
a stockholder, or about whom they may say there is no such person.
A traverse of the plea in its terms would put in issue what the
orators know that the defendants do not know about the stock-
holders in those states. It would be quite singular if a suit should
be abated at the instance of defendants on account of the supposed
existence of persons whom they cannot name or identify. The
want of such persons as parties is not likely to harm them. Hotel
Co. V. Wade, 97 U. S. 13.
The pleas of Clark and Worthington C. Smith are to the same
effect, and so nearly alike that they may well be considered to-
gether. They have been spoken of in argument as pleas to the
jurisdiction of the court, or to the ability of the orators to brin""
suit, or as pleas in abatement otherwise; but, correctly speaking,
they are not either. Tlie orators and defendants are alleged in the
bill to be citizens of different states. This fact gives the court
jurisdiction of the controversy between them, and enables the
oratoi-s to bring the suit, and to maintain it if they can establish
their case. The refusal of the directors is a part of their case
wliicli they must establish, and not a fact on which the jurisdiction
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<lemurr r, ha e be n argued. h y may properly be considered in 
th inver e ord r of their tat ment. 
The la t on , that f th rmont Central ailroad Company, i 
not in the prop r form and ufficient, ev n if the fact that there 
wer to khold r , itizen of V rmont, Mas achu ett, or Maine, 
not iuvit d to tal' e part in the pro ution of th uit, would defeat 
it. n ·u h a the d f ndant hould, at law, give the plaintiff a 
better writ, by etting out the name and identifying the party 
who xi. , nee i all g d to create a fatal non-joinder, o that the 
plaintiff ma traver e the allegation and form a definite j ue to 
Le tried, or di continue and bring a new uit, joining the proper 
par ti , upon the informartion given. The rule of pleading are the 
·ame in quity a at law, unle the rea on of them are varied 
b · th di.0: rent method of proc dure. There i no rea on growing 
ou of the proc eding in equity for varying this rule. The orators 
have the right to have the name of the to(.;kholder , if there are 
any in tho e tate who e exi tence would defeat the uit, et forth, 
o that they ould traverse the exi tence of the persons or the fact 
of their b ing tockholder . They could not do tha:t upon the e 
all •gation . There i no per on named whom they may ay i not 
a .Jo kholder, or about whom th y may say there is no uch person. 
\. traver e of the plea in it term would put in i sue what the 
orator know that the defendants do not know aibout the stock-
hold rs in tho e tate . It would be quite ingular if a uit should 
be abat d at th in!rtance of defendants on account of the suppo ed 
xi t nc of person whom they cannot name or identify. The 
want of uch p r on a partie i not likely to harm them. Hotel 
o. v. 1 ade, 9 U. . 13. 
T11 pl a of lark and W O'rthington C. Smith are to the same 
ff t a d o nearly alike that they may well be considered to-
th r. The have b en poken of in argum nt a pleas to the 
juri~ di tion of th ourt or to th ability of the orators to bring 
uit or a pl a in aibatement otherwi~e · but con ctl peaking) 
th · r not ither. Th orator and def ndant ar alleged in th 
l ill t b itiz of differ nt tat . Thi fact gi e the ourt 
j nri di ti n of rthe ontro r } b tw en them, and nabl th 
n t r ~ t brino- the uit and to maintain it if the can tabli h 
their ·n . h r fu al of th dir ctors i a part of th ir ca 
which th y mu t talJli h and not a fact on whi h the juri .. di ti n 
of th urt, r th ir abilit to ue) at all d p nd . f h an 
216 Answer to Support Plea
establish the fact of refusal, together with the other facts necessary
to make out a case for the relief asked, then they have a case
on which they can rest; otherwise, not. They have the right to
a full answer and discovery from the defendants as to their whole
case, this part as well as the rest, unless there is some outside fact
which would show that they have no right to maintain the suit
at all; or some single fact on which the whole case depends is
objected to by plea, and full answer and discovery are made to that
part of the case. Pure and proper pleas in equity were such as set
up some fact outside of the bill which would show that the bill
should not be answered at all. These pleas required no answer to
support them, for they would not be included in that which the
party was called upon to answer. Anomalous pleas, denying a
single part of the case, may, by the bill on which the whole case
depended, come to be allowed, for convenience, to save trying the
whole case, when the failure of tliat part would be fatal, and for
safety against enforced discovery in a suit by those not in any
manner entitled to the discovery; but, as the ground of the plea
would be included in what the defendant was called upon to
answer, he could not avoid the right to have at least that part
answered by merely pleading to it. He must answer that, although
the plea raising the objection and the answer supporting it might
show that no answer to the rest of the case ought to be required.
If this plea should be allowed, the orators would be deprived of the
discovery on oath to which they are entitled, as to this part of the
case, as evidence upon the traverse of the plea, if they should
traverse it, as they would have a right to do. This would be con-
trary to sound principles and to authority. Story, Eq. PL § 372 ef
seq. These views are not contrary to the decision in Memphis v.
Dean, 8 Wall. 64, cited and much relied upon in behalf of the de-
fendants. There was an answer by the party pleading, as well as
the plea, denying refusal of the directors to prosecute, and the
cause appears to have been decided in both courts in chief, and not
upon the plea alone.
The plea of John Gregory Smith depends solely upon the effect
of the pendency of the suit in the state court of chancery in favor
of himself and other security-holders, of which James E. Langdon
is the foremost plaintiff in the title to the suit against the Vermont
& Canada Pailroad Company, through whose rights the orators here
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e tablish the fact ~f refusal, together with the other facts neces ary 
to make out a case for the relief asked, then they have a case 
on which they can rest; otherwise, not. They have the right to 
a full an wer and discovery from the defendants as to their whole 
ca e, thi part a well as the rest, unles there is some outside fact 
which would sho·w that they have no right to maintain the suit 
at all ; or some single fact on which the whole case depends is 
objected to by plea, and full answer and discovery are made to that 
part of the case. Pure and proper pl as in equity were such as set 
up ome fact outside of the bill which would how that the bill 
hould not be answered at all. These pleas required no answer to 
suppor1t them, for they would not be included in that which the 
party was called upon to answer. Anomalous pleas, denying a 
single part of the case, may, by the bill on which the whole case 
depended, come to be allowed, for conv nience, to save trying the 
whole case, when the fail.lure of that part would be fatal, and for 
afety against enforced discovery in a suit by tho e not in any 
manner entitled to the discovery; but, as the ground of the plea 
would be included in what the defendant was called upon to 
answer, he could not avoid the right to ha·ve at least that part 
answered by merely pleading to it. He must answer that, although 
the plea rai ing the objection and the answer supporting it might 
show that no answer to the rest of the case ought to be required. 
If this plea should be aUowed, the orators would be deprived of the 
discovery on oath to which they are entitled, as to this part of the 
case, as evidence upon the traver e of the plea, if they should 
traverse it, as they would have a right to do. This would be con-
trary to ound principles and to authority. Story, Eq. Pl. § 372 et 
seq. The e view are not contrary to the decision in Memphi,s v. 
Dean, 8 Wall. 64, cited and much relied upon in behalf of the de-
fendant . There was an answer by the party pleading, as well as 
the plea, denying refusal of the dir tor to pro cute, and th' 
cau e appears t have b en decided in both court in chi f, and not 
upon the pl a alone. 
The plea of John Gr gory Smith d pend ol ly upon the effect 
of the p n 1ency of th uit in th tai court of hancery in favor 
of him elf and other ecurity-hold r , of which Jam R. Langdon 
i the foremo t plainti:O: in th titl to th uit again t th V rmont 
& anada ailroad Compan , throuo-h who right the orator her 
make claim. Doubt hav been entertain d by thi ourt an 1 some 
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others as to whether the pendency of a suit in a state or federal
court in the same district might not be successfully pleaded to the
further prosecution of a like suit in the other court, and this court
inclined to the opinion that it could be. Mercantile Trust Co. v.
Lamoille VaUcy R. Co., 16 Blatchf. 324; Andrews v. Smith, 5 Fed.
Kep. 833. But it now seems to be well settled that it cannot be.
Gordon v. Gilfoil, 99 U. S. 168; Latham v. Chafee, 7 Fed. Rep.
520. If this were not so it has always been held that, in order to
have the mere pendency of one suit defeat another, the suits must
be between the same parties, or their representatives, upon the same
facts, and for the same relief. \Yatson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679. A
very slight examination and comparison of the two cases will show
that they are not brought upon the same facts nor for the same
relief. The plea is pleaded to the whole bill. According to l>oth
bills the Central Vermont Railroad Company is in ]X)ssession of the
road. In that case it is an orator as a security-holder seeking to
hold the road as security for its pay. This particular defendant is
a defendant there admitting the right of the Central Vermont Rail-
road Company. That is essentially a bill of foreclosure by security-
holders in possession. Tlie decree would ordinarily be that those
interested must pay or be foreclosed of all right to redeem. The
decree could go no further than to cut off their right if they should
not redeem. If they should redeem, the possession would remain
to be maintained by any other right which the possessor might have
or claim to have, so far as it would prevail. Another suit would
be necessary to determine the rights of the Vermont & Canada
Railroad Company and its stockholders as to everj-thing but the
foreclosure. In this suit the right to the road is attempted to be
maintained outside of the right to redeem. If this plea should
prevail there would be no suit left in which that right could be
tried.
Tlie plea of the Central Vermont Railroad Company raises the
most important questions of any of these pleas, and has received
such careful consideration as its importance has seemed to demand.
The bill alleges that this defendant is in posseesion of the road
without right, and against the right of the Vermont & Canada
Ixailroad Company and of the orators. This plea asserts that it was
placed in possession by the court of chancery of Franklin county to
run, operate, and manage the road under the decree and orders
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oth r a to wh th r the p nd n ·y of a uit in a tate or federal 
court in the am dj trict migl t not b ucc fully pl aded to the 
furth r pr cution f lik uit in th oth r ourt, and thi ourt 
in lin d to th opinion that it c ul l . Mercantile Trust 
Lamoille Valley R. o., 16 Blat hf. ; Andrew . mith, 
I p. 33. ut it now e m t b well ettl d that it cannot be. 
Gordon v. Gilfoil, 9 U. . 16 ; Latham v. hafee, Fed. R p. 
· O. If thi w r not o it 1 a alway been h ld that, in order to 
hav th m r p nd ncy of one uit d feait another, the uit mu t 
b, b tw n th am parti , or th ir r pre entativc., upon the ame 
Ia t~, and for th am reli f . Watson v. Jone, 13 Wall. 6 9. A 
ry 'light xamination and compari on of th two ca e will how 
that they ar not brou ·ht upon the ame facts nor for th am 
r li f . Tbe pl a i pl al d to th whole bill. According to both 
bill the entral ermont Railroad 'ompany i in po e ion of the 
road. In that ca it i an orator as a security-holder seekinO' to 
hold th road a ecurity for it pay. Thi particular defendant i 
a d f ndant ther admitting th right of the Central Vermont Rail-
road ompany. That i entially a bill of fore lo ure by security-
hold r in po e ion. The d cree would OTdinarily be that tho e 
intere ted mu t pay or be for clo ed of all right to red em. The 
decree could go no further than to cut off their right if they ~hould 
not r d m. If th y hould redeem, the pos e ion would remain 
to b maintained by any other right which the po or might have 
or claim to have, o far a it would prevail. nother uit would 
be nece ary to determine the right of the \ rmont & Canada 
ailroad Compan and it tockholders a to verything but the 
for lo ur . n thi uit the right to the road i attempted to be 
maint in cl out id of th ri ht to redeem. If thi plea hould 
pr ail th re would be no uit 1 ft in which that right could be 
tri d. 
h pl a of th ntral \ errnont ailroad ompan rai e th 
mo t important qu tion of an of th pl a and ha rec iv d 
:n h car ful ron i rnti n a it importance ha emed to d mand. 
1 h bill all a '- that thi a fen lant i in p ion of the r a 
wi lhout ri ht an a ain t th right of th Y rm nt e · ada 
Pnilroacl mpan. an 1 f th orator . T11i plea ':l s rt that it was 
pla 1 in p ~~c ,,j n by th court o.r han ry of ranklin unh t 
nm p rat , an 1 mana th road un 1 r h d r an 1 ord r 
ther tofor mad and under th direction of th ourt o long a" 
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it should contiime to act as such receiver and manager, and denies
that it is in possession without right, and that it ought to be com-
pelled to surrender its possession to the Vermont & Canada Railroad
Company, and prays judgment whether it ought to answer further.
The proceedings upon which it was placed in possession show that
certain persons were, in regular course, made receivers of this road,
with other railroad property, to operate the roads, and out of the
income to pay the rent to the Vermont & Canada Railroad Com-
pany ; that pursuant to an agreement between the parties, according
to its terms embodied in a decree, the then receivers continued to
operate the roads according to the provisions of the agreement and
decree, by which they were to operate them and apply the income
to the payment of the rent ; then to the payment of the first-mort-
gage bonds of the Vermont Central Railroad; then to the second-
mortgage bonds of the Vermont Central Railroad; and then to
pay it to the Vermont Central Railroad Company; and that upon
the joint petition of those receivers and their successors, and the
Central Vermont Railroad Company, a decree was made by which
the Central Vermont Railroad Company was placed in possession
in their stead.
The orators claim that the prior possessors had lost their right to
this road through their non-payment of rent, and that the transfer
to the Central Vermont Railroad Company was merely a transfer by
one to the other, although sanctioned by the court, and that the
transferee took no greater or different rights than the transferors
had. The defendants claim that the transfer was ordered by the
court; that the rights of the Central Vermont Railroad Company,
under the transfer, cannot be inquired into anywhere except in that
court ; and that they are valid everywhere else against all claimants.
The right of the orators, denied by the plea, is the same which they
set up and seek to enforce by their bill, and which they claim to
have tried and determined upon the answer of the defendants in
the usual course. As stated before, the parties are citizens of dif-
ferent states, and this is a suit in which there is a controversy
between them, and which those bringing it have the right to have
determined in this court, unless there is some unusual reason for
turning them out of court.
As said by Mr. Justice Campbell in Hyde v. Stone, 30 How. 170 :
"But the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judg-
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it should con7,inue to act as uch receiver and manager, and denies 
that it i in po session without right, and that it ought to be com-
pelled to urrender its po se sion to the Vermont & Canada Railroad 
Company, and prays judgment whether it ought to answer further. 
The proce dings upon which it wa placed in posse ion show that 
certain person were, in regular course, made receivers of this road, 
with other railroad property, to operate the roads, and out of the 
income to pay the rent to the Vermont & Canada Railroad Com-
pany; that pursuant to an agreement between the partie , accordiI).g 
to its terms embodied in a decree, the then receivers continued to 
operate the road according to the provi ions of the agreement and 
decree, by which they were to operate them and apply the income 
to the payment of the rent; then to the payment of the :first-mort-
gage bond of the Vermont Central Railroad; th n to the second-
mortgage bond of the Vermont Central Railroad ; and then to 
pay it to the Vermont Central Railroad Company; and that upon 
the joint petition of those receivers and their successor , and the 
Central Vermont Railroad Company, a decree wa made by which 
the Central Vermont Railroad Company was placed in pos es ion 
in their stead. 
T'he orators claim that the prior pos e ors had lost their rig1t to 
this road through their non-payment of rent, and that the transfer 
to the Central Vermont Railroad Company was merely a transfer by 
one to the other, although sanctioned by the court, and that the 
tran feree took no greater or different rights than the transferors 
had. The defendants claim that the tran fer wa ordered by the 
court; that the rights of the Cenrtral Vermont Railroad Company, 
under the transfer, cannot be inquired into anywhere except in that 
court; and that they are valid everywhere el e again tall claimants. 
The right of th orator , denied by the plea, is the ame which they 
et up and eek to enforce by their bill, and which th y claim to 
have tri d an det rmined upon the an w r of the defendant in 
the u ual cours . A tat d b fore, the partie are citizens of dif-
fer nt tate , and thr i a uit in which there i a controversy 
betw en th m, and which tho e bringing it hav the right to have 
d t rmin d in thi court unl th r i ome unu ual rea on for 
turning them out of court. 
ai by Mr. Ju tice ampb 11 in Hyde v. Stone 20 How. 1 0: 
" ut th ourt of the nit d tat are bound to proc d to judg-
m"ni and to aff r1 r dr . t ui o 1 for th m in very ca e to 
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which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their
authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction/'
This is not a mere matter of abatement; it goes to the right, and
none the less because the right of the defendant may rest upon an
order of the court. The order of court, whatever its effect is, may
be discharged before any decision is reached, and, if it should be,
the rights of the parties otherwise would still remain to be deter-
mined. If it should not be, but should remain in force, whatever
right it should give to any party, or whatever immunity from
interference it should afford, could be maintained and upheld. If
that should be the defendant's title, and it should be found to be
good, it would prevail. There would be no conflict between courts,
for all rights acquired through the state court, and all protection
furnished by the authority of that court, would be respected.
There is no sound reason apparent why these rights may not stand
for trial according to the usual course, the same as rights acquired
by contract, or in any other mode. On principle this seems to be
the proper course. And there is not any case shown by counsel,
or which has been seen by the court, among the many wherein
rights acquired under legal proceedings have come up for adjudica-
tion, in which the decision has been made otherwise than in chief.
In Ilagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. -iOO, where the title of a sheriff to
property seized by him and receipted was upheld against a marshal
of the United States, who seized it subsequently, the trial was upon
the merits of these respective rights. So in Brown v. Clarhe, 4
How. 4, and in Pulliam v. Oshorne, 17 How. 471. And in Taylor
V. Carry], 20 How. 583, where the question was as to the right of a
state seizure, as against proceedings in admiralty, the trial was
not upon any plea denying the right to interfere, but was upon
the title acquired through the proceedings.
In Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, the right of a mortgagee to
personal property taken by the marshal, on process against the
mortgagor, was tried on replevin in chief. So similar rights were
tried in an action of trespass in Buck v. Colhath, 3 Wall. 334.
And in Wisivell v. Sampson, 14 How. 52, the right acquired by the
levy of a marshal upon property in possession of a receiver was
tried upon ejectment on the merits.
In Pond V. Vermont Valley 7?. Co., 12 Blatchf. 292, the question
of this same receivership was raised, but not until after the decision
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, hich their juri diction xt nd . They annot abdicate their 
authority or dut in any a e in fa or of another juri diction:'' 
Thi i not a mere matt r of abatement; it goe to the right, and 
none th le b cau th right of the defendant may re t upon an 
rd r of th court. The order of court, whatever it effect i , may 
b di charg d b for any de i ion i rea hed, and, if it hould be, 
the right of th par ie oth rwi e would till remain to be deter-
mined. f it hould nort be, but hould remain in for e, whatev r 
rirrht it hould give to any party, or what er immunity from 
int rfer nee it hould afford, could be ma·intained and upheld. If 
that bould be the d fendant' title, and it hould be found to be 
good it would pre ail. There would be no confli t between courtn, 
.for all right acquired through the tate court, and all protection 
furni h d b the authority of that comrt, would be re pected. 
Th r i no ound r a on apparent why the e right may not ta·nd 
for trial according to the u ual cour e, the ame a right acquired 
by contract, or in an3 other mode. On principle thi eem to be 
the prop r com e. And there i not any ca e hown by coun 1, 
r which ha b n een by the court, among the many wherein 
riO'ht a quired under legal proceeding have come up for adjudlca-
tion in which the deci ion ha been made otherwi e than in chief. 
In Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, where the title of a heri:ff to 
prop rt3 eized by him and rec ipt d wa upheld a ain t a mar hal 
of the Dnited tate , who eized it ub equ ntl · the trial wa upon 
h m rit of the e re pecti e right . o in Brown . Clarke, 4 
ow. ±, and in Pulliam . Osborne, 1 How. 4 1. And in Taylor 
v. arryl, 0 How. 5 3, where the que tion wa a to the right of a 
~tat izure, a again t proceeding in admiralty the trial wa 
n t upon any pl a d nying the right to interfere, but wa upon 
th title a quired through the proceeding . 
In Free11ian . Howe, 4 ow. ±50 the right of a mortga e to 
p r anal rap rt ' tak n b the mar hal on proc a ain t the 
m rtO'a or a tri d on r pl vin in hief. o imilar ri <Th were 
lri a in an acti n of tr pa in Buck . Colbath 3 Wall. 33± . 
... \n 1 in 1 i,swell . amp on, 1± ow. the right acquired b · th 
1 "· f a marhal upon prop rt ' in po.. ion of a recei r wa 
Lri d upo j tment on the merit . 
In Pond . o., 12 Blatchf. 9· th qu tion 
f thi am r fr r hip wa rai e but not un il after the de ision 
r port c1 and up n th hearincr b f obn on on 
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answers and proofs, and it was disposed of as not affecting the
rights of the parties to the property involved, nor the jurisdiction
of the court over the case.
Attention has been particularly called to the provisions of section
5 of the act of March 3, 1875, to determine the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts, etc.; 18 St. at Large, 470 (Supt. Rev. St. 175),
enacting :
"That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court, or removed
from a state court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall
appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after
such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does
not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy prop-
erly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties
to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case
cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall
proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand
it to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require,
and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just," etc.
Speaking of this section, Johnson, J., in Warner v. Pennsylvania
B. Co., 13 Blatchf. 231, said : "All that is necessary to bring the
case really and substantially within the jurisdiction is, that it in-
volves a controversy of the character, either as to the subject-matter
or the parties, specified in either the section which defines the juris-
diction by original suit, or that which authorizes removal, and the
acquisition of jurisdiction in that manner." As before stated and
shown, the parties to this suit are citizens of different states, and
the suit is one of which this court has jurisdiction for that reason,
if the orators can make out the ease presented by their bill, includ-
ing the refusal of the directors to prosecute as a part of their case ;
if they cannot they have no case. That part of their case, as also
before shown, has not been denied in the necessary manner by
answer to be effective to defeat the case upon that point, and there
is no evidence before the court, upon that or any other point, to
make it appear at all that parties have been either improperly or
collusively made or joined for the purpose of creating a case within
the jurisdiction. There is nothing before the court now on which
the court is authorized to act under the provisions of that section.
The pleas and demurrer are overruled ; the defendants to answer
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an wers and proof , and it was di posed of as not affecting the 
rights of the parties to the property involved, nor the jurisdiction 
of the coul't over the case. 
Attention ha been particularly called to the provisions 0f section 
5 of the act of Ma-rch 3, 187 5, to determine the jurisdiction of the 
circuit courts, etc.; 18 St. at Large, 470 (Supt. Rev. St. 175), 
enacting: 
''That if, in an3 uit commenced in a circuit court, or removed 
from a tate court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall 
appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after 
uch suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does 
not really and ub tantially involve a di pute or controversy prop-
erly within the jurisdiction of aid circuit court, or that the parties 
to aid suit have been improperly or collu ively made or joined, 
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpo e of creating a ca e 
cognizable or removable under this act, the aid circuit court shall 
proceed no further therein, but shall di mi the suit or remand 
it to the court from which it was removed, a ju tice may require, 
and shall make such order as to costs as shall be ju t," etc. 
Speaking of this ection, John on, J., in Warner v. Pennsylvania 
R . Co ., 13 Blatchf. 231, said : "All that i nece sary to bring the 
ca e really and ub tantially within the juri diction is, that it in-
volves a controver y of the character, either a to the subject-matter 
or the partie , peci:fied in either the ection which defines the juris-
diction by original uit, or that which authorize removal, and the 
acquisition of juri diction in that manner." As before stated and 
hown, the parti to thi uit are citizen of different tates, and 
the suit i one of which this court ha juri diction for that rea on, 
if the orator can make out the case pr ented by their bill, includ-
ing the refu al of the directors to pro ecute a a part of their case; 
if they cannot they have no ca e. That part of their ca e, a al o 
befor ·hown, ha not been denied in th neces ary manner by 
an wer to be effe tive to defeat the ca e upon that point, and th re 
i no vidence b fore th court upon that or any other point, to 
make it app ar at all that parti hav b n ither improperly or 
collu i ly mad or join d for th purpo e of creati g a ca e within 
th juri diction. Th r i nothinO' b f re the court now on which 
the court i authorized to act und r th provi ion of that ection. 
Th pl a an 1 d murr r are overruled; the defenda:n to an wer 
over l y the :th . da of n xt term. 
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Answer.
Holt V. Daniels, 01 Vt. 89. (18S8.)
This was a suit in chancery. Tlie bill alleges that some time pre-
viously the orator had bought of the defendant a colt, for which
he had given the defendant his note with the condition that the
colt should be the property of the defendant until the note was
fully paid; that since the giving of said note there had been
other deal between them, and that there was due the orator a
large balance from the defendant, more than sufficient to dis-
charge the balance of the note, and that if upon an accounting
between them anything should be found due from the orator, he
was ready and willing to pay such balance to the defendant;
that the defendant for the purpose of embarrassing the orator
had begun a suit in trover against him for the conversion of the
said colt, and that such suit was then pending; that since the
giving of said note the orator had taken the farm of the defend-
ant to carry on upon shares, under a written memorandum, and
that the defendant was largely liable to the orator under such
written memorandum, but that the same was in the possession of
the defendant, who refused to exhibit to the orator, or to settle
with him, and allow him the amount his due; that in the mak-
ing of the said farm trade he had been largely damnified by the
false representations of the defendant; that he had taken pos-
session of the defendant's farm, and carried on the same, and
that the defendant utterly refused to account to him in the prem-
ises; praying that an account be taken between the parties, and
that if upon such an accounting there is any balance due the
defendant upon said note, the orator may be allowed to pay the
same and redeem the colt, and that the suit at law be perpetually
enjoined.
Tlie answer admitted the making of the farm trade, and set
out the contract in cxtenso: denied that there was any lialanee
diK' tlie orator on it, or that tlie note secured by lien on the colt
had l>cen paid; insisted that the orator had a complete remedy
at law, and that therefore the court had no jurisdiction.
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A WER. 
Holt . Daniel, Gl l. 89. {1888.) 
Thi \ a a uit in hanc ry. Th bill alleg that om time pre-
Yiou 1 th orator had bought of th d f ndant a · lt, for whi ·h 
h · had gi n th d f ndant hi not with the ondition that th· 
ol hould be the prop rty of th defendant until the not wa 
fully paid· that in th ai1ing of aid not th r had been 
other d al b tw n th m, and that there wa du th orator a 
lar balan from th defendant, more than uffici nt to di -
th balan of th not and that if upon an accounting 
n th m anything hould b found due from the orator he 
wa r ady and willing to pay u h balanc to the def ndant; 
that th d f ndant for the purpo e of mbarra ing the orator 
hacl be0 un a uit in trover again t him for th conv r ion of the 
aicl alt and thait u h uit wa th n pending · that ince the 
criying f aid not the orator had tak n th farm of the d f nd-
ant to arry on upon har und r a written memorandum and 
that the d fendant wa laraely liable to the orator und r u h 
writt n m morandum but that the ame wa in the p ion of 
th d f ndant, who refu ed to exhibit to h orator or to ettle 
with him and allow him the amount hi due; that in the mak-
incr of th aid farm trad h had b en laraely damnified by the 
Ial r pr entation of the d f ndant · that he had taken p -
.. ~ ion of th d f ndant farm and arried on the ame and 
Urn l the 1 f ndant utt rl · r fu d to aiccount to him in the pr m-
i~ ·; I raying that an a aunt be tak n b tween th partie an 
that if u1 n u h an a untina th re i any balan e du th 
cl ,f ndant u1 n ai 1 not th orator may b allo11 d to pa_ th 
. am nncl r d em th alt and that th uit at law b p rpetually 
nj in d. 
1"'1.1 an:-;wcr admitt 1 th makin()' of th farm trad an t 
ut th ntract in e. ·ten o · 1 ni d that th r wa an· alan 
dn L' lh' rat r on it r that th n t ur d y li n n th 1t 
h;H1 1 11 pail· in:-;i, l l that t11C' rat r hal a mpl t r Ill dy 
at law, ( 11 l that th I' r r th url had n juri di ti 11. 
Th wa r f rr d t a ma l r who r port cl 'lith r .., f r n e 
:<J22 Answer
to the circumstances under which the farm was leased and colt
sold as follows:
"A few days before the lease was executed but when the con-
tract was in contemplation, the defendant sold to the orator a
four-year-old horse colt at an agreed price of $116 and took from
him his promissory note therefor and reserved a conditional lien
on said colt for the security of the payment of said note by the
orator.
I lind that it was the express understanding and agreement
between the parties at the time this conditional sale was made
and the note given by the orator, they then having in view the
farm trade for the ensuing year, that the orators share of the
money that should be derived from the sale of butter produced
on the farm, when it should be sold in the fall of the ensuing
year, should be applied first to the payment of this note, and
that the orator and defendant both so understood it."
When the butter was so sold, there was more than enough of
the orator^s share to extinguish the note, and the orator desired
that it should be so applied, but the defendant refused to so
apply it, and claimed to retain it as security for the fulfilment
of the terms of the lease on the part of the orator."
With reference to items 42 and 43 the master reported:
"If in the opinion of the court the orator can recover dam-
ages in this suit for the false representations made by the de-
fendant to the orator as to the productiveness of said farm,
then I find that the difference between what the farm was repre-
sented to be and what it really was, amounts to the sum allowed
on these two items, $118, and that they should he disallowed
to the defendant ; but if in the opinion of the court such damages
cannot be recovered by the orator in this suit, then said items
should be allowed as designated above."
There had been other deal between the parties, and as a result
of the entire accounting the master found that, allowing items
42 and 43, there would be due the defendant the sum of $75.02,
March 1, 1884; that disallowing said items, there would be due
the orator on said date the sum of $42.98.
The defendant had demanded the colt of the orator, and on
his refusal to surrender the same, had begun a suit against the
orator in trover for its conversion, which was then pending.


















































































































































to the circum tance under which the farm wa lea ed and colt 
~old a follow : 
A few day before the lease was executed but when the con-
tract wa in contemplation, the defendant old to the orator a 
four- ea·r-old hor e colt at an aO'reed price of $116 and took from 
him hi promi ory note therefor and reserv d a conditional lien 
on said colt for the security of the payment of aid note by the 
orator. 
I find that it wa the expr understanding and agreement 
between the parties at the time thi conditional sale was made 
an l the note given by the orator, they then having in view the 
farm trade for the en uing year, that the orator's share of the 
money that hould be derived from the ale of butter produced 
on the :farm, when it hould be old in the fall of the ensuing 
year, hould be applied first to the payment of this note, and 
that the orator and defendant both so under toad it." 
When the butter was so old, there was more than enough of 
th orator's hare to extingui h the note, and the orator desired 
that it hould be so applied, but the defendant refused to so 
apply it, and claimed to retain it as security for the fulfilment 
of the term of the lea e on the part of the orator." 
With reference to items 42 and 43 the master reported: 
"If in the opinion of the court the orator can recover da.m-
age in thi suit for the fal e repre entations made by the de-
fendant to the orator a to the productivene s of said farm, 
then I find that the difference between what the farm wa repre-
sented to be and what it really was, amounts to the sum allowed 
on the e two item , $118, and that they hould be di allowed 
to the d fendant; but if in the opinion of the court such lamages 
cannot be recovered by the orator in thi uit, then said items 
should be allow d a de ignat d abov ." 
There had b n other deal between the parti s, and a a r sult 
of the entire accounting the ma ter found that, allowing items 
42 and there would be due the d fendant th um of $75.0'2, 
March 1, 18 4; that di allowino- aid item , th re would be due 
th orator on aid date th um of $-±2.98. 
The d f ndant had dema-nd d th ·colt of the orator, and on 
hi refu al to urr nd r th ame had begun a uit against the 
orator in trover for it onve ion, which wa then p nding. 
The ma t r furth r repmt d that the defendant in i ted at the 
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earliest possible moment before him, that this suit could not be
maintained for the reason that the orator had a complete remedy
at law.
To this report the defendant filed exceptions, and the case
was heard at the March Term, 1888, Washington County, Rowell,
Chancellor, upon the pleadings, report and exceptions thereto,
whereupon it was ordered that the l)ill be dismissed. Appeal by
the orator.
Powers, J.:
The defendant, by a demurrer interposed into his answer, raises
the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the bill.
The propriety of this mode of pleading has been considered of
late, and the effort has been to adhere to the rules of pleading laid
down in the text books and best considered eases.
The respective functions of a dennirrer and an answer are
entirely distinct and one cannot take the place of the other.
The answer serves the double pur])ose of pleading and evidence.
So far as it sets up matter as a bar it is a pleading. So far as
it serves the complainant's ]nirpose by discovering facts, it is a
deposition. If the defendant would waive making an answer,
he may demur or plead. The object of a demurrer or plea, as
a general rule, is to excuse the defendant from answering the
bill on its merits. Both are dilatory pleadings, a demurrer being
proper if the fault of the complainant's case is apparent from the
face of the bill, and a plea being proper if the fault must be shown
by bringing matter dehors upon the record. Accordingly it has
been generally said in the books that a party cannot demur or
plead and answer the same matter, but he may demur to one part
of the bill, plead to another and answer to another. If he answers
to the same part that he demurs to, his answer will overrule his
demurrer. The rule is the same at law. 1 Chit. PI. 512. The
reason for the rule is thus given by Gilbert, Forum Rom. 58, in
speaking of dilatory defenses, "all these pleas with us are to be put
ante litem contestnm, because they are pleas only why you should
not answer, and therefore if you answer to anything to which you
may plead, you overrule your plea, for your plea is only why you
should not contest and answer, so that if you answer, your plea
is waived." This rule is laid down everywhere as expressive of the


















































































































































•arlie t p ible mom nt befor him) that thi uit could not be 
rna:intain d for th r a on ih t th rator had a compl te r rn dy 
at Jaw. 
To thi r p rt th d f ndant x ·eption ) and the ase 
wa heard .at th far h T rm) 1 a hington ounty) ow 11, 
1ban ell r upon th pl adings r port and . c ption th r to) 
wh r up n it wa ord r d that the bill be di mi ed. ppeal 1 y 
th orator. 
OWEH J.: 
Th tl f ndant, by a demurr r int rpo ed into hi an w r rai ~ 
th qu tion of th juri di tion of th ourt to ntertain the bill. 
Th propri ty of thi mod of pleading ha b n n idered of 
lat and th ffort ha b n to adh r to th rule of pleading laid 
down in th text book and 1 . t con idered ca 
T'h r p tiv function of a demurrer and an an wer are 
ntir 1 di tinct and on cannot tak th place of the other. 
The an w r erve the douibl purpo e of pl ading and vid nee. 
o far a it et up matt r a a bar it i a pl ading. o far a 
it rv th omplaina·nt' purpo b di ov rin()" fact ) it i a 
po ition. If the d f ndant would waiv makin an an wer) 
h may demur or plead. Th obj ct of a demurr r or plea a 
a g n ral rule) i to excu e the d f ndant from an wering the 
bill on i m rit . oth are dilatory pl ading ) a d murr r b ino-
prop r if th fault of th mplainant' a i appar nt from the 
fa of th bill, and a pl a bein()" proper if the fault mu t be hown 
by bringinD" matt r dehor u n th r ord. Accordin ly it ha, 
b n ()" n rall aid in th book that a party annot d mur or 
pl ad and an w r th am matt r, but he may d mur to on part 
f h bill pl al t anoth r and an wer to anoth r. If h an w r 
t th am pa·rt that h d mur to hi an wer will ov rrule hi 
c1 murr r. Th rul i th am at law. 1 hit. Pl. 1 . Th 
ilb rt F rum Rom. in 
pr a with u ar to b put 
plea only wh you .. hould 
r u an w r to anythincr to hi h you 
ma. ' pl a 1 y u v rrul . ur I 1 a for our pl a i onl: why y u 
,'h ull n t ·ont and an w r . that if y u an w r. y ur pl a 
i waiY 1.'' hi rul i laid c1o" n " rywh r a xpr s~i' of th 
i.ru fun li n f a d murr 'r r pl a in it r lati n t th an w r. 
234 Answer
Mitford (Tyler's Ed.) 304, 305, 411, Beames' PI. in Eq. 37;
WhaUy v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef. 371; Jones v. Earl of Strafford,
3 P. Wms. 81; Oliver v. Piate, 3 How. 412; Clarl; v. Phelps, 6
Johns. Chan. 214; Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt. 71.
Incorporating a demurrer into an answer is often done and no
violation of the rule is occasioned if the demurrer is left for
consideration as if it stood alone. In the old precedents in-
stances may be found of demurrers and pleas incorporated into
answers, but in each case the answer was provisional, the plea
ending with a demand for judgment, and then proceeding, "and
if this defendant shall by order of this honorable court be com-
pelled to make any other answer to the said bill, etc., then and
not otherwise the defendant saving, etc., answereth and saith,"
going through the answer as if no plea had been put in. The
more modern practice, however, and the one sanctioned by Mit-
ford and other standard writers, is to file each pleading by itself.
But in all cases the demurrer should be brought to a hearing
before the cause is tried on its merits. Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt.
and cases there cited.
In this case it is urged that a court of equity has no jurisdic-
tion, as a court of law could give the orator an adequate remedy.
This objection, if valid, is apparent upon the face of the bill and
so is the subject of a demurrer, and if it be sustained the case
is at an end. But an objection to the jurisdiction of the court,
if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject matter, will
not be entertained unless it is brought to a hearing before the
expense of a trial upon the merits has been incurred. In 1 Dan.
Chan. Prac. 579, it is said that if the objection to the jurisdic-
tion is not taken seasonably by plea or demurrer and the de-
fendant enters into his defense at large, the court having the
general jurisdiction will exercise it. To the same effect are the
cases Cong. Society v. Trustees, etc., 23 Pick. 148; Underliill
V. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Chan. 369; Baiih of Bellows Falls
V. R. & B. R. R. Co., 28 Vt. 470. Indeed the rule in equity
appears to be the same as at law. A plea to the jurisdiction at
law is said to be analagous to a plea in abatement and is the
earliest in the order of pleading, and if the general issue be pleaded
the jurisdiction is confessed. So in equity it is a dilatory objection
that is waived by an answer. In equity, as at law, if the court


















































































































































l\Iitford (Tyler's Ed.) 304, 305, 411, Beames' Pl. in Eq. 37; 
Whaley v. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef. 371; Jones v. Earl of Strafford, 
3 P. Wms. 81; OZiver v. Piate, 3 Hmv. 412; Clark v. Phelps, 6 
John. Chan. 214; Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt. 71. 
Incorporating a demurrer into an answer is often done and no 
violation of the rule is occasioned if the demurrer is left for 
consid ration a if it tood alone. In the old precedents in-
tances may be found of demurrers and pleas incorporated into 
answers, but in each ca e the answer was provi ional, the plea 
ending with a demand for judgment, and then proceeding, "and 
if thi defendant hall by order of this honorable court be com-
pelled to make any other answer to the said bill, etc., then and 
not otherwise the defendant saving, etc., answereth and aith,'' 
going through the an wer as if no plea had been put in. The 
more modern practice, however, and the one sanctioned by Mit-
ford and other standard writers, is to file each pleading by itself. 
But in all .cases the demurrer . hould be brought to a· hearing 
before the cau e is tried on its merit . Wade v. Pulsifer, 54 Vt. 
and ca es there cited. 
In this case it is urged that a court of equity has no jurisdic-
tion, ·as a court of law could give the orator an adequate remedy. 
This objection, if valid, is apparent upon the face of the bill and 
so is the subject of a demurrer, and if it be sustained the case 
i at a·n end. But an objeciion to the juri diction of the court, 
if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject matter, will 
not be entertained unless it is brought to a hearing before the 
expen e of a trial upon the merit has been incurred. In 1 Dan. 
Chan. Prac. 579, it i ·aid that if the objection to the jurisdic-
tion i not taken seasonably by plea or d murrer and the de-
fendant enter into hi defen e at large, the court having the 
general juri diction will exercise it. To th same effect are the 
ca es Cong. ociety v. Trustee , etc., 23 Pick. 148; Underhill 
v. Van Cortlandt, 2 John . Chan. 369 · Bank of Bellows Falls 
v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 2 Vt. 470. Indeed the rul in equity 
app ar to be the am a at }aw. A plea to the juri diction at 
law i said to be analagou to a plea in abat m nt and i the 
earlie t in the order of pleading, and if the gen ral i ue be pleaded 
th juri diction i onf d. o in qui1ty it i a: dilatory objection 
that j waiv d by an an w r. In equity, a at law, if the court 
di. cov 1 that under no cir um tan ha it juri~di ti n in the 
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premises, it will, at any stage of the proceedings, dismiss the cause
svxi sponte, if no objection is raised.
In the case at bar a court of equity has jurisdiction. The
sale of the colt to the orator witli a lien reserved to the defendant
amounted to a mortgage of the colt. The orator all the time
had an equity of redemption and after condition broken might
sustain a bill to redeem as was held by this court in Blodgett v.
BlodgeU, M. 48 Vt. Tlie facts appearing from the master's report
show that the question whether the defendant's lien upon the colt
had been extinguished by payment in full depended upon an
accounting of the farm dealings. Courts of equity have concur-
rent jurisdiction with courts of law in all cases where the common
law action of account would lie, Fonblanque Eq. 1, 10; Cooper
Tr. 36; Bispham Eq. 484; Ludlow v. Stenard, 2 Caine's Cas. in
Error 1; Leach v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 195, and in many other cases
where the accounts are intricate and a discovery is demanded. In
the action of trover brought by the defendant against the orator,
no offset arising out of the farm dealings would be available to
the orator, and unless he could make out full payment of the lien,
he would be cast in the suit. But in equity on an accounting he
can have applied all the indebtedness in his favor that he can
establish, and if this is insufficient to extinguish the lien, the court
can give him a day of redemption.
In taking the accounts of the parties, the master finds that
items 42 and 43 in the defendant's specification accrued from
false representations of the defendant. These items should be dis-
allowed, as in equity no one can be made a debtor by fraud.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded with a mandate
to enter a decree for the orator to recover the sum of $42.98
reported by the master, with interest thereon from March 1, 1884,
and that the furtlior prosecution of the suit at law in favor of the
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premi es, it will, at any tag of the proceeding , dismi the cau. e 
sua ponte, if no objeotion i raised. 
In th ca e at bar a court of quity ha juri diction. The 
al of the colt to th orator with a lien reserved to the defendant 
amounted to a mortgage of the colt. Th orator all the time 
had an equity of red mption and after conditio broken might 
u tain a bill to redeem a wa held by thi ourt in Blodgett v. 
Blodgett, 1. 4 Vt. The fact appearing from th ma~ter r eport 
how that the que tion whether the defendant' ljen upon the colt 
ha 1 b en extingui hed by payment in full depended upon an 
a ounting of the farm dealing . Oourts of equity have concur-
r nt juri~ diction with court of law in all ca es where the ommon 
law action of account would lie, Fonblanque Eq. 1, 10; ooper 
Tr. 6; Bi pham Eq. 484; Ludlow v. tenard, 2 Caine' a . in 
rror 1; Leach v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 195, and in many other ca e 
wh re the accounts are intricate and a discovery is demanded. In 
the action of trover brought by the defendant against the orator, 
no off et ari ing out of the farm dealing would be available to 
th orator, and unl he could make ou full payment of the lien, 
h would be ca t in the suit. But in equity on an accounting he 
can have applied all the indebtedness in his favor that he can 
e tabli h: and if thi is insufficient to extinguish the lien, the court 
can gi e him a day of redemption. 
In taking the account of the parties, the master find that 
i em 49 and 43 in the defendant's pecification accrued from 
fal repre entation of the defendant. These items should be dis-
allow d, a in equit no one can be made a debtor by fraud. 
The decree i re er d and the cau e remanded with a mandate 
to nt r a decree for the orator to recover the um of ±'> .98 
r port d by the ma ter with intere t thereon from March 1 1 ±, 
and that the further pro ecution o·f the uit at law in favor of the 
d f ndant against th orator mentioned in the pleadings be per-
petuall enjoined. 
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Moors V. Moors, 17 N. H. JfSl. (18Jk5.)
In Equity. The statements of the bill and answer, tfcgether
with important testimony in the case, are set forth by the court
in the opinion.
Woods, J. :
The plaintiff, in this suit, seeks to be relieved against a suit
commenced at law by the defendant upon a promissory note of
$1,025.52, signed by her, and delivered to him on the 18th day of
October, 1840. The grounds upon which she claims the inter-
position of this court are, without any doubt, sufficient to entitle
her to the relief sought, if the evidence is sufficient.
She states, in substance, that she had a settlement with the
defendant on that day, relating to an item of rent, which he owed
her, and an item of money, paid by him for taxes which she owed
him, and a claim which was at first disputed, but afterward ad-
mitted by her, of $25, which he called on her to pay him for wood
he had furnished her father; that the balance due to him upon
the adjustment of tliese items was about $10, for which she was
willing to give her note, and for which she intended to give her
note; but that, trusting her brother to write it, she, through his
fraud, had been made to sign a note for $1,025.52, the subject of
the controversy.
She states that she did not, at the time, owe him any further
or other sum, and interrogates him as to whether there were any
other demands or claims considered or included in the settlement,
and if so, what? Whether there were any claims presented for
money horrowed, and if so, what?
The answer of the defendant was quite full, and shows that he
held two notes against the plaintiff at the time of the settlement,
from the aggregate amount of which the small balance of accounts
due her was deducted, and the note in question for the remainder,
and that the old notes were given up to hex to be canceled.
This allegation in the answer does not derive direct support
from evidence ; but, on the other hand, the plaintiff has produced
one witness, who was present during the interview, and who ap-


















































































































































Moors v. Moors, 17 N. H. 481. {1845.) 
IN EQUITY. The statements of the bill and an wer, tbgether 
with important te timony in the case, are set forth by the court 
in the opinion. 
WOODS, J.: 
The plaintiff, in this suit, seeks rto be relieved against a suit 
commenced at law by the defendant upon a promissory note of 
$1,025.52, signed by her, and delivered to him on the 18th day of 
October, 1840. The grounds upon which she claims the inter-
position of this court ar , writhout any doubt, sufficient to entitle 
her to the relief sought, if the evidence is sufficient. 
She states, in substance; that she had a settlement with the 
defendant on that day, relating to an item of rent, which he O'Wed 
her, and an item of money, paid by him for taxes which she owed 
him, and a claim which was at first disputed, but afterward ad-
mitted by her, of $25, which he called on her to pay him for wood 
he had furnished her father; that the balance due to him upon 
the adjustment of these items was about $10, for which she was 
willing to give her note, and for which she intended to give her 
note; but that, trusting her brother to write it, she, through his 
fraud, had been made to sign a note for $1,025.52, the ubject of 
the controversy. 
She states that she did not, at the time, owe him any further 
or other sum, and interrogates him as to whether there were any 
oth r demand or claims considered or included in the settlement, 
and if so, what? Whether there were any claim presented for 
money .borrowed, and if o, what? 
Th answer of the defend·ant was quite full, and hows thait he 
held two not against th plaintiff at the time of the ettlement, 
from the aggr gate amount of which the small balance of account 
due her wa deducted, and the note in que tion for the remainder, 
and that the old notes w Te given up to her to be cane led. 
This allegation in the an wer doe not d riv dire t upport 
from evidenc ; but on th other hand, the plaintiff has produced 
one witnes , who was pre cnt during the interview, and who ap-
p ar to hav ha ome knowl dg of the bu in that wa in 
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progress, and who did not hear any mention made of the old
notes, or of money borrowed by the plaintiff of the defendant
on former occasions. This was Friend Moors.
His wife was also present a part of the time, and, although she
heard conversation about rent and taxes, and wood, did not learn
that the settlement comprehended the more important matters of
the notes.
The testimony of these witnesses tends undoubtedly to sustain
the allegations in the bill ; that the three items of mutual account,
which are described in it, were all that were comprehended in the
settlement, and that the small balance resulting formed the only
consideration for the note.
But that testimony has to be considered in connection with the
defendant's answer, which, in this material point in the con-
troversy, is in direct conflict with the allegations of the bill, and
the question arises as to the weight that is to be allowed to the
answer.
The general rule of law is quite clear, that when the answer
controverts a material allegation of the bill, no decree can be made
for the plaintiff, unless the answer in that particular is overborne
by evidence that is more than equivalent to the testimony of one
witness. 2 Story's Eq., sec. 1528; Dodge v. Griswold, 12 X. H.
Eep. 577.
In order that the answer may have that force, it is necessary
that the statement of the bill which it controverts be a material
statement; that is, that it be essentially a part of the plaintiff's
ease, and that the answer, so far as it relates to the statement,
contain such matters only as the defendant is required by the
exigencies of correct pleading to embrace in his answer. Or, in
other words, that it go to the point of discovery, to which the
plaintiff is entitled, by the case that he has stated ; for it is clear
that a statement which the defendant volunteers is entitled to no
such consideration as is accorded to an answer strictly responsive
to, and clearly demanded by, the case of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's case, as stated by the bill, is, that the note in
controversy was obtained by fraud ; that she did not intend to give
such a note ; that no such sum was due, and that no other demands
than those which she enumerated were embraced in the settle-
ment.

















































































































































MooRs v. Moons 
progro ) and who did not hear any mention made of tho old 
note , or of money borrow d by the plaintiff of the defendant 
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Hi wif wa al o pre ent a part of the time, and, although he 
heard co v r ation about r nt and taxe , and wood) did not learn 
that the ettlement compTeh nded th mor important matter of 
the not . 
Th te timony of the witne s tend undoubtedly to u tain 
th allegation in the bill ; that the three item of mutual account, 
which ar d eril>ed in it, were all thait were comprehend d in the 
ettlement and that the mall balance re ulting formed the only 
con ideration for the note. 
ut that testimony ha to be con idered in connection with the 
defendant an w r, which) in thi material point in the on-
trover y, i in dir ct conflict with the allegation of the bill, and 
the qu ·tion ari e as to the weight that is to be allowed to the 
an wer. 
The g n ral rul of law i quite clear, that when the an wer 
ontrm· rt a material allegation of the bill, no decree can be made 
for the plaintiff, unle th an wer in that particular i overborne 
by evidence that i more than equival nt to the te timony of one 
witne . 2 tory' Eq., sec. 1528; Dodge v. Gri.swold, 12 N. H . 
Rep. 5 7. 
In order that the answer may have that fo rce, it is neces ary 
that the tat ment of the bill which it controverts be a material 
stat ment; that i , that it be e entially a part of the plaintiff' 
a e, and that the answeT, so far a it rel.ate to the tatement, 
contain uch matters only a the defendant i required by the 
exi enci of correct pleading to embrace in hi an wer. Or in 
other word that it go to the point of di cov ry, to which the 
plaintiff i ntitl d by th a that he ha tafod · for it i lear 
that a tat m nt which th de·f ndant volunteer i entitled to no 
~ uch con id ration a i a corded to an an wer trictly re pan ivo 
to and 1 rl d mantled by the ca e of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff ca a tat d b th bill i that the not in 
ontrov wa obtained b fraud; that h did not intend to ITT'i 
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OW it om tim a qu tion of iliffi ul( t ettl h w fa r 
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a defendant is required to go in his answer, and how far he may
protect himself by saying that it is as particular as the plaintiff's
question. Story's Eq. PL, sec. 855, note. But one principle, well
stated, and stated in the books in the various forms, is this: that
a simple denial of the plaintiff's case literally, as stated, is wholly
insufficient. He must meet it with full and circumstantial denial,
and not with a negative pregnant, which, while it controverts the
case in the precise terms in which it is stated, is perfectly con-
sistent with one not substantially differing from it. Story's Eq.
PL, sec. 855 ; Woods v. Mornll, 1 Johns. Ch. 103. As, if he be
charged with the receipt of a sum of money, he must deny that
he has received that sum, or any part thereof, or else set forth
what part he has received.
If to that part of the bill which stated what items were com-
prehended in the settlement, the defendant had said no more than
that other items were comprehended, the plaintiff might still have
had substantially the case made by the bill, and the answer yet
have been true.
To that part of the bill which states that no more than the
small sum named was due, the defendant was bound to answer,
not only how much was due, but, to the best of his ability, upon
what account it was due. Such discovery is important to enable
the plaintiff to amend her case, or to maintain it by disproving
the consideration, which, of course, it is the more difficult to do
before the defendant has been called on to specify it. These
obvious purposes of the discovery would have been defeated by a
less explicit answer.
The answer, therefore, in discovering what matters were em-
braced in the settlement, contained no more than the defendant was
bound by the statement of the plaintiff's ease to set forth, or was,
in other phrase, strictly responsive to the bill.
Although tending to sustain a material statement of the bill,
we cannot say that the testimony of Friend Moors and his wife
is in conflict with the answer in the particulars to which thoy in
common relate. Had those witnesses participated in the transac-
tion; had they, or either of them, had occasion or an interest to
know its details, or had they even been so situated that they could
have known them with reasonable certainty, the case would have
been different. As it was, it is not unreasonable to suppose that


















































































































































a defendant is required to go in bis answer, and bow far be may 
protect himself by saying that it is as particular as the plaintiff's 
question. Story's Eq. PL, sec. 855, note. But one principle, well 
tated, and tated in the books in the various forms, i thi : that 
a simple denial of the plaintiff's case literally, as stated, is wholly 
insufficient. He must meet it with full and circumstantial denial, 
and not with a negative pregnant, which, while it controvert the 
case in the preci e terms in which it i tated, is perfectly con-
i tent with one not ub tantially differing from it. Story's Eq. 
PL, sec. 855; Woods v. Morrill~ 1 Johns. Ch. 103. As, if he be 
charged with the receipt of a sum of money, he must deny that 
he has received that sum, or any part thereof, or else set forth 
what part he has received. 
If to that part of the bill which stated what items were com-
prehended in the ettlement, the defendant had said no more than 
that other item were comprehended, the plaintiff might still have 
had substantially the case made by the bill, and the answer yet 
have been true. 
To that part of the bill which states that no more than the 
small sum named was due, the defendant was bound to answer, 
not only bow much was due, but, to the best of his ability, upon 
what account it wa due. Such di covery is important to enable, 
the plaintiff to amend her case, or to maintain it by disproving 
the consideration, which, of course, it is the more difficult to do 
before the defendant bas been called on to specify it. These 
obvious purpo es of the discovery would have been defeated by a 
le s explicit an wer. 
The an wer, therefore, in diiscovering what matters were em-
braced in the ettlement, contained no more than the defendant was 
bound by the tatement of the plaintiff's case to set forth, or was, 
in other phra e, trictly responsive to the bill. 
Although tending to u tain a material statement of the bill, 
we cannot ay that the te timony of Friend Moors and hi wife 
is in confli t with the an wer in the particulars to which th y in 
common r late. Had tho e witne e particip t d in th tran ac-
tion; had th y or eith r of th m had oc· a ion or an inter t to 
know it d tail , or had th y ev n b en o ituat d that th y ould 
hav known them with rea onable certainty th ca e would h ve 
b n differ nt. A it wa it i not unr onable to uppo that 
th y migl1t hav heard mor of th mall r item , that required 
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and actually engaged discussion, than of the greater matters of
the notes and interest, which might have been adjusted with fewer
words, because of a nature to admit of no question.
It is plain that all that is stated in the answer, on the subject
of the settlement, might have been strictly true, and yet the facts
stated have wholly escaped the notice of both the witnesses. How-
ever their testimony, therefore, may tend to detract from the credit
that might otherwise be due to the answer, it ought not to be
considered as coming in direct conflict with it. The answer is the
testimony of one directly to a fact, about which it is scarcely
possible that he could have been mistaken, or that he could have
forgotten. The testimony of the witnesses, on the other hand,
is only to the point that they did not observe a transaction that
it is certainly possible might have taken place without their obser-
vation.
Nor can we say that the case of the plaintiff derives material
support from considering the other evidence which has been ad-
duced by either party. No part of it goes to the point of sustain-
ing the allegations of the bill against this denial in the answer,
of the very essence of the plaintiff's case, even if we could say that
the preponderance was in favor of the plaintiff, on the secondary
matters on which it bears.
The conclusion is, that the plaintiff's case, having been denied
by the answer, and not sustained by sufficient evidence, no decree
can be pronounced in her favor.
Bill dismissed without prejudice.
Beech v. Haynes, 1 Tenn. Ch. 569. (187Jk.)
The Chancellor:
The question submitted to me on this record is one that savors,
perhaps, more of curiosity than of practical utility in the present
state of the law of evidence. It is, how far the complainant may
use the admissions of a defendant in his answer to charge him,
without giving him the benefit of the matters of discharge or avoid-
ance, with which the admissions are coupled. And the difficulty
is not so much in ascertaining the law bearing upon the point in
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and a tually ngaged di cu ion, than of the greai:€r matter 0f 
th not and intere t, which might have been adju ted with fewer 
wo~'d , becau e of a natur to admit of no qu tion. 
It i plain that all that i tat d in the an wer, on the subject 
of the ettl ment, might hav b n trictly tru , and y t th fact 
. tated hav wholly e caped the notic of both the witne e . How-
er their t timon:y, th r for , may tend to detract from the credit 
that might otherwi e be clue to the answer, it ought not to be 
on id red a coming in direct conflict with it. The answer i the 
t timony of one directly to a fact, about which it is carcely 
po ible that he could have been mi taken, or that he could have 
forgotten. The te timony of the witnes e , on the other hand, 
i only to the point that they did not observe a transaction that 
it i certainly possible might have taken place without their ob er-
vation. 
Nor can we ay that the ease of the plaintiff derives material 
support from considering the other evidence which ha been ad-
duc d by either party. No part of it goes to the point o·f sustain-
ing the all ga:tions of the bill again t this denial in the an wer, 
of the very e ence of the plaintiff's ca e, even if we could ay that 
th preponderance was in favor of the plaintiff, on the secondary 
matters on which it bears. 
The conclusion is, that the plaintiff's case, having been denied 
by the an wer, and not sustained by ufficient evidence, no decree 
can be pronounced in her favor. 
Bill dism'issed without prejudice. 
Beech v. Haynes~ 1 T enn . Ch .. 569. (1814.) 
T HE Cn .r CELLOR : 
The qu tion ubmitt d to me on thi record i one that a ors, 
rhap , more of curio ity tha·n of practical utility in the pre ent 
at of th law of evicl nc . It i , how far the complainant ma 
u ' th admi , ion of a defendant in hi an wer to charge him, 
with ut ·il'in cr him th b nefit o·f the matters of di charge or a oid-
an , with which the admi ion are coupled. nd the difficult 
i n t o mu h i a rt· ining th law bearing upon th point in 
qu ti a upon the appli ation of that law to th fac f the 
parti ular a e. 
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The general rule undoubtedly is that an answer which, while
admitting or denying the facts in the bill, sets up other facts
in" defense or avoidance, is not evidence of the facts so stated.
Sto. Eq. Jur. § 1,529; Gresley's Eq. Ev. 13. This rule, upon a
careful review of the authorities, was considered as well settled
by Ch. Kent in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 88; and, although
its application to the facts of that case was held erroneous by the
court of errors, it has been approved by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall. 315, and by our Su-
preme Court in Napier v. Elam, 6 Yer. 113. The qualification of
the rule, or of its application, established by the Court of Errors
of New York upon appeal in the case of Uart v. Ten Eyck, is
stated to have been, for the decision was never reported, that if the
facts in discharge or avoidance are a direct and proper reply to
an express charge or interrogatory of the bill, then the answer
is evidence of those facts. Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 74-1, note.
And this distinction has also been adopted by our Supreme Court.
Alexander v. ^Yill^ams, 10 Yer. 109; Goss v. Simpson, -4 Cold.
288; ^Valter v. McNahh, 1 Heisk. 703. And fhis whether the
response be by a direct denial or by a statement of facts by way
of avoidance. HopTcins v. Spwfloch, 2 Heisk. 152. Some authori-
ties are quoted as holding that where a defendant, in response to
the bill, once admits liability, there is no escape except by proof
of the matters of discharge or avoidance. Dyre v. Sturgess, 3
Des. 553 ; Paynes v. Coles, 1 Munf . 395 ; Fisler v. Porcli, 2 Stock.
248. It is probable, however, that a careful analysis of the cases
would show that the rule is substantially the same everywhere,
but its application is varied by the particular facts of the several
cases.
A qualification of the general rule is, that where the transaction
is a continuous one, and the matters of charge and discharge occur
at the same time, the whole statement must be taken together.
'Robinson v. Scotney, 19 Ves. 582 ; Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson,
13 Ves. 50; Thompson v. Lamhe, 7 Ves. 588. The qualification
is more broadly stated under the English practice in 2 Dan. Ch.
Pr. 835, thus : "Where a plaintiff chooses to read a passage from
the defendant's answer, he reads all the circumstances stated in
the passage. If the passage so read contains a reference to any
other passage, that other passage must be read also." Bartlett v.


















































































































































The general rule undoubtedly is that an answer which, while 
admitting or denying the facts in the bill, sets up other facts 
in· defen e or avoidance, i not evidence of the facts so stated. 
Sto. Eq. Jur. § 1,529; Gresley's Eq. Ev. 13. This rule, upon a 
careful review of the authorities, was considered as well settled 
by Ch. Kent in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 88; and, although 
it application to the facts of that ca e wa held erroneous by the 
court of errors, it has been approved by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall. 315, and by our Su-
preme Court in Napier v. Elam, 6 Yer. 113. The qualification of 
the rule, or of its application, established by the Court of Errors 
of New York upon appeal in the case of Hart v. Ten Eyck, is 
stated to have been, for the decision was never reported, that if the 
facts in discharge or avoidance are a direct and proper reply to 
an expre charge or interrogat:ory of the bill, then the answer 
i evidence of tho e facts. Woodcock v. Bennett, 1 Cow. 74-±, note. 
And this distinction has al o been adopted by our Supreme Court. 
Alexander v. Williams, 10 Yer. 109; Goss v. Simpson, 4 Cold. 
2 8; Walter v. McNabb, 1 Rei k. 703. And ibis whether the 
re ponse be by a direct denial or by a statement of facts by way 
of avoidance. Hopkins v. Spurlock, 2 Heisk. 152. Some authori-
tie are quoted as holding that where a defendant, in re pon e to 
the bill, once admits liability, there is no escape except by proof 
of the matters of discharge or avoidance. Dyre v. Sturgess, 3 
Des. 553; Paynes v. Coles, 1 Munf. 395; Fisler v. Porch, 2 Stock. 
248. It i probable, however, that a careful analysi of the case 
would show that the rule is substantially the same everywhere, 
but its application is varied by the pa·rticular facts of the several 
ca e. 
A qualification of the general rule i that where th tran action 
i a continuou one, and the matt rs of charge and di charge occur 
at the same tim , the whole tatement mu t be taken toO'ether. 
Robinson v. cotney, 19 Ve . 5 9 ; Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson, 
13 Ve . 50; Thompson v. Lamb e, 7 V . 5 . The qualification 
i more broadly tat d under th EnO'li h practic in 2 Dan. Ch. 
Pr. 8 5, thu : "Where a plaintiff boo e to read a pa age from 
the defendant' an wer, he read all th cir um tanc tated in 
th pa age. If the pa age o read ontain a reference to an} 
other pa age that oth r pas ag mu t 1 r ad al o. ' Bartlett v. 
Gillard, Ru" . 1 7 · Nurse v. Bunn, 5 im. 22 . Th old de-
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cisions went so far as to hold that a discharge in the same sentx^nce
with the charge woukl be evidence (be<3ause the whole context must
be read), when it would not have been if stated separately. Ridge-
way V. Darwin, T Yes. 404; TJioinpson v. Lanihe, 7 Ves. 588. The
consequence of which was, as siated by Mr. Gresley in his work
on Evidence in Equity, p. 15, that formerly much of the skill re-
quired in drawing an answer consisted in uniting by connecting
pai-ticles important points of the defendant's ease with admis-
sions that could not be withheld. The answer in the case now
before me seems framed on these old cases. But the modem de-
cisions are governed by the sounder rule of being contrx)lled by
the sense instead of the contiguity or grammatical structure of the
sentences. Passages connected in meaning may be read together
from distinct parts of the answer. Rude v. Whitechurcli, 3 Sim.
563. And, on the other hand, if the matter in avoidance has been
skilfully interwoven into the senten;ce6 containing responsive ad-
missions, the complainant w411 be entitled to have the matter of
avoidance considered as struck out. McCoy v. Rhodes, 11 How.
U. S. 131; Baker v. Williamson, 4 Penn St. 467; 3 Greenlf. Ev.
§ 281.
The rule, it will be noted, which considers an admission as bind-
ing, and as throwing upon the defendant the burden of proving
the matter of avoidance, applies only to admissions wliich are
responsive to or go to support the charges of the bill. The reason
is, that otherwise the matter of admission would not be in issue,
and if tlie complainant reads it, he reads it as evidence, not as
pleading, and must read the whole; and no relief can ordinarily
be granted upon it except by conceding the facts to be as stated in
connection with the admission. Neal v. Robinson, 8 Hum. 438;
MuUoy V. Young, 10 Hum. 298; Jameson v. Shelby, 2 Hum. 201;
Ruse V. Mynatt, 7 Yer. 30.
The matter in avoidance or discharge, if in resjwnse to a direct
charge, is, as we have seen, evidence in favor of the defendant.
Smith V. Clark, 4 Paige, 373. But it seems that a statement of
the answer expressly waived or not called for, is not responsive,
and not evidence. Jones v. Best, 2 Gill. 106. Tliis limitation
may be important in the present case, for the bill expressly calls
upoii the defendant to declare "when, where and from whom he
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c1 10n went o far a to hold that a di charge in th ame entence 
with the harge would b vid n (because the wh 1 context mu~ t 
b r ad) wh n it ould not ha1e b n if tated eparatcly. Ridge-
way . arwin, \ . -±0 ; Thonipson v. Lambe, e . e 
con ·qu n of whi h a , a stated by Ur. r 1 y in hi work 
on Evid n e in 'quity, p. 1 , that formerly much of the kill re-
quir d in drawing an an wer con · ted in uniting by conn cting 
par ·cl important points of the defendan ' ca e with admi -
ion thait uld not be withheld. The an w r in the ca e now 
befor me eem £ram d on th old ca e . ut the modern de-
·i ion are govern d by the ounder rule of b ing controll d by 
the n e in tead of the contiguity or grammatical tructure of the 
sentenc . Pa ag connected in meaning may be read to ether 
from di tinct part of the answer. Rude v. Whitechurch, 3 im. 
5 . And, on the other hand, if the matter in avoidance ha been 
kilfull3 interwo-ven into the enterroa:; containing re pon i e ad-
mi ion , the complainant will be entitled to ha·ve the matter of 
a oidance con idered as tn1ck out. JJicCoy v. Rhodes, 11 How. 
u. . 1 1; Baker v. Williamson, 4 Penn St. 46 ; 3 Greenlf. E1. 
1. 
Th rule, it will be noted, which con ider an admi ion a bind-
ino-, and as throwing upon the defendant the burden of proving 
th matter of avoidance, a·pplie only to admi ion which are 
re~pon ive to or go to upport the charge of the bill. The re on 
i that oth rwi e the matter of admi ion would not be in i u ::., 
and if th complainant read it, he read it a evidence, not a 
pl a ing and mu t mad the whole; and no relief can ordinaril.J 
be rant d upon it except by conceding the fact to be a tated in 
onn tion with th admi ion. Neal v. Robinson, 8 Hum. -±3 ; 
]1 ulloy . Young, 10 um. 29 ; J a17ieson v. helby, 2 Hum. 901; 
Ro e Y. Jlynatt, Y er. 30. 
Th matter in a oidanc or di harg if in r po e to a direct 
barg i , a we ha·v een e-vid nee in favor of the defendant. 
'mith lark, -! Pai , 3 3. But it eem that a ~tatem nt of 
th an~ ''° r .xpr 13 aiv d OT not call d for, i not re pon~i1 
and not 1i n e. Jones . Best, 9 Gill. 106. Thi limitation 
may b important in th pr nt a , for th bill pr sly an 
n n th d f ndant to d lar wh n wh re and from whom h 
purchn" d tton for th omplainant~ and when_, wh r an 1 t 
232 Answek
whom he said it/' and adds : "The discovery which complainants
seek is confined exclusively to these points."
The bill is filed for the purpose of charging the defendant with
cotton bought by him with certain moneys of the complainants
acting as their agent, and with the proceeds of the sales of such
cotton. The answer admits the receipt of the money, the purchase
of cotton, and the sale thereof as complainant's agent, and dis-
closes "when, where and from whom the defendant purchased cotton
for the complainants, and when, where a^nd to whom he sold it."
The answer states the amount of cotton bought, but adds that at
least one-fourth was lost by stealage or otherwise. It also states the
prices at which the cotton was sold, and adds "that out of the pro-
ceeds of sale, the expenses of keeping, carr^'ing to market, and
selling the cotton, and a large government tax, contained in an
itemized schedule (annexed to the answers) were paid." The an-
swer is replied to under our practice, and there is no proof.
The answer admits the contract as alleged in the bill, and the
purchase and sale of cotton as agent, but states, in avoidance, that
the cotton was to be bought in the Confederate lines, the contract
having been made in the Federal lines. The matter in avoidance
is clearly not evidence under any of the recognized rules and must
be proved.
In this state of the case and the pleadings, if there were nothing
more, it is clear that the complainant would be entitled to a decree
reciting the contract, and the fact that the defendant had bought
and sold cotton under it, and to a reference to the master to take
and state an account between the parties, in which he should charge
the defendant with all cotton which was purchased with the defend-
ant's money, and with the proceeds of such of the cotton as may
have been sold by him, allowing him all just credits in the way of
loss of cotton without fault on his part, and all proper disburse-
ments in the care, preservation and disposition of the cotton. Tlie
complainants are not compelled, either at the hearing or upon the
reference to read any part of the answer as evidence of the amount
of cotton bought or sold, and the defendant himself could only
read such parts of the answer as are responsive to the charges
and interrogatories of the bill, under the rules as hereinbefore set
forth. But the complainants claim now, upon the hearing, to use
against the defendants his admissions of charge without giving


















































































































































whom he o1d it," and add : "The di covery which complainants 
ek i confined exclu ively to the e points.' 
The bill i filed for the purpose of chaTging the defendant with 
cotton bought by him with certain money of the complainants 
acting a their agent, and with the proceed of the sales of such 
cotton. The an wer admits th receipt of the money, the purchase 
of cotton, and the sale thereof as complainant's agent, and di.B-
elo es "when, where and from whom the defendant purcha ed cotton 
for the complainant , and when, where and to whom he sold it." 
The answer tate the amount of cotton bought, but adds that at 
lea t one-fourth was lo t by tealage or otherwi e. It al o tates the 
prices at which the cotton was old, and adds "that out of the pro-
ceeds of ale, the expen es of keeping, ca:rrying to market, and 
elling the cotton, and a large government tax, contained in an 
itemized chedule (annexed to the an wer ) were paid." The an-
wer is replied to under our practice, and there is no proof. 
The an wer admits the contracl as alleged in the bill, and the 
purchase and ale of cotton as agent, but sfates, in avoidance, that 
the cotton was to be bought in the Confederate lines, the contract 
ha·ving been made in the Federal line . T'he matter in avoidance 
is clearly not evidence under any of the recognized rule and mu t 
be proved. 
In thi tate of the ca e and the pleadings, if there were nothing 
more, it is clear that the complainant would be entitled to a decree 
reciting the contract, and the fa.ct that the defendant had bought 
and old cotton under it, and to a reference to the ma ter to take 
and state an account between the parties, in which he hould charge 
the defendant with an cotton which wa purchased with the defend-
ant' money and with the proceed of uch of the cotton a may 
have been sold by him, allowing him all ju t er dits in the way of 
lo of cotton without fault on hi pa!lt, and all proper di bur e-
ments in the care, pre ervation and di po ition of the otton. The 
complainant are not comp ll d, ith r at the h aring or upon the 
referen · to read any part of the an w r a evid nc of the amount 
of cotton bou ht or ld and the 1 f ndant him lf coul 1 only 
r ad u h par of the an wcr a ar r pon iv to th charges 
an interrogafori of th bill, und r th ml a her inbefor t 
forth. ut th omplainant claim n w up n th h aring t u 'e 
a ain t h d f n ant hi admi ion of har without gi' inv 
him th b n fit 1'. the matt r of cli ~char . nd the que ti on 
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for consideration is, can this be done under the pleadings in this
case?
The general rule, as we have seen, is that the complainant may
read any portion of the defendant's answer which goes to support
the case made in the bill. Barilett v. Gale, 4 Paige, 507. The ad-
missions which the complainants in this case propose to read do
clearly support the case made in the bill. The defendant was not
bound to make them, the discovery having been expressly waived;
but having made them, the complainant may, if he chooses, rely
upon them as fixing the defendant's liability. It is clear, also, that
the discovery called for having been limited so as not to include
the details, the defendant could not himself read any portion of the
matters of discovery, either of charge or discharge, unless they are
responsive to a direct charge or interrogatory of the bill. There is
no interrogatory calling for such discovery, the interrogatories hav-
ing been purposely limited. If, however, this part of the answer
were directly and properly responsive to a positive charge of the
bill, I think the defendant would have been entitled to read it,
notwithstanding the limitation quoted from the bill. For that
limitation, it is obvious, was not intended to prevent the defendant
from answering the charging part of the bill, but merely to restrain
the discovery, so far as it could be evidence for the defendant, to
those charges. Smith v. Clark, 4 Paige, 373. Is there, then, any
charge in the bill which calls for the details of the answer in dis-
charge ?
The bill does charge that the money received by defendant
(which sum is admitted by the answer), invested at twenty-five
cents per pound, the price paid as averred, would have purchased
15,319 pounds, and adds: "Complainants are satisfied that ha
(defendant) realized from the cotton nearly or quite fifty cents
per pound net, and at least $7,500." If, now, the discovery had
not been expressly limited, the answer stating the real amount of
cotton bought and the net proceeds realized, would perhaps have
been responsive under the qualification of the general rule, as ''a
statement of facts by way of avoidance." Be this as it may, the
express limitation of the discovery rendered anything more than
a denial of the charges of the bill not responsive within the rule
which permits the defendant to use responsive matter of avoidance
as evidence in his favor. The complainant has the right so to limit
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for con ideration i , can thi be done under the pleadings in thi 
<.:a e? 
The general rule, a we have een, i that the complainant may 
read any portion of the defendant an wer which goe to upport 
the ca e made in the bill. Bartlett . Gale) 4 aig , 0 . The ad-
mi ion which the complainant in thi ca e propose to read do 
learly upport the ca e ma·d in the bill. The d f ndant wa not 
bound to make them, the di covery having been xpr ly waived; 
but ha ing made them, the complainant ma), if he choo ~, rely 
upon th m a fixing the defendant' liability. It i clear, al o, that 
th di co ery call d for having b en limited so a not to include 
the detail , the defendant could not him elf read any portion of the 
matt r of di covery, either of charge or di charge, unle they are 
r pon~i e to a direct charge or interrogatory of the bill. There is 
no interrogatory calling for uch discovery, the interrogatorie hav-
ing been purpo ely limited. If, however, this part of the an wer 
w r directly and properly responsive to a pooitive charge of the 
bill, I think the defendant would have been entitled to read it, 
notwith tanding the limitation quoted from the bill. For that 
limitation, it is obviou , was not intended to prevent the defendant 
from answering the charging part of the bill, but merely to restra·in 
the di co ery, o far as it could be evidence for the defendant, to 
tho c charge . Smith v. Clark) 4 P aige, 3 3. Is there, then, any 
barge in the bill which call for the details of the an wer in dic-
charge? 
Th bill does charge that the money received by defendant 
(which um i admitted by the an wer), invested at twenty-five 
cent per pound, the pric paid a averred, would have purcha ed 
15,319 pound , and add : " omplainani:s are ati fied that he 
( d fenda·nt) realized from the otton nearly or quite fift cent' 
per pound net and at lea t $ , 00. If, now the di covery had 
not bee expre ly limit d, the an wer tating the real amount of 
cotton bought and the net proce d realized, would perhap have 
b en re pan ive under the quali:fi ation of the general rule a "a 
. tat m nt of fact b way of avoidance.' Be thi a it ma r the 
pr limitation of the di COY r r ndered an rl:hing more than 
a 1 nial of the har of the bill not re pon iv ithin the rule 
whi h p rmit the d f ndant to u re pon ive matter of a oidance 
a i 1 nc in hi favor. Th complainant ha th ri ht o to limit 
hi charO' and hi all for di co very a to con.fin th r pon i rn 
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part of the answer within a narrow compass, and this has been
done in the present instance.
The conclusion is that the complainants may insist upon the
matters of charge in the defendant's answer without giving him
the benefit of the matters of discharge.
In the examination of the question discussed above, I think I
have discovered the source of the strange dictum of our Supreme
Court in Ragsdah v. Buford, 1 Hay. 194, that "in no case is an
answer replied to evidence against the plaintiff," a dictum com-
mented on by me in a note to that case in my edition of Haywood's
Eeports. An answer, as we all know, performs a double office, and
is both a pleading and a discovery. Sto. Eq. PI. § 850. This
distinction was noted by Sir Samuel Eomilly, then Solicitor-Gen-
eral, in his argument in the case of Lady Ormond v. Hutchinsan,
13 Ves. 50. The complainant having relied upon an admission in
the answer, the defendant seems to have insisted that the whole
answer should be read. No, said the Solicitor-General; for, al-
though the rules of evidence are the same in equity as at law,
and, if you undertake to read an answer at law you must read
the whole of it, yet, he adds: "WTien passages are read from
an answer [at the hearing in Chancery] which is replied to, it
is not produced as evidence, but to show what he has admitted,
as to which, therefore, it is unnecessary to produce evidence; as
to the rest, the plaintiff, having replied to the answer, puts him
on proof. Upon a bill for discovery only, the answer being
produced as evidence, the whole of it must be read, not a part
only." This distinction was approved by the Lord Ch. (Erskine)
in his opinion in that case. Chancellor Kent in commenting on
this language in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 91, says: "It was
said that when passages are read from an answer which is
replied to, and is not an answer to a mere bill of discovery, they
are not read as evidence, in the technical sense, but to show what
the defendant has admitted and which, therefore, need not be
proved." It is impossible to place the language of the Chancellor
and Solicitor-General in juxtaposition with that of our Supreme
Court above referred to, without seeing that the only object of the
latter was to call attention to this distinction. For, they add,
following the lead of Sir Samuel Eomilly, "the answer which
cannot be replied to is evidence for the defendant. That is the
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part of th an wer within a narrow compass, and this has been 
done in the pre ent instance. 
The conclu ion is that the complainants may insist upon the 
matters of charge in the defendant's answer without giving him 
the benefit of the matters of discharge. 
In the examination of the question discussed above, I think I 
have discovered the source of the strange dictum of our Supreme 
Court in Ragsdale v. Buford, 1 Hity. 194, that "in no case is an 
an wer replied to evidence against the plaintiff," a dictum com-
mented on by me in a note to that case in my edition of Haywood':s 
Report . An answer, a we all know, performs a double office, and 
is both a pleading and a discovery. Sto. Eq. PL § 850. This 
distinction was noted by Sir Samuel Romilly, then Solicitor-Gen-
eral, in his argument in the ca e of Lady Ormond v. Hutchinson, 
13 Ves. 50. The complainant having relied upon an admission in 
the answer, the defendant seem to have insisted that the whole 
an"wer should be read. No, aid the Solicitor-General; for, al-
though the rules of evidence are the a:rne in equity as at law, 
aind, if you undertake to read an answer at law you must read 
the whole of it, yet, he adds: "vVhen passages are read from 
an answer [at the hearing in Chancery] which is replied to, it 
i not produced as evidence, but to how what he has admitted, 
a to which, therefore, it is unnece sary to produce evidence; as 
to the re t, the plaintiff, having replied to the answer, puts him 
on proof. Upon a bill for discovery only, the an wer being 
produced as evidence, the whole of it must be read, not a part 
only." This distinction was arpproved by the Lord Ch. (Erskine) 
in hi opinion in that case. Chancellor Kent in commenting on 
thi language in Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 J. Ch. 91, says: "It was 
aid that when pa sage are read from an an wer which is 
replied to, ancl i not an an wer to a mere bill of discovery, they 
are not read a evidence, in the technical en e, but to show what 
the defendant ha admitted and which, therefore, need not be 
proved." It i impo ible to plac the language of the Chancellor 
and oli itor-General in juxtapo ition with that of our Supreme 
Court abov referred to, without ing that the only object of the 
latt r wa to call attention to thi di tin tion. For, they add, 
following the 1 ad orf ir Samu 1 Romilly, "the an wer which 
annot be repli c1 to i vid n for th defendant. That i the 
ca · of an an w r to a bill for di O\' ry. ' The language i not 
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as accurate as that of Ch. Kent, but was ineaiit to convey the same
idea, namely, that an answer on a hearing in equity is not evidence,
in a technical sense. And, it is obvious, that the court had no in-
tention to lay down general principles in conflict with their own
positive rulings, and that the compilers of our Digests have erred
in carrying the words into their Digest as absolute rulings.
In like manner, what the court say in the same case about the
bill is strictly accurate when the intention with which it is made is
kept in view. "jSFeither, they say, is more verity attributable to
a bill sworn to than to one which is not so. The oath of the plaint-
iff is required ad informandum conscientiam curice, not for the
purpose of making it evidence against his adversary who denies it."'
Neither the bill nor the answer is evidence, in a technical sense, on
the hearing of a cause in chancery, nor is either allowed to be read
in extenso under the English practice. The plaintiff only reads
such part of the answer as he relies on to support his case as admis-
sions, and the defendant reads such part of the bill he relies on as
admissions. We read the pleadings, ad informandum conscientiam
curia, in lieu of the preliminary statement of counsel required in
England. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 996.
Exceptions to Answer,
Brools V. Byam, 1 Story, 296.
Bill in equity. Tlie bill in this case states, that one Alonzo D.
Phillips obtained letters patent for the making of friction matches ;
that he sold six rights therein, that is, the right to employ six per-
sons at the same time, in the manufacture of the said matches, to
one John Brown ; and that Brown sold one such right to the plaint-
iff; but that the deeds of conveyance, both to Brown and the
plaintiff, were not recorded in the Patent Office, as the law requires.
It also states, that the defendants, claiming to be the sole assignees
of Phillips, by a deed of conveyance from him to Byam, and from
Byam to the other defendants, but of later date than the deed to
the plaintiff, had commenced a suit against him, in the Circuit
Court of the United States, for Massachusetts District, for an

















































































































































BROOKS v. BYAM 235 
a.· a ·curate a tha·t of Ch. r nt, but wa m ant to convey th ame 
idea, nam ly, that an an w r on ah aring in quity i not vidence, 
in a t hni al n . nd, it i abviou , that th ourt had no in-
t ntion to lay d wn g n ra-1 principl in conflict with th ir own 
po itive ruling , and that th oompil r of our ig t have erred 
in arr) ing the worcJ. into th ir ig t a ab olut ruling . 
In lik mann r, what th ourt ay in th am ca c about the 
bill i tri tly a curat when th intention with which ii i made i 
k pt in view. " ither, they ay, i more verity attributable to 
a bill worn to than to one which i not o. The oath of th plaint-
iIT i required ad informandum conscientiam curim, not for the 
purpo e of making it evidence again t his adversary who deni it.' 
ith r the bill nor the an w r i evidence, in a technical en e, on 
the h aring of a au in chanc ry, nor i ith r allow d to b read 
in extenso und r the Engli h practice. The praintiff only read 
such part of the an wer as he r li on to upport his c~ e a admi -
ion , and the defendant read uch part of the bill he relies on as 
a :I.mi ion . We read the pleadings, ad inf ormandum conscientiam 
urim, in lieu of the preliminary tatement of coun el required in 
England. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 996. 
ExcEPTIO TO ANSWER. 
B1·ooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 96. 
BILL in equity. Th bill in thi ca e tat , that one Alonzo D. 
Phillip obtained 1 tt r patent for the making of friction mat he ; 
that h old ix right therein, that is, the right to employ ix per-
on at the am time, in the manufacture of th aid match to 
n John Brown; and that Brown old one uch right to th plaint-
iff· but that the d d of conv anc both to rown and the 
plaintiff w r not r ord d in th Patent Office, a the law r quire . . 
t al o tate , that th d fendant , claiming to b th ole a irn e 
f hillip by a d d of onveyanc from him to Bj am an 1 fr m 
yam to the oth r d f ndant but of lat r dat than th to 
th plaintiff, ha 1 omm n e 1 a uit ac;ain t him in th 
ourt f th nit d tat for ~Ia a hu~ett i tri t for an 
alJ cl inva ion of th ir aid ric;ht; th plainti a,· rrinc;, that h 
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has done nothing therein not granted to him by the deeds from
Phillips to Brown, and from Brown to him.
It then i^roceeds to state, that at the time of the assignment from
Phillips to Byam, and before delivery of the deed, "the said Byam
was informed, and well knew, or had good cause to believe, that
the said Phillips had previously conveyed to the said John Brown
the right before mentioned, as set forth to have been so assigned
and conveyed; and that the said Brown had previously conveyed
to the plaintiff the right herein before set forth, and alleged to
have been so assigned and conveyed; and that the said Byam had
previously caused inquiry to be made, whether the said several
instruments of conveyance and assignment to the said Brown and
Brooks had been recorded." It then proceeds to allege the same
knowledge or belief, in like terms, by the other defendants, at the
time of the conveyance of their rights from Byam.
Prentiss Whitne}^, one of the defendants, whose answer is ex-
cepted to, says, that he "does not of his own knowledge know,"
whether Byam had any information, knowledge, or "any cause to
believe" the facts above stated; but that he "has been informed
by said Byam, that at the time when" (&c.), "the said Byam had
no knowledge, information, or cause to believe, that said Phillips
had made any conve^-ance to said Brown" (&c.), "and this defend-
ant has no knowledge, information, or belief, that the information
so derived from said Byam is not true." He then proceeds to say,
that 'Tie has been informed by said Byam, and verily believes, that
he did not make any inquiry," whether Brown's and the plaintiff's
were recorded, as stated in the bill.
The plaintiff filed the following exception to the answer :
"The plaintiff excepts to the answer of Prentiss Whitney, one
of the defendants in this case, because, in stating in the said an-
swer, what lie has been informed of by the said Byam, he does
not say, whether he actually believes the same to be true. And he
prays, that the said Whitney may be required to put in a better
answer in that particular. By his Solicitor, S. Greenleaf."
Story, J.:
The question arising, in this case, is upon the exception taken
by the plaintiff in equity, to the answer of Prentiss Whitney, one
of the defendants, because, in stating in his answer, what he has

















































































































































236 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWER 
ha done nothing therein not granted to him by the deeds from 
Phillips to Brown, and from Brown to him. 
It then proceed to tate, that at the time of the as ignment from 
Phillips to Byam, and before delivery of the deed, "the said Byam 
was informed, and well knew, or had good cause to believe, that 
the aid Phillip had previou ly conveyed to the aid John Brown 
the right before mention€d, a et forth to have been so a signed 
and conveyed; and that the aid Brown had previou ly conveyed 
to the plaintiff the right herein before set forth, and alleged to 
have been o assigned and conveyed; and that the said Byam had 
previou ly caused inquiry to be made, whether the said several 
in trument of conveyance and a ignment to the said Bro·wn and 
Brook had been recorded. ' It then proceed to allege the same 
knowledge or belief, in like term , by the other defendant , at the 
time of the conveyanoo of their rights from Byam. 
Prenti Whitney, one of the defendants, whose answer is ex-
cepted to, ays, that he "does not of his own knowledge know," 
whether Byam had any information, knowledge, or "any cause to 
believe" the facts above tated; but that he "has been informed 
by aid Byam, that at the time when" ( &c.), "the said Byam had 
no knowledge, information, or cau e to believe, that aid Phillip 
had mad any conveyance to aid Brown" ( &c.), "and thi defend-
ant has no knowledge, information, or belief, that the information 
so derived from aid Byam is not true." He then proceed to say, 
that ''he ha been informed by said B3 am, and verily believes, that 
he did not make any inquiry," whether Brown' and the plaintiff's 
were record d, a tated in the bill. 
The plaintiff filed the following exception to the an wer : 
"The plaintiff except to the an wer of Prentis Whitney, one 
of the d f ndant in this ca e, becau e, in tating in the said an-
swer, what he ha been informed of by the aid Byam, he does 
not ay, wheth r h a tually b lieve the am to be true. And he 
pra3 , that the aid Whitney may be r quired to put in a better 
answer in that particular. By hi Solicitor, S. Greenleaf." 
STORY, J.: 
The que tion ari ing, in this ca e, i upon the exception taken 
by the plaintiff in equity, to the an wer of Pr nti Whitney, one 
of the defendant , "becau e, in tatinO" in hi an wer what h ha 
l cen informed of 1 y B3 am ( anoth r d fendant) h doe not a · 
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whether he a<jlually believes the same to be true." Certainly, this
exception is taken in a form and manner entirely too general, to
be upheld by the Court. The exception should have stated the
charges in the bill, and the interrogatory a2)plieable thereto, to
which the answer is addressed, and then have stated the terms of
the answer verbatim, so that the Court, without searching the bill
and answer througbout, might at once have perceived the ground
of the exception, and ascertained its sufficiency. It is very properly
observed by the Vice Chancellor (Sir John Leach) in Hodgson v.
Butterfield, 2 Sim. & Stu. ^36, that "if the plaintiff complains,
that a particular interrogatory of the bill is not answered, he must
fctate the interrogatory in the very terms of it, and cannot impose
upon the Court the trouble of first determining, whether the varied
expressions of the interrogatory and the exception are to be recon-
ciled."^ To wliich it may be added, that the same rule applies in
respect to the necessity of stating the charge or fact in the bill, on
which the interrogator}' is founded; for, if the interrogatory be
irrelevant to the matters charged in the bill, the defendant need
not answer the interrogatory at all.^ The Court ought, therefore,
witbout searching through the whole bill, from the form of the
exception, to have the materials fully before it, by which to ascer-
tain at once its competency and propriety. In this respect the
exception is in itself insufficient and exceptionable. The objection,
however, has not been insisted upon at the bar.
Nothing is more clear in principle, than the rule, that in the
case of an interrogatory, pertinent to a charge in the bill, requiring
the defendant to answer it "as to his knowledge, remembra^nce,
information and belief" (which is the usual formulary), it is not
sufficient for the defendant to answer as to his knowledge; but he
must answer also, as to his infonnation and belief. The plain
reason is, that the admission may be of use to the plaintiff as proof,
if the defendant should answer as to his behef in the affirmative,
without qualification. Tlius, although a defendant should state,
that he has no knowledge of the fact charged, if he should also
state, that he has been informed and believes it to be true, or
simply, that he believes it to l)e true, without adding any qualifica-
^See also Gresley on Evid. 2i.
=Mitford Eq. PI. by Jeremy, 45; Cooper Eq. PI. 12; Gilh. For. Roman.
91. 218; Story on Equity Plead. §36; Gresley on Evid. 17 to 20, Am. edit.
1S37: Story on Equity Plead. §853; Harrison Ch. Pract. by Newland,
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whether he a: ually beli the ame to be true. Certainly, thi 
exc ption i tak n in a form and mamner entirely too general, to 
b uph ld by the iourt. The :>xception hould ha e tated the 
charge in h bill, and th int rrogatory applicable thereto, to 
which the an w r i adclre d, and th n have tat d the term of 
the an w r rbatim, o that th ourt, without earching the bill 
and an w r throughout, might at once have p rcei d the ground 
of the e ·c ption, and a certained i ufficienc) . It i \'ery properl ' 
olJ rved b th Vice Chane llor ( ir John Leach) in Hodg on v. 
Butterfield~ 2 im. & Stu. 236, that 'if the plaintiff complainn, 
that a particular int rrogatory of the bill i not an w red, he mu t 
·ta th int rrogatory in the very term of it, and cannot impo e 
upon the Court the trouble of fir t determining, whether the va·ried 
expre "ion of the interrogatory and the exception are to be recon-
cil d. 1 To which it may be added, that the ame rule applie in 
re, p ct to the nece ity of tating the charge or fact in the bill, on 
which the interrogatory i founded; for, if the interrogatory be 
irr levant to the matters charged in the bill, the defendant need 
not an wer the interrogatory at all.2 T'he ourt ought, therefore, 
without searching through the whole bill, :from the form of the 
exception, to have the materials fully before it, by which to a cer-
tain at once its competency and propriety. In thi re pect the 
exception i in it elf in ufficient and exceptionable. The objection, 
how ver, ha not been in i ted upon at th bar. 
Nothing i more clear in principle, than the rule, that in the 
ca e of an interrogatory, pertinent to a charge in the bill, requiring 
the defendant to an wer it "a to hi knowledge, r membra·nce, 
information and belief" (which i the u ual formulary), it i not 
ufficient for the def ndant to answer a to hi know ledge; but he 
mu t an wer al o, to hi information and belief. The plain 
r a on i that th admi ion may be of u to the plaintiff a proof, 
if the def ndant hould an wer a to hi belief in the affirmati"ve, 
without qualification. Thu although a def-ndant hould tate, 
that h ha no know 1 dae of the fact charged, if h hould al o 
. tate that he ha been inform d and b li e it to be true or 
impl · that h belie it to b tru , without addino- an· qualifica-
1 e al o Gre Jey on EYid. 21. 
-).litf rd Eq. Pl. by J remy, 45 · Cooper Eq. Pl. I · Gilb. F o r. Roman. 
91. 21 ; tory on Equity Pl ad. § 36 · Gre ley n Evict. 17 to 20, • m. edit. 
I ~7: tor on Equity Plead. S · Harri on Ch. Pra t. b 'ewland, 
ch. I p. I I. 
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tion thereto, such as that he does not know of it of his own knowl-
edge to be so, and therefore, he does not admit the same, it would
be taken by the Court, as a fact admitted or proved; for the rule
in equity generally (although not universally) is, that what the
defendant believes, the Court will believe.^ The rule might, per-
haps, be more exactly stated, as to its real foundation, by saying,
that whatever allegation of fact the defendant does not choose
directly to deny, but states his belief thereof, amounts to an admis-
sion on his part of its truth, or, that he does not mean to put it
in issue, as a matter of controversy in the cause. But a mere state-
ment by the defendant in his answer, that he has no knowledge,
that the fact is, as stated, without any answer, as to his belief
concerning it, will not be such an admission, as can be received as
evidence of the fact.^ Such an answer is insufficient; and, there-
fore, the defect properly constitutes a matter of exception thereto,
since it deprives the plaintiff of the benefit of an admission to
which he is justly entitled.^ However; Courts of Equity do not,
in this respect, act with rigid and technical exactness, as to the
manner, in which the defendant states his belief, or disbelief, if it
can be fairly gathered from the whole of that part of the answer,
what is, according to the intention of the defendant, the fair result
of its allegations.*
It is obvious, that in answers as to the information and belief of
the defendant, there may be, and indeed, ordinarily will be, partial
admissions and partial denials, of every shade and character, some
of which may be delivered in terms of great ambiguity and uncer-
tainty, and some mixed up with various qualifications, and at-
tendant circumstances.^ No general rule, therefore, can be laid
down, which will govern all the different classes of cases, which
may thus arise, as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of an answer
in this respect. A man may have an undoubting belief of a fact,
or he may disbelieve its existence, or he may believe it highly
probable, or merely probable, or the contrary, or he may have no
belief whatsoever, as to it. In each, of these cases, he is bound to
^2 Danicll Chan. Prac. 257; Id. 402; Gresley on Evid. 19, 20; Potter v.
Potter ( I Vcs. 274) ; Carth v. Jackson (6 Ves. 2i7, 38) ', Story on Eq.
Plead. §854.
-2 Daniell Ch. Pr. 257; Id. 402; Coop. Eq. PI. 314; Harris. Ch. Pract.
by Newl. ch. 31, p. 181.
nbid.
*2 Daniell Ch. Prac. 257; Amhurst v. Kin^ (2 Sim. & Stu. 183).

















































































































































238 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWER 
tion thereto, uch a that he doe not know of it of his own knowl-
edge to be so, and therefor , he doe not admit the same, it would 
be taken by the Court, a a fa t admitted or proved; for the rule 
in equity generally (although not universally) is, that what the 
defendant believes, the Court will believ .1 The rule might, per-
hap , be more exactly tated, a to it real foundation, by aying, 
that whatever allegation of fact the defendant doe not choose 
directly to deny, but tates his belief thereof, amounts to an admis-
ion on hi part of its truth, or, that he doe not mean to put it 
in is ue, a a matter of controver y in the cau e. But a mere tate-
ment by th d fendant in his an wer, th.at he has no knowledge, 
that the fact i , a stated, without any an wer, as to his belief 
concerning it, will not be uch an admi ion, a can be received as 
vidence of the fact. 2 Such an an wer is in ufficient; and, there-
fore, the defect properly constitute a matter of exception thereto, 
since it d prives the plaintiff of the benefit of an admission to 
which he is justly entitled.3 However; Courts of Equity do not, 
in thi resp ct, ad with rigid and technical e:xiactnes , as to the 
manner, in which the defendant states his belief, or disbelief, if it 
can be fairly gathered from the whole of that part of the answer, 
what i , according to the intention of the defendant, the fair result 
of its allegations.4 
It is obvious, that in a·nswer as to the information and belief of 
the defendant, there may be, and indeed, ordinarily will be, partial 
admissions and partial denial , of every hade and character, ome 
of which may be delivered in term of great ambiguity and uncer-
tainty, and ome mixed up with variou qualifications, and at-
tendant circum tance .5 No general rul , th refore, can be laid 
down, which will govern all the different la es of ca 86, which 
may thu ari e, a to the ufficiency or in ufficiency of an an wer 
in this r pect. A man may have an undoubting b lief of a fact, 
or he may cli b li v it xi tence, or he may b lieve it highly 
pr babl , r mer ly probabl , or the contrary, or he may have no 
belief what o v r, a to it. In ea·ch of the ca 86, he i bound to 
12 Daniell Chan. Prac. 257; Id. 402; Gresley on Evid. 19, 20; Potter v. 
Potter (I Ve . 274) ; Carth v. Jackson (6 Ve . 37, 38) ; Story on Eq. 
Plead. § 854. 
22 Dani 11 Ch. Pr. 257; Id. 402; Co p. Eq. Pl. 314; Harris. Ch. Pract. 
by N wl. ch. 31, p. 181. 
3lbid. 
42 Daniell Ch. Prac. 257; Amhurst v. Kini{ (2 Sim. & Stu. 183). 
GGresley on Evid. 2d edit. 1837. 
Brooks v. Byam 239
answer conscientiously, as to the state of his mind, in the matter
of his belief; and if he does, that is all, which a Court of Equity
will require of him. If a man truly states, that he cannot form
any belief at all respecting the truth of the fact or information,
that is sufficient, and it puts the plaintiff upon proof of it. If, on
the other hand, the defendant should state (as in the present ciase
the defendant does in effect state), that he "has no knowledge, in-
formation, or belief, that the fact or information inquired about,
is not true," or if he states (as in the present case), that he has
been informed by a party, and verily believes, that such party did
not possess any knowledge, information, or belief of the fact, which
the interrogatory points out; in each of these cases, it seems to
me, that the answer, if expressive of the true state of mind of the
defendant, might at least, for some purposes, be held sufficient.
But, then, if such language were unaccompanied by any other
qualifications, or explanations, I should understand, that the de-
fendant did mean to assert his belief of the truth of the informa-
tion or statement of fact, because, if he had no knowledge, in-
formation, or belief, that it is not true, he must be presumed to
give credit to it; and if he did not intend so to be understood,
it would be his duty to say in express terms, that he had no belief
about the matter ; and he ought not to be allowed to shelter himself
behind equivocal, or evasive, or doubtful terms, and thereby to mis-
lead the plaintiff to his injury. And this leads me to remark, and
it is the real and only point of difficulty, which I have felt upon
the exception, whether, although the plaintiff may agree to take
and accept such an admission, interpreting it as affirmative of the
defendant's telief, if in that sense it would be beneficial to himself,
he is positively bound to receive it, when it is clearly susceptible of
a different, or even of an opposite interpretation, which may affect
the nature and extent of his proofs at the hearing of the cause.
Uj)on full reflection, I think, that he is not positively bound to
receive it, although certainly I should interpret it as an affinnative,
if it would be favoral)le for the plaintiff; but he has a right to
require, that the defendant should state in direct terms, or, at
least, in unequivocal terms, either that he does believe, or that he
does not believe the matter inquired of, or that he cannot form
any belief, or has not any belief concerning the matter, and ac-
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an w r on ci ntiou ly) to th ta of hi mind) in the matter 
of hi belief; and if h doe ) that i all) which a iourt of 1 iuity 
will r quire of him. If a man truly tate ) that h cannot form 
any b li f at all r p ting th truth of the fa ·t or inf rmation) 
that i ufficient, an 1 it put th plaintiff upon proof of it. f) n 
th oth r hand) th clef n ant hould tate (a in th pr nt ca e 
th d f ndant do in ffect tat ) , that h ha no knowl 1 in-
formation) or b li f, tha h fact or information inquir d about, 
i , not tru ) or if he tate (a in the pre nt case), that he ha 
be n informed by a party, an 1 verily believe ) that uch party did 
not po any knowl clg , information, or beli f of th fa t, which 
the int rrogafor I int out; in ach of th e ca , it m to 
m , that th an w r if xpr ive of the true tate of mind of the 
def ndant, might at 1 a t, for ome purp-0 e , be held uffi ·ient. 
But, th n, if u h language were unaccompanied by any other 
qu lifrcation , or e rplanation , I ' hould under tancl, that ih de-
f nc1ant did mean to a ert hi b lief of the truth of the informa-
tion or tatement of fact, becau e, if he had no knowleclg , in-
formation, or beli f, that it i not true, he mu t be pr urned to 
give er clit to it; and if he did not intend o t.o be und rtoocl, 
it would be hi duty to ay in expre term , that he had no b lief 
about th matter; and he ought not to be allow d to helter him eH 
behind equi ocal, or vasive, -or doubtful term , and thereb to mi -
lead the plaintiff to hi injury. And thi lead me to remark and 
it i th r al and only point of difficulty, which I ha e felt upon 
the e c ption, wh ther although the pla·inti:ff may agTee to take 
and ace pt uch an admi ion, interpreting it a affirmative of the 
def ndant belief, if in that n it would be b ne:ficial to him elf, 
h i po iti ely bound to recei e it, wh n it i cl arly u ceptible of 
a different, or e en of an oppo it interpretation whi h ma) a·ff ct 
th natur and xtent of hi pr of at the h aring of th au" . 
pon full r fie tion, I think, that h i not po ~itiv ly bound to 
r iv it although rtainly I houlcl int rpr t it a an affirmative 
if it would b fa orabl for th plain iff; but h ha ~ a ricrht to 
r quir , that th d f ndant hould tate in dir t t rm~ r at 
l a t in un quivo al t rm ith r that he do b li r h· t hv 
1 not b lieve th matt r in uir d f or that h ann t form 
an , b li f or ha not an b li f con rning h matt r and a -
ording a th an w r hall b the on 11a · or th th r that h 
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calls uiDon the plaintiff for proof thereof, or he admits it, or he
waives any controversy about it.
Upon this ground my opinion is, that the exception is well
founded, at least, as to some of the allegations in the answer. It
may, perhaps, be sufficient for the Court merely in this general
manner to intimate its present opinion upon the case; and it will
be easy for the counsel to make its application to the various parts
of the answer comi)lained of. But to make myself more clearly
understood, I wish to give an illustration of the principle, drawn
from the present bill and answer, especially as the nature of the
objection may thereby be seen in a more strong and exact light.
The object of the bill is to obtain, among other things, a per-
petual injunction to a suit now pending, on the Law side of this
Court, brought by the defendants in the bill (Byam and others)
against the plaintiff (Brooks), for violation of a patent, which
they claim title to, as assignees of the patentee ; and, among other
charges, the bill for this purj^ose alleges, that the original patentee
(Alonzo D. Phillips) had before his assignment to these parties
assigned a limited right therein to one John Brown, under whom
the defendant claims a still more limited title, as a sub-purchaser
pro tanto, and insists that his acts done in supposed violation of
the patent, are rightfully done under this sub-title. The patent is
alleged to bear date on the 2-ith of October, 1837 ; the assignment
to Brown, on the 2d of January, 1837; the assignment to Brooks,
on the 18th of September, 1837; but it was not recorded until the
15th of July, 1839; and the assignment to Byam, on the 38th day
of July, 1838, under whom the other defendants (Whitney and
others) derive title, which was only recorded within the time pre-
scribed by law, whereas the assignment to Brown was not. Under
these circumstances the bill charges, that Byam at the time of the
assignment to him and the other defendants (and, among them,
Whitney) at the time of the assignment to them by Byam, had
knowledge and information, and good cause of belief of the prior
assignment to Brown. And in the interrogatory part of the bill
the defendants are required "full, true, direct, particular, and per-
fect answer and discovery to make, and that not only according
to the best of their knowledge, but to the best of their respective
information, hearsay, and belief, to all and singular the matters
and allegations and charges aforesaid."
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call upon the plaintiff for proof thereof, or he admits it, or he 
waives any controversy a:bout it. 
Upon thi ground my opinion i , thart the exception i well 
founded, at lea t, as to ome of the allegations in the an wer. 1t 
may, perhap , be sufficient for the Court merely in this general 
manner to intimate its pre ent opinion upon the case; and it will 
be a y for the coun el to make it application to the variou parts 
of the an wer complained of. But to make my elf more clearly 
under tood, I wi h to give an illustration of the principle, drawn 
from the pre ent bill and an wer, pecially as the nature of the 
objection may thereby be een in a more trong and exact light. 
The object of the bill is to obtain, among other things, a per-
petual injunction to a suit now pending, on the Law ide of this 
Court, brought by the defendants in the bill (Byam and others ) 
again t the plaintiff (Brooks), for violation of a paiten t, which 
they claim title to, as as ignees of the patentee; and, among· other 
charge , the bill for thi purpose alleges, that the original patentee 
(Alonzo D. Phillips) hail before his a ignment to these parties 
assigned a limited right therein to one John Brown, under whom 
the defendant claims a till more limited title, as a sub-purchaser 
pro tanto_, and in ist:s that his acts done in supposed violation of 
the patent, are rightfully done under this sub-title. The patent is 
alleged to bear date on the 24th of October, 1837; the assignment 
to Brown, on the 2d of January, 1837; the a ignment to Brook , 
on the 18th of ptember, 1837; but it wa not recorded until the 
15th of July, 1839; and the assignment to Byam, on the 28th day 
of July, 1838, under whom the oth r defendant (Whitney and 
other ) derive title, which was only r corded within th time pre-
s ·rib cl by law wherea the a ignment to Brown wa not. Und r 
th ~ circum tanc the bill cha·rges, that Byam at the time of the 
a jgnment to him and the other defendants (and, among them, 
Whitney) at the time of the a ignment to th m by Byam, had 
knowl dg and information, and good cau e of belief of the prior 
a , i nm nt to rown. nd in the interrogatory pa-rt of the bill 
the def ndant ar r quir d "full, tru , dir ct, particular, and per-
f ct an w r and di overy to make, and that not only a cording 
t the b t of th ir kno·wl dge, but to the b t of their r p cti 
information, hearsay, and b lief, to all and ingular the matter 
and all gation and charge aforesaid." 
ow th an w r of th d f ndant W11itney ( whi h i .·cep 1 
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to), states, that he (the defendant) does not of his own knowledge
know, whether, at the time of the assignment to Byam, he (Byam)
had any information, or knowledge, or had any cause to believe,
that Phillips had previously made any conveyance to Brown, or
Brown to the plaintiff (Brooks) as alleged in the bill; but this
defendant has been informed by said Byam, that at the time, when
the said Phillips conveyed and assigned to him all his right and
interest in and to the patent right, the said Byam had no knowl-
edge, information, or cause to believe, that the said Phillips had
made any conveyance to the said Brown, or that the said Brown
had made any conveyance to the complainant ; and this defendant
has no knowledge, information, or belief, that the information so
derived from the said Byam is not true. Now, it is to the matter
and form of this last clause (and a like allegation is to be found in
other parts of the answer), that the objection is taken by the ex-
ception. The argument is, that the clause is ambiguous; that it
does not assert, in direct terms, that the defendant believed or
disbelieved the statement of Byam ; or that the defendant had no
belief, or was unable to form any belief about the matter, and,
therefore, required the plaintiff to prove the knowledge, informa-
tion, or belief of Byam at the time of the assignment to him. So
that, in fact, the defendant, by the form of his allegation, does
not positively put the asserted fact in controversy, as to the knowl-
edge, information, or belief of Byam, by affirming his own belief
of Byam's statement; neither does he dispense with the proof
thereof, by denying his ow^n belief thereof ; neither does he assert,
that he is unable to form any belief upon the subject, and therefore
calls for proof of the allegation of the bill on this point; but he
leaves the matter in a state of am'biguity and open to different
interpretations, as to the true intent and meaning of the answer.
It appears to me, that in this view the exception is well founded.
When the defendant says, that he "Tias no knowledge, information,
or belief, that the information so derived from the said Byam is
not true," he merely pronounces a negative, which may, indeed,
in some sort amount to a negative pregnant, arguendo, that, as he
has no information or belief, that it is not true, therefore he be-
lieves it to be true, which would certainly be a natural, although
not an irresistible presumption. But it seems to me, that the
plaintiff has a right to more than this; to know, whether the
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to), states, that he (the d f ndant) do not of hi own knowledge 
I now, wh ther, at the time of th as ignm nt to Byam, he ( yam) 
had an information, or knowl dg , or had any cau e to b li ve, 
that l illip had pr viou ly made any conveyance to Brown, or 
rown to th plaintiff ( rook ) a alleged in the bill; l ut thi 
cl f ndant ha be n informed by aid yam, that at the tim , when 
th aid hillip onvey d and a igned to him all hi right and 
intere t in and to the patent right, th aid Byam had no lmowl-
lg , information, or cau e to beli v , that the aid hillip had 
made any onv yanc to the aid Brown, or that the aid rown 
ha l made any onveyanc to the complainant; and thi defendant 
h, no knowledge, information, or belief, that the information o 
d rived from the aid B)am i not true. Jow, it i to the matter 
and form of thi la t lau e (and a like allegation i to be found in 
other part of the an w r), that the objection i taken by the ex-
ption. The argument is, that the clau e is ambiguou ; that it 
do not a ert, in direct term , that the defendant beli ved or 
di b liev d the tatement of Byam; or that the defendant had no 
belief, or wa unable to form any belief about the matter, and, 
ther for , r quired th plaintiff to prove the knowledge, informa-
tion or belief of Byam at the time of the a ignment to him. o 
that, in fact, the defendant, by the form of hi allegation, does 
not po itively put th as erted fact in controversy, a to the knowl-
edg information, or belief of Byam, by affirming hi own belief 
of Byam's tatement; neither doe he di pen e with the proof 
th reof, by denying hi own belief thereof; neither doe he a rt, 
that he i una:ble to form any belief upon the ubject, and th refore 
all for proof of the allegation of the bill on thi point; but he 
1 av the matter in a tate of ambiguity and open to different 
intcrpr t.ation , a to the tru int nt and meaning of the an wer. 
t app ar to me that in thi vi w the exc ption i well founded. 
\\h n th d fendant a· ' , that h "ha no knowl dcr information, 
or b li f that the information o d ri-ved from the aid B ·am i 
n t tru ' h mer 1 pronounce a n ati which ma3 ind d, 
in ome ort amount to a n crativ pr gnant arguendo that a h 
ha n information or lief that it i not true th r for h b 
li e it to be true, which would c rtainl_ b a natural althou h 
not an irr i tibl pr umption. ut it m to m , hat th 
plaintiff ha .. a right to more than thL · o know wh ther the 
d f ndant him elf ha I lac onfid n in th ~tat m nt or not 
16 
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or whether his mind haugs in dubio, and he is unable to form any
belief either way. In the latter case, certainly, less evidence would
be necessary to infer presumptively the knowledge, information,
or belief of Byam himself, than if the defendant himself believed
Byam's statement, and acted upon that belief; for a Court is not
bound, in favor of a defendant, to have a more confident belief
in a party, than the defendant himself professes to have. But
what I rely on is, that the defendant, by such a form of answer,
leaves it entirely equivocal, whether he believes, or is unable to
form any belief ; and the plaintiff has a right to know positively,
which of the two is his real predicament.
The exception, therefore, on this jDoint, ought to be allowed.
Stafford v. Brown, Jf Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 88. (1833.)
This case came before the court upon exceptions to the master's
report allowing certain exceptions to the defendants' answer.
The Chancellor:
The question which arises upon the five first exceptions allowed
by the master, is, whether there are any allegations or interroga-
tories in the complainant's bill to authorize him to call upon the
defendants to answer the several matters of those exceptions. In
the case of V/liitmarsli v. Morris & Camphell, and in some other
cases, none of which have been reported, this court decided that
exceptions to an answer for insufficiency could not be sustained,
unless there was some material allegation, charge or interrogatory
contained in the bill, which was not fully answered. That where
new matter, not responsive to the bill, was stated in the answer,
if such matter was wholly irrelevant and formed no sufficient
ground of defence, the complainant might except to the answer
for impertinence, or might raise the objection at the hearing. All
the writers on the subject of equity pleading, lay down the prin-
ciple, distinctly, that exceptions for insufficiency are founded upon
the supposition that some material allegation, charge or interroga-
tory in the complainant's bill, is not fully answered. In Lord
Redesdale's Treatise it is said, that if the complainant conceives
an answer to be insufficient to the charges contained in the bill,

















































































































































2-±2 EXCEPTIO:N"S TO A SWER 
or whether his mind hangs in dubio, and he i unable to form any 
belief either way. In the latter case, certainly, less evidence would 
be nece ary to infer pre umptively the knowledge, informatiou, 
or belief of Byam him elf, than if the defendant himself believed 
Byam's tatement, and act d upon that belief; for a Court is not 
bound, in favor of a defendant, to have a more confident belief 
in a party, than the defendant him elf profes e to have. But 
what I rely on i , that the d·efendant, by such a form of answer, 
leaves it entirely equivocal, whether he believes, or is unable to 
form any belief; and the plaiinti:ff has a right to kna.w positively, 
which of the two is his real predicament. 
The exception, therefore, on this point, ought to be allowed. 
Stafford v. Brown, 4 Paige Oh. (N. Y.) 88. (1833.) 
This ca e came before the court upon ex.ceptions to the master's 
report allowing certain exceptions to the defendants' answer. 
THE CHANCELLOR : 
The question which airises upon the five first exceptions allowed 
by the master, i , whether there are any allegations or interroga-
tories in the complainant's bill to authorize him to call upon the 
defendants to an wer the everal matters of those exception . In 
the case of Whitmarsh v. Morris & Campbell, and in some other 
cases, none of which have been reported, this court decided that 
exceptions to an answer for insufficiency could not be sustained, 
unle there wa ome material allegation, charge or interrogatory 
contained in the bill, which was not fully answered. That where 
new matter, not re ponsive to the bill, was tated in the answer, 
if uch matter wa wholly irrelevant and form d no sufficient 
ground of defence, th complainant might except to the an w r 
for impertinence, or might rai e the obj ction at the hearing. All 
the writer on the ubject of equity pl ading, la~r down the prin-
ipl , di tinctly, that xception for in ufficiency ar founded upon 
th uppo ition that om material all gation charge or interroga-
tory in the compla1inant' bill, i not fully an w r d. In Lord 
R d dale' Treati e it i said, that if th complainant cone iv 'S 
an an wer to b in ufficient to the charge contain d in the bill, 
h may take exceptions t-0 it tating u h part of the bill a he 
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conceives are not answered, and praying that the defendant may
in such respects put in a full answer to the bill. (Mitf. PL 4 Lond.
cd. 315.)* Cooper says, the exceptions for insufficiency are to
l)e in writing, stating the parts of the bill which the complainant
alleges are not answered. (Cooper's PI. 319.) Xewland also says,
that exceptions for insufficiency are allegations in writing, stating
the particular points or matters in the bill which the defendant
has not sufficiently answered. (1 Newl. I'r. 3 Lond. ed. 259.)
And Lube, in his analysis of the principles of equity pleading,
says the exception must state the precise points in the bill un-
answered, or which are imperfectly answered. (Lube's Eq. PL
87.) Although it may not be necessary in the exception to state
the precise words of the allegation, charge or interrogatory in the
bill, which is not fully answered, yet the substance at least must be
stated; so that by referring to the bill alone, in connection with
the exception, the court may see that the peculiar matters to which
a further answer is sought, are stated in the bill, or that such an
answer is called for by the interrogatories. (See Hodgson v. But-
tcrp.cld, 2 Sim. & Stu. 23G.) As the general denial of all the
matters of the bill not before answered, with which the answer
usually concludes, is sufficient as a pleading to put the several
matters of the bill in issue, the principal object of the exceptions
for insufficiency is to examine the defendant on oath, for the pur-
pose of discovery merely. For this purpose the complainant may
even anticipate the defence of the defendant, and may obtain a
*An insufficient answer, is no answer. (M'Laughlin's Adm'r v. Daniel,
8 Dana, 184.) [Vide 8 Ves. 87; Story's Eq. PI. 465, 469, 646, 647, 648, 649.]
It has been held that an answer clearly evasive on its face, and no reason
assigned, should be considered a contempt of court. (lb.) [I'idc 14 Ves.
415.] Where an answer is believed to be designedly defective, for the pur-
pose of imposing on the plaintiff the burthen of proving what the defend-
ant is, in conscience, bound to admit, the proper course is to except to the
answer, and compel the defendant to put in a complete one. {Luini v.
Jolmson. 3 Iredell's Eq. Rep. 70.) An exception to an answer for insuffi-
ciency, should state the charges in the bill, the interrogatory applicable
thereto, to which the answer is responsive, and the terms of the answer
verbatim. (Brooks v. Byam. i Story's Rep. 297.) Exceptions to an an-
swer do not lie for irregularities in the practice. (Vcrmilyea v. Christie,
4 Sandf. Ch. Rep. 376.) By excepting for insufficiency, the complainant
necessarily assumes that the answer is valid, and properly before the court,
(lb.) The verification of an answer taken abroad, it was alleged, was not
properly authenticated, whereupon the complainant excepted to certain
portions of the answer for insufficiency, relying solely upon its being no
answer, by reason of the defect in its verification. Held, that he had mis-


















































































































































24J: Exceptions to Answer
discovery of matters connected with sucli defence, which are in
nowise responsive to the main charges in the bill upon which the
complainant's equity is supposed to rest. The proper method of
obtaining such discovery, however, is not by exceptions for in-
sufficiency founded upon the answer alone, but by framing the
bill in such a manner as to call for all the particulars of the defence
which it is supposed the defendant will set up. This is effected by
what is usually called the charging part of the bill, in which the
anticipated defence is stated as a pretence of the defendant, sup-
ported by proper charges and interrogatories founded upon such
alleged pretence. In this way the complainant is not only enabled
to anticipate the defence itself, by putting other matters in issue
which will have the effect to displace the equity thereof, but he
is also enabled to examine the defendant on interrogatories in
relation to all the particulars of such defence. (Mitford, 43;
Lube's Eq. PL 241, 268.) By an amendment of the bill the
complainant may generally effect the same object, even after the
defendant has put in an answer setting up such defence.
In the case under consideration the complainant, in his bill,
has stated the recovery of a judgment against the defendant E.
Brown, on which an execution has been returned unsatisfied. But
as he has left the question of present indebtedness to be presumed,
as an inference of law arising from the facts thus stated, the
defendants were not called upon to do more than to admit the facts
as stated in the bill. The admission, however, did not preclude
them from rebutting this legal presumption of indebtedness by
setting up, as a distinct matter of defence, the payment of the
judgment either wholly or in part. But as this part of the answer
was not called for by the bill and was not responsive to anything
contained therein, it would be no evidence in favor of the defend-
ants unless established by proof. If the complainant had stated
in the bill that the defendants pretended that E. Brown had paid
the whole or part of the judgment, and charged that such pretence
was unfounded, he might in the interogatory part of the bill, have
called for all the particulars as to the time, place, amount and
manner of such pretended payment. But in that case the answer
would have been evidence in favor of the defendants, as to the
matters they were thus called upon to answer. Nothing should
be permitted to remain in an answer, which is neither called for
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discovery of matters connected with such defence, which are in 
nowise-responsive to the main charges in the bill upon which the 
complainant's equity is supposed to rest. The prnper method of 
obtaining such discovery, however, is not by exception for in-
sufficiency founded upon the answer alone, but by framing the 
bill in such a manner a to caill for all the particulars of the defence 
which it is supposed the defendant will set up. This is effected by 
what is usually called the char:ging part of the bill, in which the 
anticipated defence i stated as a pretence of the defendant, sup-
ported by proper charges and interrogatories founded upon such 
alleged pretence. In this way the complainant is not only enabled 
to anticipate the defence itself, by putting other matters in issue 
which will have the effect to displace the equity thereof, but he 
is also enabled to examine the defendant on interrogatories in 
relwtion to all the particulars of such defence. (Mitford, 43 ; 
Lube's Eq. Pl. 241, 268.) By an amendment of the bill the 
complainant may generally effect the same object, even after the 
defendant has put in an answer setting up such defence. 
In the case under consideration the complainant, in his bill, 
has stated the recovery of a judgment against the defendant E. 
Brown, on which an execution has been returned unsatisfied. But 
as he has left the question of present indebtedness to be presumed, 
as an inference of law arising from the facts thus stated, the 
defendant.s were not called upon to do more than to admit the facts 
as stated in the bill. The admission, however, did not preclude 
them from rebutting this legal presumption of indebtedness by 
setting up, as a distinct maitter of defence, the payment of the 
judgment either wholly or in part. But as this part of the answer 
was not called for by the bill and was not responsive to anything 
contained therein, it would be no evidence in favor of the defend-
ants unl e tabli hed by proof. If the complainant had stated 
in the bill that the defendants pretended that E. Brown had paid 
the whole or part o.f the judgment, and charged that uch pr tence 
wa unfounded, he might in th interogatory part of the bill, have 
called for all the particulars as to the time, place, amount and 
manner of such pretend cl payment. But in that cas the answer 
would have be n vicl nee in favor of the defendant , a · to the 
matters they were thu called upon to answer. Nothing should 
be permitted to r main in an an w r which i neith r called for 
by the bill, nor material to the defence or with reference to any 
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decree or order which may be made in the cause. But the proper
mode of maJving the objection to any such immaterial statement
with a view to have it expunged, is by excepting to the answer
for impertinence.
As the whole of the discovery called for by the five first excep-
tions allowed by the master, was founded upon new matters set
up by the defendants in their answer, by way of defence, those
exceptions should have been disallowed.
The matters of the ninth, twelfth and thirteenth exceptions, are
fully answered, so far as any foundation was laid for those excep-
tions by the allegations in the bill; and so far as the exceptions
went beyond the bill they were inadmissible. So much of the
master's report as was excepted to by the defendants, must therefore
be overruled, with costs. And if the complainant does not think
proper to amend his bill within ten days, as authorized by the
190th rule of this court, the defendants must answer the matters
of the eighth, tenth and eleventh exceptions within the time

















































































































































STAFFORD v. DROWN 245 
decree or order which may be made in the cause. But the proper 
mode of making the objection to any such immaterial tatement 
with a view to have it expunged, is by excepting to the answer 
for impertinence. 
A th whol of the di covery called for by the five fir t excep-
tion allow d by the ma t r, wa founaed upon n w matters et 
up by the defendants in their an w r, by way of defence, those 
exception hould have been di allowed. 
The matter of th ninth, twelfth and thirteenth xc ption , are 
fully answer d, o far as any foundation was laid for tho e excep-
tion by the allegations in the bill; amd o far a the exceptions 
went beyond the bill they were inadmis ible. So much of the 
ma ter's report as was excepted to by the defendant , must therefore 
be overruled, with costs. And if the complainant does not think 
proper to amend his bill within ten days, as authorized by the 
190th rule of this court, the defendants must answer the matters 
of the eighth, tenth and eleventh exceptions within the time 
pecified in the report of the master. 
V
CHAPTER VII.
FUETHER PROCEEDIXGS OX PART OF PLAINTIFF.
Replication.
Mason v. Hartford By. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 334. (1882.)
lu Equity. Decision upon defendants' motions to strike replica-
tions from the files, and to dismiss bill of revivor, and upon com-
plainants' motion to withdraw replications, and amend bill of
revivor.
Colt, D. J. :
In this cause a bill of revivor was filed August 1-i, 1880, by the
alleged administrators and trustees of Earl P. Mason, the original
complainant. To this bill one of the defendants, William T. Hart,
put in a plea, setting up that it did not appear by said bill of
revivor that the plaintiffs named therein had ever been appointed
administrators of said estate by any court of competent jurisdiction
in the state of Massachusetts, and that therefore the plaintiffs had
no right to file said bill, that the court had no jurisdiction thereof,
and praying that the bill might be dismissed. The New York &
New England Railroad Company, another defendant, demurred
to the bill upon this as well as other grounds. To this plea and
demurrer the complainants in the bill of revivor filed separate
replications, setting out, among other things, that since the filing
of the plea and demurrer they had been appointed administrators
of the estate of the said Earl P. Mason in the state of Massa-
chusetts.
The defendant William T. Hart now moves — First, that the
replication to his plea be stricken from the files, because it is
special, and sets up new matter, and matter accruing after the
filing of the bill of revivor; and, second, that the bill of revivor
be dismissed, because the complainants have not taken issue on
the plea, nor set the same down to be argued, though the same has
been filed more than a year.



















































































































































FURTHER PROCEEDINGS O~ PART OF PLAINTIFF. 
REPLICATION. 
Mason . Hartford Ry. Go., 10 Fed. Rep. 334. (1882.) 
In Equit:J. Deci ion upon defenda:nt ' motion to trike replica-
tion from the files, and to di mi bill of revivor, and upon com-
plainant ' motion to withdraw replication , and amend bill of 
rev1vor. 
COLT, D. J.: 
In thi cau e a bill of revivor wa filed Augu t 14, 1880, by the 
alleged admini trator and trustee of Earl P. Ma on, the original 
complainant. To thi bill one of the defendant William T. Hart, 
put in a I lea, etting up that it did not appear by aid bill of 
revivor that the plaintiff named therein had ever been appointed 
admini trator of aid e tate by any court of competent juri diction 
in the tate of Ma sa hu ett , and that therefore the plaintiffs had 
no right to file aid bill, that the court had no juri diction thereof 
and praying that th bill might be dismi ed. The New York & 
New England Railroad Company, another defendant, demurred 
to the bill upon this a well a other ground . To thi plea and 
demurrer the complainant in the bill of revivor filed eparate 
r plication , etting out, among other thing , that ince the filing 
of the plea and demurrer they had been appointed admini trator. 
of th tate of the aid Earl P. Ma on in th tate of Ma a-
chu ett . 
The fendant William T. Hart now mov -Fir t that the 
r plication to hi plea b trick n from th fil becau e it i 
p cia-1 and t up new matt r, and matt r accruing after the 
filing of th bill of r vi or· and econd that the bill of revivor 
b di mi ed b cau th complainant ha e not taken i ue on 
the plea, nor et the ame down to b argued though the same has 
b en :fil d mor than a year. 
'1'he _ ew York T w Eno-land Railr ad ompany al o move 
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that the replication to the demurrer be stricken from the files,
and that the bill of revivor l;e dismissed, because the complainants
have not set the demurrer down for argument, though filed over
one 3'ear before.
It is apparent that the replications here filed are special, setting
up new matter, and matter accruing since the filing of the bill of
revivor; therefore they are irregular. By equity rule 45, of the
United States court, "no special replication to any answer shall be
filed."
In Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet. 252, 274, the supreme court declare
that no special replication can l3e filed except by leave of the court ;
holding it to be contrary to the rules of a court of chancery for the
plaintiff to set up new matter necessary to his case by way of repli-
cation ; that omissions in a bill cannot be supplied by averments in
the replication; and that a plaintiff cannot be allowed to make out
a new case in his replication. This is equally true whether it is an
answer or plea that is replied to. See Daniell Ch. PL & Pr. (4th
Ed.) 828, note 1. "Matters in avoidance of a plea, which have
arisen since the suit began, are properly set up by a supplemental
bill, not by a special replication"; citing Chouteau v. Rice, 1 Minn.
lOG. In Mitford & Tyler, PI. & Pr. in Eq. 412, 413, we find,
"special replications, with all their consequences, are now out of
use, and the plaintiff is to be relieved according to the form of the
bill, whatever now matters have been introduced by the defendant's
plea or answer." The replications to the plea and demurrer can-
not be sustained.
The second motion of the defendants, that the bill of revivor be
dismissed, is based upon equity rule 38, which provides that if the
plaintiff shall not reply to any plea, or set down any plea or de-
murrer for argument, on the rule-day when the same is filed, or on
the next succeeding rule-day, he shall be deemed to admit the truth
and sufficiency thereof, and his bill shall be dismissed as of course,
unless a judge of the court shall allow him further time for the
purpose.
It appears in this case that the bill of revivor was filed August
14, 1880; the plea and demurrer, September 6, 1880; the repli-
cations, July 30, 1881; and that soon after (August 4th) the
plaintiffs' counsel asked the court to fix a day for the argument.
It further appears that after the filing of the plea and demurrer,
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that th r plica ion to th d murrer be trjcken from the file , 
and that th bill of revivor 1 i mi d, becau e the complainant 
hav not t th d murrer do-vvn f r argument, though filed o er 
one y ar for . 
It i appar nt that th r plication h re filed are pecial, etting 
up new matt r and matter accruing in th filing of th bill of 
r evi or; h r fore they ar irr gular. By equity rule 45, of the 
Unit l tat ourt, "no p cial r plication to any an w r haU be 
fil d.' 
In Vattier v. Hinde, 7 P t. 52, 74, the upreme court declare 
that no pecial r plication can be filed except by leave of the court ; 
holding it to b contrar to the rule of a court of chancer for the 
plaintiff to t up n w matter nee ary to hi ca e by wa of repli-
cation · that omi ion in a bill cannot b uppli d by av rm nt in 
the r plication · and that a plaintiff cannot b allowed to make out 
a new ca e in hi r eplication. Thi i equally true whether it i an 
an w r or pl a that i replied to. ee Dani ll Oh. Pl. & Pr. (4th 
Ed.) , not 1. "Matter in avoidance of a plea, which hav 
ari en ince the uit began ar properly et up b a upplemental 
bill not by a pecial repliootion' ; citing Chouteau v. Rice, 1 Minn. 
106. In Mitford & T yler, Pl. & Pr. in Eq. 41 , 413 we find 
"pecial replication , with all their con equ nee , are now out of 
tre and the plain tiff i to be relieved according to the form of the 
bill whatever new matter have been introdu ed by the defendant 
pl a or an wer." The replication to the plea and demurrer can-
not be u tained. 
The ond motion of the defendants, that the bill of revivor be 
di mi d i ba d upon quity rul 3 whi h pro ide that if the 
plaintiff hall not r eply to any pl a or et down any plea or de-
murrer for argum nt, on th rule-day wh n th ame i filed or on 
th n t u ce ding rul -da3 h hall b deemed to admit the truth 
and uffi i n y th r of and hi bill hall be di mi ed a of cour e 
unl a judg of the court hall aUow him further time for the 
purpo . 
It app ar in thi ca e that the bill of revi vor wa ~ :fil d ~ u cru.::t 
1-1:, 1 0 · th pl a and d murr r ptember 6 1 · th r pli-
July 30 1 1 · and that oon after ( ucru t -± h) th 
plain i oun 1 a ked th ourt to fix a day for the anrument. 
H forth r app ar that after th filing f th pl a and demurr r 
pt m r 1 a tipulation "as; nt red into b · ouns 1 upon 
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both sides extending the time for hearing to the November rule-
day, 1880, meantime the complainants to be allowed to file proper
pleadings in reply to said plea and demurrer. By further written
arguments between counsel the postponement provided for by this
stipulation was extended monthly until February, 1881. Then
we find a further stipulation as follows :
"It is hereby agreed that no movement on either side shall be
made "in this cause until May, 1881, without prejudice to com-
plainants' right to file evidence of appointment as administrators
in Boston."
By the affidavit of Mr. Payne, one of complainants' counsel, it
appears that in October or November, 1880, Mr. Lothrop, one of
defendants' counsel, stated, in effect, that while he would sign the
stipulation, the complainants' counsel might take their own time
about bringing the case to a hearing.
In the light of all these circumstances it is fair to presume that
complainants' counsel understood that any rigid enforcement of the
rule now invoked had been waived, impliedly by acts and conduct,
if not in express terms; and we are of this opinion.
Considering the repeated postponements which had taken place,
for the mutual accommodation of both sides, so far as appears, the
language used by defendants' counsel as to time of hearing; and
bearing also in mind that the replications were filed within three
months after May, 1881; and that within a week thereafter the
plaintiffs moved the court to set a time for hearing, — it would, we
think, be inequitable to allow the defendants' motion to dismiss to
prevail. Indirectly, as bearing on this question of laches, reference
is made to the fact that the original bill in this case was brought in
1871, the answer filed in 1873, the replication not put in until
1875; also, that the original complainant died in 1876, and that
the bill of revivor was not brought until 1880. In answer to this
charge, the complainants say that the delay has been owing to the
pendency of another suit in the state court of Rhode Island,
the determination of whicli might affect the prosecution of this
suit, and that, consequently, the delay was acquiesced in by both
sides. They further state that within a short time after the final
decision by tlic Ehode Island state court the bill of revivor was
filed, and that they are now anxious to speed the cause. Under
these circumstances, and in tbe absence of any motion on the part


















































































































































both sides extending the time for hearing to the November rule-
day, 18 0, meantime the complainants to be a1lowed to file proper 
pleading in r ply to aid plea and demurrer. By further writi;en 
argument between counsel the po tponement provided for by this 
tipulation wa extended monthly until February, 1881. Then 
we find a further tipulation a follows: 
"It is hereby agreed that no movement on either side shall be 
made ·in thi cause until May, 1881, without prejudice to com-
plainants' right to file evidence of appointment as admini trators 
in Boston." 
By the affidavit of Mr. Payne, . one of complainants' counsel, it 
appea·rs that in October or November, 1880, Mr. Lothrop, one of 
defendants' counsel, tated, in effect, that while he would ign the 
stipulation, the complainants' counsel might take their own time 
about bringing the case to a hearing. 
In the light of all these circumstances it is fair to presume that 
complainants' counsel understood that any rigid enforcement of the 
rule now invoked had been waived, impliedly by acts and conduct, 
if not in express terms; and we are of this opinion. 
Considering the repeated postponements which had taken place, 
for the mutual accommodation of both ides, so far as appea·rs, the 
language u ed by defendants' coun el as to time of hearing; and 
bearing al o in mind that the replications were filed within three 
months a.fter May, 1881; and that within a week thereafter the 
plaintiffs moved the court to set a time for hearing,-it would, we 
think, be inequitabl to allow the defendant ' motion to dismi to 
prevail. Indirectly, as bearing on this question of laches, reference 
i made to the fact that the original bill in thi case was brought in 
1871, the a·nsw r filed in 1873, the r plication not put in until 
1 5; al o that the original complainant died in 1876, and that 
the bill of revivor wa not brought until 18 0. In an w r to thi5 
charge, th complainant ay that the delay ha b en owing to the 
pendency of anoth r uit in th tat court of Rhode I lant1, 
th det rmination of which might a:ff ct the pro e ution of thi. 
suit, and that, on equently, th d lay wa a qui c d in by 1 oth 
sid . Th y furth r tat that within a hart tim aft r the final 
d i ion y th Rh d I land tat ourt th bill of revivor wa, 
fil d, and that they ar now anxiou to p d th ca us . Un 1er 
th circum tance , and in the ab nee of any motion on the part 
of the d f ndants to p d th oau , w do not e how the charg 
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of laches can be seriously pressed; at last, so far as the prcsunt
motion is concerned.
Tlie complainants, in the event of their replications being held
to be bad, ask leave to withdraw them, and to amend their bill of
revivor by inserting, among other things, the fact that they were
on the twenty-fifth day of July, 1881, by the court of probate for
the district of Suffolk, in the state of Massachusetts, duly appointed
administrators of the estate of Earl P. Mason. The defendants
object, upon the ground that this is new matter, accruing since the
filing of the bill, which cannot be set up by amendment, but only
by supplemental bill. It is true that events which have happened
since the filing of a bill cannot be introduced by way of amend-
ment, and that as a general rule they may be set out by supple-
mental bill. Equity Rule 57, U. S. Court.
In Daniell, Ch. PL & Pr. (-Ith Ed.) 1515, note 1, we find "an
original bill cannot be amended by incorporating anything therein
wliich arose subsequently to the commencement of the suit. This
should be stated in a supplemental bill." And again, on page 828,
note 1 (already cited), it is laid down that matters in avoidance
of a plea, which have arisen since the suit began, are properly set
out by a supplemental bill. Mitford & Tyler, PI. & Pr. in Eq.
159; Story Eq. PL § 880. But in this case it is difficult to see
how a supplemental bill can be brought. This bill of revivor has
not become defective from any event happening after it was filed.
But originally, when it was brought, it was wholly defective; for
the fact that the plaintiffs were appointed administrators by the
proper court in Massachusetts was necessary to its maintenance.
Melius V. Thompson, 1 Clif. 125. And yet this event happened,
as the record discloses, nearly a year after it was brought. If the
bill is wholly defective, and there is no ground for proceeding upon
it, it cannot be sustained by filing a supplemental bill, founded
upon matters which have subsequently taken place. Candler v.
Petm, 1 Paige Ch. 168.
In Pinch v. Anthony, 10 Allen, 471, 477, the court observe :
'^e have found no authority that goes so far as to authorize a
party, who has no cause of action at the time of filing his original
bill, to file a supplemental bill in order to maintain his suit upon
a cause of action that accrued after the original bill was filed, even
though it arose out of the same transaction that was the subject
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o:f 1, ch can be eriou ly pr d; at la t, o far a the pre nt 
motion i concerned. 
The complainant, in th ev nt f their replication being h ld 
to b bad, a k 1 a to withdraw th m, and to am nd their bill of 
revivor by in erting, am ng th r hing , th fact that they wer 
n th tw nty-:fifth da of uly, 1 1, by the ourt of probate for 
th di tri t of ufl'.olk, in th tat of Ma a hu tt , duly appointed 
atlmini trators of th tate o:f arl P. on. T'h defendant · 
ol ject, upon th ground that thi is new matter, a cruing in e the 
filing of th bill, whi h annot be t up by amen m nt, but only 
by upplem ntal bill. It i tru that e nt which have happeneJ 
ince the filing of a bill annot be introdu ed by way of amend-
ment, and that a a g neral rul th y may be et out by supple-
mental bill. Equit Rul 5 , U. S. Court. 
In Daniell, h . Pl. & Pr. (4th Ed.) 1515, note 1, we :find "an 
original bill cannot be amended by incorporating anything th rein 
which aro u1b quently to the commencement of th uit. Thi 
hould be tated in a upplemental bill." And again on pag 2 , 
note 1 (already ited), it i laid down that matters in avoidan e 
of a plea, which hav ari en ince the uit began, a-re properly t 
out by a upplem ntal bill. Mitford & Tyl r, Pl. & Pr. in Eq. 
159; Story Eq. Pl. § 0. But in thi ca e it i difficult to ee 
how a upplemental bill can be brought. Thi bill of revivor ha 
not becom d fective from any e ent happening aft r it wa :filed. 
But originally, when it wa brought, it wa wholly d fective; for 
the fact that the plaintiff w re appointed admini trator by tbe 
proper court in Mas a. hu tt wa n ary to it maintenance. 
lllellus v. Thomp on, 1 lif. 1 5. And et th' ev nt happened 
a the r cord di clo nearl a year aft r it w brought. If the 
bill is wholly d f ti1 and ther i no ground for pro ding upon 
it, it cannot be u tained by :filing a uppl m ntal bill, founded 
upon matt r whi h ha ub qu ntly tak n pl Candler v. 
Pettit, 1 Paige Oh. 16 . 
In Pinch . Anthony, 10 ll n -! 1, 4 , th court ob er1 : 
hav found no authorit that O'O o far a to authoriz a 
part who ha no au f a tion at th time of filing hi oriO'inal 
bill to :fil a uppl m ntal bill in ord r to maintain hi uit u n 
a au f a tion that a· ru d aft r th original bill wa :file 
thouO'h it aro out f th am tran a tion that wa th 
of the original bill. ani 11 h. 1. T r. (-!th d. 1 ~1 
350 Eeplicatiok
We are of the opinion that this new matter cannot be incor-
porated in the bill of revivor by amendment, nor introduced in
a supplemental bill, and that the proper cause for the complainants
to pursue is to bring a new bill of revivor.
(1) The defendants' motion to strike from the files complain-
ants' replications to plea and demurrer is granted. (3) The
defendants' motion to dismiss bill of revivor is denied. (3) The
complainants' motion to amend bill of revivor is denied.
Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) Jf25. (1817.)
Bill for a legacy, filed the 3d of October last. The defendants
put in their answer the 13th of December, and the plaintiff filed
his replication the 4th of January last. The plaintiff now pre-
sented a petition for leave to withdraw the replication, to enable
him to except to the answer, and to amend his bill.
The petition was not sworn to : a copy of it, with notice of the
motion, was duly served on the solicitor of the defendants.
An affidavit of the plaintiff's solicitor, made since the service of
the notice of the motion, a copy of which had not been served on
the defendants' solicitor, was produced, stating, that the replication
was filed through misapprehension, on the ground that the answer
was sufficient, arising from his perusal of an imperfect and incor-
rect draft of the bill; and that he had since discovered that the
bill filed charged the matters which he supposed were omitted,
and which were not fully answered.
The affidavit of the defendants' solicitor stated, that the answer
filed was a full answer to the bill; that since the cause was at
issue, no step had been taken by the plaintiff; and that, on the
21st of March, he entered rules to produce witnesses, and to show
cause against publication.
The Chancellor:
The petition states two objects of the motion for leave to with-
draw the replication; the one is, to except to the answer; the
other, to amend the bill.
As to the first object ; the plaintiff does not state, in his petition,
wherein the answer is defective, nor why the defects, if any, were

















































































































































250 REPLICA.. TIO N 
\\ e are of the opinion that thi new matter cannot be incor-
porated in the bill of revivor by amendment, nor introduced in 
a upplemental bill, and that the proper cau e for the complainants 
to pur ue i to bring a new bill of revivor. 
(1) The defendant' motion to trike from the files complain-
ant ' r plication to plea and demurrer i granted. ( ) The 
d fendan ts' motion to di miss bill of re i vor i denied. ( 3) The 
complainant ' motion to amend bill of revivor i denied. 
Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 425. {1817.) 
BILL for a legacy, filed the 3d of Octaber la t. The defendants 
put in their an wer the 13th of Decemb r, and the plaintiff filed 
hi replica.hon the 4th of January last. The plaintiff now pre-
-·ented a petition for leave to withdraw the replication, to en~ble 
him to except to the an wer, and to amend hi bill. 
The petition wa not worn to: a copy of it, with notice of the 
motion, wa duly erved on the olicitor of the defendant . 
An affidavit of the plaiintiff olicitor, made ince the service of 
the notice of the motion, a copy of which ha<l not been erved on 
the defendants' olicitor, wa produced, tatin , that the replication 
was filed through mi appr hen ion, on the ground that the an w r 
wa sufficient, ari ing from hi peru al of an imperfect and incor-
rect draft of the bill; a1nd that h had ince di covered that the 
bill filed charg d the matter whi h h upposed were omitted, 
and which wer not fully an wered. 
The affidavit of the defendant ' olicitor tated, tha.t the an wer 
fil d wa a full an wer to the bill · that ince the cause wa at 
i . ue, n t p had been taken by th plaintiff; and that on the 
21 t of Mar h h entered rule to produc witn e , and to how 
·au e again t publi ·ation. 
THE 0II CELLOR: 
The etition tat two obj f th motion for leave to with-
draw th r pli ation · th n i , to c pt to the an wer; the 
other, to am nd th bill. 
to th fir t 1 j t; th plaintj 1o n t tat in hi petition 
wh r i th an w r i d f iv 11 r why th d f t , if an3, wer 
n t di. cov r d l r r . It i now upward of three month ince 
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the replication was filed. There is, indeed, an affidavit presented
on making the motion, but that affidavit was not served on the
op]X)site solicitor, and if notice of the motion was requisite at all
(which is not disputed), a copy of the affidavit on which it was
founded ought equally to have been served. The affidavit is, there-,
fore, not regularly before me on this motion; and even if it were,
the reason therein assigned for the motion is not sufficient. The
plaintiff's solicitor says, he filed the replication through misappre-
hension, inasmuch as he mistook an incorrect draft of the bill for
the corrected copy on file, and that the answer, though good as to
the former, is not as to the latter. But this affidavit does not
disclose wherein, or to what extent, the answer is insufficient, nor
when the variation between the draft of the bill, and the one on
file, was discovered, nor in what that variation consists. The excuse
itself is feeble and imperfect. The solicitor to the bill compares
the answer with some defective draft of his own bill, and now
comes, three months after the cause it put at issue, with such a plea
of negligence, and with all this want of precision and regularity
in bringing forward the motion, for leave to file exceptions to the
answer. This would be granting an unreasonable indulgence, and
one leading to vexation and delay in the prosecution of a suit. It
was said, by Lord Hardwicke, in Pott v. BcijnoJch, 3 Atk. 565,
that the Court rarely grants leave to withdraw the replication,
unless there be some special cause shown to induce the Court to
grant this indulgence; and the books say, that as the replication
admits the sufficiency of the answer, it is not usual for the Court
to allow the plaintiff to withdraw it, for the purpose of excepting
to the answer. (Wyatt's P. R. 202. Cooper's Eq. PI. 328.) The
reasons for such an application should be clearly stated, and be
of sufficient import, and the laches of the plaintiff fully accounted
for. The rules of the Court allow only three weeks to except to
the answer. The policy of the rule is to make the party vigilant,
and oblige him to look early and well to the answer. If the object
of the motion was only to set down the cause for hearing, on bill
and answer, I presume that it would be much, of course, according
to the late case of Cowdell v. Tatlocl-, 3 Vesey & Beame, 19.
The other ol)ject of the present motion is to amend the bill.
Tlie petition states, that the bill is materially defective; but the
affidavit of the plaintiff's solicitor states, that the bill fully charges
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the repli ation w :fil d. r.rh r i , incl d an affida·vit pre ented 
on making th ID tion but that affidavit wa not rved on the 
oppo it oli ·itor and if noti f th motion wa r qui ite at all 
(which i not di put cl) a · py of th affidavit n whi ·h it wa 
found 1 ouo·ht quall to hav 1 n rved. The affidavit i , there-. 
for , not r 'gularl · b fore ID on thi motion; and n if it were, 
th r a on th r in a ·i ne l for h motion i not ufficient. The 
plaintiff' oli itor ay , h :fil cl th r plication throu h mi appre-
h n ion, ina mu h a he mi took an incorrect draft f the bill for 
th orr t d c p r on :file, and that th an wer, though good a to 
the form r i not a to th latter. But thi affidavit doe not 
di lo wh rein, or t what xtent, the an w r i in u:fficient, n r 
wh n the variati n b tween the draft of the bill and the one on 
fil wa ii ov r d, n r in whait that variation on i t . The excu e 
it H i f bl and imperf t. The olicitor to the bill compare 
th an wer with ome def ctive draft of hi own bill, and now 
ome , tbr month after the cau e it put at i ue, with uch a pl a 
of negligence, and with all this want of preci ion and regularity 
in bringin forwa·rd the motion, for leave to file exception to th 
an wer. Th. would be granting an unrea onable indulgence and 
on leading to vexation and delay in the pro ecution of a uit. It 
wa aid, b Lord Hardwicke, in Pott v. Reynolds, 3 tk. 56 , 
that the ourt rarel3 grant leave to withdraw th replication, 
unl th re b ome pecial cau e hown to induce the Court to 
grant thi indulgence; and the book ay, that a the replication 
admit the ufficienc of the an wer, it i not u ual for the Court 
to allow th plaintiff to withdraw it, for the purpo e of excepting 
t th a·n w r. (Wyatt' P. . 0 . ooper' Eq. Pl. 39 . ) Tha 
r a on for u h an application hould be clearl3 tat d and be 
f ~ufficient imp rt and th lache of the plaintiff fully accounted 
f r. The rul of th ourt allow only thr w ek to except to 
th an "er. 'h polic r of th rul i to make the part . -vi!rilant 
and obli e him to l ok rly and w 11 to the an wer. If th obj t 
of th motion wa only to t down th cau e for hearing on bill 
and an wer pre um that it' would b mu h of com according 
t th late a f owdell . Tatlock, 3 \ e & earn 1 . 
'l1h th r bj t f the pr nt motion i t am nd th bill. 
Th I ti ti n tat hat tb bill i materiall: cl f iY ; ut th ::. 
, ·ffi favit f th plaintiff oli itor tate that th bill full harcre 
th matt r whj h h , at fir,.t, though had 1 en mitt , ancl th 
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same solicitor now states, in support of his motion, that the bill is
full, and that the only amendment desired is one of mere form,
and requiring no further answer. It will readily be perceived,
that this is not sufficient ground for withdrawing a replication
several months after is has been filed. To withdraw the replication
for the purpose of amending the bill, the plaintiff must show the
materiality of the amendments, and why the matter to be intro-
duced by the amendment was not stated before, otherwise the rules
of the Court to prevent vexatious delays of the plaintiff would be
nugatory. (Longman v. Calliford, 3 Anst. 807.)


















































































































































ame solicitor now tates, in upport of his motion, that the bill is 
full, and that the only amendment desired is one of mere form, 
and requiring no further an wer. It will readily be perceived, 
that thi i not sufficient ground for withdrawing a replication 
e eral month after i has been filed. To withdraw the replication 
for the purpo e of amending the bill, the plaintiff mu t how the 
materiality of the amendments, and why the matter to be intro-
duced by the amendment was not stated before otherwi e the rule 
of the Court to prevent vexatiou delay of the plaintiff would be 
nugatory. (Longman v. Calliford, 3 Anst. 807.) 
The motion is, accordingly, denied, with co ts. 
CHAPTER VIII.
DECREES.
Nature, Effect, Amending and Enforcing.
Hughs V. ^Yashington, 65 III. 21^5. (1S72.)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Wm.
W. Farwell, Judge, presiding.
Mr. Justice Walker delivered the opinion of the Court:
These cases present substantially the same questions, and wo,
therefore, consider them as one. Tliey were brought by the heirs
of John A. Washington against George E. H. Hughs and the heirs
of Sanderson Robert. The bills were filed to set aside and annul
contracts of sale of large and valuable real estate in the city of
Chicago, by Hughs, as the agent of Washington's heirs, to Robert.
The ground alleged for rescinding the contract was fraud.
The cases were heard together, in the circuit court of Cook
county, on the 6th day of May, 1871. The evidence was very
voluminous, and consisted largely of letters sent and received by
the various parties, depositions and other documentary evidence.
After the hearing was had, it is claimed that the court below
decided the cases in favor of the complainants, but, before anv
decree was rendered or enrolled, the fire of October of that year
destroyed the court house and all the papers in the cases, both
pleadings and evidence.
Counsel agreed upon and restored the pleadings in the cases.
The defendant then made a' motion for time to retake and restore
all of the destroyed evidence, and urged their right to have the
evidence restored and on file before a decree should be passed and
filed for record or recorded.
The motion of the defendants was denied, and the court, from
memory of the evidence, pronounced a decree in each case, and
they were duly enrolled and became final. From that decree the
defendants ap^oeal, and assign the refusal of the court to stay the
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II ugh Wa hington~ 65 Ill. 45. {1 7 .) 
pp al from th 
W. A.RWELL, Judg 
ir uit ourt of 
pr iding. 
ook coun y ; the Hon. WM. 
Mr. J TI E WALKER d liver d th opinion of the Court: 
a pre nt ub tantially the ame qu tion , and we, 
th r for , con id r th m a one. They were brought by the heir. 
of John . W a hington again t George R. H. Hugh and the heir 
of ander on Robert. The bill wer filed to et a ide and annul 
contra t of al of large and aluable real e tate in the cit of 
hicago b · Huuh as the agent of Wa hington' heir , to Robert. 
The ground all g d for re cinding the contract wa fraud. 
Th a e w r heard together, in the circuit court of ook 
county, on the 6th da of Ma 1 1. The evidence wa ery 
voluminou , and con · ted largely of 1 tter nt and received by 
the va1riou partie d po ition and other documentary evidence. 
Aft r the h aring wa had, it i claimed that th court below 
d cided the ca in favor of the omplainan but, before an~ 
d r e wa r nd red or nroll d th fir of ctober of that y ar 
d troved th ourt hou e and all the paper in the ca e , both 
pl a ling and e iden e. 
oun el agre d upon and r tored the pleadin in the ca e . 
Th d f ndant th n mad a1 motion for time to retak and r tore 
all of the d troy d -vi 1 n and uru d th ir riuht to hav the 
Yid nc r tored and on fil b for a d r e h uld be pa d and 
file 1 for r cord or r cord . 
The motion of the d f ndant \la d nied an the court from 
m mor of th id n pron unc d a d ere in a h a an 
they ·w re dul enroll d and b am final. rom that th 
f ndant ap al an 
r ndition of th d r 1id n a one 
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of the errors in the case; and, from the view we take of the case,
we deem it unnecessary to consider any other.
According to the ancient practice in the English court of chan-
cery, the decree recited at length the entire pleadings in the case,
and the substance of the evidence contained in the depositions.
That practice has been slightly modified in that court in modern
times, but its decrees still contain full recitals. In our courts of
chancery, the practice has permitted, but not required, such recitals,
especially of the CTidenee. The practice has obtained neither in
Great Britain nor this country to set out the depositions in full,
but simply to recite the substance of the evidence they contain
pertinent to the issue.
As the practice in chancer}^ has always required the evidence
to be in writing, or if oral, to be reduced to writing, and preserved
in the record, it is apparent that the old practice of embodying
it in the decree was not material, as it could at all times be referred
to for the purpose of seeing upon what the decree was based, and
whether it was sustained by the evidence ; and hence, our practice
dispensed with emlx)dying it in the decree. But the practice, as
modified, does not dispense with the absolute necessity of preserv-
ing the evidence in the record. ]T7n7e v, Morrison, 11 111. 361;
Wilhite V. Pearce, -17 111. 413 ; Hill's Ch. Pr. 319, and numerous
other cases, recognize the rule.
On an appeal from the decree, each party has the right to rely
upon the evidence heard in the c-ourt below, to test the correctness
of the conclusions at which the court has arrived; and, in such
a case, the finding of the facts in the decree will be controlled by
the evidence in the record, where it appears that it has all been
preserved. The appellate court will look into the record to see
whether the evidence warrants the court in its action in finding
the facts stated in the decree, and if, from all the evidence that was
heard, it appears the chancellor erred in the finding of the facts,
the appellate court will disregard the findings, and will be con-
trolled by the evidence. Under the ancient practice, the decrees
in these cases would ha-ve contained a complete record of the case,
and from it alone the appellate court could have determined
whether error had intervened; and if the evidence had been pre-
served in the record, the same result would follow where a complete
record is presented for consideration. But in the position the case
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of the errors in the ca e; and, from the view we take of the ca e, 
we deem it unnece ary to con ider any other. 
According to the ancient practice in the Engli h court of chan-
cery, the decree recited at length the entire pleadings in the ca e, 
and the ub tance of the evidence contained in the depo itions. 
That practice ha been lightl modified in that court in modern 
tim , but its decree till contain full recital . In our court of 
chancer , the practice ha permi ted, but not required, uch recitals, 
e peciall of the evidence. The practice ha obtained neither in 
Great Britain nor thi country t-0 et out the depo itions in full, 
but impl ' to recite the uibstance Gf ·the evidence they contain 
pertinent to the i ue. 
A the practice in chancery ha alway required the e'Tidence 
to be in writing, or if oral to be reduced to writino- and pre erved 
in the record, it i apparent that the old practice of embodying 
it in the decree wa not material a it could at all time be referred 
to for the purpo e of eeing upon what the decree wa ba ed, and 
whether it wa u ta•ined b the e idence; and hence, our practice 
di pen ed with embod ing it in the decree. But the practice, as 
modified, do not di pen e with the ab olute nece ity of pre erv-
ing the evidence in the record. TVhite v. Morrison, 11 Ill. 361 ; 
Wilhite v. Pearce, -± Ill. -±13; Hill' Ch. Pr. 319, and numerous 
other ca , recognize the rule. 
On an appeal from the decree, each part ha the right to rely 
upon the evidence heard in the court below, to te t the correctness 
of the conclu ion at which the court ha aorrived; and, in uch 
a ca e, the :finding of he facts in the decree will ·be controlled by 
the evidence in the record where it appears that it ha all en 
pr erved. The appellate court will look into the record to ee 
whether the evidence warrants the court in it action in finding 
the fact tated in the decree and if, from all the evidence that wa 
heard, it appear the chancellor erred in the :finding of the facts, 
the appellate court will di regard the finding and will be con-
troll d by the evidence. Under the ancient practice the decrees 
in th ~e 1Ca e would ha·ve contain d a complete record of the case, 
and from it alone the appellate court could have determined 
whether error had intenen · and if th evidence had b en pre-
served in the r cord the ame result would follow where a complete 
r ecord i pre nted for con ideration. But in the po ition the case 
now occupi the d fendant ha no power to how that the facts 
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found by the chancellor in the decree are not warranted by the
evidence.
It is an undoubted right, enjoyed by every litigant, to have the
judgment or decree to which he is a party passed upon and reviewed
by an appellate court. This, the constitution has guaranteed to
him; nor can the courts, by rules of practice, deprive him of the
right, or materially impair its efficiency. And, in all common law
cases, under our statute, it is the duty of the party desiring to have
the case reviewed on the evidence, to preserve it in the record, or the
presumption will be indulged that the court below acted prop-
erly in its decision. Not so with a decree, as no presumption is
indulged beyond the extent to which it is sustained by the proofs
appearing in the record. Hence, it devolves upon the party in
whose favor it is rendered to preserve evidence that will sustain
the decree, or it must find that facts were proved that will sustain
the decree, or it will be reversed.
Did the court below act prematurely in rendering these decrees
before the evidence was restored ?
It is contended that inasmuch as the chancellor had heard the
evidence, and had announced what his decision would be, and had
written out a statement of the grounds for the decision, it must be
considered that the case was finally decided, and nothing remained
but the formal matter of drawing and passing the decree. This
is manifestly not the correct view of the question. Under the
English practice, after the hearing is had, the chancellor pro-
nounces his decree, and the registrar takes minutes of it, and they
are usually read over by him to the parties, or their solicitors, and
copies of such minutes are generally applied for and furnished to
the parties. If not satisfactory, by reason of their uncertainty, or
that anything has been omitted, and the registrar refuses to correct
them, application may be made to the court to correct them. After
the minutes are settled, the decree is then drawn up by the registrar,
and delivered to the party who demanded it. "The decree having
been returned, and an office copy taken by the adverse party, the
next step to be taken is to have it passed and entered; till which
is done, the decree is only inchoate." 2 Danl. Ch. Pr. 670. But
this practice has not, in form, obtained in this State.
But our practice is, in principle, the same. The decree is m-
clioaie until it is approved by the chancellor and filed for record,
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found by the chancellor in the d cree are not warranted by the 
evidence. 
It i an undoubted right enjoyed by e ery litigant, to have the 
judgment or decre to which he i a part3 pa ed upon and reviewed 
by an appellate court. T'hi , the con titution has guaranteed to 
him; nor can the court , by rule of practice, deprive him of the 
right, or materially impair its efficiency. And, in all common law 
ca es, under our tatut , it i the dut of th party de iring to have 
the ca r viewed on the evidence, to preserve it in the record, or the 
pre umption will be indulged that the court below acted prop-
erl3 in it deci i·on. Not o with a decree, a no pre umption is 
indulged beyond the ext nt to which it is u tained by the proofs 
appearirw in the record. H ence, it devolves upon the party in 
who e favor it i rendered to preserve evidence that will ustain 
the decree or it mu t find that facts were proved that will su tain 
the decree, or it will be reversed. 
Did the court below act prema·turely in rendering these decrees 
before the evidence was restored? 
It is contended that ina much as the chancellor had heard the 
evidence, and had announced what hi decision would be, and had 
written out a statement of the grounds for the deci ion, it mu t be 
considered that the case w.a finally decided, and nothing remained 
but the formal matter of drawing and pa ing the decree. This 
is manife tly not the correct view of the que ti on. Under the 
Engli h practice, after the hearing is had, the chancellor pro-
nounce hi decree, and the registrar take minute of it, and they 
are u ually read over by him to the partie , or their olicitor , and 
copie of ucb minute are generally applied for and furni bed to 
the parti . If not ati facror3, by rea on of their uncertainty, or 
that anything ha been omitted, and the regi trar refu e to correct 
them application may be made to the court to correct them. After 
the minute are ettled, th decree i then drawn up by the regi trar, 
and dehvered to the party who demanded it. "The decree having 
b en returned and an office cop3 ilaken by the adverse party, the 
next tep to be taken i to have it pa ed and entered; till which 
i done the decree i onl inchoate." Danl. Ch. Pr. 6 0. But 
thi practice ha not, in form, obtained in thi tate. 
But our pradic i , in principle, the am . The decree i 'in -
choate until it i approved by the chancellor and fil d for r ord, 
or hall be recorded which an wer to th pa jno- and nterino- it, 
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in the English court. The mere oral announcement of the chan-
cellor of his decision, and the grounds upon which it is hased, or
the reducing them to writing, is no more than the minutes taken,
in the English practice. The whole matter is completely under the
control of the chancellor until the final decree has been filed or
recorded. Until that time, he may alter, amend, change, or even
disregard, all that he had said in his minutes ; and if, upon further
reflection, he became satisfied his conclusions were wrong, it would
be his duty to reverse his announcement, and to decree as he was
convinced the equities of the case required; or if, upon further
reflection, he should doubt the correctness of his conclusion, he has
the undoubted right to order a rehearing, on his own motion, at
any time before he has passed the decree, and it has been filed for
record, or has been spread upon the record. But after that is
done, the whole matter is beyond his control, unless it be on a bill
of review, or a bill to impeach the decree, or some such subsequent
proceeding. It is then, and not till then, that it is the decree of
the court, and is res ad judicata.
There was, then, no decree of the court until it was approved
and filed for record, or was recorded; and that was the time the
case was decided and the decree was rendered; and there was at
that time, as a matter of fact, no evidence upon which to base the
decree. Had the fire occurred, and the papers been destroyed
before the court heard the evidence read, no one would pretend the
court could have, after its destruction, rendered a decree until the
testimony was restored, or if the evidence had been but partly read
to the court, the same would be undeniably true; and we presume
it would not be claimed that the court could have proceeded to
decree, had the evidence been destroyed after it was heard by the
court, and before he had announced what decree he intended to
render; and, as we have seen, that announcement concluded no
one, nor did it legally bind the court to adhere to the announce-
ment.
The case, it is true, was before the court for decision, but was
not finally decided until the decree was filed for record; and we
have seen that there was no evidence at that time upon which to
base the decree.
The court below should have allowed the evidence to be supplied
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in the Engli h court. The mere oral announcement of the chan-
cellor of hi deci ion, and the grounds upon which it i based, or 
the reducing them to writing, is no more than the minutes taken, 
in the Engli h practice. The whole maitter is completely under the 
control of the chancellor until the :final deoree ha been :filed or 
recorded. Until that time, he may alter, amend, change, or even 
di r gard, all that he had aid in hi minute ; and if, upon further 
reflection, he became aiti :fied hi concl u ion were wrong, it would 
be his duty to reverse his announcement, and to decree as he was 
convinced the equities of the case required; or if, upon further 
reflection, he hould doubt the correctne s of his conclusion, he has 
the undoubted right to order a rehearing, on his own motion, at 
any time before he has passed the decree, and it has been :filed for 
record, ,or has been pread upon the record. But after that is 
done, the whole matter is beyond his control, unles it be on a bill 
of review, or a bill to impeach the decree, or some such subsequent 
proceeding. It is then, and not till then, that it is the decree of 
the court, and is res adjudicata. 
There was, then, no decree of the court until it was approved 
and filed for record, or was recorded; and that was the time the 
case was decided and the decree was rendered; and there was at 
that time, as a matter of fact, no evidence upon whioh to base the 
decree. Had the :fire occurred, and the papers been destroyed 
before the court hea·rd the evidence read, no one would pretend the 
court could have, after its destruction, rendered a decree until the 
testimony wa re tared, or if the evidence had been but partly read 
to the court, the iame would be undeniably true; and we presume 
it would not be claimed that the court could have proceeded to 
deer e, had the evidence been de troy d after it wa heard by the 
court, and before he had announced what decree he intended to 
render; and, a we have seen, that announcement concluded no 
one, nor did it 1 gally bind the court to adhere to the announce-
ment. 
The ca e, it i true, wa b fore the court for d ci ion, but was 
not finally decid d until the deer e was :fil d for r cord· and we 
have s en that th r was no evidence at that time upon which to 
base the decree. 
The court 1 elow hould have allow thee idence to be supplied 
before th decree wa pa ed and :filed. It wa the only mean by 
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which their right of appeal could be rendered availing to the
parties.
The destruction of the evidence was occasioned by one of those
public calamities for which the parties were in nowise responsible ;
and such being the case, neither of them should be prejudiced by
it, beyond what can not be repaired.
We are clearly of opinion that the court below erred in rendering
the decree until the evidence was restored ; and, for that reason, the
decree of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded,
with leave to appellants to restore the evidence, and, for that pur-
pose, the court below will give them a reasonable time.
Decree reversed.
La. Bank v. Whitney, 121 U. 8. 28^. (1887.)
This was a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The
case is stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a proceeding begun May 22, 1883, by Mrs. Myra> Clark
Gaines, then in life, to subject a certain sum of $40,000 on deposit
in the Louisiana National BanJc to the payment of a judgment
in her favor against the City of New Orleans. There is no dispute
about the fact that the money in question was on deposit when the
proceeding was begun and the bank served with process, but the
Board of Liquidation of the City Debt has made claim to it as
part of the fund appropriated by Act No. 133 of 1880 to the pay-
ment and liquidation of the bonded debt of the city. Pending
the determination of the questions involved, the court, March 15,
1880, ordered the money paid into the registry of the court. From
this order the bank has appealed, and also sued out a writ of error,
and the Board of Liquidation has likewise appealed. The repre-
sentatives of Mrs. Gaines, who were made parties to the proceeding
after her death, now move to dismiss both the writ of error and
the appeals, tecause the order to be brought under review is not
a final judment or decree within the meaning of that terra as used
in the acts of Congress giving this court jurisdiction on appeals
and writs of error.
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which their right of app al could be r nd r d a·vailing to the 
partie . 
Th d ruction of th vidence wa occa ion d by one of tho ·e 
public calamiti for whi h th parti' w r in nowi r p n ible; 
and u h being th ca , n ith r of them houlcl b rejudic d by 
it, b yond what an not b r air c1. 
We ar cl arly f opinion ihai th ourt b low rr d in rend ring 
the d er until th vi nee r tor d; and, f r that rea on the 
d er of th ourt b low mu t b r v r d and th cau e r mandecl, 
with 1 a to app Hant to r tor the vid nee, and, for that pur-
p 'e, the ourt below will giv them a r a onabl time. 
Decree reversed. 
La. Bank v. Whitney, 1 1 U. . 84. {1887.) 
THIS wa a motion to di mi for want of juri diction. The 
ca e i tated in the opinion of the court. 
MR. CHIEF Ju TI E WAITE d livered th opinion of the court. 
Thi i a proceeding begun May 22, 18 3, by Mrs. 1yrai lark 
Gaine , then in life, to ubj ct a certain um of $40,000 on depo it 
in the Loui iana ational Bank to the payment of a judgment 
in her favor again t the ity of New Or lean . Ther i no di pute 
about the faict that th mon y in que tion wa on depo it when the 
pro ding wa b gun and the bank erved with proc , but the 
Boar of Liquidation of the ity ebt ha mad laim to it a 
part of the fund appropriat d by ct o. 133 of 1 0 to th pay-
m nt and liquidation of the bond d d bt of the it . Pending 
t11 d t rmination f the que tion involved the court Uar h 1-, 
1 6 ord r d th m n y paid into th r gi try of the ourt. 1 ·om 
thi ord r th bank ha app al d and al o u d out a writ of rror 
an l th oar 1 f iquidation ha lik wi e app aled. Tb r pr -
nta ti f Ur . who \\r r mad partie to the pr c din 1 • 
an l nit of rror. 
to di mi both the writ of rr r an 
ord r t b brought und r r vi ~ i n t 
within th m anino- f that t rm a u ~ 
giYin thi urt jnrisdi ti n n app al~ 
\\ ha1 n h itati n in (}'ranting th m tion. Th ourt has 
17 
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not adjudicated the rights of the parties concerned. It has only
ordered the fund into the registry of the court for preservation
during the pendency of the litigation as to its ownership. Such
an order it has always been held is interlocutory only and not a
final decree. Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 20-i; Grant v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 106 U. S, 431. If in the end it shall be found tha:t
the fund belongs to the Board of Liquidation, it can be paid from
the registry accordingly, notwithstanding the order that has been
made. The money when paid into the registry will be in the hands
of the court for the benefit of whomsoever it shall in the end be
found to belong to.
Both the appeals and the writ of error are dismissed.
Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meelcer, 109 U. S. ISO. (1S83.)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Western District of Michigan. — Motion to dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a motion to dismiss an appeal because the decree ap-
pealed from is not a final decree. The motion papers show
that the appellees, Meeker, Brown, and Brooks, a minority of
the stockholders of the Winthrop Iron Company, on or about
the 12th of November, 1881, filed a bill in equity in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan
against the Winthrop Iron Company, the Winthrop Hematite
Company, and certain directors of the Iron Company who were
the stockholders of the Hematite Company, the object and purpose
of which was to set aside as fraudulent and void the proceedings
of the stockholders of the Iron Company at a meeting held in
Chicago on the first of October, 1881, and to have a receiver
appointed to take possession of the property of the company and
manage its affairs. The effect of the proceedings of the meeting
complained of was, as alleged, to authorize a lease of the property
of the Iron Company to the Hematite Company from and after
the first of December, 1882, for the personal advantage of the
majority stockholders of the Iron Company, regardless of the
rights of the minority. The stockholders of the Hematite Company
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not adjudicated the righ of the parties concerned. It ha only 
ordered the fund into the regi try of the court for preservation 
during th pendency of the litigation .a to its ownership. Such 
an order it ha alway been held is interlocutory only ~nd not a 
final decree. Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 20-1; Grant v. Phwnix 
In . Co., 106 U. . 431. If in the end it hall be found that 
the fund belongs to the Board of Liquidation, it cam be paid from 
the registry accordingly, notwith tanding the order that has been 
made. The money when paid into the registry will be in the hands 
of the court for the benefit of whom oever it hall in the end be 
found to belong to. 
Both the appeals and the writ of error are dismissed. 
Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109 U. . 180. {1883.) 
APPEAL from th Circuit Court of the United Stat for the 
We tern Di trict of Michigan.-Motion to di miss the aippeal. 
MR. CnrnF J STICE WAITE deliv ed the opinion of the court. 
Thi i a motion to di miss an appeal because the decree ap-
pealed from i not a final decree. The motion paper show 
thait the appellee , Meeker, Brown, and Brook , a minority of 
the tockholders of the Winthrop Iron Company, on or about 
the 1 th of November, 1 1, filed a bill in quity in th Circuit 
Court of the United States for the Western Di trict of Michigan 
again t the Winthrop Iron Oompany, the Winthrop Hematite 
ompany, and certain dir ctor of the Iron Company who were 
the tockholders of the Hematite Company, th object and purpo e 
of which wa to et a ide a fraudulent and void the proceeding 
of th to khold r of the Iron Company at a meeting held in 
hi a o on th fir t n£ ctober, 1 81, and to hav a r eiver 
appoint d to tak po ion of the prop rty of the company and 
mana e i affair . The ff t of th pro dingo of th m eting 
mplained of wa a all g d, to auth rize a 1 a e of th prop rty 
f th Iron ompany to the H matit ompany from and aft r 
th fir t of mber, 1 2, for the per anal advantage of th 
majority tockh 11 r of th Iron ompany, r gardl of the 
right of th minority. The tockholders of th ematit ompany 
w r al o elect d dir ctor of the Iron ompany an 1 con tituted 
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a majority of the board. On the second day of October, 188'^, the
cause was submitted to the court upon the pleadings, proofs, and
arguments of counsel. From the proofs it appeared that notwith-
standing the pendency of the suit, the Iron Company had, on
the 30th of Xovember, 1881, executed a lease to the Hematite
Company, according to the vote of the stockholders. On the
6th of April, 1883, a decree was rendered which, in effect, ad-
judged that the proctn^dings of the meeting were in fraud of
the rights of the minority stockholders, and that the lease which
had been executed in accordance with the authority then given
was "null and void, for the fraud of the defendants, the Win-
throp Hematite Company and the St. Clair Brothers," the ma-
jority stockholders and directors of the Iron Company, "in pro-
curing the same." By the same decree a receiver was appointed
to take charge of and manage the business of the Iron Com-
pany, evidently because a majority of the board of directors,
after the election at the October meeting, were considered unfit
to control its affairs, as their personal interests were in conflict
with the interests of the company. Both the Iron Company and
Hematite Company, as well as the defendant directors of the Iron
Company, were ordered to "forthwith surrender and deliver to"
the receiver all the property of the Iron Company, and "all cor-
porate records and papers." Tlie recei's^r was fully authorized to
''continue the management of the business of the . . . com-
pany, with power to lease or operate its mines and plants until the
further order of the court." The decree further ordered an
accounting before a master by the Hematite Company and the
defendant directors of the Iron Company, for all profits realized
from the use of the leased property after the 1st of Decembei-,
1882, the date of the beginning of the term under the lease which
had been set aside. There was also an order for an accounting
by the defendant directors "concerning the ores mined by them,
and the royalty upon such ores due and owing by them to the
. . . company, and concerning the rights and obligations of
the lessor and lessee, under and according to a lease mentioned in
the bill, . . . expiring on December 1st, 1882." At the foot
of the decree is the following: "And the court resen-es to itself
such further directions as may be necessary to carry this decree
into effect, concerning costs, or as may be equital)le and just."
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a majority of the board. n the econd day of ctober, 1 8·, the 
cau v a ubmitt d to th ourt upon th pleading , proof , anrl 
argum nt of oun 1. From th pr f it appear d that notwith-
tan ing the pend n i the uit, tl e Iron o pany had, on 
the th of o emb r, 1 1, cuted 1 a c to th Hematilc 
t mpany, according to the vote of the tockholder . On the 
6th 0£ 1..pril, 1 , a de ree wa r nd r d whi h, in eff ct, ad-
jud5 cl that the proce dings of the meeting w re in fraud of 
th rjght of th minori y tockholder , and that the lea e whi ·h 
had b n ex cu ed in accordan e with he authorit then given 
wa null and void, for the framd of the d fendants, the in-
thrap H matite ornpany and the St. Clair Brother ," the ma-
jority to kholde1 and directors of the Iron Company, "in pro-
curing th ame. By the ame decree a recei er was appointell 
to take charge of aind manage th bu ine of the Iron om-
pany, evid ntly becau e a majority of the board of director. , 
aft r th election at the October meeting, were con idered unfit 
to ontrol its a:ffai , a their personal inter t were in confii t 
with the intere t of the company. Both the Iron ompany and 
H maitite ompany, a well a the defendant directors of the Iron 
Company, were ordered to "forthwith urirender and deliver to" 
the r c i r all the property of the Iron Company, and 'all cor-
porat r cord and paper . The receiver wa fully authorized to 
' continue the mana ment of the bu ine of the . . com-
pany with pow r to lea e or operate its mine am.d plant until the 
furth r order of the court." T'he decree further ordered an 
accounting before a mater by the Hematite Company and the 
derendant directors of th Iron ompany for all profits realized 
from th u e of th lea ed propert after the 1 t of December, 
1 9 th da.te of th beginning of the term und r the lea e which 
ha 1 1 n et a id . Th rn was al o an order for an accounting 
b ' th d fendant dir cto1 ' oncerning the or mined by them, 
and the ro alty upon uch ore due and owing b them to the 
. . compan r and concerninc; the rights and obliga ion" of 
th 1 or and le e, un r aind ac ordinc; to a lea e rn ntion d in 
th bill cemb r 1 t 1 H th f ot 
of th d r IT " to it" 1£ 
such furth r dir ctio a may be n ary to carry thi" deer 
inl [ t oncerninc; o~t or a may b quitable an ju,.,t.' 
rom hi d er the app al ~a tak n. 
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In our opinion the decree as entered is a final decree, within
the meaning of section 692 of the Revised Statutes, regulating
appeals to this court. The whole purpose of the suit has been
accomplished. The lease made under the authority of the meet-
ing of October, 1881, has been cancelled, and the management
of the affairs of the company has been taken from the board of
directors, a majority of whom were elected at that meeting, and
committed to a receiver appointed by the court, plainly because,
in the opinion of the court, the rights of the minority stock-
holders would not be safe in the hands of directors elected by the
majority. In order that the receiver may perform his duties, the
defendants are required to turn over to him the entire property
and records of the company. The accounting ordered is only in
aid of the execution of the decree, and is no part of the relief
prayed for in the bill, which contemplated nothing more than a
rescission of the authority to execute the fraudulent lease, or a
cancellation of the lease if executed, and a transfer of the manage-
ment of the affairs of the company from a board of directors, whose
personal interests were in conflict with the duty they owed the
corporation, to some person to be designated by the court. The
litigation of the parties as to the merits of the case is terminated,
and nothing now remains to be done but to carry what has been
decreed into execution. Such a decree has always been held to
be final for the purpose of an appeal. Bostwick v. Brinkerlioff,
106 U. S. 3, and the cases there cited. In Forgay v. Conrad, 6
How., at p. 204, it was said by Chief Justice Taney, for the
court :
"And when the decree decides the right to the property in
contest, and directs it to be delivered by the defendant to the
complainant, .... and the complainant is entitled to have
such a decree carried immediately into execution, the decree must
be regarded as a final one to that extent, and authorizes an appeal
to this court, although so much of the bill is retained in the
circuit court ae is necessary for the purposes of adjusting, by a
further decree, the accounts between the parties pursuant to the
decree passed. This rule, of course, does not apply to cases where
money is directed to be paid into court, or property to be delivered
to a receiver, or property held in trust to be delivered to a new-
trustee appointed by the court, or- to cases of a like description.
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In our opinion the decree as entered i a final decree, within 
the meaning of ection 692 of the Revi ed Statute , regulating 
appeal to thi court. The whole purpose of the suit has been 
accompli hed. The lea e made under the authority of the meet-
ing of October, 1881, ha been cancelled, and the management 
of the affair of the company ha been taken from the board of 
director , a majority of whom were elected at that meeting, and 
committed to a receiver appointed by the court, plainly becau e, 
in the opinion of the court, the right of the minority tock-
holder would not be af e in the hand of directors elected b3 the 
majority. In order that the receiver may perform his duties, the 
defendant are required to turn over to him the entire propeTty 
and record of the company. The accounting ordered is only in 
aid of the ex cution 0£ the decree, and i no part of the relief 
prayed for in the bill, which contemplated nothing more than a 
re cission of the authority to execute the fraudulent lease, or a 
cancellation of the lease if executed, and a transfer of the manage-
ment of the affairs of the compa,ny from a board of directors, who~e 
personal intere t were in conflict with the duty they owed the 
corporation, to ome person to be designated by the court. The 
litigation of the parties a to the merits of the case is terminated, 
and nothing now remains to be done but to carry what has been 
d creed into execution. Such a decree has always been held to 
be final for the purpose of an appeal. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 
106 U. S. 3, and the cases there cited. In Forgay v. Conrad, 6 
Ho"., at p. 204, it was said by Chief Justice Taney, for the 
court: 
" nd when the decree decides the right to the property jn 
contest, and directs it to be delivered by the defendant to the 
complainaint, . . . . and the complainant is entitled to have 
such a decree carried immediately into execution, the decree must 
be regarded as a final on to that extent, and authorizes an appeal 
to thi court, although o much of the bill i r tain c1 in the 
circuit court as is nee ary for the purpo es of adjusting, by a 
furth r d cree, th ac oun betw n the parti pur uant to the 
deer c pa d. T'hi rule of our , do not apply to a e where 
mon i dir t d to be paid int court or property to b delivered 
to a receiv r, or property held in tru t to be deliv red to a new 
tru. t appoint d by the court or· to ca e of a like d · riptjon. 
Or of that kin are frcqu ntly and neces a·ril made in the 
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progress of a cause. But they are interlocutory only, and intended
to preserve the subject-matter in dispute from waste or dilapidation,
and to keep it within tlie control of the court until the rights
of the parties concerned can be adjudicated by a final decree."
Here the rights of the Hematite Company and the defendant
directors of the Iron Company liave been adjudicated and definitely
settled. Their lease, which was in reality the subject-matter of
the action, has been cancelled, and a deliver}' of the leased property
to the Iron Company has been ordered. The complainants arc
entitled to the immediate execution of such a decree. The receiver
to whom the delivery is to be made was not appointed to hold
the property until the rights of the parties could be adjudicated,
but to stand, subject to the direction of the court, in the place
of and as and for the corporation, because, under the circumstances,
the corporation is incapacitated from acting for itself. His posi-
tion is like that of the guardian of the estate of an incompetent
person. He represents the Iron Company, and a delivery of the
leased property to him is a delivery in fact and in law to the
company itself; that is to sa}^, to the party for whose use the suit
was prosecuted. The complainant stockholders sue for the com-
pany, and the delivery to the receiver is a delivery to the company
that has been adjudged to be entitled to immediate possession,
notwithstanding the lease to the Hematite Company. The de-
fendant directors have not in form been removed from their office,
but their power as directors has been taken from them, and they
are no longer able to carry into effect the orders of the stock-
holders made in fraud of the rights of the minority at the meeting
in October. A new officer has been appointed to stand in the place
of the directors as manager of the affairs of the company. In the
words of ]\Ir. Justice McLean in Craighead v. Wilson, 18 How.,
at p. 201, the decree is final "on all matters within the pleadings,"
and nothing remains to ]yc done but to adjust the accounts between
the parties growing out of the operations of the defendants during
the pendency of the suit. The case is altogether different from
suits by patentees to establish their patents and recover for the
infringement. There the money recovery is part of the subject-
matter of the suit. Here it is only an incident to what is sued for.
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proe;r f a au . ut th ar int rlocutory only, and int nded 
t pr th ubj t-mat r jn :ti pute from wa t OT dilapidation, 
and t p it itl in th ntr 1 f the ourt until the rights 
of th parti c n ern an b adjudicat d by a final decree." 
re th righ matite ompany and th d f ndant 
tor of the ron ompan ha l en adjudi ated and d finit ly 
Th ir 1 a , whi h wa in r ality th ubj ct-ma·tter o-f 
th a ti n ha~ be n an 11 d and a delivery of th lea ed prop rty 
to th Ir n ompan ha b n ordered. The complainan ar 
nti 1 d to the imm diate e ution of uch a d re . The rec iver 
to whom th d li\' ry i to b made wa not appointed to hold 
the prop rty until t he right of th parti could be adjudicat 1, 
but to tand, ubj t to the dfrection of th court, in the place 
of and a and for th corporation, becau e, under the circum tance 
the corporation i incapacitat d from acting for it elf. Hi po i-
tion i like tha.t of th guardian of the esfate of an incomp tent 
pe on. He repre ent th Iron Company, and a delivery of the 
1 a d property to him i a delivery in fact and in law to th 
company it elf; that i to ay, to the party for who e u e the uit 
wa pro,.ecuted. The complainant tockholder ue for the com-
pany, and the deliv ry to the receiver is a delivery to the companv 
that ha b en adjudg d to be entitled to imm diate po e, ion_, 
notwith tanding the lea e to the Hematite ompany. The de-
fendant director have not in form been remov d from their office, 
but th ir power a director ha been taken from them, and they 
are no Jonaer able to carry into effect the order of the tock-
holder made in fraud of the rights of the minority at the meeting 
in October. A n w offi er has b en appointed to tand in the place 
of the director a mana er of the affair of the company. In the 
word of Ur. Ju tic 1\IcL an in Oraigheacl . TVil on~ 18 How. 
at p. 201 the d er i final 'on all matter within the pleading, ' 
an i n thing remain t b don but to adju t th accoun b t"' en 
th parti towin ou f the operation of the d f ndan durina 
th p nd n of the uit. Th a e i altog th r diff r nt from 
uit b pat nt to abli h th ir patent and r cover for the 
infrin m nt. Th r th mone recovery i part of the u je 1.-
matt r of the uit. r it i onl r an incident t what i "u d :for. 
The motion to di nii is denied. 
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Giant Powder Co. v. Cal Powder Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 197. (1880.)
In Equity. Petition for rehearing.
Field, C. J.:
This ease was heard b}^ me whilst holding the circuit court in
San Francisco, in the month of September last, and was decided
on the twelfth of October following. The decision was against the
complainant, and a decree was entered dismissing the bill. The
complainant's counsel now present to me at Washington a petition
for a rehearing.
The case was elaborately argued at the circuit, counsel occupying
several days in the presentation of their views. Their arguments
were taken down by a short-hand writer, and printed, thus enabling
me to read what I had patiently listened to in the oral discussion.
The question before the court was the validity of the re-issued
patent to the complainant. The main objection urged to its
validity was that it was for a different invention from that de-
scribed in the original patent. And upon that point the argument
was full, elaborate, and able. It is difficult to see how the position
of the complainant in support of the patent could have been more
cogently presented.
The original patent was for a compound of nitro-glycerine, with
an inexplosive porous absorbent, which would take up the nitro-
glycerine, and render it safe for transportation, storage, and use,
without loss of its explosive power. The re-issued patent is for a
compound of nitro-glycerine with any porous absorbent, explosive
or inexplosive, which will be equally safe for transportation,
storage, and use, without loss of explosive power. In other words,
the re-issued patent drops the limitation of the original, and seeks
to cover all compounds in which nitro-glycerine is used, in con-
nection with a porous absorbent, in the production of blasting
powder, thus practically securing to the patentee a monopoly of
nitro-glycerine in the manufacture of that powder. The court
held that the re-issued patent was, therefore, more extensive in its
scope than the original patent, and on that ground was invalid.
It covered a different invention.
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Giant Powder Go. v. Gal. Powder Go.J 5 Fed. Rep. 197. (1880.) 
IN EQUITY. Petition for rehearing. 
FIELD, c. J. : 
Thi ca e wa heard by me whil t holding the circuit court in 
San Franci co, in the month of September last, and was decided 
on the twelfth of October following. The deci_,ion was against the 
complainant, and a decree was entered di mi sing the bill. The 
complainant's counsel now present to me art Washington a petition 
for a rehearing. 
The ca e wa elaiboraitely argued at the circuit, counsel occupying 
everal day in the presentation of their view . Their arguments 
were taken down by a short-hand writer, and printed, thus enabling 
me to read what I had patiently li tened to in the oral discu sion. 
The qu tion before the court was the validity of the re-is ued 
patent to the complainant. The main objection urged to its 
vahdity was that it was for a different invention from that de-
cribed in the origina·l patent. And upon that point the argument 
wa full, elaborate, and able. It is difficult to ee how the po ition 
of the complainant in upport of the patent could have been more 
cogently pre ented. 
The original patent was for a compound of nitro-glycerine, with 
an inexplo ive porou absorbent, which would take up the nitro-
glycerine, a1nd render it safe for transportation, torage, and use, 
without los of it explo 'ive power. The re-issued patent is for a 
compound of nitro-glycerine with any por-0us ab orbent explo ive 
or inexpfo ive, which will be equally safe for tran portatiou, 
storag , and u e, without lo of explosive power. In other word., 
the re-i ued patent drops the limitation of the OTiginal, and eek:; 
to cover all compound in which nitro-glycerjne is u ed, in con-
nection with a p-orou aib rib nt, in the production of blasting 
powder, thu practically ecuring to the pat nt e a monopoly of 
nitro- ly erine in the manufacture of that powder. The court 
h ld that the re-i ued patent wa , therefore, more exten ive in it 
cope than th original pat nt, and on that ground wais invalid. 
t cover a di:ff rent invention. 
The court a1 o h ld that the original patent wa n ith r invalid 
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nor inoperative from any defective specification, but was valid and
operative for the invention described; and that this appeared upon
a comparison of the two patents, the re-issued patent differing
from thu original only in the extent of its claim ; and that, there-
fore, the commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in granting a
re-issue at all, as well as on the ground that the re-issued patent
was for a different invention. This latter position was not, it is
true, discussed in the oral argument, but it is raised by the plead-
ings, and the attention of complainant's counsel at San Francisco
was called to it, and a note of authorities on the point was received
from him, embracing the greater part of those mentioned in the
petition for rehearing. ^^Tiether the position be well taken or not
cannot affect the decision of the case, if the re-issued patent cover
a different invention from that described in the original patent.
But the petition cannot now be considered by me at Washington.
It is not an ex parte proceeding; it can only be presented on
notice, and can only be considered after the other side has had an
opportunity to answer it. The ex parte presentation by counsel has
evidently been made from a failure to distinguish between an
application for rehearing after the decision of an appellate tribunal,
and an application for a rehearing in a court of original jurisdic-
tion after entry of a final decree. The distinction between applica-
tions for rehearing in the two cases is pointed out by Chief Justice
Taney, in Brown v. Aspden, 1-i Howard, 26: "By the established
rules of chancery practice/' said the chief justice, "a rehearing,
in the same sense in which that term is used in proceedings in
equity, cannot be allowed after the decree is enrolled. If the party
desires it, it must be applied for before the enrollment. But no
appeal will lie to the proper appellate tribunal until after it is
enrolled, either actually or by construction of law; and, conse-
quently, the time for a rehearing must have gone by before an
appeal could be taken. In the house of lords in England, to which
the appeal lies from the court of chancen% a rehearing is alto-
gether unknown. A reargument, indeed, may be ordered, if the
house desires it for its own satisfaction. But the chancery rules in
relation to rehearings, in the technical sense of the word, are
altogether inapplicable to the proceedings on the appeal.
"Undoubtedly, this court may and would call for a reargument
where doubts are entertained, which it is supposed may be re-
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nor inoperativ from a·ny d fe tiv p cification, but wa valid ancl 
op rativ for th invention d cril d; and that thi appeared upon 
a ompari. on of th two pat nt the re-i u d patent diff ring 
from th, ori!D.nal nl in th xt nt of it claim; and that, there-
for , the ommi ion r exc d d hi juri diction in granting a 
r -i ue ait all a w ll on th ound that the re-i ued pat nt 
wa for a different inv ntion. Thi latter po ·ition wa not, it i 
true, di cu ~ in th oral argum nt but it i rai ed by the pl ad-
ino- and th attention of omplainant coun el at an Franci co 
wa caUed to it, and a note of authoritie on the point wa received 
from him, mbra ing the greater part of tho e mentioned in the 
petition for rehearing. Wheth r the po ition be well taken or not 
cannot affect the deci ion of the case, if the re-i~ ued patent cover 
a differ nt invention from that de cribed in the original pat nt. 
But the petition cannot now be con idered by me at Washington. 
It i not an ex parte proceeding; it can only be pre ented on 
notice, and can only be con idered after the other side ha had an 
opportunity to an wer it. The ex parte presentation by coun el ha· 
evidently be n made from a1 failure to di tingui h between an 
application for rehearing after the deci ion of an appellate tribunal, 
and an application for a rehearing in a court of origina·l juri dic-
tion after entry orf a final decree. The di tinction between applica-
tion for rehearing in the two case i pointed out by hief Ju tice 
Taney, in Brown v. Aspden, 14 Howard, 26 : "By the e ta1bli hcd 
rul of chancery practice," aid the chief ju tice, a rehearing, 
in the am en e in which th·at term i u ed in proceeding in 
equit cannot b allowed after the decree i enrolled. If the party 
de ir it, it mu t be applied for before the enrollment. But no 
app al will lie to the proper a•ppellate tribunal until after it j ~ 
enroll d, ith r a tually or b r con truction of law · and con e-
quently, th tim for a rehearing mu t have gone by before an 
appeal could b tak n. In th hou e of lord in England to which 
the appeal lie from the court of chancery a r h aring i alto-
gether unknown.. reargument, inde d ma be ordered if th~ 
hou e d ire it for it own ati faction. But th bane ry rule ~ in 
r lation to r h arin in the t chnical en of th word are 
altoo-e her inapplicabl to th proceedino- on th app al. 
ndoubt dlv thi court ma,· and would call for a r arrument 
wh r doubt~ ar ent rtain d, which it i ~ upp d ruay be r -
mov d b furth r di u ion a th ar. n thi may be one 
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after judgment is entered, provided the order for reargument is
entered at the same term. But the rule of the court is this —
that no reargument will be heard in any case after judgment is
entered, unless some member of the court who concurred in the
judgment afterwards doubts the correctness of his opinion, and
desires a further argument on the subject. And, when that hap-
pens, the court will, of its own accord, apprise the counsel of its
wishes, and designate the points on which it desires to hear them."
According to the practice in the supreme court, if the court
does not, of its own motion, desire a rehearing of a case decided,
counsel are at liberty to submit without argument a brief petition
or suggestion of the points upon which a rehearing is desired. If,
then, any judge who concurred in the decision thinks proper to
move for a rehearing, the motion is considered by the court;
otherwise, the petition is denied, of course. Public Schools v.
Wallace, 9 Wall. 604.
A similar course of procedure would be appropriate in any
appellate tribunal. To allow an argument upon such a petition
would lead, in a majority of cases, to a mere repetition, with more
or less fullness, of the points presented on the original hearing, and
cause infinite delays to the prejudice of other suitors before the
court.
There is another observation to be made upon rehearings in
equity after a final decree in courts of original jurisdiction. The
practice in this country and that which formerly prevailed in
England are essentially different. According to the practice in the
English courts, a rehearing previous to the enrollment of the
decree, when the petition was approved by the certificate of two
counsel, was granted almost as a matter of course. Eepeated re-
hearings in the same cause were not uncommon, and the consequent
delays and expenses from this practice were so great as to lead
to the interposition of parliament for its correction. This subject
is mentioned by Chief Justice Taney in his opinion in the case
in Howard. There, when a case was decided, memoranda for the
decree were entered in the minutes of the court; in some instances
the final decree was thus entered; but the decree was not con-
sidered as strictly a record until it was engrossed, signed, and
entered at length in the rolls of the court. Between the time of
the decision and the entry of memoranda for the decree, and the
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after judgment i entered, provided the ordeT for reargument is 
entered at the ame term. But the rule of the court is this-
that no reargument will be heard in any case after judgment is 
entered, unle s some member o.f the court who concurred in the 
judgment afterwards doubts the correctne s of his opinion, and 
desires a further argum nt on the ubject. And, when that hap-
pen , the court will, of its own accord, apprise the counsel of its 
wi hes, and de ignate the points on which it desires to hear them." 
According to the practice in the supreme court, if the court 
does not, of its own motion, desire a rehearing of a case decided, 
coun el are at liberty to submit without a:rgument a brief petition 
or suggestion of the points upon which a rehearing is desired. If, 
then, any judge who concurred in the decision thinks proper to 
move for a rehearing, the motion is con idered by the court; 
otherwise, the petition is denied, of course. Public Schools v. 
Wallace, 9 Wall. 604. 
A similar course of pTocedure would be appropriate in any 
appellate tribunal. T'o allow an argument upon such a petition 
would lead, in a majority of cases, to a mere repetition, with more 
or less fullness, of the points presented on the original hearing, and 
cause infinite delays to the prejudice of other suitors before the 
court. 
There is another observation to be made upon rehearings in 
equity after a final decree in courts of original jurisdiction. The 
practice in this country and that which formerly prevailed in 
England are essentially different. According to the practice in the 
Engli h courts, a rehearing previous to the enrollment of the 
decree, when the petition was approved by the certificate of two 
coun el, wa granted almo t as a matter of course. Repeated re-
hearing in the ame cause were not uncommon, and the con equent 
delay and expen e from thi practice were o great as to lead 
to the interpo ition of parliament for its correction. Thi ubject 
i mention d by hi f Ju ti e Taney in hi opinion in the ca e 
in Howard. T'h r , w h n a ca wa decid d memoranda for the 
d cree were enter din th minut of th court· in om in~tance 
the final deer e wa thu nt r d; but th d cree wa not con-
idered as trictly a r cord until it wa ngro d, igned, and 
nt red at length in th roll of the court. B tw n the time of 
the d i ion and the ntry of memoranda for the d cree, and the 
tim th d er took a d finite hap by enrollment, it wa open 
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to modification and correction, and even to entire change. But
when once enrolled the decree was not subject to change except
in the house of lords, or by a bill of review. 2 Daniell's Chancery
Practice, 1018.
In this country there is not, except, perhaps, in one or two
states where the old forms of equity practice are retained, any
such proceeding as the formal enrollment of decrees. Here, when
a case in equity is decided, a decree is drawn up and signed by
the judge, and entered on the records of the court, with about
the same formality as a judgment in a case at law. And rehearings
are then granted, except when the judge acts of his own motion,
only upon such grounds as would authorize a new trial in an action
in law; that is, for newly-discovered evidence or errors of law
apparent upon the record. All the limitations which control courts
in actions at law, in considering allegations of newly-discovered
evidence and of errors at law, apply to applications for rehearing
in such cases. Bentley v. Phelps, 3 W. & M. 403. See, also,
Doggett v. Emerson, 1 W. & M. 1; Emerson v. Daniels, Id. 21;
Tufts V. Tufts, 3 W. & M. 426; and also Clapp v. Thaxter, 7
Gray, 38G.
Tlie course of procedure for the complainant, therefore, is to
file its petition with the clerk of the circuit court at San Fran-
Cisco, and obtain from the court or circuit judge an order upon
the defendants to show cause on the following rule day, or some
other day mentioned, why its prayer should not be granted. The
defendants can then answer the petition, and upon the petition
and answer the application can be heard. A rehearing should not
be granted for newly-discovered evidence where the evidence could
have been obtained by reasonable diligence on the first hearing,
nor when it is merely cumulative to that previously received, nor
when, if presented, it would not have changed the result. And as
to errors of law, they should be such as are clearly shown by
considerations not previously presented. A new hearing should not
be had simply to allow a rehash of old arguments. The proper
remedy for errors of the court on points argued in the first hearing
is to be sought by appeal, when the decree is one which can
reviewed by an appellate tribunal. See Tufts v. Tufts, supra.
The petition, therefore, cannot be heard by me ex parte at
Washington. The complainant must pursue the regular course
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to modification and corr ction, and ven to entir change. But 
when once enrolled the decree wa not ubject to change except 
in the hou of lords, or by a bill of review. 2 Daniell's Chancery 
Practice, 1018. 
In thi country ther i not, xcept, perhap , in one or two 
state wh r the old form of quity practic are retained, any 
such pro e ding a th formal enrollment of decree . Her , when 
a case in qu.ity i decid d, a deer e i drawn up and igned by 
the judg , and enter d on the record of the court, with about 
the same formality a ~judgment in a case at law. And rehearing 
are then granted, except when the judge act of hi own motion, 
only upon uch ground a would authorize a new trial in an action 
in law; that i , for n wly-di covered evidence or errors of law 
a1pparent upon the record. All the limitation which control court 
in action at law, in con idering allegation of newly-di covered 
evidence and of error at raw, apply to application for rehearing 
in uch ca e . Bentley v. Phetlps; 3 W. & M. 403. See, al o, 
Doggett v. Emerson; 1 W. & M. 1; Emerson v. Daniels; Id. 21; 
Tufts v. Tufts; 3 W. & M. 426; and ail o Clapp v. Thaxter, '( 
Gray, 386. 
The cour e of procedure for the complainant, therefore, i Lo 
:file it petition with the clerk of the circuit court at San Fran-
ci co, and obtain from the court or circuit judge an order upon 
the defendants to how cause on the following rule day, or ome 
other day mentioned, why its prayer should not be granted. The 
defendants can then an wer the petition, and upon the petition 
and an wer the application can be h ard. A rehearing hould not 
be granted for newly-di cov r d evidence where the evidence could 
hav b en ob ain d by rea onable d.iligenc on the :fir t hearing 
nor wh n it i merely cumulative to that previou ly recei ed, nor 
when, if pr nt d, it would not hav cha1nged the re ult. nd a-
to rror of law, they hould be uch a ar clearl hown b 
con id ration not previou 1 pre ented. A n w hearing hould not 
be ha impl r to allow a reha h of old argumen . Th prop r 
rem d for ITO of the ourt on point awu d in th :fir t hearing 
i to b ought b app al wh n th d r i one whi h can 
r vi w 1 b 1 an appella tribunal. e T uft . Tuft upra . 
h p tition ther f r annot b heard b r m e:r parte at 
Wa hirnrton. h mplainant mu t puru th r D"ular our 
of pro dur and gi noti to th oppo~it art·. f th peti-
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tion be filed during the term, the court will retain jurisdiction
over the case, and may subsequently decide upon the application.
The eighty-eighth rule in equity applies only where no petition
is presented during the term.
As the circuit court in San Francisco will be held by the circuit
judge in my absence, he will direct its clerk to forward the petition
and answer to me, at Washington, accompanied with such briefs
as counsel may file within a reasonable time to be allowed by the
court. The application will then be taken up and disposed of,
and my judgment sent to the circuit court and there entered.
Where cases have been heard by the circuit judge sitting alone,
I do not myself hear applications in them for a rehearing, or
motions for a new trial, except by his request. This consideration
to the different judges composing the court is essential to the
harmonious administration of justice therein. As observed by me
in a case reported in 1 Sawyer : "The circuit judge possesses equal
authority with myself on the circuit, and it would lead to unseemly
conflicts if the rulings of one judge, upon a question of law, should
be disregarded, or be open to review by the other judge in the same
case." Page 689.
The petition contains what purports to be a copy of my opinion,
but it is a copy of the opinion before it was revised. The opinion
should not have been published until it had received my revision,
as counsel very well know. In any petition hereafter filed it is
expected that a correct copy will appear, if any one is given. If the
present petition is used, the opinion must be corrected in accordance
with the revised copy.
Before concluding, it may not be amiss to invite the attention
of complainant's counsel to the language of Judge Story, in the
case of Jenkins v. Eldridge, with respect to the earnestness with
which counsel, in applying for rehearings, sometimes asseverate
their convictions of the errors of the court; and, to repeat what is
there said, "that if any judge should be so unstable in his views,
or so feeble in his judgment, as to yield to them, he would not only
surrender his independence, but betray his duty. However humble
may be his own talents, he is compelled to treat every opinion of
counsel, however exalted, which is not founded in the law and the
facts of the case, to be voiceless and valueless." 3 Story, 303.
Nothing can be gained by the strong language expressed by counsel
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tion be :filed during the term, the court will retain jurisdiction: 
over the case, and may sub equently decide upon the application. 
The eighty-eighth rule in equity applies only where no petition 
i pre ented during the term. 
As the circuit court in San Francisco will be held by the circuit 
judg in my ab ence, he will direct its clerk to forward the petition 
and answer to me, at Washington, aiccomrpanied with such briefs 
a coun el may file within a reasonable time to be allowed by the 
court. The application will then be taken up and disposed of, 
and my judgment sent to the circuit court and there entered. 
Where ca e have been heard by the circuit judge itting alone, 
I do not myself hear applications in them for a rehearing, or 
motions for a new trial, except by his request. This consideration 
to the different judges compo ing the court is essential to the 
harmoniou administration o.f justice therein. As ob erved by me 
in a case reported in 1 Sawyer: "The circuit judge po e ses equal 
aiuthority with myself on the circuit, and it would lead to unseemly 
conflicts if the rulings of one judge, upon a question of law, should 
be disregarded, or be open to review by the other judge in the same 
case." Page 689. 
The petition contains what purpmts to be a copy o·f my opinion, 
but it is a copy of the opinion before it was revised. The opinion 
hould not have been published until it had received my revi ion, 
as counsel very well know. In any petition hereafter filed it is 
expected that a correct copy will appear, if any one is given. If the 
present petition is used, the opinion must be corrected in accordance 
with the revised copy. 
Before concluding, it may not be amiss to invite the attention 
of complainant's counsel to the languag of Judge Story, in the 
ca e of J enkins v. Eldridge, with respect to the earnestness with 
which coun el, in applying for rehearing , ometimes as everat 
their convictions of the errors of the court; and, to repeat what is 
there aid, "that if any judge hould be o· un table in his view~, 
or o feeble in hi judgment a to yield to th rn, he would not only 
urrender hi ind p ndence, but b tray hi duty. However humble 
may b hi o·wn tal n , he i comp 11 d to treat every opinion of 
oun 1, however exalted, whi h i not found d in the law and th 
fact. of the ca e, to b voic 1 and va1lu le ." 3 Story, 30 . 
othing can be gain d by th trong larnruag xpre ed by coun .,l 
in pre enting th p tHion a to th uppo d rror of the court, 
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nor by the statement a^ to what may have been said of the decision
by other counsel, who have neither examined, studied, nor under-
stood the case.
Eider v. Kidder, 12 Yes. Jr. 202. (1806.)
A MOTION was made by the Plaintiff, for a short Order upon the
Defendant, to transfer the stock under the Decree in this cause;
and that service upon the Clerk in Court may be good service.
Mr. Bell, for the Defendant, opposed the Motion ; insisting upon
the general rule, that nothing can be done for the purpose of bring-
ing a man into contempt without personal service. An attachment
will not issue, except upon personal service of the writ of execution
of the Decree; and the Court giving the indulgence of a short
Order, which is not the regular process of the Court, will not put
the Defendant in a worse situation.
The Solicitor-General [Sir Samuel Eomilly], and Mr. Hart, in
support of the Motion, took the distinction, that, this application
being for service of the writ of execution of the Decree, the De-
fendant being present in Court, must have had notice; and the
only object of requiring personal service is to prevent surprise. It
was observed, that the reason of applying for a short Order is to
prevent expense.
The Lord Chancellor [Erskine] :
The practice in this Court, that in order to fix a person with
contempt, the service must be personal, has a strong analogy to
the practice in Courts of Common Law upon attachment. The
sernce must be personal, unless upon some very special application
it is dispensed with; which may be under circumstances certainly.
The reason of requiring personal service is, non constat, that there
is a contempt; that the party knows, that he has neglected to do
any thing ho was called upon to perform. But in this instiince, a
Decree made, when the Defendant was present in Court, she knows,
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nor by th tat m nt a to what may hav b n aid of the deci ion 
by oth r un el, who have neither xamin d, tudied, nor under-
stood th ca e. 
Rider v. Kidder, 12 Ves. Jr. 202. {1806.) 
A MOTIO wa made by the Plaintiff, for a hart Order upon the 
Defendant, to tran fer the tock under the Decree in thi cau e; 
and that rvice upon the Clerk in Court may be good service. 
Mr. Bell, for the Defendant, oppo ed the Motion; insi ting upon 
th gen ral rule, that nothing can be done for the purpo e of bring-
ing a man into contempt without per anal service. An attachment 
will not i ue, except upon per onaJ ervice of the writ of execution 
of the D cree; and the Court giving the indulgence of a hart 
Order, which i not the r gular proce of the Court, will not put 
the fendant in a war e ituation. 
The oli itor- eneral [Sir Samuel Romilly ], and Ir. Hart, in 
upport of th l\1otion, took the di tinction, that, thi application 
b ing for ervice of the writ of execution of the D ere , the De-
f n iant being pr ent in ourt, mu t hav had notice; and the 
onl) object of requiring per onal ervice i to pr vent urpri e. It 
wa ob r d, that the r a on oif applying for a hart Order is to 
pr vent xpen . 
The Lord II NCELLOR [ R KINE] : 
The pra ti in thi ourt that in order to fix a pe on with 
ont mpt, th rvice mu t be per onal, ha a trong anafog to 
th 1 ra ti e in urt f ommon aw upon atta hm nt. Th 
nic mu t b p r anal unl upon om ver p ial application 
it i di p n ed with; which may b under cir um ta nee ertainl y. 
Tb r a on of r quirinO' p onal erri i non con tat that there 
i a cont mpt; that h part 1-now hat b ha n gl t o 
an ' thin h wa call d upon to p rf rm. But in thi in t.anc a 
r mad wh n the ef n ant wa pre nt in ourt h know 
b ha not don hat he a dir d to d an mu t her fore 
868 Natuke, Effect, Amending and Enforcing
be conscious, that she is in contempt. If this course cannot be
taken, the Defendant might, when called upon to pay money, keep
out of the way; and so prevent the effect of a Decree or Order
made, when he was present in Court.
The same point arising in the case of De Manneville v. De Manne-
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be conscious, that she is in contempt. If this course cannot be 
taken, the Defendant might, when called upon to pay money, keep 
out of the way; and so prevent the effect of a Decree or Order 
made, when he was present in Court. 
The same point arising in the case of De Manneville v. De Manne-
ville, the Order in this case was postponed; that the practice might 
be looked into. 
CHAPTER IX. Y/^-^ l)P
AMENDMENTS, BILL OF REVIEW, NE EXEAT, PRODUC-
TION OF PAPERS, ABATEMENT, ETC.
Amendments.
VerplancJc v. Mercantile Co., 1 Edwd. Ch. (N. Y.) Jf6. (1831.)
In this case, Ogden Edwards, Esq. as Vice-Chancellor of the
first circuit, had granted a general injunction, and allowed of the
appointment of a receiver. Appeals were had; and by an order
of the Chancellor, dated at Albany, on the twenty-first day of June,
1831, the orders granting the injunction and appointing a receiver
were vacated with costs. The following is a part of the Chancellor's
order: — "It is ordered, that the said orders granting a general
injunction in the said bill and appointing a receiver in this cause
be and the same are hereby reversed and vacated, with costs on
the appeals therefrom, to be paid by the respondents to the
solicitor of the appellants. And it is further ordered, that the
proceedings be remitted back to the Vice-Chancellor of the first
circuit; with permission to the complainants to apply to the said
Vice-Chancellor to amend their bill of complaint so as to make the
corporation of the Mercantile Insurance Company defendants
therein,* and otherwise as they may be advised, upon due notice
*The prayer in the original bill went against the President and Direc-
tors of the Mercantile Insurance Company of New York, whereas the style
of the Company, by the act of incorporation (April lo, i8i8), was. The
Mercantile Insurance Company of New York. In the opinion which his
Honor the Chancellor gave, in relation to setting aside the orders for the
injunction and a receiver, he says, ''The first objection is, that although the
order appointing a receiver purports to have been entered in a suit against
'The Mercantile Insurance Company of New York,' under which order the
appellants have been deprived of the possession of their property, they were
not, in fact, parties defendant in the bill ; as the prayer of process was only
against the officers of the corporation. The name of the corporation is as
before stated. The prayer for process is. that the subpoena may be directed
to the president and directors of said company. This was undoubtedly
owing to the mistake of the solicitor who drew the bill; and who proba-
bly did not intend to make the president or directors, but only the corpora-
tion and Joseph Barker, parties to the suit. The same mistake exists as to
the prayer for the injunction; and is also carried into the order granting
the injunction. So that the injunction in fact is neither against the corpora-



















































































































































AMENDME T , BILL 
TI F P E 
\J 
1 EXE T, PRODUC~ 
TE IE T, ETC. 
MEND IE TS. 
Verplanck v. Mercantile o., 1 Edwd. h. ( . Y.) 46. {1831.) 
I thi ca , gden E<lward, E q. a Vice- hancellor of the 
fir t circuit, had grant d a g n ral injunction, and aHowed of the 
appointment of a recei r. ppeal were had; and by an order 
of the han ellor, dat d at Albany, on the twenty-fir t day of June, 
1 1, th order granting the injurnction and appointing a receiver 
were vacat d with o t . The following i a part of the hancellor' 
order:-' It is ordered, that the aid order granting a general 
injunction in the aid bill and appointing a receiver in thi cau"e 
be and the ame are her by rever ed and vacated, with co t on 
the appeal therefrom, to be paid by the re pondent to the 
olicitor of the appellants. And it is furth er 01·dered, that the 
proce ding be remitted back to the Vice-Chancellor of the fir.~ t 
circuit; with permi ion to the complainant to apply to the aid 
Vice-Chancellor to amend their bill of complaint o as to make the 
corporation of the Mercantile In urance Company defendant 
ther in,* and otherwi e a they may be ad vi ed upon due notice 
*The prayer in the original bill went against the Pre ident and Direc-
tor. of the Mercantile In urance Company of New York, wherea the tyle 
of the Company, by the act of incorporation (April IO, 1818) \ a The 
Mercantile In urance Company of New York. In the opinion which hi 
H nor the Chancellor gave, in relation to etting a ide the order for the 
injunction and a r ceiv r, he ay , "The fir t objection is, that although the 
ord r appointing a receiver purports to have been enter d in a su it again t 
'The ~Iercantile In urance Company of New York, under' hich order the 
app ll ant hav b en deprived of the po e ion of their property, they were 
not. in fact partie d fendant in the bill; a the prayer of proce wa only 
again t the offic r of the corporation. The name of the corporation i a 
bef re stat d. The pray r for proce s i , that the ubp na may be directe 
to th pr ident and direct r of aid company. Thi wa undoubtedly 
owing to the mi take of th olicit r ' ho drew the bill; and who pr ba-
bly did n t int nd to mak th pr ident or dir tor , ut only the orpora-
ti n and J ph a rk r partie to the uit. The ame mi: tak .· i t a t 
th pray r for th in juncti n · and i al arried int th ord r ranting 
th injunction. that th injun ti n in fa ti n ith r again t th corpora-
ti n nor it officer , by th ir pr pe r name . thi o j tion i merely 
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to the solicitor of the appellants, amd of Jacob Barker, of such
application; and upon such amendment being made, an order may
be entered, directing the defendants to show cause before the said
Vice-Chancellor, at such time and upon such notice as he shall
direct, why a general or other injunction should not be granted
and a receiver be appointed," &c. &c.
A petition, in the names of the complainants, was this day
presented to the court. It mentioned the suit; the appeals from
the orders before mentioned; and the reversal of those orders,
referring also to a copy of the Chancellor's order, which was an-
nexed. Also, the necessity of amending their bill. Tlie proposed
amendments were set forth in a schedule. The petitioners further
showed, that the additional facts contained in the said amendments
and schedules, so far as the same differed from the original bill,
had been discovered since the filing thereof, and were truly stated,
according to the best information and belief of the petitioners.
The prayer of the petition was in these words : — "Your petitioners
therefore pray leave to amend their said bill, by striking out that
l>art of the said bill, after the words, as hij reference to the said
formal, I should not feel disposed to sustain it, if the difficulty could be
obviated by an amendment. As it now stands, it may deprive the appel-
lants of a substantial right. It is somewhat doubtful whether they have the
power to answer this bill. It neither prays process against the corpora-
tion, nor calls upon them to answer. For, by another singular oversight
of the solicitor, that part of the bill merely prays the confederates may
answer upon their corporal oaths. Whereas, the officers of the corporation,
and not the company, are charged with confederacy ; and they only could
put in their answer on their oaths. It is well settled, that no persons are
parties as defendants in a bill in chancery, except those against whom
process is prayed, or who are specifically named and described as defend-
ants in the bill, (i Marsh. Ken. Rep. 594. 2 J. C. R. 245. 2 Dick. R.
707.) In Elmcndorfv. Dclanccy, i Hopk. R. 555, Chancellor Sandford says,
when it is uncertain who are the complainants, or who are the persons
called to answer, the suit is fundamentally defective, and if the parties
are not clearly designated, it is the fault of him who institutes the suit.'
In answer to this objection, it was suggested by the respondents' counsel,
that it is a mere misnomer of the corporation, and can only_ be taken
advantage of by a plea in abatement. It cannot, however, in this case, be
considered a misnomer. The name of the corporation and the substance
of the charter is distinctly stated in the commencement of the bill,
and the process is then prayed against the officers only. Besides, the ap-
pellants never had an opportunity to make the objection by plea of abate-
ment or in any other form. As the true name of the corporation was
stated, the objection appeared on the face of the bill, and no plea was
necessary to bring the fact to the notice of the court." "The proceedings
must be remitted back to the Vice-Chancellor of the first circuit, with per-
mission to the complainants to apply to him for leave to amend their bill,
so as to make the corporation defendants therein; and otherwise as they


















































































































































to the olicitor of the appellant , and of Jacob Barker, of such 
application; and upon uch amendment being made, an order may 
be ntered, directing the d f ndant to how cau e before the said 
Vice-Chancellor, at uch time and upon uch notice a he shall 
direct, why a general or other injunction hould not be granted 
and a receiver be appointed," &c. &c. 
A petition, in the names of the complainants, wa this day 
pre ented to the court. It mentioned the uit; the appeals from 
the orders before mentioned; and the reversal of those order:-;, 
referring al o to a copy of the Chancellor's order, which was an-
nexed. Al o, the nece ity of amfmding their bill. The proposed 
amendment were et forth in a schedule. The petitioners further 
showed, that the additional facts contained in the aid amendments 
and chedules, o far a the ame differed from the original bill, 
had b en discovered since the filing thereof, and were truly stated, 
according to the be t information and belief of the petitioner . 
The prayer of the petition wa in these words :-"Your petitioners 
therefore pray leave to amend their said bill, by triking out that 
part of the aid bill, after the word , as by reference to the said 
formal, I should not feel di posed to su tain it, if the difficulty could be 
obviated by an amendment. A it now stand , it may deprive the appel-
lants of a sub tantial right. It is somewhat doubtful whether they have the 
power to answer this bill. It neither prays process against the cor.pora-
tion, nor calls upon them to answer. For, by another singular oversight 
of the solicitor, that part of the bill merely prays the confederates may 
answer upon their corporal oaths. Whereas, the officers of the corporation, 
and not the company, are charged with confederacy; and they only could 
put in their answer on their oaths. It is well settled, that no persons are 
parties as defendants in a bill in chancery, except those against whom 
proce s is prayed, or who are specifically named and described as defend-
ant in the bill. (1 Marsh. Ken. Rep. 594. 2 J. C. R. 24s. 2 Dick. R. 
707.) In Elmendo1'f v. Delancey I Hopk. R. SSS, Chancellor Sandford say , 
when it is uncertain who are the complainant , or who are the per ons 
called to an w r, the nit is fundamentally defective, and if the parties 
are not clearly de ignate<l, it is the fault of him who in titutes the suit.' 
In an wer to thi obj ection, it was sugge ted by the re pondents' counsel, 
that it is a mere mi namer f the corporation, and can only be taken 
advantage of by a plea in abatement. It cannot, however, in this ca e, be 
con idered a mi namer. The name of the corporation and the substancl! 
of the charter i di tinctly stated in the commencement f the bill, 
and the proce s i then prayed again t the officer only. esides, the ap-
pellants never had an opportunity to make the objection by plea of abate-
m nt or in any other form. A the true nam of the corporation was 
tated, the objection appear d on the face of the bill, and no plea was 
n ces ary to brin th fact to the notice f the court." "The proceedings 
mu t be remitte back to th Vice-Chane llor of the fir t circuit, with per-
mi ion to the c mplainant to apply to him for leave to amend their bill, 
so as to make th e corporation defendants therein; and otherwise as they 
may be advi ed, ' &c. 
Verplanck v. Mercantile Co. 271
act will more fully and at large appear, in the sixth page of said
bill, to the words as in duty bound," &c. in the twenty-third page
thereof; and "insert the proposed amendment hereto annexed,
marked B; and that the said schedules referred to as such, be
taken as a part of said amended bill ; and that one or more of the
complainants be permitted to verify by oath, in the usual way,
the said amended bill; or, for such other and further order in
the premises as to your honor shall seem meet."
All the complainants resided in the city of N'ew York; but
the petition was only signed and sworn to by their solicitor;
Jurat : "F. S, K., solicitor for the complainants in this cause,
being duly sworn, says, that he has read the foregoing petition,
and knows the contents thereof : that the same is true of his own
knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to l)e upon his
information and belief, and as to those matters he believes it to
be true. F. S. K. Sworn, &c."
The Vice-Chaxcellor :
A motion is made on the part of the complainants, for leave
to amend their bill, which was sworn to at the time it was filed,
and upon which, ex parte, an injunction was granted and a
receiver appointed. The orders allowing the injunction and ap-
pointing the receiver, were, upon appeal, reversed: with permis-
sion to the complainants to apply for leave to amend the bill,
so as to make the corporation of the Mercantile Insurance Com-
pany defendants therein; and otherwise, as they might be advised.
The application to amend is accordingly made; and besides
inserting the name of the company, the complainants propose to
strike out the whole stating part of the bill (except the recital of
the charter), the interrogating part and the prayer; and to insert,
as a substitute, and by way of amendment — not a statement of
a new matter entirely — ^but a restatement of the original matter
in a different phraseology; leaving out some of the allegations
or portions thereof; introducing some new and additional matter;
specifying, in some instances, dates and times where none were
mentioned before, omitting the whole of the particular interroga-
tories, and restating the prayer of the bill although, in substance
and effect, the same as is contained in the original.
Tlie question is, as this is a sworn bill, whether amendmenis
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act will more fully and at large appear, in th ixth page of ai<l 
bill, to the word a in duty bound," & . in th tw nty-third page 
thereof ; and "in ert th propo 1 am ndment h reto annexed, 
marked B; and that th aid ch dul r f rr d to a uch, be 
ta·ken as a part of aid amended bill; and that one or more of the 
complainant be p rmitt d to verify by oath, in the u ual way, 
the aid am nd d bill; or, for uch oth r and further order in 
the pr mi e a to your honor hall eem meet." 
All the complainants resided in the city of New York ; but 
the petition wa only signed anrd worn to by their olicitor ; 
Jurat: "F. S. K., olicitor for the complainant in thi cause, 
being duly sworn, ay , that he has read the foregoing petition, 
and know the contents thereof: that the ame is true of hi own 
knowledge, except a to the matters therein tated to he upon his 
information and beli f, and a to those maitters he belie es it to 
b true. F. S. K. Sworn, &c." 
T HE V ICE- CH.A CELLOR : 
A motion i made on the part of the complainants, for leave 
to amend their bill, which was worn to at the time it wa filed, 
and upon which, ex parte, an injunction wa granted and a 
r eceiver appointed. Tib.e orders allowing the injunction and ap-
pointing the receiv r, were, upon appeal, rever ed: with permi -
sion to the complainant to appl:y for leave to amend the bill, 
so a to make th corporartion of the Mercantile I n urance Com-
pany defendants therein; and otherwi e, a they might be advised. 
The application to amend i accordingly made; and b ides 
in erting the name of the company, the complainant propo e to 
trike out the whole tating part of the bill (except the recital of 
the charter), th interrogating part and the prayer; and to in er~, 
a a ub titut , and by way of amendment- not a tat ment of 
a n w matter entir ly- but a r tatement of th original matter 
in a diff rent phra ology; 1 aving out ome of the all ation 
or portion thereof· introducing ome new and additional matter; 
p cifyin in om in tance date and tim where none were 
m ntion d befor omitting the whole of the particular int rro<Ya-
tori and r tating th pra r of the bill althou<Yh in ub t nee 
and ff t th am a j contain d in th ori O'inal 
Th qu tion i a thi i a worn bill, wb th r am ndmenl 
can b admitt d in hi wa an to the ext nt her pro d? I n 
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considering this question, it is necessary to distinguish between
an amendment and matter which would constitute a new bill;
for under the privilege of amending, the party is not to be per-
mitted to make a new bill. Amendments can only be granted
when the bill is found defective in proper parties, in its prayer for
relief, or in the omission or mistake of some fact or circumstance
connected with the substance of the case but not forming the sub-
stance itself. This is the principle laid down in Lyon v. Tall-
madge, 1 J. C. E. 184; and it applies to all bills and to pleadings
in general in this court. When it comes to be applied to injunc-
tion bills or to bills and answers which have been sworn to, other
regulations adopted for the prevention of mischief are to be ob-
served. Thus in Bodgers v. Rodgers, 1 Paige's C. E. 424, upon
an application to amend an injunction bill, the Chancellor held,
that the amendments proposed must be merely in addition to the
original bill and not inconsistent with it; and the complainant
must swear to the truth of the matter proposed to be inserted by
way of amendment and show a valid excuse for not having incor-
porated it in the original bill. And the latter branch of this rule
was strictly adhered to in the subsequent case of Whitmarsh v.
Campiell, 2 Paige's C. E. 67. It is contended, however, that the
rule in these cases, is to be confined to injunction bills, that is to
say, to cases where an injunction has been issued and is actually
pending and where the complainant asks for leave to amend without
prejudice to the injunction— as was the case in Bodgers v. Bodgers
—and that it does not apply, where a bill has merely been sworn
to and no injunction is outstanding upon it. But I apprehend
it is not to be thus limited in its application ; and that the delay
which would be occasioned by allowing amendments after an in-
junction and in some instances after an answer put in, is by no
means the only reason for the rule.
Another and more important reason for holding a strict hand
over the privilege of amending sworn pleadings is, to check all
temptation to falsehood or perjur}% by not permitting a party
who has once made his allegations or statements under oath to
come in at any time and expunge the same or substitute other
and different matter. If, indeed, it clearly appears there has been
a mistake arising from inadvertency or accident, and that the
statement is not what the party thought it was or intended it


















































































































































considering thi question, it is necessary to distinguish between 
an amendment and matter which would constitute a new bill; 
for under the privilege of amending, the party is not to be per-
mitted to make a new bill. Amendment can only be granted 
when the bill is found defective in proper parties, in its prayer for 
relief, or in the omission or mistake of some fact or circumstance 
connected with the substance of the case but not forming the sub-
tance it elf. This is the principle laid down in Lyon v. Tall-
madge, 1 J. C. R. 184; and it applies to all bills and to pleadings 
in general in this court. When it comes to be applied to injunc-
tion bills or to bills and answers which have been sworn to, other 
regulations adopted for the prevention of mischief are to be ob-
served. Thus in Rodgers v. Rodgers, 1 Paige's C. R. 424, upon 
an application to amend an injunotion bill, the Chancellor held, 
that the amendments proposed must be merely in addition to the 
original bill and not inconsistent with it; and the complainant 
must swear to the truth of the matter proposed to be inEerted by 
way of amendment and show a valid excuse for not having incor-
porated it in the original bill. And the latter branch of this rule 
was strictly adhered to in the subsequent case of Whitmarsh v. 
Campbell, 2 Paige's C. R. 67. It is contended, however, that the 
rule in these cases, is to be confined to injunction bills, that is to 
say, to cases where an injunction has been issued and is actually 
pending and where the complainant asks for leave to amend without 
prejudice to the injunction-as was the case in Rodgers v. Rodge1·s 
-and that it does not apply, where a bill has merely been sworn 
to and no injunction is outstanding upon it. But I apprehend 
it i not to be thus limited in its application; and that the delay 
which would be occasioned by allowing amendment.s after an in-
junction and in some instances after an answer put in, is by no 
means the only reason for the rule. 
Another and more important reason for holding a strict hand 
over the privilege of amending worn pleadings j to check all 
t emptation to fal ehood or perjury, by not permitting a party 
who has once made his all gations or statement under oath to 
come in at a•ny time and expunge the ame or ub titute other 
and different matter. If, indeed, it clearly appears there ha been 
a mi take ari ing from inadvertency or accid nt and that the 
tatem nt j not what the party thought it wa or intended it 
hould he at th time of wearing to th pl adino- the court will 
Verplanck v. Mercantile Co. 273
permit him to amend upon discovery of the error. But, even in
such cases, the court will not suffer the amendment to be made
by striking out any part of the pleading. It can only be done
by introducing an additional or supplemental statement explaining
and correcting the former erroneous one. Thus, in Jennings v.
Merton College, 8 Ves. 79, a motion was made to take the answer
off the file, upon the ground of a mistake which had occurred in it.
The Lord Chancellor refused the application, saying, the safest
way would be to file an additional answer, giving the explanation
so that the court might have the whole before it, without letting
any thing go out of the record. And this course was sanctioned
in the subsequent cases of Bolder v. The Bank of England, 10
Ves. 284, and Wells v. Wood, ib. 401; and several others. The
same question came under consideration in Boiven v. Cross, 4 J. C.
E. 375, where Chancellor Kent, upon a review of all the English
cases, held it to be not only settled, but the safer and wiser practice,
not to permit any thing to be struck out of an answer, even where
a mistake was clearly shown, but (for the purpose of correcting it)
to give the party leave to file a supplemental or additional answer
— thereby leaving to the parties the effect of what had been sworn
before, with the explanation given by the supplemental answer.
A perusal of his opinion in that ease will show the extreme caution
with which the court permits even this to be done. He says,
"there can be no doubt that the application ought to "hQ narrowly
and closely inspected, and a just and necessary case clearly made
out."
If then, as respects amending an answer, the court is to be thus
watchful to prevent any thing from, being stricken out, though
introduced unintentionally and through mistake, is it not necessary
to be equally particular in regard to a sworn bill, which a com-
plainant may seek to amend in an important and material part?
In some respects, the comparison may not hold good; for the
occasions are much more frequent for amending bills than answers
— and therefore a greater latitude should be given in the former
cases. Yet it will be perceived that the occasions for amending
bills, in which it is necessary to exhibit a greater indulgence, gen-
erally arises from a discovery of a defect in the proper parties, in
the prayer for relief, or in the omission of some fact or circum-
stance rendered necessary to be introduced in consequence of the
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permit him to amend upon di covery of th rror. But, even in 
uch ca e , the court will not suffer the amendment to be made 
by triking out any part of the pleading. t can only be done 
by introducing an addition 1 or upplemental tatement explaining 
and correcting the form r rroneous one. Thu , in J ennings v. 
Merton College, 8 Ve. 79, a motion wa made to take the an wer 
off the file, upon the ground of a mi take which had occurr d in it. 
The Lord Chancellor refu ed the application, aying, the aifest 
way would b to file an additional an wer, giving the explanation 
o that the court might hav the whole before it, without letting 
any thing go out of the record. And thi course wa auctioned 
in the sub equent ca es o·f Dolder v. The Bank of England, 10 
Ve . 284, and Wells v. Wood, i-b. 401; and several other . The 
same question came under consrderation in Bowen v. Cross, 4 J. C. 
R. 375, where Chancellor Kent, upon a review of all the English 
ca .. es, held it to be not only settled, but the safer and wiser practice, 
not to permit any thing to be struck out of an answer, even where 
a mistake was clearly shown, but (for the purpose of correcting it) 
to give the party leave to file a supplemental or additional answer 
-thereby leaving to the parties the effect of what had been sworn 
before, with the ex.planation given by the supple.mental answer. 
A perusal of hi opinion in tha1t case will show the extreme caution 
with which the court permits even thi to be done. He ay., 
"there can be no doubt that the application ought to abe narrowly 
and closely inspected, and a just ·and necessary case clearly made 
out." 
If then, a respects aimending an answer, the court i to be thus 
watchful to prevent any thing from~ being tricken out, though 
introduced unintentionally and through mi take, is it not nece ary 
to b equally particular in regard to a worn bill, which a com-
plainant may eek to alillend in an important and material part? 
n ome re pect , the comparison may not hold goo ·; for the 
occa ion ar much mor frequ nt for amending bill than an wers 
-and therefore a greater latitud hould be giv n in the former 
ca B . Yet it will be perceived that th occasion for amending 
bill in which it i neces ary to exh~bit a greater indulO'ence gen-
rall ari e from a di cov r of a defect in th proper parti in 
the pra3 r for relief or in th omi ion of om fact or circum-
tance rend r n c ar to b introduc in con equ nc of the 
d fendant' an w r ( arrid which a complainant may b rmitted 
u 
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to introduce, especially where the defendant, upon exceptions, is
bound to make further answer) and where the matter for amend-
ment does not affect the substance of the case made by the bill.
Where the object of the amendments is to alter or change the
substance of the bill, I hold that the same strictness should be
required as where an answer is in question. The complainant may
amend by introducing new parties; and by making such new
charges, allegations and statements, in addition to the former, as
he can verify by his oath, and which are not inconsistent with his
former allegations. These are the true and legitimate purposes
for which leave to amend may be granted; and it cannot be
extended, with any sort of propriety, to the striking out of former
allegations and substituting others, although they may not be very
different in substance and effect. It has been urged that Renivich
V. Wilson, 6 J. C. E. 81, contains a different doctrine, and that
Chancellor Kent, if he has not so decided, has there, at least,
sanctioned the idea that parts of a sworn bill may be expunged
for the purposes of amendment — and that too, without prejudice
to an injunction, provided the part expunged does not constitute
the ground upon which the injunction rests. I do not, however,
understand him as going that length. On the contrary, he ex-
pressly limited the amendments, which he permitted to be made in
that case, to additions to the bill; by "inserting such additional
statements, matters and charges as the plaintiff should be advised
"were material;" and this was done without prejudice to the
injunction. At the same time, he says, he could not allow any
part of the bill to be stricken out, without a previous specification
of the parts intended to be omitted. It would seem from this
expression, he considered the court might, in the exercise of its
discretion, permit an amendment by striking out: but I appre-
hend this permission should in no case be extended beyond the
mere formal parts of a bill, and that the Chancellor in that case
did not mean to be understood as intimating an opinion that
any material or substantial allegation of fact, sworn to, might, at
the instance of the party who made it, be withdrawn or obliterated,
so that, if guilty of perjury no vestige of it might remain.
Xo court of justice or equity ought, for one moment, to tolerate
a practice, which would hold out to the designing an opportunity
to commit and yet escape from this crime. By thus adverting to
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to introduce, e pecially where the defendant, upon exception , is 
bound to make further an wer) and where the matter for amencl-
ment doe not affect the ub tance of the case made b3 the bill. 
Where the object of the amendments is to alter or change the 
ub tance of the bill, I hold that the same strictne hould be 
required a where an answer i in que tion. The complainant may 
amend by introducing new parti ; and by making uch new 
charge , allegation and tatement , in addition to the former, as 
he can erify b3 hi oa.th, and which are not inoon istent with his 
former allegation . Th e are the true and legitimate purpose 
for which leave to amend may be granted; and it cannot be 
extended, with any sort of propriety, to the triking out of former 
allegation and ub tituting other , although they may not be very 
different in ub tance and effect. It ha been urged that Renwick 
v. TI ilson~ 6 J. C. R. 81, contain a different doctrine, and that 
Chancellor Kent, if he ha not o decided, has there, at lea t, 
anctioned the idea that part of a worn bill may be expunged 
for the purpo e of amendment-and that too, without prejudice 
to an injunction, provided the part expunged doe not con titute 
the ground upon which the injunction re ts. I do not, however, 
under .. tand him a going that length. On the contrary, he ex-
pre .. ly limited the amendment , which he permitt d fo be made in 
that ca e, to addition to the bill; by "in erting uch additional 
tatement , matter and charge a the plaintiff hould be advi ed 
"were material;" and thi wa done without prejudice to the 
injunction. At the ame time, he ay , he could not allow any 
part of the bill to be stricken out, without a previou peci:fication 
of th parts intended to be omitted. It would eem from this 
xpr ion, he con idered the court might, in the exerci e of it 
di er tion, p rmit an amendment by triking out: but I appre-
hend thi permi ion hould in no ca e be extended be 1ond th~ 
mere formal part of a bill and that the Chane llor in that ca e 
did not m a·n to be und r tood a intimating an opinion that 
any mat rial or ub tantial all gation of fa t worn to might, at 
the in tanc of the party who made it, b withdrawn or obliterated, 
o that, if guilt of perjury no ve tig of it might remain . 
.J.. o court of ju ti e or quity ought for one moment to tolerate 
a practice, whi h would hold out to th d igning an opportunity 
to commit and 3 et e cap from thi crime. By thu ad erting to 
th dang r of u h a pra ti I do not wi h t b under toad a" 
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refleding in tlio slightest degree upon the complainants. I am
bound to believe and do believe the present application is mado
from pure and honest motives, the better to enable them to present
their case. My object in these observations is merely to show, that
if the bill is permitted to be amended to the extent proposed, it
will be establishing a precedent dangerous in practice — and the
consequences of which might be a reproach to the court. The
only safe and true rule, in my judgment, is the one adopted in
Eodgers v. Bodgers; and I see no reason for confining its applica-
tion to the case of an injunction bill having a writ of injunction
outstanding. It applies, with equal force, to all cases of sworn
bills; and I must, therefore, hold that no bill which has been
sworn to in this court can be amended by striking out the whole
or any portion of the stating part and recasting it in different
phraseolog}', with some omissions of former charges, and the addi-
tion of some new matter. This, instead of being an amendment in
the technical sense of the term, would be converting it into a new
bill : and which the complainants can resort to, if they please.
Other objections have been urged against the present applica-
tion, namely, that the proposed amendments are not verified by
the oath of the complainants or of any of them; and also, that
the complainants have not sworn as to the information (upon which
the new matter is founded) having come to their knowledge since
the filing of the original bill. The petition is verified by the
affidavit of the solicitor only; and no reason is given, why the
complainants or some one of them have not sworn to it. I am
strongly inclined to think it is insufficient; and that, on this
ground alone, the court would be compelled to deny the motion.
I have thought it my duty, nevertheless, to examine the case and
to express my opinion upon the other and principal question; and
the result is, that I cannot give the complainants permission to
amend, in the way proposed. All I can do upon this application is,
to let them amend by inserting the corporate name of the Mer-
cantile Insurance Company in the place of the President and
Directors: but it must be upon the payment of the costs of op-
posing this motion.
The amendment was made accordingly.
As to the costs of opposing the above motion :
!Mr. Jacob Barker presented to the Yice-Chancellor. as taxing

















































































































































VERPLANCK . MERO.A TIL • 0. 
refleo1ing in the lighte t d gr e upon the omplainant . am 
bound to belie e and do b li e the pre ent application is mad:.. 
from pure and hon t motiv , the better to enable them to pre ent 
th ir a e. Iy object in the e ol r ation i mer ly to how, that 
if th bill i permitt d to b amended to the ext nt propo ed, it 
will l abli hing a precedent dangerou in practice-and the 
con qu nces of which might be a reproach to the court. Th 
only a-fe and tn1 rule, in my judgment, i th one adopted in 
Rodgers . Rodgers.; and I no rea on for confining it applica-
tion to th cas of an injunction bill having a writ of injunction 
out tanding. It appli , with equal force, to all ca of worn 
bill ; and I mu t, therefor , hold that no bill which ha be n 
worn to in thi court cau be amended by striking out the whole 
or any portion of the tating part and reca ting it in differen: 
phra eology, with ome omi ion of former charge , and the addi-
tion of ome new matter. Thi , in tead of being an am ndment in 
the technical en e of the term, would be converting it into a new 
bill : and which the complainant can r ort to, if they plea e. 
Other objection have been urged again t the pre ent applica-
tion, namely, that the proposed amendment are not Yerified by 
the oaith of the complainant or of any of them; and al o, that 
the omplainants ha e not sworn ·as to the information (upon which 
the new matter i founded) having come to their knowledge ince 
the filing of the original bill. The petition is verified by the 
affidavit of the solicitor only; a·nd no rea on i given, why the 
complainant or some one of them have not worn to it. I am 
trongly inclined to think it i insufficient ; and that, on thi ~ 
ground alone, the court would be compelled to deny the motion. 
I have thought it my duty, neverthele , to examine the ca e and 
to expre my opinion upon the other and principal que tion; and 
the r ul i , tha1t cannot give the complainant permi ion to 
amend in the way propo ed. 11 I can do upon thi application i~ 
to 1 t them amend by in erting the corporate name of the Mer-
antile n urance ompany in the place of the Pre id nt and 
ir ctor : but it mu t be upon the payment of the co t of op-
po~ ino- thi motion. 
he am nd nt wa made accordingl . 
t th o t of oppo ino- the above motion: 
:Jir. a ob ark r pr .. oo.t d to the \ ic - hancellor. a taxin 
o r a ill of ro t on hi own part. Hi honor i d. h ould 
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not tax Mr. Barker any costs for his opposition, he not being an
officer of the court: the Revised Statutes having made provision,
only for fees to "counsellors" and: "solicitors." 2 E. S. 629, 630.
Thorn v. Germand, ^ JoJins. Ch. (N. Y.) 363. (1820.)
Motion to amend the bill, by adding new and material charges,
after issue joined, a rule to produce witnesses, a commission ta
take testimony sued out, and one witness examined. The petition
stated, that after issue joined, and while the solicitor for the plain-
tiffs was preparing to take testimony, the matter proposed to be
introduced by way of amendment, was discovered. The affidavit,
as to the above facts, was sworn to by the solicitor for the plaintiffs.
To oppose the motion, an affidavit of G. B., a third person, was
produced, stating, that before the filing of the bill he communicated
to one of the plaintiffs, the material fact proposed' by way of
amendment viz. the entry of a judgment in the Supreme Court.
The Chancellor:
The application should have been for leave to withdraw the
replication, for the purpose of amending the bill. No amendment
can be allowed, going to the merits, while the replication remains.
(1 Atk. 51. 1 Ves. jun. 142. Newland's Pr. 82.) And if that had
been the motion, the materiality of the amendment, and why the
matter was not stated before, must have been shown, and satisfac-
torily explained. {Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Ch. Eep. 425.
Turner v. Clialwin, cited in 1 Fowler's Ex. Pr. 113.)
In this case, it is proved, on the part of the defendants, and it is
not denied by the plaintiffs, that they, or one of them, knew the
existence of the matter now sought to be introduced into their bill,
before the filing of the bill. It is, therefore, not new matter, that
is to be added by way of amendment, but matter before resting
in the knowledge of the party.
There is another fatal objection to the motion. Here has been
a witness already examined in the cause. If no witness had been
examined, an amendment, otherwise proper, and when the omission
was duly accounted for, might have been permitted, for it has been
permitted after publication. (Hastings v. Gregory, cited in W]H.


















































































































































not tax Mr. Barker any costs for his opposition, he not being an 
officer of the court: the Revised Statutes having made provision 
only for fees to "counsellors" amt "solicitors." 2 R. S. 629, 630. 
Thorn v. Germand, 4 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 363. {1820.) 
MoTIO.r to amend the bill, by adding new and material charge3, 
after is ue joined, a rule to produce witnesses, a commission to 
take testimony sued out, and one witness examined. The petition 
stated, that after issue joined, and while the solicitor for the plain-
tiffs was preparing to take testimony, the matter proposed to be 
introduced by way of amendment, wa di covered. The affidavit, 
a to the a!bove facts, was sworn to by the solicitor for the plaintiffs. 
To oppose the mohon, an affidavit of G. B., a third person, was 
produced, stating, that before the filing af the bill he communicated. 
to one of the plaintiffs, the material fact proposed- by way of 
amendment .. viz. the entry of a judgment in the Supreme Court. 
THE CHANCELLOR : 
The application should have been for leave to withdraw the 
replication, for the purpose of amending the bill. No amendment 
can be allowed, going to the merits, while the replication remains. 
(1 Atk. 51. 1 Ves. jun. 142. Newland's Pr. 82.) And if that had 
been the motion, the materiality of the amendment, and why the 
matter was not stated before, must ha·ve been shown, and satisfac-
torily explained. (Brown v. Ricketts, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. -125. 
Turner v. Chalwin, cited in 1 Fowler's Ex. Pr. 113.) 
In this ca e, it i proved, on the part of the defendants, and it is 
not denied by the plaintiffs, that they, or one of them, knew the 
exi tence of th matter now ought to be introduced into their bill, 
before the filing of the bill. It i , therefore, not new matter, that 
i to be added by wa.y of amendment, but matter before re ting 
in the know ledge of the party. 
There i another fatal objection to the motion. Here ha been 
a witn already xamin d in th cau . If no witne had be- n 
examined, an am ndment, otherwi e proper, and wh n the omL ion 
wa duly accounted for, might hav been p rmitt d for it ha been 
p rmitt d alt r publi ation. (Hastings . Gregory, cit d in ~fitf. 
Pl. 25 . and 1 Fow] r Ex. Pr. 111.) But after th xamination 
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of witnesses, the pleadings cannot be altered or amenaed, except
under very special circumstances, or in consequence of some subse-
quent event, unless it be for the sole purjwse of adding parties.
This is the established rule of practice on the subject. (Mitf. PI.
258, 259.) The only course for the plaintiff, in these cases, when
he cannot have permission to alter his original bill by amendment,
is to apply for leave to file a supplemental bill. {Shephard v.
Merril 3 Johns. Ch. Eep. 423.)
Motion denied with costs.
Bill of Review.
Dexter v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 303. (1829.)
Petition to file a bill for the purpose of obtaining a review of
a decree, rendered in this Court at a former term, in the case of
Edward Dexter v. Thomas Arnold. (See ante. Vol. III. p. 284.)
The original bill, filed at the November Term, 1821, charged
Thomas Arnold, as surviving partner, joint owner, trustee, and
agent of his brother Jonathan Arnold, and as administrator upon
his estate. Upon the bill, answer, and exhibits, an interlocutory
decree passed, for the defendant to account upon oath, with di-
rections to the master as to the mode of taking an account, and
allowing the plaintiff to surcharge and falsify the stated accounts
exhibited by the defendant. A report was made by the master
at the June Term, 1823, and a final decree entered for the plain-
tiff at the following Xovember Term, for five hundred dollars
sixty-six and a half cents.
The grounds, presented by the petition for a review of that
decree, were, the discovery of new facts showing, that several sums
of money had come into the hands of the defenda-nt, belonging
to Jonathan Arnold, which were not entered in Thomas Arnold's
accounts, nor allowed by the master, and that several claims, made
by Thomas Arnold and allowed by the master, were without foun-
dation and erroneous.
Story, J.:
The present is a somewhat novel proceeding in this Circuit ; and
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of witne ~e , the pl adin afilnot be alter d or amenaed, xcept 
under very p cial circum tanc , or in con equence of .., ome ub e-
quent event, unl it b for the ole purpo e of adding partie~ . 
Thi i the e tabli h rul of practice on the ubj ct. ( Mitf. Pl. 
, 2 9.) Th only cou e for the plaintiff, in the e ca , when 
1 e annot hav p rmi ion to alter bi original bill by am ndment, 
i to apply for 1 aive to file a upplemental bill. ( hephard v. 
M err,il, 3 John . h. Rep. 4 3.) 
Motion denied with costs. 
BILL OF REVIEW. 
Dexte1· v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 303. {1829.) 
I 
P ETITION to file a bill for the purpo e of obtaining a r eview of 
a decree, rendered in this Court at a former term, in the case of 
Edwa1·d Dexte1· v. Thomas Arnold. (See ante, Vol. III. p. 284.) 
The original bill, filed at the November Term, 1821, charged 
Thoma Arnold, as surviving partner, joint owner, tru tee, and 
,ag nt of his brother Jonathan Arnold, and as administrator upon 
hi e tate. Upon the bill, an wer, and exhibits, an interlocutory 
leer pa ed, for th defendant to account upon oath, with di-
r ction to the ma ter a to the mode of taking an account, and 
allowing the plaintiff to urcb:arge and fal ify the stated accounts 
exhibit d by the d fendant . A report was made by the master 
at th June Term, 1 3, and a final decre ent red for the plain-
tiff at the following ovember T'erm, for fi e hundred dollars 
sixt - ix and a half c nU:. 
The ground pr n ed b the petition for a review of that 
d r e, wer , th di co ry of new fact bowing, that everal um 
of mane had om into the hand of th d fendal!l.t belongincr 
to Jonathan rnold which w r not nter d in Thom rnold , 
a count nor allow by the ma t r and that v ral claim made 
b. mold an allow d b th ma t r were without foun-
TRY J.: 
h pr ent i ' a om what o 1 proceedinO' in thi 
I am n t awar hat in a 1 th r ·r uit f th 
ircuit · an 
ni.t d tat 
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any general course of practice has prevailed, which would super-
cede the necessity of acting upon this, as a case of first impression,
to be decided upon the general principles of Courts of Equity.
It comes before the Court upon a petition for leave to file a
bill of review of a decree rendered in this Court at November
Term, 1823, principally upon the ground of a discovery of new
matters of fact. The petition was filed at November Term, 1837,
and affidavits have been read in support of it. Counter affidavits
have also been admitted on the other side, not for the purpose of
investigating or absolutely deciding upon the truth of the state-
ments in the petition ; but to present, in a more exact shape, some
of the circumstances growing out of the original proceedings,
which may assist the Court in the preliminary discussion, whether
leave ought to be granted to file the bill of review. This course,
though not very common, is, as I conceive, perfectly within the
range of the authority of the Court ;^ and may be indispensable
for a just exercise of its functions, in granting or withholding the
review. If, indeed, it were doubtful, in case the bill of review
should be allowed, whether the defendants could by plea or answer
traverse the allegation in such bill, that the matter of fact is new,
I should not hesitate to inquire, in the most ample manner, into
the truth of such allegation, before the bill was granted, in order
to prevent gross injustice. But as every such bill of review must
contain an allegation, that the matter of fact is new, it seems to
me clear upon principle, that, as it is vital to the relief, it is
transversable by plea or answer, and must be proved, if not ad-
mitted at the hearing. In Hanhury v. Stevens (178-1), cited by
Lord Redesdale (Redesd. PI. Eq. 80) [3d edition, 70], the Court
is reported to have held that doctrine. The case of Lewcllen v.
Mack worth (2 Atk. R. 40; Barnard, Ch. R. 445), though very
imperfectly, and, as I should think, inaccurately reported, seems
to me to support the same conclusion. It has been relied on by
the best text writers for that purpose.^ Lord Redesdale, in his
original work on Equity Pleadings (Redes. Eq. PI. 80, 2d edition),
stated the point, as one which may be doubted; but upon prin-
ciple I cannot see, how that can well be. And in the last edition,
*See Livingston v. Hitbbs, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 124; Norris v. Lc Neve, 3
Atk 2^
2Rerlesd. PI. Eq. 231 (3d edition); Coop. Eq. PI. 305; Montague, Eq.

















































































































































278 BILL OF REVIEW 
any general course of pradice ha prevailed, which would uper-
cede the necessity of acting upon this, as a case of :first impression, 
to be dec~ded upon the general principles of Courts of Equity. 
It come before the Court upon a petition for leave to :file a 
bill of review of a decree rendered in this Court at November 
Term, 1823, principally upon the ground of a discovery of new 
matter of fact. The petition was :filed at November Term, 1827, 
and affidavits have been read in support of it. Counter affidavits 
have al o been admitted on the other side, not for the purpose of 
investigating or absolutely deciding upon the truth of the state-
ments in the petition; but to present, in a more exact shape, some 
of the circumstances growing out of the miginal proceedings, 
which may assist the Court in the preliminary discussion, whether 
leave ought to be granted to file the bill of review. This course, 
though not very common, is, as I conceive, perfectly within the 
range of the authority of the Court ;1 and may be indispensable 
for a just exercise of its functions, in granting or withholding the 
review. If, indeed, it were doubtful, in case the bill of review 
should be allowed, whetheT the ·defendants could by plea or answer 
traverse the allegation in such bill, that the maitter of fact is new, 
I should not hesitate to inquire, in the most ample manner, into 
the truth of such allegation, before the bill was granted, in order 
to prevent gro s injustice. But as every such bill of review mu t 
contain an allegation, thait the matter of fact is new, it seems to 
me clear upon principle, that, as it is vital to the relief, it is 
transversable by plea or answer, and must be proved, if not ad-
mitted at the hearing. In Hanbury v. Stevens (1784), cited by 
Lord Red sdale (Red sd. Pl. Eq. 80) [3d edition, 70], the Court 
is reported to have held that doctrine. T'he case of Lewellen v. 
Mackworth (2 Atk. R. 40; Barnard, Ch. R. 445), though very 
imperfectly, and, as I should think, inaccurately reported, seems 
to me to support the same conclusion. It ha been relied on by 
the best text writer for that purpose.2 Lord RedesdaJe, in hi 
original work on Equity Pleadings (Redes. Eq. Pl. 80, 2d edition), 
tated the point, as one which may be doubt d; but upon prin-
ciple I cannot ee, how that 1can well be. And in th la t dition, 
tSee Livingston v. Hubbs, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 124; Norris v. Le N eve, 3 
Atk. 25. 
2R de d. Pl. Eq. 23T (3d dition) ; Coop. Eq. Pl. 305; Montague, Eq. 
Pl. 335, note; Id. 336; 2 Montague, Eq. Pl. n7, Note 100. 
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(the third), revised by his Lordship, I find that he has questioned
the propriety of such a doubt.-"^
Before I proceed to consider the particular grounds of the
present petition, it may be well to glance at some of the regula-
tions, which govern Courts of Equity in relation to bills of review,
that we may be better enabled to judge of their application to
the Courts of the United States. The ordinance of Lord Bacon
constitutes the foundation of the system, and has never been de-
parted horn. It is as follows: "j^o decree shall be reversed,
altered, or explained, being once under the great seojl, but upon a
bill of review. And no bill of review shall be admitted, except
it contain either error in law, appearing in the tody of the decree,
without further examination of matters of fact, or some new mat-
ter, which hath arisen after the decree, and not any new proof,
ivhich might have been used, when the decree was made, j^ever-
theless, upon new proof that is come to light after the decree
made, and could not possiVIy have been used at the time when the
decree passed, a bill of review may be grounded by the special
license of the Court, and not otherwise." ^
A bill of review, therefore, lies only, when the decree has
been enrolled under the great seal in chancery. If it has not
been so enrolled, then for error of law apparent upon the decree
the remedy is by a petition for a re-hearing.^ But if the ground
of the bill is new matter, discovered since the decree, then the
remedy is by a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review,
and a petition for a re-hearing, which are allowed by special license
of the Court.*' This distinction between a bill of review and a
bill in the nature of a bill of review, though important in England,
is not felt in the practice of the Courts of the United States, and
perhaps rarely in any of the State Courts of Equity in the Union.
I take it to be clear, that in the Courts of the United States all
decrees as well as judgments are matters of record, and are deemed
to be enrolled as of the Term, in which they are passed. So that
the appropriate remedy is by a bill of review.
3Redesd. PI. Eq. 70 (t,<\ edition).
*Beame's Orders in Chancery, i.
^Pcrry v. PhcUps, 17 Vez. 171, 178.
«Redesd. Eq. PI. 65. [78] 81 : Coop. Eq. PI. 88. 89. 90. 91 ; Beame's Or-
ders m Chan. 2 and 3. notes; Sheffield v. Duchess of Buckingham. 1 West.
R. 682; Montag. PI. Eq. ch. 12, p. 330; Norris v. LeXeve, 3 Atk. 26; Perry
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(th third), revi d by hi Lord hip, I :find that he has ue tioneJ 
th propri ty of uch a doubt.3 
Before I proce d to on id r the particular ground of the 
pr ent petition, it may be well to gla·nce at ome of the regula-
tion , which govern our of 1 quity in relation to bill of review, 
that w may b better enabled to judge of th ir application to 
the Court of the United tate . The ordinance of Lord Bacon 
on titute the foundation of the y tern, and ha never been de-
part d from. It i as follow : " o decre hall be rcve etl, 
alt red, or xplain d, being once under the great se(J}l, but upon a 
bill of review. And no bill of review hall be admitted, xcep t 
it contain either rror in law, appearing in the body of the decree, 
without further examination of matter of fact, or some new mat-
ie'r, which hath ari en after the decree, and not any new proof, 
which might have been used, when the decree was made. ever-
th le , upon new proof that is c01ne to light after the decree 
made, and could not possilJly have been used at the time when the 
decree passed, a bill of review may be grounded by the special 
license of the Court, and not otherwi e." 4 
bill of revi w, therefore, lies only, when the decree ha 
b n enrolled under the great eal in chancery. If it ha not 
be n o enrolled, then for error of la1w apparent upon the decree 
the remedy is by a petition for a re-hearing.5 But if the ground 
of the bill i new matter, di ·covered ince the decree, then the 
r m dy i by a upplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, 
and a petition for a re-hearing, which are allowed by special licen e 
of the ourt. G Thi di tinction between a bill of review and a 
bill in th nature of a bill of review, though important in England, 
i not felt in the practice of the Court of the United State , and 
perhap rarely in any of the tate Court of Equity in the Union. 
I take it to be cl ar, that in the Court of the United State all 
decree a well a judgment are matter of record, and are deemed 
to b enrolled a of the T rm, in which they are pas ed. So that 
the appropriate rem a i b T a bill of review. 
BR d d. Pl. Eq. 70 ( d dition). 
4 amc' Ord r in hanc ry, I. 
5Pcrry v. Plze lips, 17 z. 173, 178. 
6R d d. Eq. Pl. 65, [7 ] 1; o p. Eq. Pl. , 9. , 91 · ame'~ Or-
der in han. - and 3, n te ; lreffi Id v. D11clzess of B11cki11 ham. 1 \\ e t. 
R. - ; ~Ion ta . Pl. Eq. ch. I-, p. o · Norris v. Le,\ c"l'C, Atk. _6 · P rry 
v. Plielif's, 17 V z. 173; Bia~ c . Foster, 2 . & eatt) 47 46o. 
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In regard to errors of law, apparent upon the face of the de-
cree, the established doctrine is, that you cannot look into the
evidence in the case in order to show the decree to be erroneous
in its statement of the facts. That is the proper office of the
Court upon an appeal. But taking the facts to be, as they are
stated to be on the face of the decree, you must show, that the
Court have erred in point of law.'^ If, therefore, the decree do
not contain a statement of the material facts, on which the de-
cree proceeds, it is plain, that there can be no relief by a bill of
review, but only by an appeal to some superior tribunal. It is
on this account, that in England decrees are usually drawn up
with a special statement of, or reference to, the material grounds
of fact for the decree.^ In the Courts of the United States the
decrees are usually general. In England the decree embodies
the substance of the bill, pleadings, and answers; in the Courts
of the United States the decree usually contains a mere reference
to the antecedent proceedings without embodying them. But for
the purpose of examining all errors of law, the bill, answers, and
other proceedings are, in our practice, as much a part of the record
before the Court, as the decree itself ; for it is only by a comparison
with the former, that the correctness of the latter can be ascer-
tained.
In regard to new matter, there are several considerations deserv-
ing attention. In the first place the new matter must be rele-
vant and material, and such, as if known, might probably have
produced a different determination.^ In other words, it must be
new matter to prove what was before in issue, and not to prove
a title not before in issue ;i^ not to make a new case, but to
establish the old one. In the next place the new matter must
have come to the knowledge of the party since the period, in
which it could have been used in the cause at the original hear-
ing. Lord Bacon's ordinance says in one part it must be, "after
"^Mellish V. Williams, i Vern. R. i66; Cranhorne v. Dclahay, 2 Freem.
R. 169; Comhs V. Proivd, 1 Ch. Cas. 54; S. C. 2 Freem. R. 181 ; 3 Rep- Ch.
18; Hard. R. 174; Perry v. Phelips, 17 Vez. 173; O'Brien v. Conner, 2 B.
& Beatt. 146, 154.
^Conibs V. Prozvd, i Ch. Cas. 54; Brend v. Brcnd, i Vern. R. 214; S. C.
2. Ch. Cas. 161; Bonham v. Newcomb, 1 Vern. R. 216; O'Brien v. Conner,
2 B. & Beatt. 146, 154.
^Bennett v. Lee, 2 Atk. 529; O'Brien v. Connor, 2 B. & Beatt. 155;
Portsmouth v. EtHns^hain, i Vez. 429.
i^Coop. Eq. PI. 91; Patterson v. Slaughter, Ambler R. 292; Young v.

















































































































































280 BILL OF REVIEW 
In regard to errors of law, apparent upon the face of the de-
cree, the e tablished doctrine i , that you cannot look into the 
evidence in the case in order to show the decree to be erroneous 
in its statement of the fact . That is the proper office of the 
Court upon an appeail. But taking the facts to be, as they are 
tated to be on the face of the decree, you must how, that the 
Court have erred in point of law.7 If, therefore, the decree do 
not contain a statement of the material facts, on which the de-
cree proceeds, it is plain, that there can be no relief by a bill of 
review, but only ·by an appeal to some superior tribunal. It is 
on thi account, that in England decrees are usually drawn up 
with a pecial statement of, or reference to, the material grounds 
of fact for the decree.8 In the Courts of the United States the 
decrees are u ually general. In England the decree embodies 
the substance of the bill, pleadings, and answers; in the Courts 
of the United States the decree usually contains a mere reference 
to the antecedent proceedings without em1bodying them. But for 
the purpo e of examining all errors of law, the bill, answers, and 
other proceedings are, in our pradice, as much a part of the recorJ. 
before the Court, as the decree itself; for it is only by a comparison 
with the former, that the correctness of the latter can be ascer-
tained. 
In regard to new matter, there are several considerations deserv-
ing attention. In the :first place the new matter must be rele-
vant and material, and such, as if known, might probably have 
produced a different determination.9 In other word , it must be 
new matter to prove what was before in issue, and not to prove 
a title not before in i sue ;10 not to make a new ca e, but to 
e tabli h the old one. In the next place th new matter must 
have come to the knowledge of the party ince the period, in 
which it could ha.ve been u ed in the cause at the original hear-
ing. Lord Bacon' or inance say in one part it mu t be, "after 
7 Mellish v. Williams, 1 Vern. R. 166; Cranborne v. Delahay, 2 Freem. 
R. 169; Combs v. Prowd 1 Ch. Ca . 54; . C. 2 Fr em. R. 181 ; 3 Rep. Ch. 
18; Hard. R. 174; Perry v. Phelips, 17 Vez. 173; O'Brien v. Conner, 2 B. 
& Beatt. 146, 154· 
8Combs v. Prowd, l Ch. Cas. 54; Brend v. Brend l Vern. R. 214; S. C. 
2. Ch. Ca. 161; Bonham v. Newcomb, 1 Vern. R. 216; O'Brien v. Conner, 
2 B. & Beatt. 146, 154· 
OBennett v. Lee, 2 Atk. 529; O'Brien v. Connor 2 B. & Beatt. 155; 
Portsm01tth v. Effingham, 1 Vez. 429. 
1 ocoop. Eq. I. 91; Patterson v. Slaughter, Am bl r R. 292; Young v. 
Keighley 16 Vez. 348; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. & Beatt. 457, 462. 
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the decree:" but that seems corrected by the subsequent words,
"and could not possibly have been used at the time when the
decree passed/' which point to the period of publication. Lord
Hardwicke is reported to have said, that the words of Lord Bacon
are dark ; but that the construction has been, that the new matter
must have come to the knowledge of the i>arty after publication
passed {Paterson v. tilaughier. Ambler, E. 293). The same doc-
trine was held in N orris v. LeNeve (3 Atk. E. 25, 34), and has
been constantly adhered to since. A qualification of the rule
quite as important and instructive is, that the matter must not
only be new, but that it must be such as that the party, by the
use of reasonable diligence, could not have known; for if there
be any laches or negligence in this respect, that destroys the title
to the relief. That doctrine was expounded and adhered to by
Lord Eldon in Young v. Keighley (16 Yez. 348), and was acted
uix>n by Lord Manners in Barrington v. O'Brien (2 B. & Beatt.
140), and Blake v. Foster (2 B. & Beatrt. 457, 461). It was fully
recognized by Mr. Chancellor Kent, and received the sanction of
his high authority in Wiser v. BlacUey (2 Johns. Ch. E. 488),
and Barrow v. Bliinelander (3 Johns. Ch. E. 120). And in the
very recent case of Bingham v. Dawson (3 Jac. & Walk. 243),
Lord Eldon infused into it additional vigor.
Upon another point perhaps there is not a uniformity of opinion
in the authorities. I allude to the distinction taken in an anony-
mous case in 2 Freem. Eep. 31, where the Chancellor said, that
"where a matter of fact was particularly in issue before the for-
mer hearing, though you have new proof of that matter, upon that
you shall never have a bill of review. But where a new fact is
alleged, that was not at the former hearing, there it may be a
ground for a bill of review." Now, assuming that under certain
circumstances new matter, not evidence, that is, not in issue, in the
original cause, but clearly demonstrating error in the decree, may
support a bill of review, if it is the only mode of obtaining re-
lief /^ still it must be admitted, that the general rule is, that the
new matter must be such as is relevant to the original case in
issue. Lord Hardwicke, in Xorris v. Le Neve (3 Atk. 33, 35),
^^SecNorrisy.LcNcve, 3 Atk. 33, 35; Roberts v. Kincslcv. i Vez. 238;
Earl of Portsmouth v. Lord EfRugham. i Vez. 4^9; Redesdalc, Eq PI 67
&c. (last edition.) : i Montag. PI. Eq. 332. 2>3}.\ Wilson v. Jl'cbb. 2 Cox, 3;
Staiidisli V. r<adlcy, 2 Atk. 177; see also Lord Redesdale's Observations in
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the decree:" but that e m corr ct d by the ub equent word··, 
"and could not p i•bly have been u ed at the time when the 
decree pa ed,' whi h poin to the p riod of publication. Lord 
Hardwi ke i r port d to ha aid, that the word of Lord Bacon 
aire dark; but that h on tru tion ha been, that the n w matter 
mu t have come to th knowl dge of th arly after pUblication 
passed (Paterson v. laughter, Ambler. R. 293). The same doc-
trine wa held in Norris v. L eNeve (3 Atk. , 3 ), and has 
b n con tantly adh r d to ince. A qualification of the rule 
quite a importa·nt an instructive i , that the matter mu t not 
only be new, but that it mu t be such a that the party, by the 
u e of reasonable diligence, could ndt have known; for if there 
be any laches or negligence in thi re pect, that de troy the title 
to the relief. That doctrine wa expounded and adhered to by 
Lord Eldon in Young v. KeighZey (16 Vez. 348), and was acted 
upon by Lord Manners in Barrington v. O'Brien (2 B. & Beatt. 
HO), and Blake v. Foster ( 2 B. & Beai1t. 457, 461). It wa fully 
recognized by Mr. Chancellor Kent, a.nd received the anction of 
hi high authority in Wiser v. Blackley (2 John. Ch. R. 488) , 
and Barrow v. Rhinelander ( 3 Johns. Ch. R. 120). And in the 
very r cent case of Bingham v. Dawson (3 Jae. & Walk. 243), 
Lord Eldon infu ed into it aidditional vigor. 
Upon another point perhap there i not a uniformity of opinion 
in th authoriti . I allude to the distinction taken in an anony-
mou ca e in 2 Freem. Rep. 31, where the Chancellor aid, that 
"wh r a martter of fact wa particularly in i ue before the for-
mer h aring, though you have new proof of that matter, upon that 
you hall n ver ha e a bill of review. But where a new fact i ~ 
all g 1 that wa not at the former hea1ring, there it ma be a 
ground for a bill of r view." Now, a urning that under certain 
circum tance" new matter not evidence, that i , not in i ue in the 
oriainal cau but cl arl demon trating error in the d cree ma) 
upp rt · bill of r iew, if i i the 01nly mod of obtaining re-
li f ;11 till it mu t b admitt d, that the gen ral rule i that the 
n w m tt r mu t b uch a i relevant to the original ca"c in 
i u . Lord ardwi k in L\ 01·ris . Le eve ( 3 tk. 3 3 ) 
11 orri '. L v , 3 tk. , S · Roberts v. Kin as/ y, I \ ez. - ; 
Earl of Portsm outh v. Lcrd Effi11ghal/l. r ez . ..µ9 · R ed al . Eq. I. 67. 
&c. (lat diti n.); r l\IontaO'. Pl. Eq. , 1· Wilso11 \.TT ebb. 2 Cox. ; 
ta11dis'1 v. Rad/ )', 2 tk. 177 · e al Lord R d dale' 0 ervation in 
hi third dition of hi Equity Pl adin , p. 6 . 
283 Bill of Eeview
is reiDorted to have admitted, that a bill of review might be
founded upon new matter not at all in issue in the former cause,
which seems con^trary to his opinion in Patterso?i v. Slaughter
(Ambler, 293),^^ or upon matter, which was in issue, but dis-
covered since the hearing. But the very point in 2 Freeman, 31
(if I rightly underetand it), is, that a newly discovered fact is
ground for a bill; but not newly discovered evidence in proof of
any fact already in issue. This seems to me at variance witli
Lord Bacon's ordinance, for it is there said, that there may be a
review upon "new matter, which hath arisen in time after the
decree," and also "upon new proof, that has come to light after
the decree made, and could not possibly have been used at the
time when the decree passed." It is also contrary to what Lord
Hardwicke held in the cases cited from 3 Atk. 33, and Ambler,
293. Lord Eldon, in Young v. Keighley (16 Vez. 348, 350),
said, "The ground (of a bill of review) is error apparent on the
face of the decree, or new evidence of a fact materially pressing
upon the decree, and discovered at least after publication in the
cause. If the fact had been known before publication, though
some contradiction appears in the cases, there is no a'uthority,
that new evidence would not be sufficient ground." That was
also the opinion of Lord Manners in Blalce v. Foster (2 B. &
Beatt. 457). Mr. Chamcellor Kent, in Livingston v. HuhhSj
(3 Johns. Ch. 124), adopted the like conclusion; and he seemed
to think, that such new evidence must not be a mere accumula-
tion of witnesses to the same fact ; but some stringent written evi-
dence or newly discovered papers. Gilbert, in his Forum Eo-
manum, ch. 10, p. 186, leans to the same limitation, for he says,
that in bills of review, "they can examine to nothing, that was
in the original cause, unless it be matter happening subsequent,
which was not before in issue, or upon matter of record or writing
not known before, for if the Court should give them leave to
enter into proofs upon the same points that were in issue, that
would be under the same mischief as the examination of wit-
nesses after publication, and an inlet into manifest perjury." i***
i2See also Young v. Keighley, i6 Vez. 348, 354; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. &
Beatt. 457, 462.
^'See also Barton, Eq. 216; Tovers v. Young, Prec. Ch. 193; Taylor V.
Sharp, 3 P. Will. 371 ; Standish v. Radlcy, 2 Atk. 177; Chambers v. Green-

















































































































































282 BILL OF REVIEW 
i reported to have admitted, that a bill of review might be 
founded upon new matter not at aU in issue in the former cau e, 
which eem conrtrary to hi1s opinion in Patterson v. Slaughter 
(Ambler, 93),12 or upon matter, which was in issue, but dis-
covered since the hearing. But the very point in 2 Freeman, 31 
(if I rightly understand it), is, that a newly discovered fact is 
ground for a bill; but not newly di covered evidenoe in proof of 
any fact already in issue. This seems to me at variance with 
Lord Bacon's ordinanice, for it is there said, that there may be a 
review u on "new matter, which hath arisen in time after the 
decree," and also "upon new proof, thart has come to light after 
the decree made, and could not possiibly have been used at the 
time when the decree pa ed." It i also contrary to what Lord 
Hardwicke held in the ca es cited from 3 Atk. 33, and Ambler, 
293. Lo-rd Eldon, in Young v. Keighley (16 Vez. 348, 350), 
said, "The ground (of a bill of review) i error apparent on the 
face of the decree, or new evidence of a fact mwterially pressing 
upon the decree, and discovered at least after publication in the 
cause. If the fact had been kno1wn before publication, though 
some contradiction appears in the cases, there is no authority, 
that new evidence would not be sufficient ground." That was 
also the opinion of Lord Manners in Blake· v. Foster (2 B. & 
Beatt. 457). Mr. Cha:rucellor Kenrt, in Livingston v. Hubbs, 
(3 Johns. Ch. 124), adopted the like conclu ion; and he seemed 
to think, that such new evidence must not be a mere aiccumula-
tion of witnesses to the same fact; but some stringent written evi-
dence or newly discovered papers. Gilbert, in his Forum Ro-
manum, ch. 10, p. 186, leans to the ame limitation, for he says, 
that in bill of review, "they can examine to nothing, that was 
in the original cause, unless it be matter happening subBequent, 
which wa not before in i ue, or upon matter of record or writing 
not known b fore, for if the Court should give them leave to 
enter into proofs upon the ame points that were in issue, that 
would be und r the same mischief as the examination of wit-
nesses after publication, and an inlet info manife t perjury." ta 
12See al o Young v. Keighley, I6 Vez. 348, 354; Blake v. Foster, 2 B. & 
Beatt. 457, 462. 
13See also arton, Eq. 216; Tovers v. Young, Pree. Ch. 193; Taylor v. 
Sharp, 3 P. Will. 371; Standish v. Rad?e/', 2 . tk. 177; hambcrs v. Green-
hill, 2 Chan. Rep. 66; Thomas v. H arvi s H eirs, IO Wheaton, R. 146. 
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There is much good sense in such a distinction, operating upon
the discretion of the Court in refusing a bill of review, and I
should be glad to know, that it has always been adhered to. It
is certain, that cumulative written evidence has been admitted;
and even written evidence to contradict the testimony of a wit-
ness. That was the case of Attorney General v. Turner
(Ambler, 587). Willati v. Willun (IG Yez. 72, 88) supposes,
that new testimony of witnesses may be admissible. If it be ad-
missible (upon which I am not called to decide), it ought to be
received with extreme caution, and only when it is of such a
nature as ought to be decisive proof. There is so much of just
reasoning in the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
on this subject, that I should hesitate long before I should act
against it.i'*
In the next place it is most material to state, that the granting
of such a bill of review is not a matter of right, but of sound dis-
cretion in the Court.^^ It may be refused, therefore, although
the facts if admitted would change the decree, where the Court,
looking to all the circumstances, deems it productive of mischief
to innocent parties, or for any other cause unadvisable. Bennet
V. Lee (2 Atk. 528), Wilson v. Wehh (2 Cox, 3), and Young
V. Keigliley (16 Vez. 348), are strong exemplifications of the
principle.
These are the principal considerations, which appear to me
useful to be brought into view upon the present occasion. Let
us now advert to the grounds upon which the petition is framed,
and see how far any are applicable to them.
Tlie original bill was brought against Thomas Arnold (whose
administrator is now before the Court), for an account and set-
tlement of his brother Jonathan Arnold's estate, upon which he
had administered. The case is reported in the third volume of
!^[r. Mason's Ecports, page 284, and I refer to that for a sum-
mar}' of the proceedings and final decree.
In preferring the present petition, the proper course of pro-
ceeding has been entirely mistaken. The present counsel for
the petitioner is not responsible for those proceedings, they hav-
"Sce Rcspass v. McClauahan. Hardin, Ky. R. 342; Head v. Head. 3
Marsh. Kv. R. 121 ; Raitdolfyh's Executors v. Randolph's Executors, i H.
&. M. 180:
^■'Sheffield V. Duchess of Buchiu}:hatii. 1 West. 682; Norris v. Le Neve,
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T here i mu ·h g od n in uch a: di Linction, op rating upon 
the di er tion of the ourt in rcfu ing a bill of re iew, and I 
hould b glad t kno , that it ha alway b n adh red to. It 
i certain, that cumulati e written vid nee ha be n admitted; 
and en written id nee to contradict the testimony of a wit-
n That wa the c of Attorney General v.. Turner 
( mbler, ) . Willan . 11 illan ( 16 Vez. , 8 ) uppo e , 
that new te imony of witn e may be admi ible. If it be ad-
mi ibl (upon which I am not called ito decide), it ought to he 
r c iv d with xtr m caution, and only when it i of uch a 
nature a ought to be deci i e proof. Ther i o much of ju t 
re, oning in the opinion of the Court of App al of Kentucky 
on thi ubject, that I hould hesitaite long before I hould aot 
again t i t.14 
n the next place it i mo~t material to tate, that the granting 
of uch a bill o·f review i not a matter of right, but of ound di -
cretion in the Court.15 Irt may be refu ed, therefore, although 
the fad if admitted would change the decree, where the ourt, 
looking to all the circum tance , deem it pro luctive of mi chief 
to innocent partie , or for any other cau e unadvisable. Bennet 
v. Lee (2 Atk. 5 8), Wilson . Webb (2 Cox, 3), and Young 
v. Keighley (16 Vez. 348), are trong exemplification of the 
principle. 
The e are the principal con ideration , which appear to me 
ti._eful to be brought into view upon the pre ent ooca ion. Let 
u now advert to the ground upon which the petition i framed, 
an e how far any are applicable to them. 
Th original bill wa brought aga·in t T'b.oma Arnold (who e 
admini tra tor i now b fore the ourt), for an account an 1 ~et­
tl m nt of hi brother Jonathan Arnold tat upon which he 
had admini tered. The ca e i reported in th third volume of 
~fr . Un on port page 4 and refer to that for a um-
mary of the i:iroc din and :final decree. 
In preferrinO' th pr ent p titian the proper course of pro-
ding ha been ntir 1 mi tak n. The pre ent coun 1 .for 
th p tition r i no.t r pon ibl for tho e pr c din they ha -
H e R spass v. 1 cCla11alra11 , a rd in Ky. R. 42 · H ead v. H ead. 
Iar h, Ky. R. 121 · Ra11dolph' Exerntors ' . Ra11dolplt s E :r cu tor . r H . 
. ;_f. I . 
1;; hcfficld '. Ducltcs of B11 ck i11 glia111. I \ e t. 68- · .\ orris . L e .\ c~ 
• . tk. · GoHld . Ta11cr d 2 tk. 33. 
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ing taken place before he came into the cause. A petition for
leave to file a bill of review for newly discovered matter should
contain in itself an abstract of the former proceedings, the bill,
answers, decree, &c. and should then specifically state what the
newly discovered matter is, and when it first came to the party's
knowledge, and how it bears on the decree, that the Court may
see its relevancy and the propriety of allowing it.^^ The present
petition, in its original form, contained nothing of this sort, but
referred to an accompanying bill of review, as the one, which it
asked leave to file, and then simply affirmed the facts stated in
it to be true. This was sufficiently irregular. But upon looking
into this bill of review the grounds of error are stated in a very
loose manner, and in so general a form as to be quite inad-
missible.
The first error assigned is in matter of law, and it is, that
Thomas Arnold, the administrator, ought to have been charged
with interest upon all sums of money, which he had received as
administrator, because the said sums were used by him. The
master in his report had declined to allow interest; and upon an
exception taken the Court confirmed his report on tliis point. I
see no reason for changing the decree on this point, for the rea-
sons stated in the cause in 3 Mason, 288, 290; and there is no
pretence to say, that there is any such proof of the use of the
money in the report of the master, as justifies a different con-
clusion. There is no error in this respect apparent on the face of
the master's report, or the decree. The allowance or disallow-
ance of interest rests very much upon circumstances, and slight
errors in this respect are not always held fatal.^'' There is no
error apparent, therefore, on which a review ought to be granted.
The next ground assigned is, that Thomas Arnold did receive
large sums of money and other property, which he has not ac-
counted for before the master, and for which he ought to ac-
count; and that since the decree, the petitioner hath discovered
new and further evidence in relation thereto, which would have
materially changed the report of the master and the decree.
Tlie petition does not state what the new evidence is, nor when
discovered, and it is quite too vague for any order of the Court.
The bill then proceeds, very irregularly, to require, that the ad-
i®Coop. Eq. PI. 92.

















































































































































284 BILL OF REVIEW 
ing taken place before he came into the cause. A petition for 
leave to file a bill of review for newly discovered matter should 
contain in it elf an abstract of the former proceedings, the bill, 
an wers, decree, &c. and should then specifically state what the 
newly discovered matter i , and when it first came to the party's 
knowledge, and how it beaiIB on the decree, that the Court may 
ee it relevancy and the propriety of allowing it.16 The present 
petition, in its original form, contained nothing of this sort, but 
referred to an accompanying bill of review, as the one, which it 
a ked leave to file, and then simply affirmed the facts stated in 
it to be true. This was sufficiently irregular. But upon looking 
into this bill of review the grounds of error are stated in a very 
loo e manner, and in so general a form as to be quite inad-
missible. 
The first error assigned is in matter of law, and it is, that 
Thomae Arnold, the administrator, ought to have been charged 
with interest upon all sums of money, which he had received as 
administrator, because the said sums were u ed by him. The 
master in his report had declined to allow interest; and upon an 
exception taken the Court confirmed his report on this point. I 
see no reason for changing the decree on this point, for the rea-
son stated in the cause in 3 Mason, 288, 290; and there is no 
pretence to say, that there is any such proof of the use of the 
mon y in the report of the master, as justifies a different con-
clu ion. There i no error in this respect apparent on the face of 
the master's report, or the decree. The allowance or disallow-
ance of interest rests very much upon circumstances, and slight 
errors in this respect a·re not always held fatal.1 7 T'here is no 
error apparent, therefore, on which a review ought to be granted. 
The next ground assigned is, that Thomas Arnold did receive 
large urns of money and other property, which he has not ac-
counted for before the master, ·and for which he ought to ac-
count; and that since the decree, the petitioner ha.th di covered 
new and further evidence in relation thereto, which would have 
materially changed the report of the ma ter and the decree. 
The petition does not tate what the new eviden~e i , nor when 
di covered, and it i quite too vague for any order of the Court. 
The bill then proceed , very irregularly, to require, tha·t the ad-
16Coop. Eq. Pl. 92. 
11See Gould v. Tancred, 2 Atk. 533. 
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ministrator of Thomas Arnold should answer certain interroga-
tories as to the cargoes of the ship Friendship. It then states, that
Thomas Arnold received six shares in the Tennessee Land Com-
pany; and that he received 8,000 dollars on a policy of insurance
on the brig Friendship; and that he received large consignments
of property from Vincent Gray in Cuba in bills of exchange, &c.
belonging to Jonathan's estate; and finally, that he received
divers other large sums of money as agent of Jonathan. Now,
it must be manifest, that upon allegations so general and indis-
tinct no bill of review would lie. Here is no assertion of newly
discovered evidence to maintain one. Such a bill, so framed,
ought never to be allowed by a Court acting upon the correct
principles of Chancery jurisdiction.
Afterwards, an amendment of this bill of review was filed, con-
taining more distinct specifications of new matter, most of which,
however, as I shall have occasion to notice hereafter, are open to
the same objections as those already stated.
But the radical objection to both bills is, that they are im-
properly introduced into the cause at all. A bill of review can only
be filed after it is allowed by the Court, and upon the very
grounds allowed by the Court. The preliminary application by
petition to file it should state the new matter shortly, distinctly,
and exactly, so that the Court may see how it presses on the
original cause; and it is not i>ermissible to load it with charges
and allegations, as in an original seeking bill in equity. In the
sense of a Court of Chancery there is not before this Court any
sufficient petition, upon which it can act.
But as the proceeding is a novelty in this Circuit, much indul-
gence ought to be allowed to the original counsel in the cause
(for the present counsel is not at all chargeable) for irregulari-
ties of this nature, upon the first presentation of the practice. I
advert to the posture of the cause, therefore, not so much with
an intention to subject it to close criticism, as for the purpose of
declaring, that, even if I could gather from the papers, that there
is matter, upon which a bill of review would lie, it is not before
the Court in such a shape, that the Court could judicially pass
an order of allowance.
Tlie case has, however, been argued, aiid with great ability,
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mini trator of Thoma Arnold hould an wer certain interroga-
tori as to the cargoe of the hip Friend hip. It then tat , that 
Thomas Arnold rec ived ix har in the Tenne see Land 1om-
pany; and that h r ceived 8,000 dollar on a policy of insurance 
on the brig Fri nd hip; and that h r ceiv d large con ignm nts 
of prop rty from Vin ent Gray in uba in bill of exchang , &c. 
b longing to Jonathan' e ate; and finally, that h r ceiv d 
diver other large um of money a agent of Jonathan. ow, 
it mu t b manif t, that upon allegation o general and indi -
tinct no bill of review would lie. H ere i no a ertion of newly 
di cover d evidence to maintain one. Su h a bill, o framed, 
ought never to be allowed by a Court acting upon the correct 
principle of Chancery juri diction. 
Afterwa·rd , an amendment of this bill of review wa filed, con-
taining more di tinct pecifications of new matter, most of which, 
however, a I hall have occa ion to notice hereafter, are open to 
the same objection a those already stated. 
But the radical objection to both bills is, that they are im-
properly introduced into the cause at all. A bill of review can only 
be filed after it i allowed by the Court, and upon the very 
grounds allowed by the Court. The preliminary application by 
petition to file it hould tate the new matter shortly, di tinctly, 
and exactly, o tha·t the Oourt may ee how it pre e on the 
original cau e; and it i not permi ible to load it with charges 
and allegation , a in an original seeking bill in equity. In the 
sen e of a Court of Chancery there is not before this Court any 
sufficient petition, upon which it can act. 
But a the pl"Oce ding i a novelty in thi Circuit, much indul-
gence ought to be allowed to the original coun el in the cau e 
(for the pre ent coun el i not at all chargeable) for irregulari-
ti of thi natur , upon th fir t pre entation of the pra tice. I 
adv rt to the po tur ·of the cau e, therefore, not o much with 
an int ntion to ubj ct it to lo e ritici m, a for the purpo of 
d daring that n if I could gather from th pap , that there 
i matt r, upon which a bill of re iew would lie, it i not before 
th Court in uch a hape, that the Court could judicially pa s 
an ord r of allowanc . 
T1h ca e ha however, been argued, and with O'reat ability, 
upon it merit ; and waiving for the pr ent an further refer-
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ence to the form of the proceedings, I will proceed to the con-
sideration of the points made at the bar.
The first point is one made by the defendant, and being pre-
liminary in its nature, must be disposed of before the plaintiff
can be further heard. It is said to be a rule in equity, that where
a party has less decreed to him than he thinks himself entitled
to, he cannot bring a bill of review ; for that lies only in favor of
a party against whom there is a decree. For this the opinion of
elementary writers,!^ and the case of Glover v. Partington (2
Freeman E. 183; S. C. 2 Eq. Abrid. 17-i), is cited. The
case, as here reported, certainly supports the doctrine. But it
appears to me, that, if the doctrine is correct, it is so only in
cases, where there is no erroT apparent on the face of the decree,
and no newly discovered matter to support a bill of review, for
then the proper remedy is by appeal. If there be no such rem-
edy by appeal, but only by bill of review, it would be strange, if
a material error could not be redressed upon such a bill by the
party to whom it had been injurious; that if a man had 10,000
dollars due him, and had a decree for 100 dollars, he was con-
clusively bound by an error of the Court. The decision, reported
in 2 Freem. R. 182, was made by the Master of the Rolls, who
allowed the demurrer; but from the report of the same case
in 1 Ch. Cas. 51, it appears, that it was afterwards re-heard be-
fore the Lord Chancellor and Baron Rainsf ord ; and the demurrer
was overruled?-^ So that the final decision was against the doc-
trine for which it is now cited. And Lord Nottingham, a few
years afterwards, in Vandebende v. Levingston (3 Swanst. E.
625), resolved, that the plaintiff may have a bill of review to
review a decree made for himself, if it be less beneficial to him
than in truth it ought to have been. We may then dismiss this
objection.
We may now advance to the examination of the points made
by the petitioner in support of his petition for a review, assuming
that the amended bill of review is to be received, pro hoc vice,
as such a petition. I have already stated, that it is utterly de-
fective in the essential ingredients of such a petition, in not stat-
ing with exactness the nature of the new evidence, and when it
was first discovered. It is not sufficient to say, that the petitioner
182 Madd. Pr. 412; i Harris Pr. 86.
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ence to the form of the proceeding , I will proceed to the con-
ideration of the point made at the bar. 
The first point i one made by the defendant, and being pre-
liminary in it.s nature, must be disposed of before the plaintiff 
can be further heard. It is said to be a rule in equity, that where 
a party has less decreed to him than he thinks him elf entitled 
to, he cannot bring a bill of review; for that lies only in favor of 
a party again t whom there is a decree. For this the opinion of 
elementary writers,18 and the case of Glover v. Partington (2 
Freeman R. 183; S. C. 2 Eq. A:brid. 174), is cited. The 
ca e, as here reported, certainly supports the doctrine. But it 
appears to me, that, if the doctrine is correct, it is so only in 
ca es, where there is no err·o1r apparent on the face of the decree, 
and no newly discovered matter to support a bill 0£ review, :for 
then the proper remedy is by appea1. If there be no such rem-
edy by appeal, but only by bill of review, it would be strange, if 
a material error could not be redressed upon such a bill by the 
party to whom it had been injurious; that if a man had 10,000 
dollar due him, and had a decree for 100 dollars, he was con-
clusively bound by an error of the Court. The deci ion, reported 
in 2 Freem. R. 182, was made by the Mater of the Rolls, who 
allowed the demurrer; but from the report .of the same case 
in 1 Ch. Oas. 51, it appears, that it was afterwards re-heard be-
fore the Lord Chancellor and Baron Rainsford; and the demurrer 
was overruled.19 So that the final deci ion was against the doc-
trine for which it is now cited. And Lord Nottingham, a few 
years afterward , in Vandebende v. Levingston ( 3 Swanst. R. 
62·5), resolved, that the plaintiff may have a bill of review to 
review ai decree made for himself, if it be less beneficial to him 
than in truth it ought to have been. We may then dismiss this 
objection. 
We may now advance to the examination of the points made 
by th petition r in upport of hi petition for a review, a urning 
that the am nded bill of revi w is to be received, pro hoc vice, 
a. uch a petition. I ha1ve alr ady stated, that it is utterly de-
fective in the ential ingredients 0£ uch a petition, in not stat-
ing with exactne the nature of th new evidence, and when it 
wa fir t di ov r . It i noit ufficient to ay, that the petitioner 
1s2 Madd. Pr. 412; I Harris Pr. 86. 
t9See S. C. cited Com. ig. Chancery; G. to the same effect. 
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expects to prove error in this or that respect: or that he has
discovered evidence, which he hopes will establish this or that
fact. But he must state the exact nature and form of the evi-
dence itself, and when discovered. If written evidence, it must
be stated, and its direct bearing shown. If of witnesses, what
facts the witnesses will prove; and when the party first knew
the nature of their testimony. It is impossible otherwise for the
Court to judge, whether the evidence is decisive, or is merely
presumptive or cumulative; whether it goes vitally to the case,
and disproves it, or only lets in some new matter, confirmatory
or explanatory of the transactions in the former decree. The
party must go further, and establish, that he could not, by reason-
able diligence before the decree, have procured the evidence.
Now, in every one of these particulars, the amended bill, quasi
a petition, is extremely deficient. I have looked it over care-
fully, and cannot find, that it points out a single written paper,
which disproves the original case, or names a single witness,
whose testimony, if admitted, would overturn it. It deals alto-
gether in general allegations, that certain things are expected to
be proved; and, like an original bill, proceeds to ask a discovery
from the defendant of letters and papers in her possession as ad-
ministrator, relative thereto. There are indeed, in the accompany-
ing affidavits, some papers produced and relied on ; but they cannot
supply the defects of the original petition.
1. The first charge is in effect, that Thomas Arnold, as ad-
ministrator of Jonathan Arnold, received certain property from
Vincent Gray in Cuba, belonging to Jonathan's estate, which he
has never inventoried or accounted for. The specifications under
this head are, (1.) The receipt of -10 boxes of sugar, upon which
charges were paid out of Jonathan's estate, amounting to $190:
(2.) The remittance of a bill to Thomas Arnold, drawn by Andrew
Davis on \Yilliam Davis, Philadelphia, for $1222: (3.) The re-
ceipt by Captain Mathewson of $500. All these transactions took
place in the year 1808, Jonathan having died in June, 1807.
Now, the original bill charged a partnership between Jona-
than and Thomas, and asked for an account and settlement of
the partnership concerns, as well as of the administration. After
the answer it was referred to a master to take the accounts, and
he made a report accordingly, after hearing the parties many
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xp t to pr v rror in thi r that r p ct : or that he ha 
di ov r d icl n , whi ·h he h pe will labli h thi or that 
fa. t. ut he mu t la.t th xa :rt natur and form of the evi-
nce it lf, and wh n di o r d. f written evid nc , it mu:-t 
b tat d, and it clir ct b aring hown. If of witn , what 
fa t the witn will pr vc ; and when the party fir t knew 
the nature f th ir t timony. t i impo ible otherwi e for the 
ourt to judg , wh th r the idence i deci ive, or i mer ly 
pr umptive or cumulati c; wh ther it go vitally to the ca c, 
and di pro e it, or only 1 t in ome new matter, confirmatory 
or cx1 lanatory of the tran action in th .former decree. The 
party mu t go fuirth r, and tabli h, thait he ould not, by rea on-
able dilig nee b .fore the d ere , have procured the evidenc . 
ow, in ev ry one of the e particular , the amended bill, quasi 
a I etition, i extremely d :ficient. I have looked it over care-
fully, and cannot find, that it point ourt a ingle written paper, 
which di proves the original ca e, or name a single witne~ , 
who e te timony, if admitted, would overturn it. It deal alto-
g ther in general allegation , that certa·in things are expect to 
be proved; and, like an original bill, proceed to a k a di ~co very 
from the def ndant of letters and paper in her po e ion a~ ad-
mini trator, relative thereto. There are indeed, in the accompany-
inO' affidavit , ome paper produced and relied on; but they cannot 
upply the d feet of the original petition. 
1. The fir t charge i in effect, that Thoma Arnold, a ad-
mini trator of Jonathan Arnold, received certain property from 
Vine nt ray in Cuba, belonging to Jonathan e tate, which he 
ha never inventoried or ac ounted for. The peci:fication under 
thi b ad are ( 1.) The receiprt of -±0 boxe of ugar upon which 
harg w r pail out of Jonathan tate amountinO' to 190: 
( . ) Th r mittanc of a bill to Thoma rnold drawn b; ndrew 
avi on William a i, Philad lpbia for 1292 : (3.) The r -
i1 t by aptain :Mathew on of 00. All th se tran action~ too -
la in th ; ar 1 Jona than having di l in June 1 0 1. 
ow th original bill charg d a parttn rhip hre n J ona-
than and T110ma and a ked for an account and ttl ment of 
th I artn r hip cone rn a well a of the admini tration. ft r 
th an w r it "\Ta r f rr d to a ma ter to tuk the ac unt~ and 
h mad a re rt accordin 1 ' aft r h arino th parti s many 
tim . In the h aring befor th ma t r th a u t -with \ in. 
2g8 Bill of Eeview
cent Gray were in controversy between the parties, and Thomas
Arnold was interrogated as to the whole subject, and made his
disclosures. So that the existence of an account with Gray,
and the dispute, as to the receipts from him on account of Jona-
than's estate, were matter of examination before the master.
There is no pretence, that the residence of Gray was not well
known; or that the plaintiff could not at that time, by reason-
able dihgence, have obtained his testimony, if he had desired it.
He does not show, that he made any effort to obtain it; and if he
had, the very papers now produced would have been obtained.
What then is the posture of the case? The plaintiff goes on to
a decree without seeking for evidence, though within liis reach,
and contents himself with such explanations as the defendant then
gave; and now, after the lapse of several years, the defendant
being dead, asks this Court to grant him a bill of review for
errors in the account, which ordinary diligence would have recti-
fied at that very time. If such a course should be allowed, it
would furnish a perfect immunity for the grossest negligence.
According to my understanding of the principles, upon which
bills of review are granted, this Court, under such circumstances,
is not at liberty to grant it. In Bingliam v. Dawson (3 Jac. &
Walk. 243), Lord Eldon refused to allow a bill of review under
far less cogent circumstances, deeming it a most mischievous prac-
tice; and Mr. Chancellor Kent acted most deliberately to the
same effect in Livingston v. Hubls (3 Johns. Ch. R. 124).
But as to the matter of fact; Mr. Gray's letters show, that the
40 boxes of sugar belonged to Thomas Arnold, and not to Jonathan
Arnold, thus establishing the incorrectness of this part of the peti-
tioner's case, and leaving only the $190 in his favor. Then, as to
the bill on Davis ; Thomas Arnold, on his examination before the
master, expressly stated, that it had never been paid, Davis being
insolvent. And there is not a tittle of new evidence, now offered,
to show that he did receive it. It is therefore a mere effort to re-
hear the original cause on this point. Then, as to the 500 dollars
received by Mathewson. In the report 270 dollars is credited to
Jonathan's estate on this account; and the only question is,
whether the remaining 230 dollars ought to have been credited.
Mr. Gray, in his letters (which, by the by, are mere statements
now made, and not originals written at the time of the transactions,
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cent ra, were in contro er .) between the parties, and Thomas 
Arnold wa interrogated a to the whole ubject, a·nd made his 
di clo ure . So that the exi itence of an account with Gray, 
and the di pute, as to the receipts from him on account of Jona-
than' e tate, were matter of examination before the master. 
There i no pretence, that the re idence of Gray wa not well 
known; or that the plaintiff could not at that time, by rea on-
able diligence, have obtained hi te timony, if he had de ired it. 
He doe not how, that he made any effort to obtain it; and if he 
had, the ver3 paper now prooduced would have been obtained. 
What then i the po ture of the ca e? The plaintiff goe on to 
a decree without eeking for evidence, though within hi reach, 
and contents him elf with uch explanation a the defendant then 
gave; and now, after the lap ·e of sever.al years, the defendant 
being dead, a k this Court to grant him ai bill of review for 
error in the account, which ordinary diligence would have recti-
fied at that very time. If uch a course hould be allowed, it 
would furni h a perfect immunity for the grossest negligence . 
.A!ccording to my under tanding of the principles, upon which 
bill of re iew are granted, thi Court, under such circumstances, 
i not at liberty to grant it. In Bingham v. Daws01i (3 Jae. & 
Walk. 243), Lord Eldon refused to allow a bill of review under 
far le cogent circum tances, deeming it a mo t mi chievous prac-
tice; an'd :M:r. Chancellor Kent acted mo t deliberately to the 
same effect in Livingston v. Hubbs (3 John. Ch. R. 124). 
But a to the matter of fact; Mr. Gray's letters show, that the 
40 boxe of ugar b longed to Thomas Arnold, and not to J onaith;m 
Arnold, thu e ta.bli hing the incorrectne of thi part of the peti-
tioner ca e, and leaving only the $190 in hi favor. Then, as to 
the bill on Davi ; Thoma Arnold, on hi examination before the 
ma ter, exprr- ly tated, thait it ha:d nev r been paid, Davis being 
in olvent. nd th re i not a tittle of new evidence, now offered, 
to how that h did recei it. It i ther fore a m r ffort to re-
hear the original au on thi point. Then a to the ~oo dollar 
received by Mathew on. In the report 2 0 dollar i credited to 
Jonathan' e tate on thi account; and the onl 
wh ther the remaining 30 dollar .ought to ha e 
Mr. Gray, in hi 1 tt r (which, by the b are mer tatements 
now made, and not riginal writt n at th time of th tr.an action~, 
ancl ar not . worn to by him) doe not pr t nd to an ab olute 
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certaint)^, as to the parties to whom the money belonged. He says
in that of the 14th of April, 182 G, that he had received of De la
Motte $1,984, part of which he remitted to Thomas Arnold by the
bill drawn on Davis. He did not then recollect how, or when, the
balance \v&& remitted. In his letter of the 14th of April, 1827, he
states, that on exami-ning his old accounts, &c., he finds, that he
passed to the credit of the ship Tyre, Mathewson, master, for
account of Thomas Arnold, in July 1808, $230, and in September
of the same year, $270, in all 500 dollars; and he presumes, that
this was the balance then collected. In his letter of the 27th of
February, 1828, he adds, that the money, collected of De la Motte,
belonged to Jonathan Arnold, and that the bill on Davis, the $500,
the $190, and his commissions, made up the whole sum. Such is
the explanation given by Mr. Gray, at the distance of 20 years after
the original transactions; and it is too much to say, that his
recollections, after such a length of time, ought to overturn the
solemn proceedings before the master. It is, at best, testimony
only of a presumptive character, cumulative in its nature, to a
litigated fact, and, if admissible at all, as a ground for a review,
is open to the suggestion of possible mistake. But it does so hap-
pen, that there is before the Court a letter of Mr. Gray to Thomas
Arnold, written on the 12th of April, 1808 (and which, there is
much to believe, was, among other papers from him, laid before
the master upon the hearing), which may fairly lead to the belief,
that Gray is now mistaken in supposing, that the money belonged
exclusively to Jonathan Arnold. That letter begins by saying,
"I have liquidated your accounts with Don Pablo de Motta, and
taken the acceptance on the widow P. & H. for the balance due,
&c., for 2088 dollars 3^." It then goes on to state, that Mr.
Barker, of Charleston, has requested him to pay into his hands
the money received from De la Motte, which he declined. It then
adds, "On examination of the accounts, if any thing should appear
to be due to Mr. Barker over and above the 1000 dollars heretofore
received, I will remit it to him, or pay it into the hands of Mr.
Bower. However, as you know better than I do, what sum ought
to be paid to Mr. Barker, I wish you to settle the amount with
him." If any thing is clear, from this language, it is, that Mr.
Barker had, or was supposed to have, an interest in this very fund,
and that Thomas Arnold was called upon to discharge it. And
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certainty, a to the partie to whom the mon y belonged. He ay. 
in that of the 1 th of pril, 1826, that h had recei d of De la 
Mott $1,98±, part of whi h he r mitted to boma Arnold by the 
bill drawn on a i . did not then recollect how, r when, the 
balanc w r mitted. In hi lett r of the 14th of pril, 1 , he 
tat , that on e amining hi old account , &c., he find , that he 
p d to the er dit of th hip Tyre, 1athew on, ma ter, for 
account of Thoma rnold, in July 180 , $ 30, and in eptember 
of the ame y a:r, $ 0, in all 500 dollar ; and he pre ume that 
thi wa the balance then collected. In hi lett r of the 2 h of 
F bruar , 1 , h add , that the money, collected of D la fotte, 
belonged to Jonathan Arnold, and that the bill on avi , the 500, 
the $190, and hi commi ion , mad up the whole um. uch i ~ 
the explanation given by Mr. Gray at the di tance of 20 year after 
the original tran action ; and it is too much to ay, that his 
recall ction , after such a length of time, ought to overturn the 
olemn proceeding before the mwster. It i , at best, te timony 
only of a pre umptive character, ·cumulative in it nature, to a 
litigated fact, and, if admi ible at all, as a ground for a review, 
i open to the ugge tion of po ible mi take. But it d-0e o hap-
pen, that there i before the Court a letter of Mr. Gray to Thoma 
Arnold, written on the 12th of April, 1808 (and which, there ia 
much to believe was, among other papers from him, laid before 
th ma ter upon the hearing), which may fairly lead to the belief, 
that Gray i now mistaken in upposing, that the money belonged 
exclu ively to Jonathan Arnold. That letter begin by aying, 
'I have liquidated your accounts with Don Pablo de :Motta, and 
taken the ace ptance on the widDw P. & H. for the balance due, 
&c. for 0 dollar 3f." It then goe on to tate, that :Mr. 
ark r, of harle ton ha reque ted him to pa into hi hand 
th money r c iv d from D la Motte, wh~ch he declined. It th n 
add ' On examination of th account if any thing hould appear 
to b due to Ur. Barker over and above the 1000 dollar heretofore 
r c iY d I will remit it to him, or pa it into th band of :Jir. 
Bow r. ow v r a you know b tter than I do wha·t um oucrbt 
t b paid to Mr. Barker, wi h ·OU to .. ttl the amount with 
him. If a.n thin i cl ar from thi Ian uacr that Ir. 
ark r had or a uppo d to hav an int r 
an that Thoma" rnol wa called upon t n 
th fi "t word in th 1 tter ·our accounL hat 
19 
290 Bill of Review
Thomas Arnold also might have a personal interest in the fund.
If Mr. Barker had an interest, what proof is there, that it did
not amount to the 230 dollars, now sought to be credied in Jona-
than's account? After this, what safe reliance can be placed upon
Mr. Gray's recollection as to the $190 being paid out of the funds
of Jonathan Arnold in his hands ? It is certain, that, at that very
time, he was collecting money for Thomas Arnold. Tlie letter of
instructions to Mathewson, in 1808, shows, that money was to be
collected on the personal account of Thomas Arnold, as well as on
account of Jonathan Arnold's estate. And Mr. Gray is certainly
mistaken in supposing it was credited to the brig Tyre ; for it was
credited to the brig Perseverance. I do not mean to cast the slight-
est imputation upon this gentleman's credit. I do not doubt, that
he relates the transactions, as he now supposes them to have been.
But with the most perfect respect for his veracity, it is not too
much to say, that, after such a length of time, no Court would be
safe to grant a bill of review upon such proofs, at once inconclusive
and unsatisfactory. It is to be remembered, that the case stands
here very differently from what it would on an original bill. Here,
the onus prolan di is on the petitioner to establish the error, and
it must be proved by newly discovered evidence or facts, to entitle
him to a review. Great reliance has been placed, at the argument,
upon Moore v. Moore, 2 Vez. 596, as a case of relief founded upon
analogous principles. Without doubt, if a substantial error is con-
clusively ascertained by newly discovered evidence, that furnishes
a ground for a review. But that case was not like the present.
There John Moore was made a party to a bill for an account, as
one of the executors of C. M. ; and the plaintiffs insisted, that he
acted as executor. That was not proved; and therefore he was
not decreed to account as executor, and he refused to account.
Afterwards it was discovered, that he had received £2500 mortgage
money of the testator's estate. Lord Hardwicke thought this was
proper matter for review ; and that Moore ought to have disclosed
the fact on his original answer, although he had not acted gener-
ally as executor. Xow, there was nothing in this case to put the
plaintiffs upon any inquiry as to any mortgage. They asked for an
account generally of the testator's estate from his executors, in
order to have a decree for their legacies. It would have been dif-
ferent, if the very mortgage had been in controversy between the
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Thoma Arnold al -0 might have a personal intere t in the fund. 
If Ur. Barker had an interest, what proof is there, that it did 
not amount to the 230 dollar , now sought to be credied in Jona-
than account? After thi , what af reliance can b placed upon 
Ir. Gray' recollection a to the $190 being paid out of the fund 
of Jonathan rnold in hi band ? It i certain, that, at that very 
tim , he was collecting money for Thoma Arnold. The letter of 
in truction to fathew on, in 1808, show , that money was to be 
collected on the personal account of Thomas Arnold, a well a on 
account of Jonatha·n Arnold' estate. And Mr. Gray i certainly 
mi taken in uppo ing it wa credited to the brig Tyre; for it was 
credited to the brig Perseverance. I do not mean to ca t the slight-
t imputation upon this gentleman's credit. I do not doubt, that 
be relate the t•ran action , a be now suppo es them to have been. 
But with the mo t perfect re pect for bis veracit;, it i not too 
much to ay, that, after such a length of time, no Court would be 
af to grant a· bill of review upon such proof , at once inconclusive 
and un ati factory. It i to be remembered, that the ca e stands 
here very differently from what it would on an original bill. Here, 
the onus probandi i on the petitioner to e tabli b the error, and 
it mu t be proved by newly di covered evidence or facts, to entitle 
him to a review. Great reliance has been placed, at the argument, 
upon Moore v. Moore, 2 \ ez. 596, a a ca e of r lief founded upon 
analogou principle . Without doubt, if a ub tantial error is con-
lu ivel a cerlained by newly di covered evidence, that furni hes 
a ground for a review. But that ca e wa not like the pre ent. 
There John Moore was made a party to a bill for an account, as 
one of the executors of C. M.; and the plaintiffs in i ted, that he 
acte 1 a executor. That wa not proved; and therefore he was 
not decreed to ac aunt a executor, and he refu ed to account. 
Afterward it wa di covered that he had r ceived £2500 mortgage 
man y of th t tator' esta.te. Lord Hardwicke thougl1t thi wa, 
prop r matter for r view; and that 1\loore ought to have di clo ed 
th fa t on hi ori inal an w r, although he had not acted gener-
ally a executor. ow ther wa nothin in thi ca e to put the 
plaintiff upon any inquiry a to any mart age. They a ked for an 
a count generally of the t tator tate from his ex cutor , jn 
order to hav a d er e for th ir legacie . It would hav b en dif-
f rent, if the ery mortgag had been in controver y between the 
partie and l rouaht out upon the acmunt. 
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2. The next charge is, that in the account settled on the 31st of
March, 1801, between Thomas Arnold and Jonathan Arnold, there
was debited an item for one half of tlie premium on the schooner
Fame, on her voyage home, of 180 dollars and 12 dollars interest,
in all 192 dollars; which it is now said is erroneous, because no
such insurance was made, or premium paid, the vessel and her
cargo being then insured out and home, by the Providence Insur-
ance Compan}^, for more than the value of both. One of the
charges, in the original bill, was of errors in the settlement of this
very account; and upon the hearing, the Court decreed, that the
account should stand, subject to any surcharge and falsification
by the plaintiff. Of course, this item was open for contestation
before the master. It was confirmed, as to this item, by the mas-
ter; and if the Court now reviews it, it undertakes, after a lapse
of 28 years and the death of both parties, to open a settled account
upon a mere presumption of mistake, founded upon a very im-
perfect knowledge of the real circumstances. Thomas Arnold
was liable to examination before the master for every item in his
account. He might have been inquired of, as to the facts, where
the insurance was made, and when the premium was paid; and
as to all other material circumstances. The petitioner waived
such inquiry in the very case, in which he was keenly on the
scent to discover errors. It does not appear, that he made any
inquiry, or was misled by any attempted misrepresentation or
concealment on this head. If he then used no reasonable diligence
in the matter, then before him, it must be a strong case to justify
an interposition of the Court now in his favor.
But what is the newly discovered evidence to falsify the item?
It now appears, that by a policy underwritten on the 24th of
July, 1800, by the Providence Insurance Company; Thomas
Arnold for Jonathan Arnold, Barker & Lord, and James Schmei-
bar, caused insurance to be made of 9000 dollars on the schooner
Fame and cargo, viz. 7000 dollars on the cargo, and 2000 dollars
on the vessel, from Charleston to j\Iartinico, at and from thence
to any one port in the United States, at a premium of 17 per
'cent. ; with liberty to proceed from Martinico to any other port
or ports in the West Indies, by adding three per cent, for every
English windward port, and five per cent, for every other port.
Upon the back of the office copy of the policy is the following
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2. The next charge i , that in the account ettled on the 31 t of 
March, 1801, betw en Thoma rnold and J onathain Arnold, there 
wa c1 bited an it m for on half of he premium on th chooner 
Fam , on her voyag horn , of 1 0 dollar and 1 dollar intere~ t, 
in all 19 dollar ; whi h it i now aid i rron ou , becau e no 
u h in urance wa mad , or premium paid, th ve el and her 
arao l ing then in ured out an:d home, by the rovidence In ur-
ance ompany, for more than the value of both. One of the 
charge , in the original bill, wa of error in the ettlement of thi · 
ery account; and upon the hearing, the ourt decreed, tha·t the 
account hould tand, ubj ct to any urcharge and fal i:fication 
by the plaintiff. Of cour e, thi item wa open for conte tation 
before the ma ·t r . It wa confirmed, as to thi item, by the ma -
ter; and if th ourt now review it, it undertake , after a lap e 
of 2 ) ear and the death of both partie , to open a ettled account 
upon a mere pre umption of mi take, founded upon a ecy im-
perfect knowledg of the real circumstance . Thoma Arnold 
wa liable to examination before the ma ter for every item in hi 
account. H e might have been inquired of, a to the fact , where 
the in urance wa made, and w_hen the premium wa paid; and 
as to all other material circumstance . The petitioner waived 
uch inquiry in the very ca e, in which he wa keenly on the 
cent to di cover error . It does not appear, that he made any 
inquiry, or wa mi led by any attempted mi representation or 
concealment on thi head. If he then u ed no reasonable diligence 
in th matter, then before him, it must be a trong case to ju tify 
an interposition of the Court now in his favor. 
But what i the newly di covered evidence to fal ify the item ? 
It now appear , that b) a policy underwritten on the 24th of 
J uly 1 00, by the Providence In uranc Com pan ; Thoma 
Arnold for Jonathan Arnold, Barker & Lord, and Jame chmei-
bar, au ed in urance to b mad of 9000 dollar on the chooner 
Fam and cargo, iz. 000 dolla·r on the cargo and 000 dollars 
on the e el from Charle ton to Uartinico at and from th nee 
to any one port in the Unit d State , at a premium of 1 per 
'Cent. · with liberty to proceed from Martinico t an other port 
r port in th W t Indi , b a'dding three per cent. for ' ry 
nali h windward port and five per cent. for ery other port. 
pon the back of th o c cop of th poli y i th followinO' 
indorement. tol r c i ed information of her afe 
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arrival at Charleston; touched at Trinidad and St. Thomas; for
which add 8 per cent, to the premium. Return 9 per cent, on
$ deficiency of cargo from St. Thomas." This indorsement
was doubtless made by the proper officer of the Insurance Com-
pany ; but what settlement was actually made does not appear by
any competent evidence. It appears, however, from William
Holroyd's papers, that Barker & Lord were charged in settle-
ment by Thomas Arnold with one half of the premium of the
cargo of the Fame, $986.48; and the other half of the premium
on the same cargo, viz. $986.48, was charged to Jonathan Arnold,
in the above account, settled in March, 1801. It is impossible,
I think, from such facts alone, to ascertain, whether the charge
of the 192 dollars for premium on the vessel liome was correct or
not; non constat, that there might not have been another policy,
on which it was paid. The very terms of the charge suppose it
to be a premium, not for the whole voyage, but for the return
voyage only. Besides, it does not appear from this policy, or
the other papers, that Barker & Lord had any interest in the
vessel. The charge against them is for premium on cargo only;
and if they had had any interest in the vessel, and the sum
charged included both, it would probaibly have been mentioned.
The very circumstance, that there is a distinct charge of the pre-
mium on the vessel, following that of the cargo, which is stated to
be settled with William Holroyd, in the account of March, 1801,
is strong presumptive proof, that Jonathan Arnold was the sole
owner of the vessel. And ihis is quite compatible with the
terms of the policy of insurance. And, after all, the conjecture
of the counsel may be well founded, that the settlement under
the policy, whatever it was, was by compromise. Who can say,
after such a length of time, when the transactions are involved
in so much obscurity, that he now understands them better
than the parties did at the time, when they were fresh in their
minds, and were settled in their accounts? There would be, as
I think, much rashness in such an assertion. But, supposing
there might be some doubt, is that a ground for unravelling an
intricate, settled account, after such a lapse of time? Was
there ever a bill of review maintained under such circumstances,
especially, when a prior decree had given the party leave to
surcharge and falsify? In short, can it be endured, that a bill

















































































































































292 BILL OF REVIEW 
arrival at Charleston; touched at Trinidad and St. Thomas; for 
which add 8 per cent. to the premium. Return 9 per cent. on 
$-- deficiency Df cargo from Sit. Thomas.'' This indorsement 
wa doubtle s made by the proper ,officer of the Insurance Com-
pany; but what ettlement was actually made does not appear by 
any competent evidence. It appears, however, from William 
Holroyd s papers, that Barker & Lord were cha-rged in settle-
ment by Thomas Arnold with Dne half of the premium of the 
cargo of the Fame, $986.48; and the other half of the premium 
on the ame cargo, viz. $986.48, was charged to Jonathan Arnold, 
in the above account, etitled in March, 1801. It is imp-0 sible, 
I think, from uch facts alone, to as1certain, whether the cha,.rge 
of the 192 dollars for premiurm on the vessel home was correct or 
not; non constat, that there might not have been another policy, 
on which it was paid. The very terms of the charge suppose it 
to be a premium, not for the whole voyage, but for the return 
voyage only. Besides, it does not appear from this p-0licy, or 
the other papers, that Barker & Lord ha:d any ini:€rest in the 
vessel. The charge against them is for premium on cargo only; 
and if they had had any interest in the vessel, and the sum 
charged included both, it would probrubly have been mentioned. 
The very circumstance, that there is a distinct charge of the pre:. 
mium on the vessel, following that of the cargo, which is stated to 
be settled with William Holroyd, in the account of March, 1801, 
is strong presumptive proof, that Jonathan Arnold was the sole 
owner of the vessel. And ibis is quite compatible with the 
terms of the policy of insurance. And, after all, the conjecture 
of the coun el may be well founded, that the settlement under 
the policy, whatever it was, was by compromise. Who can say, 
after such a length of time, when the transactions are involved 
in o much ob curity, that he now understands them better 
than the parties did at the time, when they were fre h in their 
minds, and were settled in their acoounts ? There would be, as 
I think, much ra hnes in uch an a ertion. But, uppo ing 
there might be some doubt, is that a ground for unravelling an 
intricate, ettled account, after uch a lap e of time? Was 
there ever a bill of r0 view maintain d under u h circum tance , 
especially, when a prior decree ha'd given the party leave to 
surcharge and fal ify? In short, can it be endure<l, that a bill 
of review hould be allowed, but upon proof, which, standing 
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alone, would overturn the decree, and would be conclusive on the
point? Ought they not to be direct, plain, unequivocal?
Tlie next item is a supposed error in the account settled in
March, 1801, where Jonathan Arnold is charged with the pay-
ment of $2207.82, principal and interest on his note to Joseph
Eogers. It is now said, that by newly discovered evidence the
petitioner can show, that only $1693.95 was in fact paid on that
account; and for the payment of this, Thomas Arnold had, in
1798, bills, the property of Jonathan, to the value of £800 ster-
ling, which he had used and enjoyed the interest of. Many of the
remarks already made apply with increased force to this item.
In the first place, there is a settled acknowledgment between the
parties, that the sum is right, and the note was paid. In the next
place, as to the bills of exchange. They are duly credited and
admitted in the same account, as correctly applied. How then
can we say, that they were used differently from what the parties
intended? There is no new evidence, as to these bills; and they
were included in the report of the master. But what is the new
evidence now suggested as to the item of $2267.82? It is
simply this. Mr. William Holroyd was agent of some sort for
Eogers (we do not know how far), and in his books (for he is
dead) there are now found two credits to Joseph Eogers, one,
under date of October 5, 1799, of $600, "received from Thomas
Arnold in part of Jonathan Arnold's note;"' the other under
date of November 9, of the same year, of "amount of Thomas
Arnold's note, $1100, deduct discount, $6.05, viz. $1093.95,"
making together the amount of $1693.95. No other credits
appear on Holroyd's books. Eogers is also dead, and in his
books no other credits can be found in his accounts with. Hol-
royd; and what is curious enough, the credit of $600 is stated
to be "cash in part of T. Arnold's note," and not of Jonathan's.
And in Eogers's cash account even the whole of these sums is
not credited. What then is the plain amount of this evidence?
not, that Thomas Arnold never paid the sum of $2267.82 on
Jonathan's note; but that the payments cannot be distinctly
traced, at this distance of time, in either Holroyd's or Eogers's
books. And suppose they cannot. Is a settled account to be
opened, because third pei'sons, to whom payments have been made,
omit to keep correct books, or enter full credits? Is their omission

















































































































































DEXTER . ARNOLD 93 
alone, would overturn the d r e, and would be conclu ive on the 
point? ught th y not to b dir t, plain, unequivocal? 
The n xt it m i a uppo d rror in th account ettled in 
March, 1 01, where Jonathan rnold i charged with he pay-
ment of $ G . , prin ipal and intCTe t on hi norte to J oseph 
Roger . It i now aid, that by newly di co ered vidence the 
petitioner ca1n how, that only $1693.95 wa in fact paid on that 
account; and for the payment of thi , Thoma Arnol had, in 
1798, bill , the property of Jonathan, to the alue of 00 ter-
ling, which h had u d and njoyed the int re t of. Many of the 
remark alr ady made a1pply with incr a ed force to thi item. 
In the :fi t place, there i a ettled acknowledgm nt between the 
partie , that th um i right, and the note wa paid. In the next 
place, a to th bill of exchange. They are duly credited and 
admitted in the ame account, a correctly applied. How then 
can we ay, that they were u ed differently from what the partie 
intended? There i no new evidence, a to the e bill ; and they 
were included in the report of the ma ter. But what i the new 
evidence now ugge ted as to the item of $226 .82 ? It i 
simply thi . Mr. William Holroyd wa agent of some sort for 
Rogers (we do not know how far), and in his books (for he i 
dead) there are now found two credits to Joseph Rogers, one, 
under date of October 5, 1799, of $600, "received from Thoma 
Arnold in part of Jonathan Arnold's note ;:' the other under 
date of November 9, of the ame year, of "amount of Thoma 
Arnold note, $1100, deduct di count, $6.05, viz. $1093.95," 
making together the amount of $1693.95. No other credit 
appear on Holroyd book . Roger i al o 'dead, and in hi 
books no oth r er dit can be found in hi account with H ol-
ro d; and what i curiou nough the credit of $600 i tat d 
to be "ca h in part of T. Arnold n-0te," and not of Jonathan ~ . 
And in Roge ' ca h account e en the whole of th um 1 ~ 
not credited. What th n i th plain amount of thi e-1idenc ? 
not that Thoma rnold never paid th um of $ ... 26 . ~ n 
Jonathan' note; but that th pa ment cannot be di ~tinctl 
traced at thi di tance of time in ither Holroyd or R a 
book . nd uppo e th cannot. I a ettled accoun to 
op n d b cau third p on to whom paTID nt ha"le b n mad 
omi to k p orrect bo k.. or nt r full er dit ? r~ their omis~i n 
to r judi e th riaht of oth r · and to OY rturn th d lib rate 
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settlements of parties? Are we to indulge in presumptions, that
the parties did not know their own concerns, and that there has
been fraud or mistake, because we cannot now trace back the origin
of payments acknowledged by them? What proof have we, that
the sums stated in these books were payments on account of the
very note charged in the settlement? The payment of $1093.95
purports to be on Thomas's note; how can we say, that it was on
Jonathan's? The Court is, then, called upon to re-examine this
account upon mere surmises and conjectures; and the petitioner
now demands, that the original note of Jonathan should be proved
to verify the payment, exactly as if this were an original bill for
an account, and a discovery. The original bill sought to set aside
the settled accounts ; leave was given to surcharge and falsify ; and
after a decree confirming the account, a discovery is sought upon
new evidence of tlie loosest texture, and most inconclusive nature.
The evidence, such as it is, was open to the plaintiff at the origi-
nal hearing, if he had chosen to look for it, and by reasonable
diligence it might then have been obtained, as well as now. If it
had been obtained, I think it would have come to nothing. But
as a foundation of a bill of review it is wholly inadmissible. I
observe too, that the master states, that this very item was in con-
troversy before him; and that Holroyd's books were examined
for the purpose of explaining one or more payments to Rogers
by Thomas Arnold on Jonathan's account.
The next item is, that there was an insurance at Malaga, of
$8000, on the brig Friendship's cargo, from that port to the
Mediterranean and home; that she was captured in 1797 on the
voyage home; and that one half of this cargo belonged to Jona-
than, and therefore half of the insurance ought to be credited to
him. Now, this very item was not only in controversy before
the master (as he states), but it was made the subject of a
special interrogatory in the original bill, and a discovery prayed."
Thomas Arnold, in his answer, expressly stated, that he had no
knowledge of any insurance at Malaga; but had been informed,
that there had been a policy there procured by Captain Proud
(the master), on the cargo from Malaga to Genoa only; and as
that risk terminated without loss, and the vessel was captured
afterwards on her voyage home, he never received anything on
that insurance. Here, then, the petitioner was bound to use

















































































































































294 BILL OF REVIEW 
settlements of parties? Are we to indulge in presumptions, that 
the parties did not know their own concerns, an·d that there has 
been fraud or mistake, becau e we cannot now traice back the origin 
of payment acknowledged by them? V\ hat proof have we, that 
the sum stated in these books were payments on account of the 
very note charged in the settlement? The payment of $1093.95 
purport to be on Thomas's note; how can we say, that it was on 
Jonathan's? The Court is, then, called upon to re-examine this 
account upon mere surmises and conjectures; and the petitioner 
now demands, that the original note of Jonathan should be proved 
to verify the payment, exactly as if this were an original bill for 
an account, and a disicovery. The original bill sought to set aside 
the settle'd accounts; leave was given to surcharge and falsify; and 
after a decree confirming the account, a discovery is sought upon 
new evidence of the loosest texture, and most inconclusive nature. 
The evidence, such as it is, was open to the plaintiff at the origi-
nal hearing, if he had chosen to look for it, and by reasonable 
diligence it might then ha;ve been obtained, as well as now. If it 
had been obtained, I think it would have come to nothing. But 
as a foundation ·of a bill of review it is wholly inadmissible. I 
observe too, that the master states, that this very item was in con-
troversy before him; and that Holroyd's books were examined 
for the purpose of explaining one or more payments to Rogers 
by Thomas Arnold ·On Jonathan's account. 
The next item is, that there was an insurance at Malaga, of 
$8000, on the brig Friendship's cargo, from that port to the 
Mediterranean and home; that she was captured in 1797 on the 
voyage home; and that one half of this cargo belonged to Jona-
than, and therefore half of the insurance ought to be credited to 
him. Now, this very item was not only in controversy before 
the ma ter (as he states), but it was made the subject of a 
special interrogatory in the original bill, and a discovery prayed. 
Thomas Arnold, in his answer, expressly stated, that he had no 
knowledge of any insurance at Malaga; but had been informed, 
that there had been a policy there procured by Captain Proud 
(the ma ter), on the caro-o from Malaga to Genoa only; and as 
that ri k terminat d without lo s, and the ve 1 wa captured 
afterwards on her voyage home, he never received anything on 
that insurance. Here, then, the p titioner was bound to u-·e 
rea onal le diligence, i£ he did not choo e to r ly upon the state-
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mcnt in the defendant's answer, and subsequent examination be-
fore the master. But he never sent to Malaga; and never made
any search for Captain Proud or his papers. Captain Proud is
now dead. There is not now tlie slightest proof, that any money
ever was received from the insurance in Malaga. The petitioner
now calls upon the other party for a discovery, exactly as he did
in the original bill; not because any new fact has come to his
knowledge since the decree; but because he has now discovered
an old letter, unsigned and unfinished, in the handwriting of
Captain Proud (which does not appear ever to. have been sent to
the owners), in which a suggestion is found about insurance made,
or to be made by him, on cocoa (part of the cargo), up the Straits,
and advising the owners to procure insurance on the vessel from
Malaga home. The letter is exceedingly obscure in its terms, and
it is utterly impossible to ascertain what were the precise terms
or nature of the insurance; though I should conjecture from its
language, that it was limited to the cargo from Malaga to Genoa.
If so, it stands completely in harmony with the original answer,
and supports it. But if it were otherwise; what ground is here
laid for a review? The paper, if newly discovered, is not evidence;
and it establishes no receipt of any money by Thomas Arnold on
the insurance, which is the material fact. A bill of review is not
a bill for a discovery ; but a bill founded upon a discovery already
made of evidence material and decisive to the issue.
The next charge is, that in the master's report an allowance
is made for a note of Jonathan Arnold to Minturn & Champlin,
indorsed by Thomas Arnold, and by him paid to Joseph Jenkins,
viz. $834,121^; whereas Minturn & Champlin had received 33
bags of pimento belonging to Jonathan, and had sold the same
for $253, and applied the proceeds towards the discharge of the
same note. It is sufficient to say, that there is no proof to this
effect; nor any newly discovered evidence offered to support the
statement. Xo reason is pretended, why Minturn & Champlin's
accounts were not investigated at the original hearing.
The next charge is, as to the Tennessee Land Company shares,
owned by Jonathan Arnold, the proceeds of which had been re-
ceived by Tliomas Arnold. The whole number owned by Jonathan
was fifteen ; Thomas accounted before the master for nine shares,
as all received by him. The petitioner had the most ample means,
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ment in the de.fendant' an wor, and ub equent examination be-
fore the ma t r. But he nev r ent to Malaga; and never made 
any ear h for Captain Proucl or hi pap r . Captain Proud is 
now dead. There i not now the lighte t proof, that any money 
ever wa receiv d from the in urance in Malaga. The p titioner 
now call upon the other pa·rty for a discovery, exactly as he did 
in the original bill; not becau e any new fact ha come to his 
knowledge since the decree; but becau e he ha now di covered 
an old letter, un igned and unfini hed, in the handwriting of 
Captain Proud (which doe not appear ever to have been ent to 
the owner ) , in which a: ugg stion is found about insurance made, 
or to be made by him, on cocoa (part of the cargo), up the traits, 
and advising the o·wners to procure insurance on the vessel from 
Malaga home. Th letter is ·exceedingly ob cure in it term , and 
it is utterly impo ible to ascertain what were the preci e terms 
or nature of the insura'Il·ce; though I should conjecture from its 
language, that it was limited to the cargo from Malaga to Genoa. 
If so, it stands completely in harmony with the original answer, 
an 1 supports it. But if it were otherwise; what ground i here 
laid for a review? The paper, if newly di covered, is not evidence; 
and it establishes no receipt of any money by Thomas Arnold on 
the insurance, which is the material fact. A bill of review i not 
a bill for a discovery; but a bill founded upon a di covery already 
made oif evidence material and decisive to the i ue. 
The next charge is, that in the master's report an allowance 
is made for a note ·Of J ona:than Arnold to Minturn & Champlin, 
indor ed by Thomas Arnold, and by him paid to Joseph Jenkins, 
viz. $824.12i; whereas Minturn & Champlin had received 32 
bags of pimento belonging to Jonathan, and had sold the same 
for $253, and appli d the proceeds towards the di charge of the 
ame note. It i ufficient to a , tha·t there is no proof to thi 
effect; nor any newly di co ered evidence offered to upport the 
statement. No rea on i pr tended, why 1inturn & ·hamplin'"' 
account were not in e tigat d at the original hearing. 
The next charge i a to the Tennes ee Land ompany har , 
own d by J ona·than Arnold, the proceed of which had been re-
c iv d b Thoma Arnold. The whole numoor owned by Jonathan 
wa :fifteen· Thoma account d before th ma t r for nin hare"' 
a all r c i d b him. Th petitioner had the mo t ampl means., 
b a carch in the prop r public office at Wahington to ha\e 
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ascertained the whole amount received by Thomas on the shares,
if he had used any diligence. The case, therefore, falls precisely
within the doctrine of Lord Eldon in Bingham v. Daivson (3 Jac.
& Walk. 243). But the receipt, now produced from the public
records at Washington, signed by Samuel Dexter, satisfactorily
establishes, that Jonathan had long before sold the six shares, now
in controversy, to Dexter. And that was the very explanation
asserted before the master by Thomas Arnold. There is not a
shadow of proof, that he ever received on these shares any money,
which he has not accounted for.
I pass over the next charge, which respects the £100 note, in-
cluded in the mortgage on the Paget farm. It was disposed of
upon an exception of the plaintiff in the former decree, which is
reported in 3 Mason R. 284, 286. jSTo new evidence on this point
is pretended.
The next item is for an allowance made out of Jonathan's
estate in the master's report of the sum of $4800 and upwards,
due from Jonathan's estate to the estate of Welcome Arnold, and
secured by a mortgage given by Jonathan to Tliomas Arnold, as
administrator of Welcome, and which was allowed him upon his
agreeing to cancel the mortgage, which he has not done, but
refused ever afterwards to do. The mortgage appears to have
been given to Samuel G. Arnold, as attorney of Thomas Arnold
and Patience Arnold, administrators of Welcome Arnold. I agree,
that it was the duty of Thomas Arnold to procure a cancellation
of that mortgage after the credit was allowed, whether he made
an express promise to do so, or not. If he had a right of retainer,
as administrator on both estates, he had a right to the credit
allowed in settling the account. It was not matter of exception,
at that time, that it was done; and it furnishes no ground of
review now. The proper remedy is by an original bill to compel
satisfaction to be entered on the mortgage, and a re-delivery or
cancellation of it. To such a bill the administratrix of Thomas
Arnold might be properly made a party, at least for the purpose
of compelling an application, or re-payment of the sum credited,
if the mortgage deed is not cancelled, and the credit has not been
already made to Welcome's estate. If such a suit should be un-
productive, I do not mean to say, that there might not be circum-
stances, upon which this Court might give leave for a bill of

















































































































































296 BILL OF REVIEW 
a certained the whole amount received by Thomas on the shares, 
if he had u ed any diligence. The ca e, therefore, falls precisely 
within the doctrine of Lord Eldon in Bingham v. Dawson (3 Jae. 
& Walk. 243). But the receipt, now produced from the public 
records at Washington, igned by Samuel Dexter, satisfactorily 
e tabli hes, that Jonathan had long before old the six hares, now 
in controversy, to Dexter. And that wa the very explanation 
a erted before the ma ter by Thomas Arnold. There is not a 
shadow of proof, that he ever received on the e shares any money, 
which he has not accounted for. 
I pass over the next charge, which re pects the £100 note, in-
cluded in the mortgage on the Paget farm. It was disposed of 
upon an exception of the plaintiff in the former decree, which is 
reported in 3 Mason R. 284, 286. No new evidence on this point 
is pretended. 
The next item is for a.n allowance made out of Jonathan's 
e6tate in the ma ter's report of the um of $4800 and upward8, 
due from Jonathan's estate to the e tate of Welcome Arnold, and 
secured by a mortgage given by Jonathan to Thomas Arnold, as 
administrator of Welcome, and which was allowed him upon his 
agreeing to cancel the mortgage, which he has not done, but 
refused ever afterwards to do. The mortgage appears to have 
been given to Samuel G. Arnold, as attorney of Thomas Arnold 
and Patience Arnold, administrators of Welcome Arn-0ld. I agree, 
that it was the duty of Thomas Arnold to procure a cancellation 
of that mortgage after the credit was allowed, whether he made 
an express promi e to do so, or not. If he had a right of retainer, 
a admini trator on both estates, he had a right to the credit 
allowed in ettling the aiccount. It wa not matter of exception, 
at that time, that it wa done; ~n<l it furni hes no ground of 
review now. The proper remedy i by an original bill to compel 
sati faction to be entered on the mortgage, and a re-delivery or 
cancellation of it. To uch a bill the admini tratrix of Thoma 
Arnold might be pmperly made a party, at lea t for the purpo~e 
of compelling an application, or re-paym nt of the um credited, 
if the mortgage deed i not cancelled, and the credit ha not been 
already made to Welcome tate. If uch a uit hould be un-
productive, I do not m an to ay, that there miaht not be cir um-
stance , upon which thi ourt might give leave for a bill of 
review, in order, that the credit might be truck out, if Jonathan's 
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estate was to sustain a real injury, as if possession under the mort-
gage was insisted upon, and held at law under the mortgage. At
present I do no more than say, that the matter now presented
furnishes no such ground.
I have thus gone over all the principal grounds for the bill of
review, supposing them to be before the Court with all due distinct-
ness and particularity, and in a shape regular and tangible. If I.
had more leisure I might comment, somewhat more at large, upon
the principles applicable to this subject. But it being my deliberate
judgment, that the case is not a fit one for a review, I content
myself with ordering, that the petition be dismissed with costs.
The District Judge concurs in this opinion, and therefore let
the petition be accordingly dismissed.
Hin v. Phelps, 101 Fed. Rep. 650. (1900.)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of xA.rkansas.
This is an appeal from an order which dismissed a bill of review
upon demurrer. The bill was filed on April 20, 1898, and sought
a modification of a decree of the court below rendered on December
22, 1897. The material facts it set forth were these : On July 3,
1894, J. M. Phelps and A. C. Phelps made their promissory note
for $5,927.70 on account of a debt which they owed to the ap-
pellants. Afterwards A. C. Phelps made his individual note for
this indebtedness, and induced the appellants, by false representa-
tions, to accept that note in lieu of the joint note. On June 3,
1896, the appellants obtained a judgment against A. C. Phelps
upon this note for $6,881.25, and caused an execution to be issued
thereon, which was returned nulla bona. Meanwhile A. C. Phelps,
for the purpose of defrauding the appellants out of their debt,
made to the appellee Adolph Sloan, as trustee, a deed of trust of
his lands to secure an alleged indebtedness of $10,279.38 to the
appellee the Lawrence County Bank, and alleged debts of $1,000
to each of the appellees F. G. Williams, Mary A. Lester, and J. M.
Cook ; and the bank, for the purpose of defrauding the appellants,
of preventing them from collecting their debt, and of covering up
the land, extended the time of payment of its claim of $10,279.38

















































































































































HILL v. PHELPS 297 
e tate wa to su tain a real injury, a if po e ion under the mort-
gage was insisted upon, and held at law under the mortgage. At 
pre ent I do no more than ay, that the matter now pre ented 
furni he no uch ground. 
hav thu gon over all the principal ground for the bill of 
review, u ppo ing them to b before the ourt with all due di tinct-
ne and particularity, and in a hape regular and tangibl . If 
had more lei ure I might comment, omewhat more at large, upon 
the principles applicable to thi ubject. But it being my deliberate 
judgment, that the ca e is not a fit one for a review, I content 
my elf with ordering, that the petition be di mi ed with co ts. 
The Di trict Judge concurs in this opinion, and therefore let 
the petition be accordingly dismissed. 
Hill v. Phelps, 101 Fed. Rep. 650. (1900.) 
; 
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United State for the 
Ea tern Di trict of Arkan as. 
Thi i an appeal from an order which dismissed a bill of review 
upon demurrer. The bill was filed on April 20, 1898, and sought 
a modification of a decree of the court below rendered on December 
22, 1897. The material facts it set forth were these: On July 3, 
1894, J. M. Phelp and A. C. Phelp made their promis ory note 
for $5,997.70 on account of a debt which they owed to the ap-
pella·nts. Afterwards A. C. Phelps made his individual note for 
thi indebtedne , and induced the appellant , by fal e repre enta-
tion , to accept that note in lieu of the joint note. On June 3, 
1896, the appellants obtained a judgment again t A. C. Phelp 
upon thi note for $6,881.25, and cau ed an execution to be i ued 
thereon, which wa returned nulla bona. Meanwhile A. C. Phelps, 
for the purpo e of d frauding the appellant out of their debt, 
made to th appellee Adolph loan, a tru tee, a deed of tru t of 
hi land to ecur an all g d indebtedne of $10 1 9. to he 
app llee the Lawrence County Bank and alleged debt of 1 000 
to ach of the appellee F. G. William Iary . Le ter and J. :JI. 
oak; and th bank for the purpo e of defrauding the appellants, 
of preventing th m from collectin their debt and of co"erino- up 
the land xtended th time of paym nt of it laim of 1 21 .3 
for five ear . Thereupon the appellant brought uit in th ourt 
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below to reinstate the joint note of A. C. Phelps and J. M.
Phelps in place of the separate note of A. C. Phelps, and to set
aside the trust deed; and on December 22, 1897, a decree was
rendered in that suit to the effect that the joint note should be
substituted for the separate note, and that J. M. Phelps should
pay it. The evidence in that suit indicated that the deed of trust
to secure the Lawrence County Bank was made to hinder and
delay the collection of the appellants' debt, but the court declared
that as J. M. Phelps was amply solvent, and the decree against him
would be sufficient to enable the appellants to recover the debt, it
would not carry the adjudication further than was necessary to
attain the ends of justice, and for this reason it denied any further
relief. The appellants prayed an appeal from this decree, but the
appellees paid off the decree, so that they could not prosecute their
appeal to a hearing. At the time of the execution of the trust
deed, A. C. Phelps owed another debt to the appellants, upon
which they recovered judgment on December 26, 1896, for $58,-
641.41. On June 18, 1897, $40,708.60 was paid on this judgment,
and the balance has not been paid. The appellants allege that they
could not include this latter judgment in their suit without making
their bill multifarious, and that the decree refusing to set aside
the deed of trust in that suit is a conclusive adjudication against
them, and bars a new suit for that purpose upon their second
judgment; and for this reason they pray that the decree of De-
cember 22, 1897, be so modified as to adjudge the trust deed to
Adolph Sloan to have been fraudulent in so far as it undertook
to secure the payment of the debt to the Lawrence County Bank;
that the land described in that deed be sold, and the proceeds
thereof, so far as the interest of the bank is concerned, be applied
to the pa3Tiient of the second debt to the appellants, or, if this relief
cannot be granted, that the decree be so modified as to dismiss
the suit in which it was rendered, without prejudice to the rights
of the appellants to proceed against the bank and Sloan.
Sanborn, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, de-
livered the opinion of the court.
The purpose of a bill of review is to obtain a reversal or modi-
fication of a final decree. There are but three grounds upon which
such a bill can be sustained. They are (1) error of law apparent
on the face of the decree and the pleadings and proceedings upon

















































































































































298 BILL OF REVIEW 
below to reinstate the joint note of A. C. Phelps and J. M. 
Phelps in place of the separate note of A. C. Phelps, and to set 
aside the trust deed; and on December 22, 1897, a decree was 
rendered in that suit to the effect that the joint note should be 
substituted for the separate note, and that J. M. Phelps should 
pay it. The evidence in that suit indicated that the deed of trust 
to secure the Lawrence County Bank was made to hinder and 
delay the collection of the appellants' debt, but the court declareJ 
that as J. M. Phelps was amply solvent, and the decree against him 
would be sufficient to enable the appellants to recover the debt, it 
would not carry the adjudication further than was necessary to 
attain the ends of justice, and for this reason it denied any further 
relief. The appellants prayed an appeal from this decree, but the 
appellees paid off the decree, so that they could not prosecute their 
a:ppeal to a hearing. At the time of the execution of the trust 
deed, A. C. Phelps owed another debt to the appellants, upon 
which they recovered judgment on December 26, 1896, for $58,-
641.41. On June 18, 1897, $40, 708.60 was paid on this judgment, 
and the balance has not been paid. The appellants allege that they 
could not include this latter judgment in their suit without making 
their bill multifarious, and that the decree refusing to set aside 
the deed of trust in that suit is a ·conclusive adjudication against 
them, and bars a new suit for that purpose upon their second 
judgment; and for this reason they pray that the decree of De-
cember 22, 1897, be so modified as to adjudge the trust deed to 
Adolph Sloan to have been fraudulent in so far as it undertook 
to secure the payment of the debt to the Lawrence County Bank; 
that the land described in that deed be sold, and the proceeds 
thereof, so far as the interest of the bank is concerned, be applied 
to the payment of the second debt to the appellants, or, if this relief 
cannot be granted, that the decree be so modified as to dismiss 
the suit in which it was rendered, without prejudice to the rights 
of the appellants to proceed against the bank and Sloan. 
SANBORN, Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, de-
livered the opinion of the court. 
The purpose of a bill of review is to obtain a reversal or modi-
fication of a final decree. There are but three grounds upon which 
such a bill can be sustained. They are ( 1) error of law apparent 
on the face of the decree and the pleadings and proceedings upon 
which it is based, exclusive of the evidence; (2) new matter which 
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has arisen since the decree; and (3) newly-discovered evidence,
which could not have been found and produced, by the use of
reasonable diligence, before the decree was rendered. No departure
has ever been made from the rules applicable to such a bill, which
were declared by Lord Chancellor Bacon, in the first of his ordi-
nances in chancery, in these words:
"No decree shall be reversed, altered, or explained, being once
under the great seal, but upon bill of review. And no bill of review
shall be admitted, except it contain either error in law, appearing
in the body of the decree, without further examination of matters
in fact, or some new matter, which hath arisen in time after the
decree, and not any new proof, which might have been used, when
the decree was made. Nevertheless, upon new proof, that is come
to life after the decree was made, which could not possibly have
been used at the time when the decree passed, a bill of review may
be grounded by the special license of the court, and not otherwise."
Beames, Orders Ch. 1; Story, Eq. PI. § 404; 2 Daniel, PL &
Prac. p. *1575; Kennedy v. Banh, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed.
1209.
The error in law which will maintain a bill of review must con-
sist of the violation of some statutory enactment, or of some recog-
nized or established principle or rule of law or equity, or of the
settled practice of the court. Error in matter of form or in the
propriety of a decree, which is not contrary to any statute, rule
of law, or to the settled practice of the court, is not suflScient to
maintain a suit to review a final decree. Freeman v. Clay, 2 U. S.
App. 254, 267, 2 C. C. A. 587, 593, 52 Fed. 1, 7; Hoffman v.
Pearson, 8 U. S. App. 19, 38, 1 C C. A. 535, 541, 50 Fed. 484, 490.
Eesort cannot be had to the evidence to discover this error of law.
It must be apparent from the pleadings, proceedings, and decree,
without a reference to the evidence, or it will not avail to sustain
a bill of review. Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet. 5, 14, 10 L. Ed. 33 ;
Kennedy v. Banlc, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed. 1209 ; Putnam v.
Day, 22 Wall. 60, G6, 22 L. Ed. 764; Buffington v. Harvey, 95
U. S. 99, 24 L. Ed. 381. The new matter which will authorize a
review of a final decree must have arisen after its rendition. The
newly-discovered evidence which may form the basis of such a
review must be, not only evidence which was not known, but also
such as could not, with reasonable diligence, have been found be-
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has ari en since the decre ; and (3) newly-di covered evidence, 
which could not have b en found and produc d, by th u e of 
rea onable dilig nc , before ihe decree wa r ndered. No d parture 
has ever been mad from the rule applicabl to uch a bill, which 
were declared by Lord Chane llor Bacon, in the fir t of his ordi-
nances in hancery, in these words : 
"No decree hall be reversed, alter d, or explained, being once 
under the great eal, but upon bill of review. And no bill of review 
..,hall be admitted, except it contain either error in law, a1ppearing 
in the body of the decree, without further examination of matters 
in fact, or some new matter, which hath arisen in time after the 
decree, and not any new proof, which might have been used, when 
the decree was made. Nevertheless, upon new proof, that i come 
to life after the decree was made, which could not po ibly have 
been used at the time when the decree passed, a bill of review may 
be grounded by the special license of the court, and not otherwise:'' 
Beames, Orders Ch. 1; Story, Eq. Pl. § 40-±; 2 Daniel, Pl. & 
Prac. p. *1575; Kennedy v. Bank, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed. 
1209. 
The error in law which will maintain a bill of review must con-
sist of the violation of some statutory enactment, or of some recog-
nized or established principle or rule of law or equity, or of the 
'Settled practice of the court. Error in matter of form or in the 
propriety of a decree, which is not contrary to any statute, rule 
of law, or to the settled practice of the court, is not sufficient to 
maintain a suit to review a final decree. Freeman v. Clay, 2 U. S. 
App. 254, 267, 2 C. C. A. 587, 593, 52 F ed. 1, 7; Hoff man v. 
Pearson, 8 U. S. App. 19, 38, 1 C C. A. 535, 541, 50 F ed. 48-±, -±90. 
Resort cannot be had to the evidence to. discover this error of law. 
It must be apparent from the pleadings, proceedings, and decree, 
without a reference to the evidence, or it will not avail to u tain 
a bill of review. Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet. 5 14, 10 L. Ed. 33; 
Kennedy v. Bank, 49 U. S. 586, 609, 12 L. Ed. 1 09; Putnam v. 
Day, 22 Wall. 60, 66, 22 L. Ed. 76-±; Buffington v. Harvey_, 95 
U. S. 99, 2-± L. Ed. 381. The new matter which will authorize a 
r view of a final decree mu t have arisen after it rendition. Tbe 
newly-di covered evidence which may form th ba i of uch a 
review mu t be not op.ly evid nee which wa not known but al~o 
. uch a ould not with r a onable dilig nee ha been found b<:-
fore the decree wa made. ity of Omaha . R edick. . S. 
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App. 204, 211, 11 C. C. A. 1, 6, 63 Fed. 1, 6; Bias v. Merle, 4
Paige, 259, 261; Hetiry v. Insurance Co. (C. C.) 45 Fed. 299,
303; Story, Eq. PL §§ 338a, 423; 1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 363, 364;
1 Hoff. Ch. Prac. 398; Post. Fed. Prac. § 188, note 19.
The sole purpose of the original suit in equity in this case was to
enforce the collection of the claim of the appellants for the $6,881.25
evidenced by their judgment of June 3, 1896. In order to accom-
plish this purpose, they asked that the court would reinstate the
joint indebtedness of J. M. Phelps and A. C. Phelps in the place of
the separate debt of A. C. Phelps, upon which that judgment was
rendered, and that it would set aside the trust deed of the lands of
Phelps to Sloan, which was made to secure the indebtedness of the
Lawrence County Bank. The court granted all the relief necessary
to effect the object of the suit. It substituted the joint debt for the
separate debt, and adjudged that J. M. Phelps should pay it. He
did so, and the entire purpose of that litigation had been served.
The court refused to avoid the trust deed, because J. M. Phelps
was solvent, and because the relief which it granted was ample,
without more, to enforce the collection of the only claim which
appeared in that suit. The bill of review seeks a modification of
this decree on the sole ground that the failure of the court to grant
this unnecessary relief may estop the appellants from avoiding this
trust deed, and thereby enforcing the collection of their second
claim, evidenced by their judgment of December 26, 1896, which
was in existence during the entire pendency of their suit in equity
upon their first claim, but which was neither pleaded, proved, nor
presented to the court in any way in that suit. There may be some
doubt whether or not the decree, as it stands, has the effect to estop
the appellants from avoiding the trust deed, for fraud, in a suit
brought upon their second claim. While such a suit will be between
the same parties and those in privity with the same parties named
in the first suit, it will be upon a different cause of action, and the
decree in the first suit will operate as an estoppel only upon the
points and questions which were actually litigated and determined
in it. Whether or not the fraudulent character of the trust deed,
as against the second claim of the appellants, was actually raised,
litigated, and determined in their suit in equity upon their first
claim, may be the subject of pleading and proof. Board v. 8utliff,
38 C. C. A. 167, 97 Fed. 270, 274; Cromwen v. 8ac Co., 94 U. S.
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App. 204, 211, 11 C. C. A. 1, 6, 63 Fed: 1, 6; Dias v. Merle, 4 
Paige, 259, 261; H en1ry v. Insurance Co. ( C. C.) 45 Fed. 299, 
303; Story, Eq. Pl. §§ 338a, 423; 1 Barb. Ch. Prac. 363, 36-±; 
1 Hoff. Ch. Prac. 398; Fost. Fed. Prac. § 188, note 19. 
The sole purpose of the original suit in equity in this case was to 
enforce the collection of the claim of the appellants for the $6,881.25 
evidenced by their judgment of June 3, 1896. In order to accom-
plish this purpose, they asked that the court would reinstate the 
joint indebtedness of J. M. Phelps and A. C. Phelps in the place of 
the separate debt of A. C. Phelps, upon which that judgment was 
rendered, and that it would et aside the trust deed of the lands of 
Phelp to Sloan, which wa made to secure the indebtedness of the 
Lawrence County Bank. The court granted all the relief necessary 
to effect the object of the suit. It substituted the joint debt for the 
separate debt, and adjudged that J. M. Phelps should pay it. He 
did so, and the entire purpose of that litigation ha.a been served. 
The court refused to avoid the trust deed, because J. M. Phelps 
was solvent, and because the relief which it granted was ample, 
without more, to enforce the collection of the only claim which 
appeared in that suit. The bill of review seeks a; modification of 
this decree on the sole ground that the failure of the court to grant 
this unnecessary relief may estop the appellants from avoiding this 
trust deed, and thereby enforcing the collection of their second 
claim, evidenced by their judgment of December 26, 1896, which 
was in existence during the entire pendency of their suit in equity 
upon their first cla,im, but which was neither pleaded, proved, nor 
presented to the court in any way in that suit. There may be some 
doubt whether or not the decree, as it stands, has the effect to estop 
the appellants from avoiding the trust deed, for fraud, in a suit 
brought upon their second .claim. While such a suit will be between 
the same parties and those in privity with the same parties named 
in the first suit, it will be upon a different cause of action, and the 
decree in the fir t suit will operate as an estoppel only upon the 
point and questions which were actually litigated and determined 
in it. Whether or not the fraudulent charaieter of the trust deed, 
a against the second claim of the appellants, was actually raised, 
litigated, and determined in their suit in equity upon their first 
cla·im, may be the subject of pleading and proof. Board v. Sutliff, 
38 C. C. A. 167, 97 Fed. 270, 274 ; Cromwelll v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 
351, 352, 24 L. Ed. 195; Nesbit v. District, 144 U. S. 610, 618, 
Hill v. Phelps 301
12 Sup. Ct. 746, 36 L. Ed. 562; Board v. Piatt, 49 U. S. App.
216, 223, 25 C. C. A. 87, 91, 79 Fed. 567, 571.
Conceding, however, but not deciding, that the decree in the suit
upon the first claim renders the question whether or not the trust
deed should be avoided for fraud res adjudicata in a subsequent
suit for that purpose on the second claim, no ground for review
or modification of the decree is presented by the allegations of the
bill before us. There was no error in law in that decree. It fol-
lowed the pleadings, and determined all the issues which they
presented. Whether or not it was warranted by the evidence, and
whether or not the evidence authorized other or further relief, are
questions that are not open for consideration here, because the error
that will sustain a bill of review must be apparent upon the plead-
ings, the proceedings, and the decree, without reference to the evi-
dence. There was no error in the failure of the court to grant
more relief than the substitution of the joint debt for the separate
debt, because it granted ample relief to accomplish the purpose
of the suit, and because, in the absence of the evidence, which we
cannot consider, it does not appear that the proofs would have
sustained any other relief. One cannot successfully assail the decree
of a court of chancery, which has procured him all the resulting
benefit he sought, because the court did not make further adjudica-
tions and grant other relief, which were not necessarj^ to the ac-
complishment of the purpose which he disclosed to the court. It
is not error for a court of chancery, which grants sufficient relief
to enable a complainant to reap all the fruits which he seeks by his
litigation, to refuse to exercise all its powers and make other and
unnecessary adjudications. The court granted relief which en-
forced the collection of the only claim which the complainants
presented to it. They have received payment of that claim. They
suffered nothing in that suit from the failure of the court to avoid
the trust deed, because they could have obtained nothing more if
it had done so. Courts of equity do not attempt to right wrongs
at the suit of those who have suffered nothing from them, or to
grant decrees that can give their suitors no relief. Darragh v.
Manufacturing Co., 49 U. S. App. 1, 16, 23 C. C. A. 609, 618, 78
Fed. 7, 16. No error appears in the pleadings, proceedings, or
decree on account of the fact that the latter may have the effect to
estop the appellants from collecting their second claim, by avoiding-
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12 Sup. Ct. 746, 36 L. Ed. 562; Boa1·d v. Platt, 49 U. S. App. 
216, 223, 25 C. C. A. 87, 91, 79 Fed. 567, 571. 
Conceding, however, but not deciding, that the decree in the suit. 
upon the first claim render the question wheth r or not the tru t 
deed hould be avoided for fraud res adjudicata in a sub equent 
uit for that purpo e on the econd claim, no ground for review 
or modification of the decree i presented by the allegations of the 
bill before u . There was no error in law in that decree. It fol-
lowed the pleadings, and determined all the is ue which they 
presented. 'Vhether or not it wa warranted by the evidence, and 
whether or not the evidence authorized other or further relief, are 
question thait ar not open for con ideration here, becau e the error 
that will u tain a bill of review must be apparent upon the plead-
ing , the proceedings, and the decree, without reference to the evi-
dence. There was no error in the failure of the court to grant 
more relief than the sub titution of the joint debt for the eparate 
debt, because it granted ample relief to accompli h the purpo e 
of the suit, and because, in the absence of the evidence, which we 
cannot consider, it does not appear that the proofs would have 
sustained any other relief. One cannot successfully assa·il the decree 
of a court of chancery, which has procured him all the resulting 
benefit he sought, becau e the court did not make further adjudica-
tion and grant other relief, which were not neces ary to the ac-
compli hment of the purpose which he disclosed to the court. It 
is not error for a court of chancery, which grants sufficient relief 
to enable a complainant to reap all the fruit which he seek by his 
litigation, to refuse to exercise all its powers and make other and 
unnecessary adjudications. The court granted relief which en-
forced the collection of the only claim which the complainants 
presented to it. They have received payment of that claim. They 
suffered nothing in that suit from the failure of the court to avoid 
the tru t deed, becau e they could have obtained nothing more jf 
ii. had done o. Court of equity do not attempt to right wrongs 
at the suit of tho e who have u:ffered nothing from them, or to 
grant d cree that can give their uitors no relief. Darragh v. 
Manufacturing Co., 49 U. S. App. 1, 16 23 C. 0. A. 609, 618, 8 
F d. 7, 16. No error appear in the pleadina proce diner~ or 
d cree on account of the fact that the latt r ma3 have the e:ff ct to 
... top th appellan from oll ctino· their econd claim, by a-raiding 
the tru t de d for fraud b cau that claim wa not pl ad d, proved, 
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or presented in the suit upon which the decree is based, and its
existence was unknown to the court when it rendered its decree.
As the question of the effect of its decree upon this second claim
vras not presented to, considered or decided by, the court below
when it entered its decree, it could not have erred upon that ques-
tion. The bill of review discloses no error in law in the decree
which it assails. Nor does the bill disclose any new matter or any
newly-disoovered evidence which will warrant the relief it seeks.
The sole ground for that relief is that the decree of December 22,
1897, estops the appellants from enforcing the collection of their
judgment of December 26, 1896, by an avoidance of the trust deed
for fraud. But the debt upon which that judgment is founded
existed during the entire pendency of the suit in equity upon the
first claim of the appellants, and all the facts which condition the
effect of the decree in that suit upon their second claim were as
well known to the appellants at the time that decree was rendered
as they ever have been since. Mr. Justice Story, at section 423 of
his Equity Pleadings, says:
"If, therefore, the party proceeds to a decree after the discovery
of the facts upon which the new claim is founded, he will not be
permitted afterwards to file a supplemental bill in the nature of
a bill of review, founded on those facts ; for it was his own laches
not to have brought them forward at an earlier stage of the cause."
The decree cannot be modified on account of new matter or
newly-discovered evidence, because the matter set forth in the bill
existed, and the evidence it pleads was known, before the decree was
rendered.
There is another reason why the decree in this case cannot be
reviewed. It is that the appellees have paid, and the appellants
have accepted, the entire debt which the decree was rendered to
enforce. One who accepts the benefits of a verdict, decree, or judg-
ment is thereby estopped from reviewing it, or from escaping from
its burdens. Albright v. Oyster, 19 U. S. App. 651, 9 C. C. A.
173, 60 Fed. 644; Chase v. Driver, 92 Fed. 780, 786, 34 C. C. A.
668, 674; Brigham City v. ToUec Ranch Co. (C. C. A.) 101 Fed.

















































































































































302 BILL OF REVIEW 
or presented in the suit upon which the decree is based, and its 
exi tence was unknown to the court when it rendered its decree. 
A the question of the effect of its decree upon this second claim 
wa not presented to, considered or decided by, the court below 
when it entered its decree, it could not have erred upon that ques-
tion. The bill of review discloses no error in law in the decree 
which it assails. Nor does the bill disclose any new matter or any 
newly-discovered evidence which will warrant the relief it seeh. 
The sole ground for that relief is that the decree of December 22, 
1897, e tops the appellants from enforcing the collection of their 
judgment of December 26, 1896, by an avoidance of the trust deed 
for fraud. But the debt upon which that judgment is founded 
exi .. ted during the entire pendency of the suit in equity upon the 
fir t claim of the a·ppellant , and all the facts which condition the 
effect of the decree in that suit upon their second claim were as 
well known to the appellants at the time that decree was rendered 
as they ever have been since. Mr. Justice Story, at section 423 of 
his Equity Pleadings, says: 
"If, therefore, the party proceeds to a decree after the discovery 
of the facts upon which the new claim is founded, he will not be 
permitted afterwards to file a supplemental bill in the nature of 
a bill of review founded on tho e facts; for it was bis own laches 
not to have brought them forward at an earlier stage of the cause." 
The decree cannot be modified on account of new matter or 
newly-di covered evidence, becau e the matter et forth in the bill 
exi ted, and the evidence it pleads was known, before the decree was 
rendered. 
There is anot:!:ier reason why the decree in thi case cannot be 
reviewed. It i that the appellees have paid, and the appellants 
have accepted, the entire debt which the decree was rendered to 
enforce. One who accept the benefit of a verdict, decree, or judg-
ment is thereby estopped from reviewing it, or from e caping from 
it burdens. Albright v. Oyster~ 19 U. S. App. 651, 9 0. 0. A. 
173, 60 Fed. 644; Chase v. Driver~ 92 Fed. 780, 786, 34 0. 0. A. 
668, 674; Brigham City v. Toltec Ranch Co. ( C. C. A.) 101 Fed. 
85. The decree below is affirmed. 
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Ne Exeat.
Dunham v. Jackson, 1 Paige Cli. (N. Y.) 029. (1829.)
In this cause the bill of the complainant had been dismissed
with costs; and the complainant had suspended the proceedings
to collect the costs by an appeal to the Court of Error.
The Chancellor:
The object of the writ of ne exeat is to obtain equitable bail,
and may be applied for in any stage of the suit. The complainant
intends to leave the state before the appeal can be determined.
The defendant is not obliged to follow her to Florida to obtain
satisfaction of the costs decreed. In Stewart v. Stewart (1 Ball &
Beatty, 73), a ne exeat was granted against a complainant who
was about to leave the country before the decree for costs could be
made effectual against him.
The ne exeat must be granted in this case unless the complainant
gives security to abide the final decree.
Denton v. Denton, 1 Johns. Ch. 36Jt. (1815.)
The petition of the plaintiff stated, that, in January last, she
filed her bill against the defendant, setting forth that she was mar-
ried to the defendant on the 25th of October, 1795, in this state,
and that they were then, and still are, citizens and residents of
this state. That on the 20th of April, 1814, the defendant broke
up housekeeping, though for years before, his annual expenses for
housekeeping were between 4 and 5,000 dollars. That the defend-
ant abandoned the plaintiff without home or support, and had since
treated her with great cruelty and persecution, and denied her all
support: that she had no means of living: that the defendant
was a man of large fortune, and threatened to leave the United
States. And she prayed a writ of ne exeat, and a writ of suppli-
cavit, to restrain the defendant from disturbing her retreat, and
for security, and for money to prosecute the suit, and also for a
weekly or monthly allowance. The bill for a divorce was filed
but no answer was yet put in.

















































































































































DENTO ... v. DENTON 303 
NE EXE.AT. 
Dunham v. J ackson, 1 Paige h. ( . Y.) 6 9. (18 9.) 
IN thi cau e the bill of the complainant had been di mi ed 
with co t ; and the complainant had u p nded the proceedings 
to collect the co t by an app al to the ourt of Error. 
THE OH NCELLOR : 
The object of the writ of ne exeat is to obtain equitable bail, 
and may be a·pplied for in any stage of the uit. The complainant 
intend to leave the state before the appeal can be determined. 
The defendant i not obliged to follow her to Florida to obtain 
.,atisfaction of the co t decreed. In Stewart v. Stewart (1 Ball & 
Beatty, 3), a ne exeat was granted against a complainant who 
was about to leave the country before the decree for costs could be 
made effectual again t him. 
The ne exeat mu t be granted in thi ca e unless the complainant 
gives security to abide the final decree. 
Denton v. Denton, 1 Johns. Ch. 364. (1815.) 
THE petition of the plaintiff tated, that, in January la t, he 
:filed her bill against the defendant, etting forth that she was mar-
ried to the defendant on the 25th of October, 1795, in this state, 
and that they were then, and till are, citizens and re idents 1Jf 
this state. That on the 20th of April, 1814, the defendaint broke 
up hou ekeeping, though for years before, hi annual expen e for 
hou ekeeping were between 4 and 5,000 dollars. That the defend-
ant abandoned the plaintiff without home or support, and had ince 
treated her with great cruelty aud per ecution, and denied her all 
..,upport: that he had no mean of living: that the defendant 
was a man of large fortune, and threatened to leave the United 
States. And he prayed a writ of ne exeat, and a writ of suppli-
cavit, to re train the defendant from di turbing her retreat, and 
for security, and for money to pro ecute the uit and al o for a 
weekly or monthly allowance. The bill for a divorce wa filed, 
but no an wer wa yet put in. 
The fact tated in the petition w re upported b affidavit , 
304 Ne Exeat
from which it also appeared that the defendant was a man of
fortune, and worth above 200,000 dollars.
The Chancellor:
The bill filed in this ca^use states matter properly cognizable in
equity. It is as well for alimony as for other relief. The allow-
ance of a ne exeat, when the husband threatens to leave the state,
and his wife without any support, is essential to justice, and has
been granted in like cases. (2 Atk. 210. Amb. 76. Dickens, 154.)
From what was said in the case of Mix v. Mix, as well as from
the cases now cited, the rule appears to be, that the wife who is
under the necessity of carrying on a suit against her husband, or
of defending one against him, is entitled, as well to a reasonable
allowance to be paid by the husband for the necessary expenses
of the suit, as to an allowance for alimony pending the prosecu-
tion.
I shall, accordingly, allow the ne exeat, and direct security under
it to be taken, in the sum of 25,000 dollars, and shall, also, allow
at the rate of 100 dollars per month, for alimony, and the further
sum of 250 dollars, to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, or
to the register, or assistant register, on her behalf, towards de-
fraying the necessary charges of the suit, on her part.
Porter v. Spencer, 2 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 1G9. (1816.)
The bill, which was for an account and a 7ie exeat, stated that
the plaintiffs were merchant tailors, and had sold clothing to the
defendant on a credit of six months; that on the 1st of January
last, there was a balance of account due to them from the defend-
ant, with interest, of 317 dollars and 85 cents. To recover this
sum, the plaintiffs had brought an action at law against the de-
fendant, and held him to bail; and the defendant had pleaded the
general issue, merely for delay. That the defendant's father was a
special bail, and had, as the plaintiffs were informed, and verily
believed, sold all his property in this state, and was about to remove
permanently from the state. That the defendant was also about
to remove immediately with his father, without leaving any prop-
erty behind.
'^riio h\]\ was sworn to, and was accompanied also with an

















































































































































304 NE EXEAT 
from which it al o appeared that the defendant was a man of 
fortune, and worth above 200,000 dollars. 
TRE CHA CELLOR : 
The bill filed in thi cause states matter properly cognizable in 
equity. It i as well for alimony a for other relief. The allow-
ance of a ne exeat, when the bu band thr aten to leave the state, 
and his wife without any support, is essential to justice, and has 
b en granted in like ca e . (2 Atk. 210. Amb. 76. Dickens, 154.) 
From what was said in the case of Mix v. Mix, as well as from 
the ca es now cited, the rule appears to be, that the wife who is 
under the necessity of carrying on a suit against her husband, or 
of defending one aga1inst him, is entitled, as well to a reasonable 
allowance to be paid by the husband for the necessary expenses 
of the uit, as to an allowance for alimony pending the prosecu-
tion. 
I shall, accordingly, allow the ne exeat, and direct ecurity under 
it to be taken, in the sum of 25,000 dollars, and shall, also, allow 
at the rate of 100 dollars per month, for alimony, and the further 
sum of 250 dollars, to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, or 
to the register, or assistant register, on her behalf, towards de-
fraying the necessary charges of the uit, on her pa:rt. 
Porter v. Spencer, 2 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 169. (1816.) 
THE bill, which was for an account and a; ne exeat, stated that 
th plaintiff were merchant tailors, and had sold clothing to the 
d f ndant on a credit of ix month ; that on the 1st of January 
la t, there wa a balance of account due to them from the defend-
ant, with intere t, of 317 dollars and 85 cent . To recover this 
um, the plaintiff had brought an action at law against the de-
f ntlant, and h ld him to bail; and the d fendant had pleaded the 
gen ral L_ue, merely for delay. That the defendant' father wa a 
pe ·ial hail, and ha 1, a the plaintiffs were informed, aind verily 
b li ved, "old all hi property in thi tate, and wa about to remove 
p rmanently from the . tate. That the d .fenaant wa al o about 
to remove immediat ly with hi father, without leaving any prop-
erty behind. 
Th bill wa worn to, and wa a•ccompani d al with an 
afficlaYit a. to th truth of the material .fa t harO'ed. 
Porter v. Spencer 305
The Chancellor:
Tlie general language of the cases prior to the time of Lord
Elclon is, that the writ of ne exeat is not to be granted, if the
demand be not purely and exclusively equitable. {King v. Smith,
Dickens, 8"3. Brocher v, Hamilton, Dickens, 154. Peartie V. Lisle,
Amb. 75. Anon. 2 Atk. 210. Crosley v. Marriot, Dickens, 609.)
If the demand be actionable at law, and the party can be arrested
and held to bail, there is no necessity for the writ ; and if the case
be not bailable, the granting of the writ would be holding the
party to bail, when the plaintiff was not entitled to bail at law.
The ne exeat has accordingly been refused, when the demand was
in prosecution at law, and not hailahle, though the defendant was
about to remove with his effects. {Crosley y. Marriot, Dick, GOO.
Case of Gardner, 15 Vesey, 444.)
But where a defendant, after a verdict at law, and before judg-
ment, was threatening to go beyond sea, the ne exeat was allowed
in an early case {ex parte BrunJcer, 3 P. Wms. 312), by the master
of the rolls, though Lord Talbot afterwards discharged the writ,
and on the ground, principally, that no bill was filed. He added,
also, "that the writ ought not to be made use of where the demand
is entirely at law, for there the plaintiff has hail, and he ought not
to have double hail, hoth at law and in equity"
The import of this case is, that the rule against the allowance
of the writ, where the matter was of legal cognizance, was not
then understood to be inflexible, but would be made to yield to
cases of necessity, when justice would be defeated without the aid
of the writ. In Athinson v. Leonard (3 Bro. 218), Lord Thurlow
laid down the rule, that if chancery had concurrent jurisdiction,
as in the case of a lost bond, it was sufficient to authorize the
writ, if the demand was an equitable one; and he granted it as
a measure to compel the party to give security to abide the decree ;
and Lord Loughborough only doubted, in Eussel v. Ashy (5 Vesey,
90). whether the ne exeat would lie when the defendant mic^ht be
held to bail at law.
Since the time of Lord Eldon, however, it has become settled
in the English chancery, that though the plaintiff may sue at law
for the balance of an account, and hold the party to bail, yet,
as chancery holds a concurrent jurisdiction upon the head of
account, the plaintiff may have the ne exeat, on a positive affidavit

















































































































































PORTER V. PE ER 305 
Trrn Cn OELLOR : 
Th g n ral language of the ca c prior to the time of Lorcl 
ElJon i that th writ of ne exeat i not to be granted, if the 
d mand be not I ur ly and lu iv 1 qui table. (King v. 1 mith, 
Di ken . Bro h;er v. Jiamillon, i k n , 1 . Pearne v. Lisle, 
Amb. 5. Anon. k. 10. Oro ley . Marriot, icken , 609.) 
I.f i.h demand b a tionabl at law, and the party can be arrc ted 
and h ld to bail, th re i no nee i ty for the writ; and if the ca c 
be not bailable, th aranting of th writ would be holding the 
party to bail when th plaintiff wa not entitled to bail at law. 
'Ih ne exeat ha a ordingly been r fu ed when the demand wa 
in pro ecution at law, and not bailable, though th defendant wa 
about to r mov with hi :ff c . (Crosley v. Marriot, Dick. 609. 
Case of Gardner, 15 Ve ey, 444. ) 
But wh r a d fondant, after a verdict at law, and before judg-
ment, wa thr at ning to go b yond sea, the ne exeat wa allowed 
in an early ca e (ex parte Brunk er, 3 P. Wm . 312), by the ma ter 
of the roll , though Lord Talbot afterward di charged the writ, 
and on the ground, principally, that no bill wa :fi.l d. He added, 
al o, 'that the writ ought not to be made u e of where the demand 
i entirely at law, for there the plaint'iff has bail, and he ought not 
to have double bail, both at law and in equity." 
The import of thi ca e i , that the rule again t the allowance 
of the writ, where the matter wa of legal cognizance, wa not 
then under tood to be inflexible, but would be made to :; ield to 
ca e of n ce ity, when ju tice would be defeat d without the aid 
of th writ. In Atkin on v. Leonard (3 Bro. 21 ) , Lord Thurlow 
laid down th rule, that if hancery had concurrent juri diction, 
a in the ca e of a lo t bond, it w uffici nt to authorize the 
writ if th d mand wa an quitable on · and he granted it aN 
a mea ure to com I 1 the party to gi v curi ty to a bil the d cree ; 
and Lord Loughborouah nly 1 ubt d in Ru el . ... by ~ Y ey 
) . wh th r th ne e. ·eat would Ii wh n the def ndant might be 
hell t bail at law. 
th tim of Lord 1 ldon h w v r it ha become ttle 
1 nali h han er · that thouah th plaintiff may ~ue at law 
alan of an account and hold the I arty to ail 1 t. 
a chan ry holl a on urr nt juri c1i tion up n th h a of 
account th 1 lainti ay haY th 11 e.reat, n a p sifr1 
of a thr at or purpo of g ing abroad ' n thouah h 
ro 
306 Ne Exeat
ant's general residence was abroad. (Jones v. Alephsin, 16 Vesey,
■iTO. 11 Vesey, 54. and 1 Ves. & Beame, 132, 133. Howden V.
Rogers). In Amsinck v. BarUay (8 Vesey, 594), tlie defendant
was arrested at law, and surrendered into custody; he was then
held to bail on ne exeat for the same sum, and afterwards dis-
charged in the suit at law for want of proceeding. The ne exeat
was discharged on the ground that the defendant had first been
arrested at law and kept in custody, and then discharged; and in
Jones V. Sampson (8 Vesey, 593), the chancellor admitted his
authority to grant the writ where the jurisdictions were concurrent ;
but he observed (p. 598), that if the plaintiff was actually arrested
at law, he would not grant the writ.
In the present case, I have some doubts, whether the bill states
a matter of account on which the jurisdiction of the Court can
attach. To sustain a bill for an account, there must be mutual
demands, and not merely payments by way of set-off. A single
matter cannot be the subject of an account. There must be a
series of transactions on one side, and of payments on the other.
{Dinwiddle v. Bailey, 6 Vesey, 136. and Wells v. Cooper, there
cited). I place my interference on the necessity of the case.
From the facts charged and sworn to, it appears to me that the
remedy in the suit pending at law would be absolutely defeated
without the interposition of this Court. The books assume and
admit principles that will justify the allowance of the writ under
the peculiar circumstances of the present case. Tlie remedy sought
is indispensable to prevent a failure of justice, and this creates a
marked difference between this and the ordinary cases. I should
think it would reflect discredit on the administration of justice,
if the plaintiff could find no relief from the impending mischief
arising from a failure of the remedy at law, by the immediate
removal of the defendant and his bail. I have no option or dis-
cretion to refuse the writ, when a case is brought within the
established rules of the Court.
This is not holding a party to bail when he is not entitled to it.
Nor is there double bail, for the first bail is going abroad with all
his effects, and that too in connection with the defendant; and
though I am not free from diffidence, as to the view I have taken
of this caee, T feel myself bound to declare, from the best judg-
ment I can form at present, that a we exeat ought to be granted.

















































































































































306 NE EXEAT 
ant' gen ral re~idence wa abroad. (Jones v. Alephsin, 16 Vesey, 
-1 0. 11 Ve e ·, 5-±. wd 1 Ve . & Beame, 132, 133. How den v. 
Roge1·s). In Amsinck v. Barklay (8 Ve ey, 59-1), the defendant 
was ar:re ted at law, and surrendered into custody; he was then 
held to bail on nei. exeat for the same um, and afterwards dis-
charged in the suit ak law for want of proceeding. The ne exeat 
wa di charged on the ground that the defendant had first been 
arre ted at law and kept in custody, and then di charged; and in 
Jones v. Sampson (8 Vesey, 593), the chancellor admitted his 
authority to grant the writ where the juri dictions were concurrent; 
but he observed (p. 598), that if the plaintiff was actually arrested 
at law, he would not grant the writ. 
In the pre ent case, I have some doubts, whether the bill states 
a matter of account on which the jurisdiction of the Court can 
aittach. To sustain a bill for an account, there mu t be mutual 
demands, and not merely payments by way of set-off. A single 
matter cannot be the subject of an account. There must be a 
eries of transactions on one side, and of payments on the other. 
(Dinwiddie v. Bailey, 6 Vesey, 136. and Wells v. Cooper, there 
cited). I place my interference on the nece ity of the case. 
From the fact charged and sworn to, it appears to me that the 
remedy in the suit pending a.t law would be absolutely defeated 
without the interposition of this Court. The book assume and 
admit principles that will justify the allowance of the writ under 
the peculiar circumstances of the present case. The remedy sought 
is indi pen able to prevent a failure of justice, and this creates a 
marked difference between this and the ordinary cases. I should 
think it would reflect discredit on the admini tration of justice, 
if the plaintiff could find no relief from the impending mischief 
arising from a failure of the remedy at law, by the immediate 
removal of the defendant and his bail. I have no option or dj -
cretion to refu e the writ, when a case is brought within the 
e taibli hed rule of the Court. 
Thi i not holding a party to bail when he i not entitled to it. 
Nor i there double bail, for the first bail is going abroad with all 
hi effects, and that too in conn ction with the defendant; and 
though I am not free from diffidence, a to the view I have tak n 
of thi case, I fe 1 myself bound to declare, from the be t judg-
ment I can form at preoont, that a ne exeat ought to be granted. 
Writ of ne exeat granted in the sum of 500 dollar . 
Kelly v. Eckford 307
Production of Papers.
Kelhj V. Eckford, 5 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) oJfS. (1S36.)
This was an appeal, by the complainants, from an interlocu-
tory order of the vice chancellor of the first circuit, directing
them to deposit certain partnership books and papers with a
master, for the inspection of the defendants, before answer. The
bill was filed by the complainants, as the assignees of J. Beacham,
for an account and settlement of a partnership transaction between
Beacham and H. Eckford, the defendants' testator. The petition,
upon which the order of the vice chancellor was founded, stated
that an inspection of the partnership books and papers, in the
hands or under the control of the complainants, was necessary
to enable the defendants to answer the bill, and to make their
defence with a due regard to the interests of tlie estate of the
decedent.
The Chancellor:
In ordinary cases the defendant is not entitled, by motion, to
call upon the complainant for the production of his books, or other
documentary evidence in his possession, before answer, to enable
such defendant to make his defence. The case of The Princess of
Wales V. The Earl of Liverpool (1 Swans. Eep. 114, 2 Wils. Ch.
Eep. 29, S. C), in which such an order was made by Lord Eldon,
and where he subsequently dismissed the bill because the note
stated in such bill was not produced, has always been considered
as a political decision. The decision of Jones v. Lewis (2 Sim. &
Stu. 242), by Sir John Leach, the only case in which it has been
followed in England, was afterwards reversed by Lord Eldon him-
self. (See 4 Sim. Eep. 324.) And in the recent case of Pen fold
V. Nunn (5 Sim. Eep. 409), where the defendant asked for the
production of documents in the hands of the complainants, to
enable him to answer the bill, Sir Launcelot Shadwell said he
never understood the reason upon which the decision in The Prin-
cess of Wales V. Lord Liverpool proceeded, and that he could not
accede to it; that if the defendant wanted to prove, in the action

















































































































































KELLY v. ECKFORD 3'07 
PROD TIO.i: OF P PER . 
K elly v. E kford~ 5 aige h. ( . } .) 4 . {1836.) 
Trn wa a·n app al, by the complainant , fr m an interlocu-
tory ord r of th ice chancellor o.f th~ fir t ·ircuit, dir cting 
th m to depo it certain artn r hip book and paper with a 
ma ter, for the in p ction o.f the d f ndant , before an w r. The 
bill wa filed by the complainant , a th as ign es of J. Beacham, 
for an account and ettlement of a partner hip tran action between 
Beacham an l . E kford, the d fendant te ta tor. The petition, 
upon which the ord r of the ice chan ellor wa founde , tated 
that an in pe tion of the partner hip book and paper , in the 
hand or und r the control of the complainants, was n eces ary 
to enable the defendant to an wer the bill, and to make their 
defence with a due regard to the inter t of the e tate of the 
decedent. 
THE CHANCELLOR : 
In ordinary ca the defendant i not entitled, by motion, to 
call upon the complainant for the production of hi book , or other 
docum ntary evidence in hi po e ion, before an wer, to enable 
uch defendant to make hi defence. The ca e of The Princess of 
Wales v. The Earl of Liverpool (1 Swans. Rep. 11±, 2 Wil . Oh. 
Rep. 2 9, S. 0.), in which · uch an order was made by Lord Eldon, 
and where he ub quently di mi ed the bill becau e th note 
tatecl in uch bill wa not proclu ha alway been con id red 
a a political deci ion. The d ci ion of Jones v. L ewis (2 im. & 
tu. 2±2), by Sir John L ach the only ca e in which it ha b n 
f llow d in England, was aft rward r v r d by Lord Eldon him-
lf. ( ee ± Sim. R p. 3 ±.) nd in the r cent case of P enfold 
v. Nunn ( 5 Sim. Rep. ±09) wher the def ndant a k d for the 
pr auction of document in th hand of th complainants to 
nable him to an w r th bill ir Launc lot hadw 11 aid he 
11 y r und rstood th rea on upon whi h th le i ion in Tlz e Prin-
e of TI ale . Lord Liverpool proc d d and that h coul not 
a cede to it; that if th ] f n font want d to pr 1c. in th a ti on 
which he had brouO'ht th on id ration ofr n f r th ill of 
308 Production of Papers
exchange whicli he then sought to have delivered up, he ought
to have filed a bill against the plaintiff, for a discovery of the docu-
ments which he then asked to have produced ; that the defendant
was at liberty to call upon the plaintiff to produce the documents,
and if the latter refused to do so, he could not afterwards com-
plain that the answer was insufficient; and that if the defendant
required them for the purposes of his defence in the suit, he ought
to file a cross bill against the plaintiff for a discovery of them.
A similar decision was made by this court, a. few days since, in
the case of Coming v. Heartt. (In Chanc. Dec. 2-^, 1835. See
also Lupton v. Pearsall, 2 John. Ch. Eep. 429 ; Denning v. Smith,
3 Idem, 409 ; Spragg v. Corner, 2 Cox's Cas. 109 ; Hare v. Collins,
Hogan's Eep. 193.)
This principle of requiring the defendant to file a cross bill of
discovery only applies, however, to those cases in which the de-
fendant wants the inspection of the complainant's documentary
evidence to enable liim to put in his answer, or to make out his
defence to the suit. But it is not applicable to the case of part-
nership books and papers in the hands of one of the partners,
or his assignees or representatives, where both parties have an
equal right to the examination and inspection thereof for the
purposes of the suit. In such cases it is the constant and uniform
practice of this court, upon the application of either party, and in
any stage of the suit, to order the adverse party to deposit any
of the partnership books and papers, which belong equally to both,
in the hands of an officer of the court, for the examination and
inspection of the adverse party; and to permit copies thereof to
be taken by the several partners, or their representatives. It was
to a case of this kind that Lord Eldon referred, in the case of
Pickering v. Righy (18 Ves. 484), and in Micllethwait v. Moore,
(3 Meriv. 296), although he does not appear to have expressed
his meaning very clearly in either case, or to have explained the
true principles upon which the production is refused in the case
of the plaintiff's own papers, while it is granted as to the partner-
ship books and papers to which both parties have an equal right.
In a court of law it is a matter of course to compel one party,
who has the possession of a document which belongs equally to
both, to produce the same for the inspection of his adversary,
for the purposes of the suit. (See Reid v. Coleman, 2 Cromp. &

















































































































































30 PRODUCTION OF p APERS 
•xchange which h then ought to have delivered up, he ought 
to have filed a bill again t the plaintiff, for a: di covery of the docu-
ment which he th n a ked to have produced; that the defendant 
wa at liberty to call upon the plaintiff to produce the documents, 
and if the laitter refu ed to do o, he could not afterward com-
plain that the an wer was in ufficient; and that if the defendant 
required them for the purpo es of hi defence in the suit, he ought 
to file a cro bill against the plaintiff for a discovery of them. 
A imilar deci ion was made by thi court, ai few day since, in 
the ca e of orning v. H eartt. (In Chane. Dec. 24, 1835. See 
al o Lupton v. Pearsall, 2 John. ·ch. Rep. 429 ; Denning v. Smith, 
3 Idem, 409; Spragg v. Corner, 2 Cox's Oas. 109; Hare 7. Collins, 
Hogan's Rep. 193.) 
Thi principle of requiring the defendant to file a cro bill of 
di"covery only applie , however, to tho e cases in which the de-
fendant want the in pection of the complainant' documentary 
evidence to enable him to put in his an wer, or to make out his 
d fence to the uit. But it i not applicable to the case of part-
ner hip book and paper in the hand of one of the partner, 
or hi a ignee or representatives, where both partie have an 
equal right to the examination and inspection thereof for the 
purposes of the suit. In such case it i the constant and uniform 
practice of thi court, upon the application of either party, and in 
any stage of the suit, to order the adver e party to depo it any 
of the partnership books and paper , which belong equally to both, 
in the hand of an officer of the court, for the examination and 
in pection of the adverse party; and to permit copie thereof to 
be taken by the everal partner , or their repre entative . It wa 
to a ca e of thi kind thait Lord Eldon ref erred, in the ca e of 
Pickering v. Rigby (1 V . 4 4), and in Miclclethwait v. ]foore, 
(3 :M:eriv. 296), although he doe not app ar to hav xpr ed 
hi meaning very clearly in either ca e, or to have explained the 
true principl upon whi h the production i refu cd in the ca e 
of the plaintiff own pap r , while it i grainted a to th partn r-
hip book and pap rs to which both parti have an equal right. 
n a court of law it i a matt r of our e to compel one part) 
who ha the po ion of a docum nt which belong equally to 
both to produc the aime for th in p ction of hi adv r ar , 
for the purpo o·f the uit. ( Reid v. Coleman, 2 Cramp. & 
Me on 4 T ·rwb. .) 
Leggett v. DcBois 309
There was no evidence before the vice chancellor that the defend-
ants had any books or papers, belonging to the partnership, in
their possession. The order appealed from was therefore right;
and it must be affirmed with costs. If the defendants have in
their custody or power any of the partnership books or papers, the
plaintifl's will be entitled to an inspection thereof, upon an affidavit
that such an inspection is necessary for the purposes of the suit,
on making a proper application to the vice chancellor for such an
order.
Abatement and Revivor.
Leggett v. Dubois, 2 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 211. (1830.)
The bill in this cause was filed to compel the specific perform-
ance of an agreement made by the Eev. J. Sellon, now deceased,
with the complainant, relative to the sale or exchange of a small
piece of land between Beekman and Ann streets in the city of
New- York; of which land it was alleged that Sellon was the real
owner, or the cestui que trust, and that H. Walton was his trustee.
It was further alleged in the complainant's bill that the land in
question was conveyed to the other defendants, or some of them,
after notice of the complainant's rights, and while it was held
adversely by him. An answer having been put in by a part of
the defendants, the cause was at issue as to them. The answer
of Sellon was adjudged insufficient; and he was in contempt for
not answering at the time of his death in March last.
The Chancellor:
The cases intended to be embraced by the 107th section of the
title of the revised statutes which relates particularly to this court
(2 R. S. 184), are those where the right of the deceased party
vests in some or one of the survivors; so that a perfect decree
may be made as to every part of the subject of litigation, without
any alteration of the proceedings, or bringing any now parties
before the court. Such is the case of a suit brought by or against
two or more executors, trustees or joint tenants; where, on the
death of one, the whole right of action or ground of relief survives

















































































































































LEG ETT . B 1 309 
Th re wa no vidence b fore th vice chancellor that the defend-
ant had any book or pap r , l longing to the partner hip, in 
their pos es ion. Th order app aled from wa th r fore right; 
and it mu t be affirm d ith co t . f the d f ndant have in 
their u tody or power any of the partn r hip book or pape , the 
plaintiff will be entitl d to an in pection thereof, upon an affidavit 
that u h an in p ction i nece ary for the purpo e of the uit, 
on making a proper application to the vice chancellor for uch an 
ord r. 
AB TE 1ENT ND R EVIVOR. 
Leggett v. DuboisJ 2 Paige Oh. (N. Y.) 211. (1830.) 
THE bill in thi cau e wa filed to compel the specific perform-
ance of an agreement made by the Rev. J. Sellon, now deceased, 
with the complainant, relative to the sale or exchange of a mall 
piece of land between Beekman and Ann treets in the city of 
New-York; of which la;nd it was alleged that Sellon was the real 
owner, or the cestui que trust, and that H. Walton wa hi tru tee. 
It wa further alleged in the complainant' bill that the land in 
que tion wa conveyed to the other defendant , or ome of them, 
after notice of the complainant' righ , and while it wa" held 
ad er el by him. An an wer having been put in by a part of 
the defendants, th cau e wa at i ue a to them. The an wer 
of Sellon wa adjudg d in ufficient; and he wa in contempt for 
not an w ring at th time of hi death in :Mar h la t . 
T ; H .[.,. ELLOR : 
Th ca e intend d to be embraced by the 10 th ction of the 
titl of the re i ed tatute which relate particularly to thi court 
( R. . 1 ±) ar tho e wher the right of the d c a .. ed party 
ye t in ome or one of the urrirnr · o that a p rf ct decree 
ma, b made a to ever part of the ubject of litio-ation without 
an alt ration of th proce dino- or bringino- any new partie 
b f r th ourt. uch i th ca e of a uit br ucrht by or again t 
t o or more executor tru tee or joint tenan :: · where n the 
dea of one the wbol ricrbt of a tion or gr unc1 of r lief ur ·, 
in fa or of or a ain t th o h r. n u h a' ", th r i in fact 
310 Abatement and Eevivor
no abatement as to the survivors; and upon a proper application
by either party on affidavit, showing the fact of the death, and
that the cause of action has survived, the court will order the suit
to proceed. The 108th section provides for another class of cases,
where some of the parties survive and the rights of the parties
dying do not survive to them, but some other person becomes
vested with the rights and interests, or is subject to the liabilities
of those who are dead. In such cases, the complainants may pro-
ceed without making those persons parties, provided a decree can
be made between the surviving parties without bringing such per-
sons before the court. The decree, in that case, will not effect
those in whom the rights of the deceased parties have become
vested. Under a similar provision in the former statutes of this
state, Chancellor Sanford decided that it was optional with the
surviving complainant to revive the suit or to proceed without
reviving; but that he was not bound to do either; that he might
elect to abandon the suit. (1 Hopk, R. -iSO.) The revised statutes
have provided for such cases; and the surviving defendants may
now revive the suit if the complainants, or those who are entitled
to revive in the first place, neglect to do so within such time as
may be allowed by the court for that purpose. The proceedings to
obtain a revival of the suit, under these provisions of the revised
statutes, must be by petition; and an order for that purpose
cannot be granted on motion founded on affidavit only. The
petition is the substitute for a bill of revivor. But a formal bill
may perhaps be necessary where the representatives of the deceased
party cannot be found, or where they are infants. (7 Jolin. R.
613, per Van ISTess, J.) It is undoubtedly the duty of the com-
plainant to revive, if he wishes to proceed with the suit, and to
have the benefit of the previous proceedings. And where a suit
abates by the death of either of the parties pending an injunction,
the defendant or his representatives may have an order that the
complainant or his representatives revive the suit, within a) reason-
able time, or that the injunction be dissolved. (1 Hen. & Munf.
203. 1 Cox's Ca. 411. 2 id. 50.)
In this case, there has not as yet been any unreasonable delay
on the part of the complainant; but he must, within sixty days,
proceed to revive the suit against the legal representatives of
Sellon, or consent to proceed against the surviving defendants only,

















































































































































310 ABATEMENT AND REVIVOR 
no aba.tement a to the urvivor ; and upon a proper application 
by either part; on affidavit, showing the fact of the death, and 
that the cau e of action has urvived, the court will order the suit 
to proceed. The 108th section provides for another dass of cases, 
wh re some of the parties survive and the rights of the parties 
dying do not survive to them, but some other person becomes 
ve ted with the rights and interests, or i subject to the liabilities 
of tho e who a·re dead. In such cases, the complainants may pro-
ceed without making those per on parties, provided a decree can 
be made between the surviving parties without bringing such per-
son before the court. The decree, in that case, will not effect 
those in whom the rights of the deceased parties have become 
ve ted. Under a similar provi ion in the former tatutes of this 
state, Chancellor Sanford decided that it was optional with the 
surviving complainant to revive the suit or to proceed without 
reviving; but that he was not bound to do either; that he might 
elect to abandon the suit. ( 1 Hopk. R. 450.) The revised statutes 
have provided for such cases; and the surviving defendants may 
now revive the suit if the complainants, or tho e who are entitled 
to revive in the first place, negl ct to do so within such time as 
may be allowed by the court for that purpo e. The proceedings to 
obtain a revival of the suit, under these provisions of the revised 
statutes, must be by petition; and an order for that purpose 
cannot be granted on motion founded on affidaivit only. The 
petition is the substitute for a bill of revivor. But a formal bill 
may perhap be nece sary where the representatives of the deceased 
party cannot be found, or where they are infants. (7 John. R. 
613, per Van Ne s, J.) It is undoubtedly the duty of the com-
plainant to revive, if he wishes to proceed with the suit, and to 
have the benefit orf the previous proceeding . And where a suit 
abates by the death of either of the parlie pending an injunction, 
the defendant or hi representatives may have an order that the 
complainant or hi repr entatives revive the uit, within ai rea on-
able time, or that the injunction be di olved. (1 Hen. & Munf. 
203. 1 Cox's Ca. 411. 2 id. 50.) 
In thi ca e, th r ha not as yet been any unrea onaible delay 
on the part of th complainant; but he mu t, within ixty day , 
proc d to revive the uit again t the 1 gal r re entative of 
ellon, or con ent to proce d again t the surviving defcndaints only, 
or the injun~tion mu t be di solved. 
CHAPTER X.
CROSS BILL, INTEHPLEADEE, PERPETUATE
TESTIMONY, ETC.
Cross Bill.
Lowenstein v. GUdewell, 5 Dillon, 325. (1878.)
Subpoena to Answer Cross-Bill. — Service on Solicitor. — Bill
and Cross-Bill. — Right of Voluntary Dismissal.
The plaintiffs filed their bill to foreclose a deed of trust on
real estate. R. D. Partee and wife, among others, were made
defendants, upon the allegation that they had some interest in the
said mortgaged premises, or some part thereof, as purchasers,
judgment creditors, or otherwise, which interests, if any, have
accrued subsequent and are Junior to complainants' lien, and sub-
ject thereto. Partee and wife answered, alleging they were the
owners in fee of the property by purchase from one Christman,
from whom Parish, the grantor in the deed of trust, derived his
title; that the sale of the premises by Christman to Partee and
wife was made long before the conveyance by Christman to
Parish, and Parish to plaintiffs; that all these parties had full
notice of the purchase by Partee and wife; that a suit for spe-
cific performance of the contract for the sale of the property
was brought by Partee and wife against Christman in the Pu-
laski chancery court, and was pending at and before the convey-
ance of the property by Christman to Parish, and Parish to
plaintiffs, aod that said parties had notice of the pendency of
such suit, and that that court decreed a conveyance of the prop-
erty from Christman to Partee and wife, the title under such
conveyance to relate back to the 20th day of December, 1876.
Partee and wife also filed a cross-bill against the plaintiffs,
setting up the same facts set out in their answer, and praying for
the cancellation of the plaintiffs' deed of trust, and for a decree
against plaintiffs for the rents and profits of the property received
by them between the 23d of January, 1877, and the 27th of
December, 1877, from the trustee in the deed of trust, who was
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RO ILL. 
Lowenstein . Glidewell, 5 Dillon, 3 5. {1878.) 
SUBPOENA to An wer Oro -Bill.- ervice on olicitor.-Bill 
and ro -Bill.-Right of Voluntary Di mis al. 
The plaintiff fil d their bill to foreclo e a deed of tru t on 
real e tate. R. D. Partee and wife, among other , were ma.de 
defendant , upon th allegation that they had ome intere t in the 
aid mortgaged premi , or ome part thereof, a purcha ers, 
judgment reditor , or otherwi e, which intere ts, if any, have 
accru d ub equent and are junior to complainants' lien, and ub-
ject ther to. Parte and wife answered, alleging they were the 
owner in fee of the property by purchase from one Chri tman, 
from whom Pari h, the grantor in the deed of tru t, derived hi 
title; that the ale of the premi es by Ohri tman to Partee and 
wife wa made long before the conveyance by Ohri tman to 
Pari h, and Pari h to plaintiff ; that all th e partie had full 
notice of the purcha e by Partee and wife; that a uit for pe-
cific performance of the contract for the ale of the property 
wa brought by Partee and wife again t hri tman in the Pu-
la ki chancery court, and wa p nding at and before the convey-
ance of th property by Chri tman to Pari h, and Pari h to 
plaintiff , aIDd that aid partie had notice of the pend ncy of 
uch uit, and that that court decreed a conveyance of th prop-
erty from Ohri tman to Partee and wife, th title und r uch 
conveyance to relate back to the 20th day of December 1 6. 
Part and wife aJ o filed a er -bill agai t th plaintiff~ , 
etting up the am fact et out in their answer, and pra ina for 
the cancellation of th plaintiff de d of tru t and for a d cree 
again t laintiff for th r n pr fit ~ of the prop rtv r cefre 
b • th m b tw en th 2 d of anuary 1 an th ~ ,, h of 
, from th tr.1 t in th d d f tru t wh wa .. 
in po e ion a uch und r ai 1 d ed, and ollect the r n f 
311 
312 Cross Bill
the property and paid the same to the plaintiffs for the period
mentioned. The cross-bill was filed February 4th, 1878. No
process has issued thereon, and the defendants, who are plaintiffs
in the original bill, have not entered their appearance thereto.
The plaintiffs in the original bill now move for leave to dismiss
the same. To this motion Partee and wife, who are named among
the defendants in the original bill, and who are plaintiffs in the
cross-bill, object, and tliey also move for a decree pro confesso on
their cross-bill.
Plaintiffs claim the dismissal by them of the original bill oper-
ates to dismiss the cross-bill.
Caldwell, J. :
The plaintiffs in the original bill have the right, as a matter
of course, at any time before decree, to dismiss their bill at their
own costs. (1 Barbour's Chancery Practice, 225, 228; 1 Daniell's
Chancery Practice, 792.)
The cause is not at issue on the original bill — no replication
to the answer having been filed — and the defendants in that bill,
under rule 66, might have obtained an order, as of course, for a
dismissal of the suit for this reason.
The motion of plaintiffs to dismiss their bill is granted, and
the same will be dismissed at their costs.
The motion of plaintiffs in the cross-bill for a decree pro con-
fesso thereon against the defendants therein named is denied.
If the defendants in the cross-bill had been served with process,
or had voluntarily entered their appearance to the cross-bill, the
plaintiffs therein would have been entitled to a decree pro confesso
after the lapse of the time allowed defendants by the rules to
answer.
The bill and cross-bill in equity do not necessarily constitute
one suit, and, according to the established practice in equity, the
service of a subpoena on the defendants in the cross-bill, although
they are parties in the original bill, and in court for all the pur-
poses of the original bill, is necessary to bring them into court
on the cross-bill, unless they voluntarily enter their appearance
thereto, which is the usual practice. And the general chancery
rule is, that service of the subpoena in chancery to answer a cross-
bill cannot be made upon the solicitor of the plaintiff in the

















































































































































312 CROSS BILL 
the property and paid the same to the plaintiffs for the period 
mentioned. The cross-bill was filed February 4th, 1878. No 
process has i ued ther~on, and the defendants, who are plaintiffs 
in the original bill, have not entered their appearance thereto. 
The plaintiffs in the original bill now move for leave to dismiss 
the same. To this motion Pa-rtee and wife, who are named among 
the defendants in the original bill, and who are plaintiffs in the 
cross-bill, object, and they also move for a decree pro confesso on 
their cross-bill. 
Plaintiff claim the dismissal by them of the original bill oper-
ates to dismi s the cross-bill. 
CALDWELL, J. : 
The plaintiffs in the original bill have the right, as a matter 
of course, at any time before decree, to di miss their bill at their 
own costs. (1 Barbour's Chancery Practice, 225, 228; 1 Daniell's 
Chancery Practice, 792.) 
The cause i not at issue on the original bill-no replication 
to the answer ha·ving been filed-and the defendants in that bill, 
under rule 66, might have obtained an order, as of course, for a 
dismissal of the suit for this reason. 
The motion of plaintiffs to· dismiss their bill is granted, and 
the same will be di missed at their costs. 
The motion of plaintiffs in the cross-bill for a decree pro con-
f esso thereon against the defendants therein named is denied. 
If the defendants in the cross-bill had been served with process, 
or had voluntarily entered their appearance to the cross-bill, the 
plaintiffs therein would have been entitled to a decree pro confesso 
after the lap e of the time allowed defendants by the rules to 
answer. 
The bill amd cro s-bill in equity do not necessarily constitute 
one suit, and, according to the establi hed practice in equity, the 
ervice of a 11bpama on the defendant in the cro -bill, although 
they are partie in the original bill, and in court for all the pur-
poses of the original bill, i neces ary to bring them into court 
on the cro -bill, unle they volunta.rily ent r their appearance 
th reto, which i the u ual practice. nd the g neral chancery 
rule i that ervic of the ubpmna in chancery to an wer a cro -
bill cannot be mad upon the solicitor of the plaintiff in the 
original bill. ( 1 Hoffman's Chancery radice, 3 5 5, and note 4.) 
LowENSTEiN V. Glidewell 313
In the chancery practice of the circuit courts of the United
States there are two exceptions to this rule — (1) in case of in-
junctions to stay proceedings at law, and (2) in cross-suits in
equity, where the plaintifl' at law in the first and the plaintiff in
equity in the second case reside beyond the jurisdiction of the
court. In these cases, to prevent a failure of justice, the court
will order service of the subpcena to be made upon the attorney
of the plaintiff in the suit at law in the one case, and upon his
solicitor in the suit in equity in the other. {Eckert v. Bauert, 4
Wash. 370; Ward v. Sebring, lb. -172; Dunn v. Clarh, 8 Pet.
1; and for application of analogous principles to parties to cross-
bills, see Schench v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175.)
It not unfrequently occurs that the facts constituting defend-
ant's defences to an action or judgment at law are of a character
solely cognizable in equity; and in suits in equity it often hap-
pens that the defendant can only avail himself fully and success-
fully of his defence to the action through the medium of a cross-
bill. In suits in these courts the plaintiff is usuall}'^ a citizen of
another state, and hence beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and
in such cases defendants who desire to enjoin proceedings at law,
and defendants in equity cases who desire to defend by means of
a cross-bill, would, but for this rule of practice, be practically
cut off from their defences by reason of their inability to make
service on the plaintiff in the action. It would be in the highest
degree unjust and oppressive to permit a non-resident plaintiff
to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in his favor, and obtain
and retain, as the fruits of that jurisdiction, a judgment or
decree to which he was not in equity entitled, by remaining be-
yond the jurisdiction of the court whose jurisdiction on the very
subject matter, and against the very party, he had himself first
invoked. The reason of the rule would seem to limit it in equity
cases to cross-bills either wholly or partially defensive in their
character, and to deny its application to cross-bills setting up facts
not alleged in the original bill, and which new facts, though they
relate, as they must, to the subject matter of the original bill,
are made the basis for the affirmative relief asked. The cross-bill
in this case is of this latter character, and, without deciding that
this fact alone would preclude the court from directing service of

















































































































































LOWENSTEIN V. GLIDEWELL 313 
In the chancery practice of the circuit courts of the United 
States there ar two xception to thi rule-(1) in ca e of in-
junctions to tay proceeding at law, and ( 2) in er - uit in 
quity, where the plaintiff at law in the first and the plaintiff in 
equity in th econd ca c reside b yond the juri diction of the 
ourt. In the e ca e , to pr nt a failur of ju tice, the court 
will order ervi e of the ubpoona to be mad upon the attorney 
of the plaintiff in the uit at law in the one ca e, and upon hi 
olicitor in the uit in equity in the other. (Eckert v. Bauert, 4 
Wash. 370; Ward v. Sebring, lb. 472 ; Dunn v. Clark, 8 Pet. 
1; and for application of analogou principle to parties to cro -
bill , ee chenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw. 175.) 
It not unfr qu ntly o curs that the facts constituting defend-
ant's defenc to an action or judgment at law are of a character 
solely cognizable in equity; and in uits in equity it often hap-
pens that the defendant can only avail himself fully and succes -
fully of his defence to the action through the medium of a cro -
bill. In suit in the e courts the plaintiff i usually a: citizen of 
another tate, and hence beyond the juri diction of the court, anc1 
in such ca e defendant who desire to enjoin proceeding at law, 
and defendant in equity ca es who desire to defend by mean of 
a cro -bill, would, but for this rule of practice, be practically 
cut off from their defences by reason of their inability to make 
service on the plaintiff in the action. It would be in the high t 
degree unju t and oppressive to permit a non-re ident plaintiff 
to invoke the juri diction of the court in hi favor, and obtain 
and retain, a the fruits of tha:t juri diction, a judgment or 
decree to which he wa not in equity entitled, by remaining be-
yond the juri diction of the court who e juri diction on the very 
ubj ct matt r and again t the very party, he had him elf first 
invoked. The r ea on of the rule would eem to limit it in equity 
ca e to cro -bills either wholly or partiaHy defen ive in their 
character, and to d n its application to cro -bill etting up fa t 
not alleg d in the original bill and which new fact thoucrh they 
relate, a they mu t to the ubj ct maitter of the original bill 
are mad th ba i for the affirmati e reli f a ked. The cro -bill 
in thi a i of thi latt r hara t r and without decidincr that 
thi fa t alon would pr lu 1 th ourt from directin er ic of 
the ubpoona on the olicitor of the plaintiff in e original bill, 
314 Cross Bill
such an order will not be made after plaintiffs have filed their
motion to dismiss their bill — a motion grantable as of course.
Whether the dismissal of the original bill carries with it the
cross-bill depends on the character of the latter. If the cross-
bill sets up matters purely defensive to the original bill and
prays for no affirmative relief, the dismissal of the latter neces-
sarily disposes of the former. But where the cross-bill sets up,
as it may, additional facts not alleged in the original bill, relating
to the subject matter, and prays for affirmative relief against the
plaintiffs in the original bill in the case thus made, the dismissal
of the original bill does not dispose of the cross-bill, but it re-
mains for disposition in the same manner as if it had been filed
as an original bill. (Warrell v. Wade, 17 Iowa, 96; 2 Daniell's
Chancery Practice, 1556.)
The cross-bill in this case is of this character, and it will re-
main on the docket, and the plaintiffs therein can take such action
in relation thereto as they may be advised, but no steps can be
taken in the case until defendants are brought into court.
Ordered accordingly.
Coach V. Jiidge, 97 Mich. 563. (1893.)
Mandamus. Argued October 31, 1893. Granted November 24,
1893.
Eelator applied for mandamus to compel respondent to vacate
an order setting aside a default. The facts are stated in the
opinion.
Hooker, C. J.:
Defendant, having filed an answer in which he claimed the
ri<Tht to affirmative relief as though upon a cross-bill, entered the
default of the complainant for his failure to file an answer to
the new facts set up in defendant's answer upon which the claim
to affirmative relief was asked, a replication in the usual form only
having been filed. This default having been set aside upon motion,
defendant asks a mandamus requiring the circuit judge to vacate
his order, it being contended that the replication is not a suf-
ficient denial of the matter set up in the answer.

















































































































































31± RO BILL 
uch an order will not be made after plaintiff have filed their 
motion to di mis their bill-a motion grantable a of course. 
Whether the di mi sal of the original bill carries with it the 
era -bill dep~nd on the character of the latter. If the era s-
hill et up matt r purely defen ive to the original bill and 
pray for no affirmative relief, the dismis al of the latter nece -
arily di poses of the former. But where the era s-bill sets up, 
a it may, additional fact not alleged in the original bill, relating 
to the subject matter, and pray for affirmative relief again t the 
plaintiff in the original bill in the ca e thu made, the di missal 
of the original bill does not dispose o·f the era s-bill, but it re-
main for dispo ition in the same manner as if it had been filed 
a an original bill. (Warrell v. Wade, 17 Iowa, 9 6; 2 Daniell's 
Chancery Practice, 1556.) 
The era -bill in thi ca e i of this character, and it will re-
main on the docket, and the plaintiffs therein can take such action 
in relation therefo as they may be advi ed, but no teps can he 
taken in the case until defendants are bTOught into court. 
Ordered accordingly. 
Coach v. Judge, 97 Mich. 563. {1893.} 
MANDAMUS. Argued October 31, 1893. Granted November 24, 
1893. 
Rela,tor applied for mandamus to compel respondent to vacate 
an order setting aside a dda ult. The facts are stated in the 
opinion. 
HOOKER, c. J. : 
Defendant, having filed an answer in which he claimed the 
right to affirmative relief as though upon a cro s-bill, entered the 
d fault of the complainant for hi failure to file an an wer to 
th new fact et up in d fendant an wer upon which the claim 
to affirmati e relief wa ked, a replication in the u ual form only 
having been filed. Thi efault having been et a ide upon motion, 
defendant asks a mandamus requiring the circuit judge to vacate 
hi order, it being contended that the replication is not a suf-
fici nt denial of the matt r et up in the an wer. 
thancery Rul o. 123 was inrended to upplant the practice 
Kile v. Goodrum 315
of filing a formal cross-bill by a simpler method. To that end it
was provided that a pereon might have all the benefits of a cross-
bill upon an answer containing the proper averments and prayer.
There is nothing in the rule that deprives the complainant of the
right to answer {IlacMey v. Mack, GO Mich, 591) ; and we think
it may also be said that there is nothing in the rule to deprive
the defendant of the benefit of an answer, the same as though a
cross-bill had been filed. The general replication, while technically
a denial of the truth of the answer, is a formal paper, intended
to complete an issue. But it cannot properly take the place of an
answer. A cross-bill proper may be taken as confessed, in jvhich
case the allegations of such bill are taken as true. 2 Barb. Ch.
Pr. 135. We think the same practice proper in case of an answer
claiming the benefits of a cross-bill. In such case the replication
puts the original case as made by bill and answer at issue, while
those averments which are properly in the answer only as the basis
of a cross-claim, under the rule, must be answered specifically,
according to the usual practice. Complainant's default was there-
fore properly entered, and the order vacating the same, and striking
the papers on which said order pro confesso was based from the
files, should be vacated. A writ of mandamus requiring this will
issue, without costs.
It is not intended hereby to foreclose the right of the com-
plainant to apply for, and the court to grant, an order setting aside
the order pj-o confesso upon a proper showing, if such relief shall
be within the proper discretion of the court.
The other Justices concurred.
Interpleader.
Kile V. Goodrum, 87 III. App. ^62. (1899.)
Mr. Justice Burroughs delivered the opinion of the court.
"We have examined the amended bill of interpleader filed by
appellant in the Circuit Court of Edgar County against appellees,
and find that it properly avers that appellees each claim from
the estate of H. N. Guthrie, deceased, of which appellant is the
administrator, the amount of a cert<iin board bill owino- bv said
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of filing a formal cro -bill by a irnpler m thod. To that end it 
wa pro id cl tba1t a p on might ha e all the b nefits of a cron -
bill upon an an w r ontaining the prop r a _,rments and prayer. 
Th r i nothing in the rule that depriv th complainant of the 
right to an w r (Ilackley . Mack; 60 :Mich. 91); and we think 
it may al o be aid that ther i nothing in the rule to deprive 
th d f ndant of the benefit of an an w r, the ame a though a 
era -bill had b en filed. Th gen ral replication, while technically 
a denial o.f the truth of the an wer, i a formatl. paper, intended 
to ompl te an i ue. But it cannot prop rly take the place of an 
an w r. A cro -bill proper may be tak n a confe d, in _which 
a the all gation of uch bill aire taken a true. 2 Barb. Ch. 
Pr. 13 . e think th ame practice proper in ca e of an an wer 
claiming the benefits of a cro -bill. In uch case the replication 
put the original ca e a made by bill and answer at i ue, while 
tho e averments whi h a'I'e properly in the an wer only a the ba is 
f a cro -claim, under the rule, must be an wered pecifically, 
according to the u ual practice. Complainant' default wa there-
fore properly entered, and the order vacating the ame, and triking 
th papers on which said order pro confesso was based from the 
fil hould be vacated. A writ of mandamus requiring thi will 
i ue, without co ts. 
It i not intended hereby to foreclose the right of the com-
la-inant to apply for and the court to grant, an order ettino- a ide 
the order pro conf e o upon a proper bowing, if uch relief hall 
b within the proper di cretion of the court. 
The other Ju tice concurred. 
INTERPLEADER. 
Kile v. Goodrum, 87 Ill. App. 462. {1899.) 
1R. J STICE BURROUGHS delivered the opinion of the court. 
We ha-ve examin d the amended bill of interpleader fil b 
appellant in the Circuit Court of Edgar Count ao-ain t app llee,.,, 
and find that it properl. ave that appellee each claim from 
th e tat of H. N. uthri d c a ed of which appellant i" th 
a mini trator th amount of a certatin boar bill wino- bv " i 
d c n eel in hi lif tim to on of them but hi h on a pellant 
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does not know ; that each of the appellees are prosecuting a claim
against said estate for said board bill ; and that appellant fears he
may be compelled to pay the same twice, for which reason he asks
the court to compel them to answer his bill of interpleader, and
allow the court to determine to which one he shall pay said board
bill. By his bill appellant offers to bring the amount due from
said estate for said board into court for the benefit of such one
of the appellees as the court shall determine it belongs, and he
disclaims all interest in such board bill, or that he has in any
manner obligated himself to pay the same to one of the appellees
in preference to the other, but that he stands indifferent between
them ; thus filling every requirement of a good bill of interpleader,
as defined by Sec. 1332 in 3 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence:
(1) that the same thing, debt or duty is claimed by both or all
of the parties against whom relief is demanded; (3) all the
adverse title or claim is dependent on or is derived from a common
source; (3) the person asking the relief does not have or claim
any interest in the subject-matter; (4) he stands perfectly indif-
ferent between those claiming the thing, debt, or duty, being in the
position merely of stakeholder. See also Newhall v. Kastens et al,
70 111. 156; Ryan v. Lamson et al., 153 111. 520; Platte Valley
Bank v. Nat. Bank, 155 111. 250; and Morrill v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 183 111. 260.
It was, therefore, error for the court to sustain the demurrer
to appellant's amended bill, for which reason we reverse the decree
appealed from, and will remand the case with directions, to over-
rule the demurrer to the amended bill, and then proceed as to law
and justice appertain. Eeversed and remanded with directions.
Perpetuate Testimony.
Booker v. Booker, 20 Ga. 777. (1856.)
In Equity, in Wilkes Superior Court. Decision by Judge
James Thomas, September Term, 1856.
This was a bill filed by James J. Booker and others to perpetuate
the testimony of one Moses Sutton, an aged man, and of infirm
health, laboring under two diseases, viz: consumption and dys-

















































































































































316 PERPETUATE TESTIMONY 
does n-0t know; that each of the appellees are prosecuting a claim 
against said estate for said board bill; and that appellant fears he 
may be compelled to pay the same twice, for which reason he asks 
the court to compel them to answer hi bill of interpleader, and 
allow the court to determine to which one he hall pay aid board 
bill. By hi bill a1ppellant offers to bring the amount due from 
aid estate for aid board into court for the benefit of such one 
af the appellees a the court shall determine it belongs, and he 
di claims all interest in such board bill, or that he ha in any 
manner obligated himself to pa1y the same to one of the appellees 
in preference to the other, but that he stand indifferent between 
them; thu filling every requirement of a good bill of interpleader, 
as defined by Sec. 1332 in 3 Pomeroy' Equity J uri prudence: 
(1) that the ame thing, deibt or duty i claimed by both or all 
of the partie against whom relief is demanded; ( 2) all the 
a·dverse title or claim is dependent on or i derived from a common 
source ; ( 3) the person asking the relief does not have or claim 
any interest in the subject-matter; ( 4) he stands perfectly indif-
ferent between tho e claiming the thing, debt, or duty, being in the 
po ition merely of takeholder. See also Newhall v. Kastens et al., 
70 Ill. 156; Ryan v. Lamson et al., 153 Ill. 520; Platte Valley 
Bank v. Nat. Bank, 155 Ill. 250; and Morrill v. Manhattan Life 
Ins. Co., 183 Ill. 260. 
It was, therefore, error for the court to ustain the demurrer 
to appellant's amended bill, for which rea on we revere the decree 
appealed from, and will remand the case with directions, to over-
rule the demurreT to the amended bill, and then proceed as to law 
and justice appertain. Reversed a1nd remanded with directions. 
PERPETUATE TESTIMONY. 
Booker v. Booker, 20 Ga. 777. {1856.) 
I 
I EQUITY, in Wilk uperior Court. Deci ion by Judge 
Jame Thoma , S ptember Term, 1 56. 
Thi wa a bill filed by Jame J. Booker and others to perpetuate 
the testimony of one Mo utton, an ag d man, and of infirm 
h alth, laboring under two di ea e , viz: con umption and dys-
p p ia; a to th value of th hire and other things in reference 
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to a certain slave for whicli the complainants intended to bring
suit against the executors of R. Booker; but which suit could not
be brought, because 12 months had not expired since the death of
E. Booker. Tb this bill a demurrer was filed,
1st. Because this was not a case authorizing such a bill.
2d. Because the name of the slave is not given, and the facts
are too loosely stated.
The Court over-ruled the demurrer, and this decision is assigned
as error.
By the Court. — McDonald, J. delivering the opinion.
The bill in this case was filed to perpetuate the testimony of
Moses Sutton. The prayer is, that the testimony may be taken
de hene esse. The complainants allege in their bill that they are
about to file a bill in Equity against the defendants, as the executors
of Richardson Booker, deceased, for an account of a certain slave
and other property held, by the testator in his lifetime, the prop-
erty of the complainants, and the profits and income arising from
the hire and labour of the slave and other property; that the
testator, in his lifetime, and the defendants, his executors, since
his death, have failed to account for the said slave, other property
and profits; that suit has not been instituted, l>ecause twelve
months have not elapsed since the probate of the will; that Moses
Sutton, 70 years old or upwards, of infirm health, afflicted with
consumption and dyspepsia, is the sole witness to a material fact
in the cause to be instituted, to-wit : that the defendant's testator,
in his lifetime, acknowledged his obligation to account to the com-
plainants for the negro and his annual value, and the value of other
property ; and that there is danger of said evidence being lost to
complainants.
The defendants demurred to the bill on two grounds:
1st. That complainants have no right, in Equity, upon the
facts stated in their bill, to proceed to take the testimony of
Moses Sutton, the witness, de hcne esse, there being no allegation
that an action at Law was pending in any Court for and concern-
ing the matters stated in said bill, which must have been the case
to take the testimony de bene esse.
2d. That the charges and allegations of complainants in said

















































































































































BOOKER v. BOOKER 317 
to a certain slave for whi h the complainant intended to brfog 
suit again t the x cutor of . Booker; but which uit could not 
be brought, becau e 1 month had not expired ince the death of 
R. Book r. Tb thi bill a d murr r was filed. 
1 t. Becau e thi was not a ca e authorizing uch a bill. 
2d. Becau the name of the lave is not gi en, and the fact 
are too loo ely tat d. 
Th ourt over-ruled the demurrer, and tbi decision i a igned 
a rror. 
By the Oourt.-l\1c o LD, J. d livering the opinion. 
Tb bill in thi ca e wa filed to perpetuate the testimony of 
Mo e utton. The pra er i , that the t timony may be taken 
de bene es e. The complainant allege in their bill that they are 
about to file a: bill in Equity against the defendant , as the executors 
of Richard on Booker, deceased, for an account of a oertain lave 
and other property held by the testator in hi lifetime, the prop-
rty of the complainant , and the profits and income ari ing from 
the hire amd labour of the slave and other property; that the 
t tator, in his lifetime, and the defendants, his executor , since 
hi d ath, have failed to account for the said lave, other property 
and profits; that suit has not been instituted, becau e twelve 
month have not elapsed since the probaite of the will; that Mo es 
Sutton, 70 years old or upward , of infirm health, afflicted with 
con umption and dyspep ia, is the ole witne to a material fact 
in the cause to be instituted, to-wit: that the defendant's testaitor, 
in his lifetime acknowledged hi obligation to ac ount to the com-
plainants for then gro and hi annual value and the value of other 
propert ; and thait there i danger of aid evidence being lo t to 
complainant . 
Th d fondant d murred to the bill on two ground : 
1 t. That co plainants have no right, in Equity, upon the 
fact tated in th ir bill, t-0 proceed to take the te timony of 
:Mo e Sutton, the witn , de bene esse, there being no all gation 
that an action at Law wa pending in any Court for and concern-
ing th matter ta d in aid bill, which must have been the a e 
to tak th te timony de bene esse. 
2d. T'hat th harg and all o-ation of complainant in aid 
bill, r peeling th ri0 ht th r in pok n of ar 0 n ral and 
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inadequate, and uncertain, that no equitable relief can be granted
respecting tlie same.
Tlie Court below over-ruled the demurrer, and his decision is
excepted to.
[1.] The defendants' Counsel insist that the bill cannot be sup-
ported to take the testimony of the witness de bene esse, because
there is no action pending. Every bill to perpetuate testimony is
a bill to take testimony de bene esse; that is, to take the depositions
of the witness to be allowed at the hearing of the cause pending
or to be instituted, on condition that the witness, for any cause
cannot, be produced for examination ; or that it is just and proper,
under a full consideration of the circumstamces of the case, that
the evidence should be read.
[2.] So, every bill to take testimony de bene esse, is a bill to
perpetuate testimony. It is to take the evidence of a witness who,
for certain specified reasons, might not be able to attend the trial.
The American Editor of Mitford's Chancery Pleading remarks,
that "bills to perpetuate testimony seem divisible into two kinds,
namely: bills to perpetuate testimony specifically, so called; and
bills to take testimony de bene esse." (P. 62, N. (1.)
[3.] It seems, from an order of the Court of Chancery in Eng-
land, in tlie reign of Philip & Miary, that the Chancellors had
placed many restraints on the perpetuation of testimony, but that
the examiners of the said Courts had not, until recently, been
restrained in the examination of witnesses in perpetual memory,
in their offices, whereunto they had been sworn; whereupon, that
order was passed which is, undoubtedly, the foundation of the bills
since used to perpetuate evidence. (See 2 Am. Ed. Gresley's Eq.
Ev. 129.)
By that order, the party who desired to have a witness examined,
was required to frame a bill containing the cause why he would
have the witness examined ; and thereupon, should sue out a writ
for that purpose ordained, and deliver it to the opposite party,
whereby he might have notice to have the same or any other wit-
nesses examined. (Id.) Bills which are now called bills to per-
petuate testimony, and bills to take evidence de bene esse, have this
common origin. In neither case can the evidence taken under this
proceeding be used, if the witness is at the trial or is able to attend,
or his testimony can be had in the usual way.

















































































































































318 PERPETUATE TE TBIONY 
inadequate, and uncertain, that no equitable relief can be granted 
re pecting the ame. 
The ourl below over-rul d th demurr , and hi deci ion is 
excepted to. 
[l.] The defendant ' Coun el insi t that the bill cannot be sup-
ported to take the te timony of the witn de bene esse, becatre 
ther i no action pending. Every bill to perpetuate te timony i~ 
a bill to take te timony de bene esse; that i , to take the depo ition 
of the witnes to be allowed at the hearing of the cause pending 
or to be instituted, on condition that the witnes , for any cau ·e 
cannot, be produced for examination; or that it i ju t and proper, 
under a full con ideration of the circumsta!Ilces of the case, that 
the evidence hould be read. 
[2.] o, every bill to take te timony de bene esse, i a bill to 
perpetuate te timony. It i to take the evidence of a witness who, 
for certain pecified reason , might not be able to attend the trial. 
The American Editor of Mitford' Chancery Pleading remarks, 
that ''bill to perpetuate testimony eem divi ible into two kinds, 
namely: bill to perpetuate te timony specifically, o called; and 
bill to take te timony de bene esse." (P. 62, N. (1.) 
[3.J It eems, from an order of the Court of Chancery in Eng-
land, in the reign of Philip & MJary, that the Chalilcellors had 
placed many re traint on the perpetuation of te timony, but that 
the examiners of the aid Courts had not, until recently, been 
re train d in the examination of witnesses in perpetual memory, 
in their office, whereunto they had been worn; whereupon, that 
order wa pa ed which i , undoubtedly, th foundation of the bills 
ince u ed to perpetuate evidence. ( ee 2 Am. Ed. Gre ley' Eq. 
Ev. 1 9.) 
By that order, the party who d ired to have a witn examined, 
wa required to frame a bill containing the cau e why he would 
ha e the witn ·amin d; and ther upon, hould ue out a writ 
for that purpo ordain d, and deliver it to the oppo ite party, 
whereby he might have notice to have the ame or any other wit-
n examined. (Id.) Bill which are now called bill to per-
p tu te te timony, and bill to take vidence de bene esse, hav thi 
ommon origin. In neither ase , n the evidence tak n under thi 
proceeding b u cd if the witn ~ i at th trial or i able to attend, 
r hi t timony an b ha in th u ual way. 
[ 4. t i a d partur from th ordinary mode of taking evi-
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dence, and the Court of Chancery has been very strict in its
requisitions upon parties who aipply for the extraordinary privilege,
tliat it may be well assured that the exigency of the case demand it.
[5.] The Court will not allow its authority to l)e used to fish
for evidence to sustain a projected law suit; hence, where the
application is to perpetuate testimony in cases where there is no
suit, or one party is impeded by the act of the other, from prose-
cuting a pending suit, the applicant must show that "the facts to
which the testimony of the witnesses proposed to be examined
relates, cannot be immediately investigated in a Court of Law;
or, if they can be so investigated, that the sole right of action
belongs to the other party; or that the other party has interposed
some impediment (as an injunction) to an immediate trial of the
right in the suit at Law; so that before the investigation can take
place, the evidence of a material witness is likely to be lost, by his
death or departure from the country." (Story's Eq, Pleading,
§303.)
[6.] An opinion seems to prevail to some extent, that a bill to
perpetuate testimony will not lie at the instance of a party who
has not possession of the property which is to be the subject of
litigation; and that such proceeding will only be allowed to a
party who is in possession, whose right or title is liable to dis-
turbance at the instance of another whose movements the com-
plainant cannot control. This is a mistake. It is true, that a
complainant who has a right of action for property out of his
possession, cannot sustain a bill to perpetuate testimony before
action brought, because he has it in his power to sue and obtain
the evidence in the usual way.
But the instance stated is not the only one in which testimony
may be perpetuated. In ever}' case in which a complainant has a
vested interest in a matter which is likely to become the subject
of litigation, however small or contingent, and it cannot be investi-
gated in a Court of Law or Equity, either from his inabilit}' from
any legal cause to institute a suit, if he should be the plaintiff;
or having sued, he is impeded by the act of the other party from
prosecuting his suit, and his interest may be endangered if the
evidence in support of it is lost, he may have the testimony of his
witnesses perpetuated. This is the principle to be collected from
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dence, and th Court of hanc ry ha b n ery trict in it 
r qui itions upon parti who · pply for th xtraordinary privilegt-, 
that it may be w 11 a ured that the xig n ' f th ca d mand it. 
[ 5. J h ourt will not allow it authorit to u to :fi h 
for evi cnce to tain a projected law uit; h nee, where the 
application i to p rpetuate te timony in a e wh r th re i no 
u.it, or on party i imp d d by the act of the other fr m prose-
uting a pending u.it, the applicant mu t how that 'the fact to 
which the te timony of th witn propo ed to b xamined 
relat , annot b immediately investigated in a ourt f Law; 
or, if th y can be o inve tigated, that the 010 right of action 
belong to th oth r party ; or that the other party ha interpo ed 
some imp diment (as an injunction) to an immediate trial of the 
right in the u.it at Law; o that before the investigation can take 
pla e he evid nc of a material witne i likely to be lo t, by hi 
d a h or departure from the country." (Story' Eq. Pleading, 
303 .) 
[ . ] n opm10n eem to prevail to ome extent, that a bill to 
perp tuate te timony will not lie at the in tance of a party who 
ha not po e ion of the property which i to be the ubject of 
litigation; and that uch proceeding will only be allowed to n. 
party who i in po ion, whooe right or title i liabl to dis-
turbance at the in tance of another who e movements the com-
plainant cannot control. This i a mi take. It i true, that a 
complainant who has a right of action for property out of hi 
po e ion, cannot ustain a bill to perpetuat t timony b fore 
action brought, becau e he has it in hi power to ue and obtain 
th id nee in the u ual way. 
ut the instance tated i not the only one in which t timony 
may b p rpetuated. n every a e in which a complainant ha a 
t interest in a matt r which i liJ~el to b come the ubject 
of liti ation how ver mall or contingent and it cannot be inve ti-
gat d in a ourt of aw or quity, either from hi inability from 
an legal cau to in titut a uit, if h ould be the plaintiff · 
or having u d h i imped d b the act of th other party from 
pr utin · hi u.it, an 1 hi int r t ma b endang r d if th 
i1 nc in upport f it i lo t he may ha th t "timon of hi 
witnc , p rp tuat 1. T'hi i th I rincipl t b coll t from 
th authori ie , and it i in accordanc with ju tice an 
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sense. (Story's Eq. PL § 301, &c.; Lube's Eq. PL 134; Gres. Eq.
Ev. 130; Smiths Ch. Pr. 484.)
[7.] The bill should state every matter which is necessary to
entitle the complainants to this remedy, to-wit: their interest;
the reason* why suit cannot be instituted ; the subject matter of
the controversy, and the proof they propose to make; the interest
or the duty of the defendants to contest the right or title; the
ground of necessity for perpetuating the evidence.
This bill is full on these points, and we are of opinion that
the prayer merely, that the testimony may be taken de bene esse,
does not divest it of its distinctive character as a bill to perpetuate
testimony given to it by its structure. The bill is amendable, in
this respect, if an amendment was necessary. A bill to perpetuate
testimony may be amended, in England, after the testimony has
been taken under it. (Story's Eq. PL note to § 306.)
Under our liberal Statutes of amendment, it is impossible that
a bill should be dismissed for a mere technical error. The first
ground of demurrer ought to have been over-ruled.
[8.] The second ground of demurrer raises the question of the
sufficiency of the allegations to entitle the complainant to tlie order
he prays for. It is insisted that the allegations of the bill are
insufficient, because the name of the slave is not set forth, for
whom and for whose hire an account is to be asked, and because
the other property is not described. The allegations in regard to
the slave and the hire, are as full as usual in a bill calling a party
to account for the value and hire of slaves, but not so in respect
to the other property. The bill was amendable in that particular,
and an amendment ought to have been ordered by the Court, if he
had considered it defective. The testimony sought for had been
taken; and if it is confined to the slave and the hire, it ought
unquestionably to be received; and if it goes beyond, to other
property, it will depend on the notice which the defendant had,
through the direct interrogatories, of the evidence sought to be
made, so as to enable him to cross-examine the witness in regard
thereto, whether that part of the evidence should be read at the
hearing of the cause. We will not send the case back merely for the



















































































































































320 PERPETUATE TESTIMONY 
en e. (Story' Eq. Pl. § 301, &c.; Lube's Eq. Pl. 134; Gres. Eq. 
Ev. 130; Smith's Ch. Pr. 484.) 
[7.J The bill hould state every matter which is necessary to 
entitle the complainants to this remedy, to-wit: their interest; 
the reason· why suit cannot be instituted; the subject matter of 
the controversy, and the proof they propose to make; the interest 
or the duty of the defendants to contest the right or title; the 
ground o·f necessity for perpetuating the evidence. 
Thi bill i full on these point , and we are of opinion that 
the prayer merely, that the testimony may be taken de bene esse, 
does not divetit it of its di tinctive character as a bill to perpetuate 
te timony given to it by its structure. The bill is amendable, in 
thi re.spect, if an amendment wa necessary. A bill to perpetuate 
testimony may be amended, in England, after the testimony has 
been taken under it. (Story's Eq. Pl. note to § 306.) 
Under our liberal Statutes of amendment, it is impossible that 
a bill should be dismissed for a mere technical error. The first 
ground of demurrer ought to have been over-ruled. 
[8.J The second ground of demurreT raiseti the quetition of the 
sufficiency of the allegations to entitle the ·complainant to the order 
he prays for. It is insisted that the allegations of the bill are 
insufficient, because the name of the slave is not set forth, for 
whom and for whose hire an account is to be asked, and because 
the other property is not described. The allega·tions in regard to 
the lave and the hire, are as full as usual in a bill calling a party 
to account for the value and hire of slaves, but not so in respect 
to the other property. The bill was amendable in that particular, 
and an amendment ought to have been ordered by the Court, if he 
had con idered it defective. The testimony sought for had been 
taken; and if it is confined to the slave and the hire, it ought 
unquc tionably to be received; and if it goes beyond, to other 
property, it will depend on the notice which the d fendant had, 
through the direct interrogatories, of the evidence ought to be 
made, o a to enable him to cro -examine the witn in regard 
thereto, whether that part of the evidence hould be r ad at the 
hearing of th cau e. W will not nd the ca e back merely for the 
purpo e of making an amendment which would be allowed as a 
matter of right. 
J udgm n t affirmed. 
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Examine Witness De Bene Esse.
Ricliter v. Jerome, 25 Fed. Rep. 679. (18S5.)
In Equity. On motion to set aside order pro confesso, and for
leave to answer.
This was a bill to take testimony de bene esse. The bill stated, in
substance, the filing of a bill by the plaintiff, in the Western dis-
trict of this state, against the defendants in this bill, the object of
which was to charge with a lien certain lands l}ang in that district ;
that defendants demurred to this bill for want of equity ; that the
demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed; that the cause is
now pending on appeal in the supreme court of the United States,
and tliat it will not be reached within two years, and if it be
reversed there will be a delay of six months more before evidence
can be taken. The bill further set forth that the testimony of four
witnesses, now living, was necessary to the maintenance of plain-
tiff's case, whose testimony, in the inevitable lapse of time before
it can be taken in the ordinary course of business, is in danger
of being lost; that one of these witnesses was over 65 years old,
another over 70, and both somewhat infirm, and that they were the
only witnesses to the facts which he proposes to prove by them.
The bill further set forth the facts which the plaintiffs expected
to prove by the testimony of each of these witnesses, and showed
the same to be material; that plaintiff had been advised that he
had no remedy for perpetuating the testimony of these witnesses,
according to the general rules and practice of this court, and could
only have relief under a bill of this nature. The prayer was for a
substituted scr\'icc upon the attorneys of the non-resident defend-
ants, and that a commission might issue to take the testimony
of the witnesses named in the bill, to be road, provided the case is
reversed 1)y the supreme court, and remanded for hearing in the
circuit. Annexed to this bill as an exhibit was a copy of the
original bill, filed in the Western district, the purpose of which
was to set aside the judicial sale of a large tract of land as a fraud
upon the plaintiff, and others standing in like situation with him.
Upon the filing of this bill an order was entered that substituted
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1 XAMI E WrTNES D E B ENE SSE. 
Richter v. J erome, 5 Fed. Rep. 6 9. {1 885.) 
IN EQ ITY. On motion to t a ide order pro confesso, and for 
leave to an weT. 
Thi was a bill to take t e timony de bene esse. The bill tated, in 
ub tance, the filing of a bill by tbe plaintiff, in the We tern di -
trict of thi tat , again t thei defendaint in thi bill, the object of 
which was to charge with a li n certain land lying in that di trict; 
that defendant demurr d to thi bill for want of equity ; that the 
demurrer was u tain d, and the bill di mi sed ; thait the cau e i 
now pending on appeal in the upreme court of the United State~, 
and that it will not be r ached within two year , and if it be 
r ver ed there will be a delay of six month more before evidence 
can be taken. The bill further et forlh that the te timony of four 
witnes e, now living was necessary to the maintenance of plain-
tiff~s ca e, whose testimony, in the inevitabl lapse of time before 
it can be taken in the ordinary course of busine s, is in danger 
of being lost; that one of these witnesses was over 65 years old, 
another over 70, and both somewhat infirm, and that the were the 
only witnesse to the facts which he propose to pro e by them. 
The bill further set forth the facts which the plaintiff expected 
to prove by the testimony of each of these witne es, and howed 
the same to be material; that plaintiff had been ad vi ed that he 
had no remedy for perpetuating the t estimon of th e witnes e 
according to the general rules and practice of thi court and could 
only hav reli f under a bill of this nature. Tbe pra er wa for a 
ub tituted ervice upon the attarney of the non-r id t defend-
ant, and that a commi ion might i ue to tak th te~timon 
of th witn e nam d in th bill, to be read, provided the c e is 
rev red by the upr me court and remand d for hearincr in the 
ircuit. nn x d to thi bill a an e hibit w a cop 1 of th 
ori inal bill fil d in the W t rn di tri t th pur .. of -which 
wa to et a id th judicial al of a lall' tra t of land a a fraud 
upon th plaintiff and other tandincr in lik ituation with him. 
Upon the filincr of hi bill an order w ent re that u .. ti.tuted 
crvic to th non-r id nt d f ndant b ma , b nincr the 
!t 
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subpoena upon their solicitors in the main case. This order was
afterwards vacated and set aside as beyond the power of the court,
and the case left to pax3ceed against the defendant Jerome, the
only resident of the state. He afterwards suffered default, and,
upon the eve of signing a decree against him, came in and moved
to set aside the order pro confesso, and for leave to answer, aecom-
panjdng his motion with a copy of the proposed answer.
Brown, J. :
This bill is an anomalous one. So far as we are informed there
is no case to be found in the reports of this country of a bill solely
to perpetuate testimony. To entitle the party to maintain a bill
of tills description the plaintiff must aver: (1) That there is a
suit depending in which the testimony of the witnesses named will
be material. Story, Eq. § 307. (2) That the suit is in such con-
dition that the depositions cannot be taken in the ordinary methods
prescribed by law, and that the aid of the court of equity is neces-
sary to perpetuate the testimony, (3) The facts which the plaintiff
expects to prove by the testimony of the witnesses sought to be
examined, that the court may see that they are material to the
controversy. (4) The necessity for taking the testimony, and the
danger that it may be lost by delay,
A failure to make the proper averment in any of these particulars
is good ground for a demurrer, but we do not understand that as a
rule the allegations of the bill can be put in issue by an answer. In
cases of bills strictly to perpetuate testimony (which will only lie
when no suit has been commenced), the defendant may allege by
way of plea any fact tliat may tend to show that there is no occasion
to perpetuate the testimony; as, for instance, that there exists no
such dispute or controversy as that alleged in the bill, or that
plaintiff has no such interest in it as will justify his application
to perpetuate the testimony. Story, Eq, PI, 306a, But in bills
to take testimony de bene esse there must be a suit depending in
some court, and this of itself is evidence of a controversy between
the parties. In Ellice v. Roupell, Story, Eq, PI, 306^^ note. Sir J.
Romilly stated the rule to be in regard to bills for perpetuating
testimony that defendant, by consenting to answer the plaintiff's
bill, admitted his right to examine witnesses in the case, and that
implies all that is demandable. "For if there is really any lona
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subpcenai upon their solicitors in the main ca e. T'his order was 
afterwards vacated and set aside as beyond the power of the court, 
and the case left to proceed against the defendant Jerome, the 
only resident of the state. He afterwards suffered default, and, 
upon the eve of igning a deoree against him, came in and moved 
to et a ide the ordeT pro confesso, and for leave to answer, accom-
panying his motion with a copy of the proposed answer. 
BROWN, J.: 
This bill is an anomalous one. So far as we are informed there 
is no case to be found in the reports of this country nf a bill solely 
to perpetuate testimony. To entitle the pa,rty to maintain a bill 
of this description the plaiintiff must aver: (1) That there is a 
suit depending in which the testimony of the witnesses named will 
be material. Story, Eq. § 307. (2) T'hat the suit is in uch con-
dition that the derpo itions cannot be taken in the ordinary methods 
pr-escribed by law, and that the aid of the court of equity is neces-
sary to perpetuate the testimony. (3) The facts which the pla,inti:ff 
expects to prove by the testimony of the witnesses sought to be 
examined, that the court may see that they are material to the 
controversy. ( 4) The necessity for taking the testimony, and the 
danger that it may be lost by delay. 
A failure to make the proper averment in any of these particulars 
i good ground for a; demurrer, but we do not under tand that as a 
rule the allegation of the bill can be put in is ue by an answer. In 
ca es of bills strictly to perpetuate testimony (which will only lie 
when no suit has been commenced), the defendant may allege by 
way of plea any fact that may tend to show that there i no occasion 
to perpetuate the testimony; as, for instance, that there eri t no 
such di pute or controversy as that alleged in the bill, or that 
plaintiff has no such interest in it as will ju tify his a,pplication 
to perpetuate the te timony. Story, Eq. Pl. 306a. But in bills 
to take testimony de bene esse there mu t be a uit depending in 
. omc court, and thi of its lf i evidence of a controv rsy between 
the parties. In Ellice v. Roupell, Story, Eq. Pl. 306a, note, Sir J. 
Romilly stated th rule to be in regard to bill for perp tuating 
t . timony that def ndant, by con enting to answer the plaintiffs 
hill admitted hi right to examine witnes e jn the ca e, and that 
implies all that is demandable. "For if there is really any bona 
fide controv y betw n the parti ~ the riO'ht to perpetuate the 
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testimony follows as a matter of course." In a case of the kind
under consideration, where a hearing cannot be had in the supreme
court in less than two or three years, and the witnesses are some
of them old and infirm, it is obvious that the plaintiff ought in
some way or another to be able to secure their testimony against
the contingency of death, absence, or mental alienation. At the
same time resort ought not to be had to the extraordinary power
of a court of equity, if the usual methods of procedure prescribed
by statute are competent to afford relief. The case is no longer
"depending" in the circuit court, and hence is removed from the
operation of the act of congress permitting depositions to be taken
de bene esse. Eev. St. § 8G3. From the time the appeal was per-
fected, the jurisdiction of the circuit court was suspended and so
remains until the cause is remanded from the appellate court.
Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. 273. It has also l)een expressly
held that this act has no application to cases pending in the
supreme court. The Argo, 2 Wlieat. 287.
Acting upon this theory that the deposition could not be taken
upon notice under the statute, it seems tliat plaintiff applied both
to the circuit and to the supreme court for leave to take his testi-
mony by deposition under equity rule 70, but this application was
refused upon the ground that he might proceed to take tlie deposi-
tions in perpetuam rei memoriam under Eev. St. § 866. Ricliter
V. Union Trust Co., 115 U. S. 55; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1162.
This section provides that "in any case where it is necessary, in
order to prevent a failure or delay of justice, any of the courts of
the United States may grant a dedimus potestatem to take deposi-
tions according to common usage; and any circuit court, upon
application to it as a court of equity, may, according to the usages
of chancery, direct depositions to be taken in perpetuam rei me-
moriam, if they relate to any matters that may be cognizable in
any court of the United States." The first clause of tliis section
clearly has no application, since the supreme court has refused a
dedimus potestatem, and the circuit court has no power to grant
one by reason of the supersedeas. We must look, then, to the second
clause, for the power of this court to order these depositions to be
taken in perpetuam, and to "usages of chancery" for the manner
in which such power shall be exercised. Before adverting to this,
however, we are bound to consider whether a remedy is not afforded
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testimony follows a a. matt r of cour e." n a case of the kind 
un ler con idera tion, where a h aring cannot be had in the supreme 
ourl in le than two or thr yea and the wi tne es are ome 
of them old and infirm, it i obviou that the plaintiff ought in 
ome way or another to be able to ecur their te timon aga·in t 
th contingency o·f death, ab ence, or mental ali nation. t the 
am time r ort ought not to be had to the extraordinary power 
of a court of quity, if the u ual method of procedure pr cribcd 
by tatute air competent to afford relief. The ca e i no longer 
"dep nding" in the circuit court, and hence i remo ed from the 
operation of the act of congress permitting depo itions to be taken 
de bene e se. Rev. St. § 863. From the time the appeal wa p r-
f cted, the juri diction of the circuit court wa u pended and o 
r main until the cau e i remanded from the appellate court. 
laughter-hou e Ca e , 10 Wall. 273. It ha al o been xpres ly 
held that thi act has no application to cases pending in the 
supreme court. The Argo, 2 Wheat. 287. 
Acting upon thi theory that the depo ition could not be taken 
upon notice under the tatute, it seems that plaintiff applied both 
to the circuit and to the supreme court for leave to take hi testi-
mon; by deposition under equity rule 70, but this application was 
refu ed upon the ground that he might proceed to take the deposi-
tions in perpetuam rei memoriam under Rev. St. § 866. Richter 
v. Union Trust Co., 115 U. S. 55; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1162. 
This section provides that "in any ca e where it is neces ar , in 
-Order to prevent a failure or delay of justice, any of the courts of 
the United States may grant a dedimus potestatem t-0 take deposi-
tion acco.rding to common u age ; and any circuit court, upon 
application to it a ai court of equity, may, aceording to th u ag ~ 
-0f chancery, direct deposition to be taken in perpetuam rei me-
moriam, if they relate to any matter that may be oognizable in 
any court of the United Stat ." The fir t clau e of thi ection 
dea·rly ha no application, ince the upreme court ha refu ed a 
ded,imus potestatem, and the circuit court ha no power to grant 
one by rea on of he supersedeas. e mu t look th n, to the econd 
clau e, for th power of thi court to ord r the e dep ~ition to be 
tak n in perpetuam, and to "u ag of chancer T for th manner 
in which uch power hall b exerci ed. B for adverting to thi 
however w ar bound to con ider wh ther ai r m d i not a ord 
b 1 ction 6 whi h provide 'that an court of the Unit tat 
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may, in its discretion, admit in evidence in any cause before it any
deposition taken in perpetuam rei memoriam which would be so
admissible in the courts of the state wherein such cause is pending,
according to the laws thereof."
If, then, there be any law of this state under which these deposi-
tions can be taken, and in such manner as to be admissible in the
courts of the state, we think we are bound to presume that the cir-
cuit court for the Western district would exercise its discretion and
receive these depositions, and hence that this bill is unnecessary.
On referring, however, to the various statutes of this state upon
the subject (2 How. St. §§ 6647, 7416, 7433, 7460, 7475, 7476), we
find they all refer to cases pending in some court within the state,
except section 7476, which authorizes "any person who expects to be
a party to a suit to be thereafter commenced in a court of record"
to cause the testimony of any material witness to be taken condi-
tionally and perpetuated. But the difficulty witli this section is
that the plaintiff is not a person who expects to be a party to a suit
to be hereafter commenced, but is already a party to a suit begun
and disposed of by the court in which it was commenced, but which
is liable to be remanded to that court for trial or hearing. Sections
7452 to 7458, prescribing the method of taking depositions to be
used in the courts of other states, have no application, since the
case, as it now stands in the supreme court, is in no condition
for the taking of testimony, and never will be until it is remanded
to the circuit court.
What are, then, the usages according to which depositions may
be taken in perpetuam rei memoriam under section 866 ? We think
an answer to this question must be found in general equity rule 90,
which, in cases where the general equity rules do not apply, requires
the practice of the circuit court to be regulated by the high court of
chancery in England, so far as the same may reasonably be applied
consistently with the local circumstances and conveniences of the
district. In England bills to perpetuate testimony axe not uncom-
mon, though much less frequent now than formerly. Upon the
whole, in view of the great doubt whether there is any statute,
either state or federal, or any established practice under which this
testimony can be taken for use in the circuit court after this case
ehall have been remanded, we have come to the conclusion that the
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ma;, in it di cretion, admit in evidence in any cau e before it any 
depo ition tak n in perpetuam rei memoriam which would be so 
admi ible in the court of the tate wherein uch cau e i pending, 
according to the la·ws thereof." 
If, i:hen, there be any law of thi state under which these deposi-
tion can be taken, and in uch manner as to he admi ible in the 
courts of the state, we think we are bound to presume that the cir-
cuit court for th W tern district would exerci e ii:s discretion and 
receive these depo itions, and hence that this bill i, unnecessairy. 
On referring, however, to the various statutes of thi state upon 
i:he ubject (2 How. St.§§ 6647, 7416, 7433, 7460, 7475, 7476), we 
find they all refer to cases pending in some court within the state, 
except section 7476, which authorizes "any person who expects to be 
a party to a suit to be thereafter commenced in a court of record" 
to cause the testimony of ainy material witness to be taken condi-
tionally and perpetuated. But the difficulty with this section i ~ 
that the plaintiff is not a person who expect to be a party to a suit 
to be hereafter commenced, but is al.ready a party to a suit begun 
a·nd di posed of by the court in which it was commenced, but which 
is liable to be remanded to that court :for trial or hearing. Section 
7452 to 7458, prescribing the method of taking depo itions to be 
used in the courts of oilier states, have no application, since the 
ca e, as it now stands in the supreme court, is in no condition 
for the taking of testimony, and never will be until it is remanded 
to the circuit court. 
What are, then, the usages according to which depositions may 
be taken in perpetuam rei memoriam under section 866? We think 
an an wer to thi question mu t be found in general equity rule 90, 
which, in ca e wher the general equity rules do not apply, require 
th practice of the circuit court to be regulated by the high court of 
chancery in England, o far a the ame may rea onably be applied 
con i t ntly with the local circumstance and conveni nee of the 
di trict. n Englan bill to perpetuat te timony ar not uncom-
mon, though much 1 fr quent now than formerly. Upon the 
whol , in view of the gr at doubt wh th r there i any tatut , 
eiili r tate or f d ral, or any fabli h d practi e under which thi 
t timony an b taken for u in the cir uit court after thi ca e 
hall hav been remand d, we have cmne to the onclu ion that the 
ca e i a proper one for a bill to take the t timony of these wit.-
RiCHTER V. Jerome 3:^5
nesses de bene esse, provided the plaintiff has, by his bill, made a
case in other respects for the interference of a court of equity.
The answer sets up in defense that, before the bill was dismissed,
the case was pending in the circuit court for some 17 months, dur-
ing all of which time this testimony might have been taken de hene
esse under the act of congress. We do not think, however, that the
plaintiff was at fault in this particular. He was not bound to pre-
sume that the circuit court would sustain the demurrer and dismiss
his bill, or to act upon any such supposition. Tlio ordinary course
is not to begin taking proofs until after the case is at issue upon
answer and replication, and we think plaintiff is not chargeable
with laches in pursuing the usual course in that regard, particularly
in view of the fact that the defendant appears to have suffered no
injury by the delay. Defendant also denies, upon information and
belief, that the witness Anthony has such knowledge of the facts
or will give such testimony as plaintiff professes to expect, and
avers that his only object is "to fish something out of him which
will have a tendency to establish his case." We do not think this
allegation of the bill can be traversed in this way. We have the
right to infer that plaintiff would not seek to examine a witness
unless he expected to obtain something material to his case, and
we are not at liberty to inquire in this proceeding whether his
testimony is likely to be favorable to him or not. If the original
case were in a condition to permit the testimony to be taken, the
plaintiff would have the right to do exactly what defendant charges
him with wishing to do, viz., to probe the knowledge and conscience
of these witnesses — to ascertain the exact facts which he alleges
constitute a fraud upon his rights. We think that all doubts with
regard to the materiality^ of his testimony should be construed in
favor of the plaintiff.
The allegations of the answer, that the testimony of the other
witnesses is not material, and that they are not the only witnesses
by whom the facts can be shown, are open to the same objection.
The court cannot properly pass upon these questions until the
testimony is given, when the court in which the depositions are
read will determine how far they are maiterial to the plaintiffs
case. Still less are we at liberty to inquire into the exact age, or
mental or physical infirmities, of these witnessee. It is true the
allegations with respect to these are necessary to be made in the
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n de bene e e, provid d th plaintiff has, by his bill, made a 
ai c in other r p ts for th int rier nee of a court of equity. 
The an wer t up in def n that, before the bill wa di mi sed, 
th case wa p nding in th circuit court for ome 17 month , dur-
ing all of whi h tim thi t timony might hav b n taken de bene 
e se und r th act of ongre . e do not think, how v r, that the 
plaintiff wa at fault in thi particular. He wa n t bound to pre-
~ ume that th circuit court would u tain the d murr r and di mi 
hi bill, or to act upon any u h uppo ition. The ordinary cour e 
i not to begin taking proofs until aft if the case i at i ue upon 
an wer and repli ation, and we think plaintiff i not chargeable 
with lach in pursuing the u ual cour e in that regard, particularly 
in view of the fact that th def ndant appears to have uffered no 
injury by the delay. Defendant also denie , upon information and 
belief, that the witness Anthony has such knowledge of the :fact 
or will give uch testimony as plaintiff prof e to exp ct, aind 
avers that his only object is "to fish something out of him which 
will have a tendency to 86tablish his ca e." We do not think thi 
allegation of the bill can be traversed in this way. We have the 
right to infer that plaintiff would not seek to examine a witne 
unless he expected to oibtain oimething material to hi ca e, and 
we are not at liberty to inquire in this proceeding whether hi. 
t timony i likely to be favorable to him or not. If the original 
a e were in a condition to permit the testimony to be taken, the 
plaintiff would ha:ve the right to do exactly what defendant charges 
him with wi hing to do, viz., to probe the knowledg and con cience 
of th e witne ffi-to ascertain the exact facts which he allege 
con titute a fraud upon hi& right . We think that all doubt with 
regard to the materiality of hi testimony hould be con trued in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
he a· 1 gation of the an wer, that tl:ie testimony of th o ih r 
witn i not mat rial and that they are not the onl witne 
b whom the fa ts can be hown, are open to the ame obj ctio . 
Th court cannot properl pa ~ upon thooe qu ~tion until the 
t imon i fri h th ourt in which th d po iti n are 
r ad will deter ·n how far th are m t rial to th plainti 
till le e at lib rt to i quir int the exact a a or 
infirmitie , of the ·tne~ t i tru th 
all aation with r pect to th ar ne e ar to ma in the 
bill a a ba i for taking th t :timony but w 1 not uncl rstan 
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them to be traversable to any greater extent than are like aver-
ments in an affidavit to take deposition de bene esse under the act
of congress. If an issue could be made upon these facts, and
testimon}^ taken, more time might be consumed than would be
necessary to take the depositions, and the whole object of the bill
thus be defeated. This object is to obtain a summary examination
of the witnesses, that their testimony may be perpetuated; and,
as before observed, we doubt whether any of the matters of fact
contained in the bill can be put in issue, except, perhaps, with
regard to the existence of the controversy. ISTor can we review
the opinion of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the original
bill, unless, at least, it appears that this bill was so clearly frivolous
that it ought never to have been filed, or plaintiff could have no
reason to expect that his suit could be successful.
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them w ·be traver able to any greater extent than are like aver-
ment in an affidavit to take depo ition de bene esse under the act 
of congre . If an i ue could be made upon these facts, and 
te timony taken, more time might be con urned than would be 
n c ary to take the depo itions, and the whole object of the bill 
thu be defeated. Thi object i to obtain a ·ummary examination 
of the witn es, that their testimony m:xy be perpetuate~; and, 
a before ob erved, we doubt whether any of the matters of fact 
ontained in the bill can be put in is ue, except, perhaps, with 
r gard to the exi tence of the controversy. Nor can we review 
the opinion of the court in ustaining the demurrer to the original 
bill, unles , at least, it appeaTS that this bill wa so clearly frivolous 
that it ought never to have been filed, or plaintiff could have no 
rea on to expect that hi uit could be succe ful. 
We think plaintiff is entitled to a decree for an examination of 
hi.. witnesses. 
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